Effects of removing some financial dis-incentives to kidney donation through the National Living Donor Assistance Center (NLDAC)

Here's a recent paper looking at NLDAC. (I'm on their advisory board.)
It might help make the case for yesterday's proposed legislation...

Clinical Transplantation

 Volume 32, Issue 7

ORIGINAL ARTICLE

Full Access

Return on investment for financial assistance for living kidney donors in the United States

Amit K. Mathur 

Jiawei Xing 

David M. Dickinson 

Patricia H. Warren 

Kimberly A. Gifford 

Barry A. Hong 

Akinlolu Ojo 

Robert M. Merion

First published: 08 May 2018

https://doi.org/10.1111/ctr.13277

Abstract

Background

The National Living Donor Assistance Center (NLDAC) enables living donor kidney transplants through financial assistance of living donors, but its return on investment (ROI) through savings on dialysis costs remains unknown.

Methods

We retrospectively reviewed 2012‐2015 data from NLDAC, the United States Renal Data System, and the Scientific Registry of Transplant Recipients to construct 1‐, 3‐, and 5‐year ROI models based on NLDAC applications and national dialysis and transplant cost data. ROI was defined as state‐specific federal dialysis cost minus (NLDAC program costs plus state‐specific transplant cost), adjusted for median waiting time (WT).

Results

A total of 2425 NLDAC applications were approved, and NLDAC costs were USD $6.76 million. Median donor age was 41 years, 66.1% were female, and median income was $33 759; 43.6% were evaluated at centers with WT >72 months. Median dialysis cost/patient‐year was $81 485 (IQR $74 489‐$89 802). Median kidney transplant cost/patient‐year was $30 101 (IQR $26 832‐$33 916). Overall, ROI varied from 5.1‐fold (1‐year) to 28.2‐fold (5‐year), resulting in $256 million in savings. Higher ROI was significantly associated with high WT, larger dialysis and transplant costs differences, and more NLDAC applicants completing the donation process.

Conclusions

Financial support for donor out‐of‐pocket expenses produces dramatic federal savings through incremental living donor kidney transplants.

Proposed new legislation: Organ Donor Clarification Act

Here's an Act that would encourage evidence-based policy towards reducing the dis-incentives to donate a kidney or part of a liver for transplantation.  (Evidence is not so popular these days, and compensation for donors is a red flag, so I expect it may yet meet with opposition, as did a differently composed previous attempt in 2016 .  So far I can't find the current version online--it looks like it will eventually be here-- but the offline version I've seen looks like something I will support:)

CARTWRIGHT ANNOUNCES LEGISLATION TO INCREASE ORGAN DONATION

Jul 19, 2018 

Press Release

Effort Comes Amidst Shortage, Resulting in Thousands of Preventable Deaths Every Year

Washington, DC – Addressing our nation’s dire organ transplant shortage U.S. Representative Matt Cartwright (D-PA) introduced the Organ Donor Clarification Act on July 19th.There are 115,000 people on the organ transplant waiting list and 20 people die every day as they wait for an organ. This bipartisan legislation will remove existing hurdles for donation and test out new ways to increase donations.

“This is life and death; 20 people die every day because they could not survive the wait for a viable organ,” Rep. Cartwright said.  “Kidney waiting lists in major cities can last from five to ten years, which is often longer than a patient can survive on dialysis.”

The number of people in the United States with kidney failure has increased by nearly 20% since 2000 and there are currently over 95,000 Americans on the national waitlist for a kidney. Each year 17,000 patients receive a kidney transplant, while about 35,000 new patients are added to the kidney waiting list. As many as 80,000 additional patients may be good candidates for kidney transplant, but have never even been listed. 

This legislation removes existing barriers that donors face under current law and allows for a pilot program to test the effectiveness of non-cash incentives to increase the supply of organs for transplantation.

Currently, organ transplantation is governed by the National Organ Transplant Act (NOTA) of 1984.  This law prohibits buying or selling organs for “valuable consideration.” 

“Confusion about what constitutes valuable consideration hampers donation by scaring people away from reimbursing organ donors for things like medical expenses and lost wages,” said Rep. Cartwright.  “Reimbursements are legal under NOTA, but the law’s lack of clarity and criminal penalties have created uncertainty that has prevented or delayed reimbursements in many cases. Additionally, this bill will allow experts and scientists to run pilot programs – subject to ethical review and government oversight – to test the effect of non-cash incentives in reducing the organ transplant waiting list.”

The expanding kidney wait list has also become a burden on our nation’s finances, as costs for dialysis and other intermediary treatments become more expensive each year. The taxpayer ends up footing the bill through Medicare and other social service programs. Experts project that eliminating the waiting list would save taxpayers well in excess of $5.5 billion per year in medical costs and billions of dollars more in savings to other social programs.

The Organ Donor Clarification Act would:

• Clarify that certain types of payments are not valuable consideration but are reimbursements for expenses a donor incurs.
• Allow government-run pilot programs to test the effectiveness of providing non-cash incentives to promote organ donation.  These pilot programs would have to pass ethical board scrutiny, be approved by HHS, distribute organs through the current merit based system, and last no longer than five years.

The Organ Donor Clarification Act has been endorsed by the following organizations:

• American Medical Association
• American Liver Foundation
• Americans for Tax Reform
• American Foundation for Donation and Transplantation
• American Transplant Foundation
• Chris Klug Foundation
• Donor to Donor
• Flood Sisters Kidney Foundation
• Foundation for Kidney Transplant Research
• Transplant First Academy
• WaitList Zero

The Bill is cosponsored by the following bipartisan members of the House of Representatives:

Rep. Jason Lewis (R-MN), Rep. Sanford Bishop (D-GA), Rep. André Carson (D-IN), Rep. Steve Cohen (D-TN), Rep. Brian Fitzpatrick (R-PA), Rep. Raul Grijalva (D-AZ),  Rep. Lynn Jenkins (R-KS), Rep. E.B. Johnson (D-TX), Rep. Mike Kelly (R-PA), Rep. Ro Khanna (D-CA), Rep. Tom Marino (R-PA), Rep. Jim McGovern (D-MA), Rep. Jared Polis (D-CO), Rep. Bill Posey (R-FL), Rep. Don Young (R-AK)

Manipulation by doctors of the Organ Allocation System Waitlist Priority

You will be shocked to learn that doctors and transplant centers respond to incentives in their effort to get scarce organ transplants for their own patients...

Here's a recent OPTN/UNOS white paper on the subject, concerning the waitlist for organs (such as hearts) for which physician decisions can influence patients' position on the waitlist.

Manipulation of the Organ Allocation System Waitlist Priority through the Escalation of Medical Therapies

"This white paper provides an ethical analysis of physicians’ practices of escalating care to waitlisted transplant candidates in order to increase their priority in the allocation system. Many in the transplant community perceive, as expressed explicitly in the medical literature23, that this practice of unnecessary escalation of care is widespread, and recognize that physicians may feel compelled to similarly manipulate the waitlist priority system so that their candidates are not disadvantaged as a result of the practices of others.

"For example, in heart transplantation, priority status can be influenced by the degree of therapeutic intervention applied to the transplant candidate, based on the assumption that therapeutic measures are a reliable indicator of disease severity.4 An unintended consequence of this approach is that a physician can raise the priority status of a patient by instituting more advanced therapeutic measures even in the absence of true medical necessity, a tactic some informally refer to as “gaming.”

"Due to the organ shortage, the transplant waitlist “is functionally a zero-sum rationing process.”5 Shortening wait times for some directly increases wait times for others. Thus, the practice of instituting more advanced therapies to shorten an individual’s wait time has no beneficial effect on wait times for the patient population in the aggregate. However, manipulating care to achieve a higher candidate priority can generate complications in candidates receiving such care while also jeopardizing public trust in the organ allocation system, which in turn, could reduce organ donation rates.

"OPTN/UNOS leadership requested an ethical analysis regarding the manipulation of the organ allocation system, particularly as it pertains to medically unnecessary escalation of interventions that are instituted for the sole purpose of increasing a candidate’s waitlist priority. The OPTNhas not previously commented on this issue."
...

"During the mid-late 1990s, three transplant hospitals in Chicago, IL were alleged by federal and state authorities to have falsely reported patients as critically ill in order to house them in the intensive care unit for the purpose of moving them to the top of the liver transplant waitlist.20 The hospitals denied any wrongdoing, but did receive financial penalties. These incidents generated questions about the integrity and fairness of the liver allocation system based on the alleged events.21,22

"In the last five years, prominent editorials described the widespread use of medical interventions that are not thought to be medically indicated in routine practice, but allow for patients to receive higher waitlist priority.23,24 This includes increased utilization of pulmonary artery (PA) catheters with continuous inotropes for the purpose of increasing the priority status on the waitlist of a patient with heart failure.25 While there are situations in which PA catheter use is appropriate, this intervention is associated with excessive adverse complications, which typically prohibits its routine use. When use of PA catheters was aligned with allocation priority, increasing use of PA catheters quickly followed.26 Further, vascular complications that preclude further catheterization have evolved to become a major justification for Status 1A exceptions, which are presumed to be related to overuse of PA catheters.27,28

"Increasingly, heart transplant candidates are being listed as Status 1A (the highest priority), which is largely based on the intensity and risk of the intervention used to treat the patient. This category was originally intended for potential transplant candidates expected to survive less than one week. Now, it’s not uncommon for Status 1A patients to have longer waitlist survival, and they may wait 6-12 months ."
...
"Multiple stakeholders stand to gain from manipulating the allocation system, including the candidate and the transplant hospital."

Matching endorsements to endorsers

The NY Times reports on speed dating of Youtube influencers and brands (and on newly relevant "moral turpitude" clauses concerning both parties):

Inside the Mating Rituals of Brands and Online Stars
By Daisuke Wakabayashi

"Recently at the Anaheim Convention Center, about 50 people entered a room decorated as a stylish lounge for a speed dating event. They moved from table to table every 20 minutes, exchanging small talk and getting to know each other.
But the participants were not looking for love. They were YouTube stars and marketing executives from companies like Uber and Amazon seeking an advertising union.

"Deals between big brands and viral online video performers, once an informal alternative to traditional celebrity sponsorships, are quickly maturing into a business estimated to reach $10 billion in 2020.
...
"As the attention and money paid to stars on sites like YouTube and Instagram balloon, the stakes for both them and the brands to find the right match are rising. The speed dating event, held during VidCon, the online video industry’s annual convention, was one way the two sides are testing each other out.
...
"Most advertising deals with YouTube or Instagram stars now include a “morality clause.” One such agreement, shown to The New York Times, stated that a creator would agree to take down any content within 12 hours if the brand determined that the talent had promoted a competing product, posted “racy content” on social media or performed “an act of moral turpitude.”
...
Increasingly, [an agent] wants the same right for his clients because they have just as much to lose if a company becomes embroiled in scandal, such as the right to take down a video sponsored by a company if that brand’s executives are caught sexually harassing staff."
**********

Update: and here's a recent paper on the subject:

The Market for Influence

39 Pages Posted:  

Itay P Fainmesser

Johns Hopkins University - Carey Business School

Andrea Galeotti

University of Essex

Date Written: July 3, 2018

Abstract

Influencer marketing is the fast growing practice in which marketers purchase product endorsements from influencers, who are individuals with many followers and strong reputations in niche markets. This paper develops a model of the market interactions between influencers, followers and marketers. Influencers trade-off the increased revenue they obtain by posting more paid endorsements, with the negative impact that this has on their followers’ engagement, which in turn affects the price marketers are willing to pay for their endorsement. Our analysis provides testable predictions on how the price that influencers receive depends on the size of their audience, and how an improvement in the online search technology affects influencers’ competition for followers and marketers. We show that, in equilibrium, over- and under-provision of paid endorsements coexist. We evaluate the strategic effects of recent, trans- parency motivated, policy interventions implemented by competition authorities in the US and Europe, requiring influencers to clearly mark the content that is sponsored by marketers.

Compensation for plasma donors--calls for a ban in Canada

At the same time as there are calls for decriminalizing drug use in Canada (see yesterday's post), there are calls for bans on compensating plasma donors. (Repugnance is a big topic..)

This post collects some thoughts on compensation for plasma donors, following my participation in the recent Plasma Protein Forum.

Much discussed there is the rash of recent legislation and proposed legislation in Canada to ban compensation for donors (a sort of repugnance event...).

E.g.
B.C. joins 3 other provinces in banning payment for blood and plasma
Alberta, Ontario and Quebec already have laws prohibiting profit from blood donations

Senator introducing bill to ban payments for blood donation
"“The point of this bill is better safe than sorry,” Wallin said.

“Canadian blood donors are not meant to be a revenue stream.”

Time to end for-profit plasma donations

Canada must never allow another tainted blood crisis and must put an end to cash-for-blood clinics. by (Senator) PAMELA WALLIN

***************

One perplexing feature of this debate is that Canada already buys lots of plasma from the U.S., where it is supplied by paid donors. No one seems to be suggesting that should be changed.

(Here are my posts to date on plasma in Canada.)

**************

In related notes, China seems to be ramping up it's "source" plasma collection (obtained at the source via plasmapheresis, as distinct from "recovered" plasma obtained from whole blood donations), with collection of about 7 million liters in 2017.  My understanding is that Chinese law forbids the importation of blood products except for albumin.

See this Lancet editorial from 2017:

The big business of blood plasma

"China,  a  country  that  holds  the  questionable  honour  of  being a world leader in liver disease, is now also the highest consumer  of  serum  albumin,  using  300  tonnes  annually,  roughly  half  of  the  worldwide  total  use,  according  to  an  article  in  the  Financial  Times. 

************

In Brazil, compensation of plasma donors is forbidden (along with compensation of organ donors) in the Constitution, article 199

"(4) The law establishes the conditions and requirements to allow the removal of human organs, tissues, and substances intended for transplantation, research, and treatment, as well as the collection, processing, and transfusion of blood and its by products, all kinds of sale being forbidden."

New calls for decriminalizing drug use in Canada

Here's the story in the Washington Post:

Toronto medical official calls for decriminalizing drugs as opioid overdoses skyrocket in Canada

"With opioid-related overdoses and deaths reaching record levels in Canada, the top medical official in Toronto is calling for the decriminalization of all drugs as part of a strategy to treat illicit drug use as a public health and social issue, not a criminal one.

"In a report released Monday, Eileen de Villa, Toronto’s chief medical officer, urged the city’s board of health to pressure the federal government to eliminate legal penalties for the possession of drugs and to scale up “prevention, harm reduction and treatment services.”

"The report also recommended assembling a task force “to explore options for the legal regulation of all drugs in Canada,” which she hopes would destroy an illegal drug market contaminated with fentanyl — a synthetic opioid 100 times more potent than morphine — and other drugs like it.

“When we criminalize people who take drugs, we inadvertently contribute to the overdose emergency,” de Villa said. “It pushes people into unsafe drug use practices and creates barriers for people to seek help.”
********

Here's the Toronto report:
A Public Health Approach to Drug Policy
Date: June 28, 2018
To: Board of Health
From: Medical Officer of Health

*********
See also the Global Commission on Drug Policy's 2016 report:
ADVANCING DRUG POLICY REFORM: A NEW APPROACH TO DECRIMINALIZATION

Kidney exchange is fragmented in the U.S.

Market Failure in Kidney Exchange

Nikhil Agarwal, Itai Ashlagi, Eduardo Azevedo, Clayton R. Featherstone, Ömer Karaduman

NBER Working Paper No. 24775
Issued in June 2018

Abstract: "We show that kidney exchange markets suffer from traditional market failures that can be fixed to increase transplants by 25%-55%. First, we document that the market is fragmented and inefficient: most transplants are arranged by hospitals instead of national platforms. Second, we propose a model to show two sources of inefficiency: hospitals do not internalize their patients’ benefits from exchange, and current mechanisms sub-optimally reward hospitals for submitting patients and donors. Third, we estimate a production function and show that individual hospitals operate below efficient scale. Eliminating this inefficiency requires a combined approach using new mechanisms and solving agency problems."

Here's a key sentence:

"The three largest multi-hospital platforms together only account for a minority share of the kidney exchange market. 62% of kidney exchange transplants are within hospital transplants that are not facilitated by the NKR, APD or UNOS. Moreover, over 100 hospitals performed kidney exchanges outside these three platforms during this period."

Jason Furman buys books when they're on sale

Here's a recent book review of my (2015) book that caught my eye, posted by Ismail Ali Manik, which begins with this tweet:

I finally got around to reading Alvin Roth's "Who Gets What--and Why" (I confess because it was on sale for $1.99 on Kindle, but too late you missed it). It is an enjoyable, accessible, insightful guide to the economics of matchmaking. My review. https://t.co/zNCsim3ivP

— Jason Furman (@jasonfurman) June 14, 2018

 Random Book recommendation — Who Gets What and Why: The New Economics of Matchmaking and Market Design

You might want to read the book yourself, and in any event there is an interesting selection of quotes, and then links to a bunch of videos, at the link above.

One kidney donor's journey

I recently heard the following story, by email from a recent kidney donor, who has given me permission to share it. It's lightly edited to preserve her privacy and mine, but I can't resist noting that her first name is Hope.

"Dear Professor Roth,

"Seven weeks ago today, I donated a kidney to a stranger in Minnesota.  Mayo Clinic sent me his email address this afternoon, just in case I want to contact him.  I'm not sure yet if I want to initiate communication but I certainly can't stop thinking about it.  It made me think about the Freakonomics episode I heard three years ago that started everything.  You know the one...

"When I heard the episode, I knew right away I wanted to become a living kidney donor.  I was 49 at the time. I never had children and my life felt incomplete.  Moreover, I lost my mother to cancer after a long battle, when I was just 14 years old.  I daydreamed about helping a child who had a sick parent so she doesn't have to go through what I went through. 

"My wife's cousin needed a kidney shortly after the episode aired.  I asked her if it was ok if I stepped up.  I played her the Freakonomics episode and she approved.  I reached out to her cousin Rick.  It turns out a few people volunteered and he got a direct match.  I felt defeated, which sounds selfish after such good news.  Then I heard a follow up episode that united a donor with his recipient.  Stephen Dubner was crying... I was crying... I called Mayo Clinic the next morning and signed up for testing.

"The rest is a long story and I know you are a busy man so I'll skip most of it.  I ended up being part of a pair, instead of an altruistic donor.  There was a man who worked with my wife that needed a kidney.  He once saved her life with the Heimlich maneuver so it was pretty poetic that I could save his.  He received his kidney from a bridge donor and I gave mine to someone on the diseased donor list.  So I got to save two lives!  I'm doing great.  I went back to work a couple of weeks ago.  I have no regrets and I hope I can inspire others to do something selfless and extraordinary in their lifetime. 

"I hope others have written to you.  I'm sure you see the statistics and know the impact of what you created with paired kidney donation.  I just wanted to make sure you hear some personal stories.  Life changing stories..."

A subsequent email exchange clarified some details:

"Hi Al!  I did all of my testing in May of 2016 to be a non-directed donor. I tested positive for Valley Fever and had to wait 90 days to be retested. The 2nd test was negative and I was approved but I was getting married in October so we put a hold on the donation. Mark came into the picture after that. He didn’t know about paired donation. We got him to switch to Mayo and we became a pair. He had lots of complications so I had to wait a long time. When he was finally approved, so much time had passed that I had to do most of the testing all over again. It took awhile to find me a match because I’m AB+. 

So a false positive Valley Fever test got Mark a kidney. 

I met Mark the day of his surgery. My wife and I were the first faces he saw. He was there the day of mine. He brought me flowers and a card from his kids. 

My team at Mayo Clinic were there for me the whole time. There was never any pressure and changing from non-directed to paired was seamless. They never discussed Mark. He had his own team. I was allowed to chicken out at any time. But I’ve never been so sure of anything in my life."
***********

And here are my posts linking to the Freakonomics shows that gave people so much of Hope.

Thursday, June 18, 2015

Freakonomics podcast on Who Gets What and Why

Make Me a Match: A New Freakonomics Radio Episode

Friday, February 26, 2016

A Freakonomics listener was inspired to become a non-directed kidney donor by the podcast on kidney exchange

Ask Not What Your Podcast Can Do for You

and this one (from huffingtonpost.com):

Saturday, May 6, 2017

A non-directed kidney donor speaks about his experience (which started with a Freakonomics podcast)

Ned Brooks: Donating His Kidney was Life-Changing. For Him.

A television interview on kidney exchange in Mexico (video)

Here's a short video that ran on Mexican tv, with a one minute introduction in Spanish, and then 11 minutes in English with Spanish subtitles. Curiously, the recording ends abruptly just as I started to talk about the 1974 paper of Shapley and Scarf...:)





Here is an earlier post about my recent visit to Mexico:

Tuesday, May 22, 2018

Forbes Health Forum in Mexico City, May 23

Thursday, May 31, 2018

Kidney exchange takes another step forward in Mexico: Pro-Renal

The June issue of the newsletter of the ACM E-commerce group is devoted to market design. You can read them at the links below:

June, 2018

• News and Views
  • Editor's Introduction
    • HU FU
  • A Report on the Workshop on Mechanism Design for Social Good
    • REDIET ABEBE and KIRA GOLDNER
• Survey
  • Good Markets (Really Do) Make Good Neighbors
    • SCOTT DUKE KOMINERS
• Letters
  • First-Price Auctions with General Information Structures
    • DIRK BERGEMANN, BENJAMIN BROOKS, and STEPHEN MORRIS
  • Combinatorial Cost Sharing
    • SHAHAR DOBZINSKI and SHAHAR OVADIA
  • Correlation-Robust Mechanism Design
    • NICK GRAVIN and PINIAN LU
  • Game Dynamics as the Meaning of a Game
    • CHRISTOS PAPADIMITRIOU and GEORGIOS PILIOURAS

HT: Scott Kominers

Capitalisn't conversation on kidneys and repugnance with Luigi Zingales and Kate Waldock

Here's a podcast and transcript of a conversation I had recently  with Kate Waldock and Luigi Zingales on the Chicago Booth Capitalisn't show, about kidney exchange, repugnant transactions and more:  Capitalisn’t: Abdomenable Transactions





The closing interaction between Luigi and Kate seemed to me to capture something important about compensation for donors, and maybe about repugnance:

Luigi: Al is a great guy. His contribution is extremely important for economics but more importantly, is also very important for humankind. However, listening to his discussion and listening to how complicated it is to do these matches even with his algorithm and how many people are left out, the question arises: Why don’t we pay for people to donate an organ? Of course, not your heart because it means that you are killing yourself, but what about a kidney? People can very happily live without a kidney. If they’re willing to donate a kidney for money, why is it so wrong?

Kate: Luigi, how much money would you have to be paid to sell your kidney?

Luigi: Wow, that’s a good question because I would give a kidney to my wife and my kids, but I don’t think I would sell it for money.

Kate: All right. Fair enough. I’m not sure there’s a price that I would accept either. "

Explaining plasma donation

In recent posts I've commented on the repugnance (in Canada and elsewhere) to paid plasma donation, which is legal in the U.S.. (The U.S. consequently supplies much of the world's plasma needs.)  One question facing the plasma industry is how to defend against compensated plasma donation being seen as a repugnant transaction.

I think they are already very well equipped to communicate the need for plasma proteins, which provide treatments for a host of diseases, and which are used around the world.  But to the extent that (paid or unpaid) donation needs to be defended and encouraged, I would expect to see more stories like this one, from Australia.

This man's blood has saved 2.4 million babies
'I'd keep going if they let me,' says 81-year-old with magical plasma.

"The man with the golden arm

"Harrison's blood is valuable because he naturally produces Rh-negative blood, which contains Rh-positive antibodies. His blood has been used to create anti-D in Australia since 1967.

"Every ampule of Anti-D ever made in Australia has James in it," Robyn Barlow, the Rh program coordinator who recruited Harrison, told the Sydney Morning Herald. "Since the very first mother received her dose at Royal Prince Alfred Hospital in 1967."

Harrison was the program's first donor.

"It's an enormous thing ... He has saved millions of babies. I cry just thinking about it."

Since then, Harrison has donated between 500 and 800 milliliters of blood almost every week. He's made 1,162 donations from his right arm and 10 from his left.

...

Harrison's retirement is a blow to the Rh treatment program in Australia. Only 160 donors support the program, and finding new donors has proven to be difficult. Additionally, attempts to create a synthetic version of anti-D have failed."

Chen Yusun Memorial Lecture at Tsinghua. 陈岱孙纪念讲座

Monday, at Tsinghua University I'll have the honor of delivering the
Chen Daisun Memorial Lecture, 陈岱孙纪念讲座

From Google translate:
"In order to celebrate the centennial birthday of Tsinghua University and the 85th anniversary of the Department of Economics of Tsinghua University, the Tsinghua School of Economics and Management launched the "Chen Yisun Economics Memorial Lecture" in April 2011.

Professor Chen Yusun was born in 1900. He graduated from Tsinghua University in Beijing in 1920. After earning an undergraduate degree in economics from the University of Wisconsin in 1922, he went to Harvard University for further studies and received his Ph.D. in economics in 1926. Among his classmates studying at Harvard University's Department of Economics, Bertil Ohlin, one of the Hecksell-Ohlin international trade models, and Edward Chamberlain, known for his theory of oligopolistic competition. (Edward Chamberlin). In 1928, Professor Chen Yisun returned to China. In the same year, he served as professor and department head of the Department of Economics at Tsinghua University. Until 1952, the Department of Economics of China's higher education institutions was merged into other universities. Professor Chen Yisun died in 1997 at the age of 97. Professor Chen Yusun is recognized as the father of modern economics education in China. Under his leadership, the Department of Economics of Tsinghua University became one of the best economics departments in China at that time. During his tenure, Professor Chen Yisun was the most undergraduate student at Tsinghua University, accounting for about one-fifth of all undergraduate students in the university.

The lecture was titled Professor Chen Yusun and is the highest level academic lecture for teachers and students. Previous speakers include: 1997 Nobel Laureate in Economics, Myron Scholes, Professor of Finance, Stanford Business School, 2007 Nobel Laureate in Economics, Professor of Harvard University, USA Eric Maskin, winner of the 1997 Nobel Prize in Economics, Robert C. Merton, a professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and winner of the 2013 Nobel Prize in Economics, University of Chicago professor Lars Peter Hansen."

I'll speak on "Repugnant transactions and forbidden markets"

Tsinghua Conference on Behavioral, Experimental and Theoretical Economics (BEAT), July 9-10

Tsinghua Conference on Behavioral, Experimental and Theoretical Economics

(Tsinghua BEAT 2018)

July 9-10, 2018

Keynote speakers:

Jacob Goeree, University of New South Wales

Ed Hopkins, University of Edinburgh

Alvin Roth, Stanford University (2012 Nobel Laureate in Economics)

We are pleased to announce the 2018 Tsinghua Conference on Behavioral, Experimental and Theoretical Economics (shortened as Tsinghua BEAT). The conference will be held on the campus of Tsinghua University, at the School of Economics and Management, in Beijing on July 9-10, 2018. 

Program Overview:

Detailed paper schedule: Tsinghua BEAT 2018 (PDF)

Conference website: http://tinyurl.com/tsinghuabeat

Monday July 9th

Session Chair:  Tracy Xiao Liu

09:00 – 10:00    The Favored but Flawed Simultaneous Multiple Round Auction, Jacob Goeree*(joint with Nick Bedard, Philippos Louis, and Jingjing Zhang)

Information and Communication

10:15 – 10:45   Costly Miscalibration in Communication, Yingni Guo* (Northwestern) and Eran Shmaya

10:45 – 11:15   Robust Persuasion of a Privately Informed Receiver, Ju Hu and Xi Weng*

11:15 – 11:45   Ambiguous Persuasion, Dorian Beauchêne, Jian Li* (McGill) and Ming Li

Market Design

13:00 – 13:30   Core of Convex Matching Games, Xingye Wu* (Columbia/Tsinghua)

13:30 – 14:00   A Dynamic College Admission Mechanism in Inner Mongolia: Theory and Experiment, Binglin Gong and Yingzhi Liang* (Michigan)

14:00 – 14:30 Obvious Mistakes in a Strategically Simple College Admissions 

Environment: Causes and Consequences, Ran I. Shorrer and Sándor Sóvágó* (Groningen)

Search and Information Preference

14:45 – 15:15  Sequential Search with a Freeze Option - Theory and Experimental Evidence, Emanuel Marcu and Charles N. Noussair* (Arizona)

15:15 – 15:45  Information Avoidance and Medical Screening: A Field Experiment in China, Yufeng Li, Juanjuan Meng, Changcheng Song* (NUS) and Kai Zheng

Chen Daisun Lecture, Main Auditorium, Weilun Buiding, chaired by Yingyi Qian, Dean of School of Economics and Management, Tsinghua University

16:15 – 17:30  Repugnant Transactions and Forbidden Markets, Alvin Roth, Stanford University, 2012 Nobel Laureate in Economics

Tuesday July 10th

Session Chair:  Alexander White

09:00 – 10:00   Price Dispersion and Cycles: Theory and Experiment, Ed Hopkins* (joint with Tim Cason and Dan Friedman)

Development

10:15 – 10:45   Targeting High Ability Entrepreneurs Using Community Information: Mechanism Design In The Field, N. Rigol, R. Hussam and Benjamin Roth* (Harvard)

10:45 – 11:15   Prosocial Compliance in P2P Lending: A Natural Field Experiment, Ninghua Du, Lingfang Li* (Fudan), Tian Lu and Xianghua Lu

11:15 – 11:45   Does Haze Cloud Decision Making? A Natural Laboratory Experiment, Soo Hong Chew, Wei Huang and Xun Li* (Wuhan)

Reputation and Risk

13:00 – 13:30   Reputation Effects under Interdependent Values, Harry Di Pei* (MIT/Northwestern)

13:30 – 14:00   The Persistent Power of Promises, Florian Ederer* (Yale) and Frédéric Schneiderz

14:00 – 14:30   Intertemporal Consumption with Risk: A Revealed Preference Analysis, Joshua Lanier, Bin Miao* (SUFE)， John Quah and Songfa Zhong

Cognitive Biases

14:45 – 15:15   Motivated Framing Effects, Christine L. Exley and Judd B. Kessler* (Penn)

15:15 – 15:45   Are People Aware of Their Inattention: Evidence from Credit Card Repayment, Jiajun Jiang, Yi-Tsung Lee, Yu-Jane Liu and Juanjuan Meng* (Peking)

15:45 – 16:15   Competing by Default: A New Way to Break the Glass Ceiling, Nisvan Erkal, Lata Gangadharan and Erte Xiao* (Monash)

Organizing Committee:

Chong-En Bai

Yan Chen

Ming Gao

Audrey Hu

Tracy Xiao Liu

Alex White

Jie Zheng

Xiaohan Zhong