Showing posts with label academic economics. Show all posts
Showing posts with label academic economics. Show all posts

Saturday, April 27, 2024

No Prices No Games! Four Economic Models by Michael Richter and Ariel Rubinstein

 Here's a new book on economic theory by Richter and Rubinstein.

No Prices No Games!  Four Economic Models  by Michael Richter and Ariel Rubinstein  

At the link you can download a pdf or read it online for free, or purchase a printed edition.

"While current economic theory focuses on prices and games, this book models economic settings where harmony is established through one of the following societal conventions:

• A power relation according to which stronger agents are able to force weaker ones to do things against their will.

• A norm that categorizes actions as permissible or forbidden.

• A status relation over alternatives which limits each agent's choices.

• Systematic biases in agents' preferences.

"These four conventions are analysed using simple and mathematically straightforward models, without any pretensions regarding direct applied usefulness. While we do not advocate for the adoption of any of these conventions specifically – we do advocate that when modelling an economic situation, alternative equilibrium notions should be considered, rather than automatically reaching for the familiar approaches of prices or games."



By email, Ariel tells me that he designed the cover.

Contents

0. Introduction

(pp. 1–12)
  • Michael Richter
  • Ariel Rubinstein
  • Michael Richter
  • Ariel Rubinstein
  • Michael Richter
  • Ariel Rubinstein
  • Michael Richter
  • Ariel Rubinstein
  • Michael Richter
  • Ariel Rubinstein
  • Michael Richter
  • Ariel Rubinstein




"In the final chapter, we compare this book's modeling approaches with each other and to those of standard Game Theory on two ``battlegrounds''.
The first is the matching economy. An even-sized population of agents must match into exclusive pairs (pairings). Each agent possesses a preference relation over potential mates.
The standard cooperative game theory solution concept for matching economies is ``pairwise stability''. Following Richter and Rubinstein (2024), we compare this concept with the jungle equilibrium, the Y-equilibrium and the status and initial status equilibrium concepts.
The second battleground is a ``political economy'' situation. A group of agents hold views on a political issue. Each agent chooses a position and has preferences only regarding the position he himself chooses (and not the choices of others). However, there is a need that a majority of agents choose the same position.
Traditionally, such a situation is modeled as a non-cooperative game and its Nash equilibria are calculated. Extending Richter and Rubinstein (2021), we compare this approach with the convex Y-equilibrium and the biased preferences equilibria.
On both battlegrounds, the new approaches lead to very different outcomes than the traditional ones."

Wednesday, April 24, 2024

New members of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences

 Each year, new members are elected to  join Benjamin Franklin in the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.

Here is the announcement of the New Academy Members Elected in 2024

Congratulations to all!

Here are the new Economists:

Section 2 – Economics

  1. Pol AntrĂ s,  Harvard University
  2. Nathaniel Hendren,  Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  3. Erik Hurst,  University of Chicago Booth School of Business; University of Chicago
  4. Anna Mikusheva,  Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  5. Serena Ng,  Columbia University; National Bureau of Economic Research
  6. Muriel Niederle,  Stanford University
  7. Amir Sufi,  University of Chicago Booth School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research

Sunday, April 21, 2024

The Curious Culture of Economic Theory by Ran Spiegler

 Ran Spiegler has new book about the academic culture of the theory part of the Economics profession.  It's open source, so you can sample it online.

The Curious Culture of Economic Theory   by Ran Spiegler

The MIT Press, 2024
ISBN electronic:
 
9780262379038

Here's what it says on the website:

"An essay collection that insightfully explores the professional culture of contemporary economic theory, highlighting key features of successful economic theory from the last quarter century.

"When is a theoretical result taken seriously enough for economic application? How do theorists actively try to influence this judgment? What determines whether a new theoretical subfield adopts a “pure” or an “applied” style? How do theorists respond to economists' penchant for “rational” explanations of human behavior? These are just some of the questions regarding the professional culture of contemporary economic theory that Ran Spiegler attempts to answer in this incisive essay collection, The Curious Culture of Economic Theory. In exploring these questions, Spiegler addresses the norms that economic theorists apply as they produce, evaluate, and disseminate research.

"Introducing a new genre—a kind of cultural criticism of economic theory—the essays in this unique collection highlight elements of style and rhetoric that characterize classic pieces of economic theory from the last quarter century. For each piece, Spiegler offers a precise yet accessible exposition of modern classics of economic theory while placing them in the broader context of the field's professional culture. Affectionate in its criticism and anthropological in its approach, The Curious Culture of Economic Theory is as valuable a complement to standard textbooks in graduate-level economic theory, game theory, and behavioral economics as it is to the libraries of practicing economic theorists, academic economists, historians of economic thought, and philosophers of economics."

I first sampled Chapter 8, whose first sentence is given below:

Chapter 8: From Competitive Equilibrium to Mechanism Design in Eighteen Months 

"If I had to name one major shift in the sensibilities of economic theorists in the past half century, a prime candidate would be the way we conceptualize markets—from quasi-natural phenomena admired from afar to manmade institutions whose design can be tweaked by economist-engineers."

Thursday, April 18, 2024

Top Trading Cycles (TTC) and the 50th anniversary of the Journal of Mathematical Economics

 This year marks the 50th anniversary of the Journal of Mathematical Economics, and also of the Top Trading Cycles (TTC) algorithm that was introduced in Volume 1, number 1 of the journal, in the paper by

Shapley, Lloyd, and Herbert Scarf. "On cores and indivisibility." Journal of mathematical economics 1, no. 1 (1974): 23-37. 

TTC was further analyzed in 

Roth, Alvin E., and Andrew Postlewaite. "Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods." Journal of Mathematical Economics 4, no. 2 (1977): 131-137.

Now the JME is assembling a 50th anniversary collection of papers surveying some of the resulting literatures, with some papers posted online ahead of publication. Here's what they had as of yesterday, including an article on Top Trading Cycles, by Morrill and Roth, and one on Housing markets since Shapley and Scarf, by Afacan, Hu, and Li:

JME’s 50th Anniversary Literature  Edited by Andres Carvajal and Felix KĂ¼bler

  1. Top trading cycles

    In Press, Journal Pre-proof, Available online 16 April 2024
    Article 102984
    View PDF
  2. Bubble economics

    April 2024
    Article 102944
    View PDF
  3. Stable outcomes in simple cooperative games

    April 2024
    Article 102960
    View PDF
  4. Fifty years of mathematical growth theory: Classical topics and new trends

    April 2024
    Article 102966
    View PDF
  5. Housing markets since Shapley and Scarf

    April 2024
    Article 102967
    View PDF

##########

At least one of the papers in the (virtual) special issue is already published, I gather that some will be in the June issue:

Monday, March 4, 2024