Nimrod Megiddo awarded the John von Neumann Theory Prize at INFORMS 2014

Nimrod Megiddo was announced as the winner of the 2014 von Neumann Theory Prize at the INFORMS meeting yesterday (although as of this writing the web page hasn't been updated).

He is a deserving member of a distinguished club:

Past Awardees

2013 Winner(s)

Michel L Balinski, C.N.R.S. and Ecole Polytechnique

2012 Winner(s)

George L. Nemhauser, Georgia Institute of TechnologyLaurence A. Wolsey, Université Catholique de Louvain

2011 Winner(s)

Gerard P. Cornuejols, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business

2010 Winner(s)

Peter Glynn, Stanford UniversitySøren Asmussen, Aarhus University, Denmark

2009 Winner(s)

Yurii Nesterov, CORE/UCLYinyu Ye, Stanford University, Department of Management Science & Engineering

2008 Winner(s)

Frank P. Kelly, Centre for Mathematical Science, University of Cambridge

2007 Winner(s)

Arthur F. Veinott, Jr., Stanford University

2006 Winner(s)

Martin Grötschel, ZIB
Konrad-Zuse-ZentrumLászló Lovász, Eotvos University, Institute of MathematicsAlexander Schrijver, CWI, National Research Institute for Mathematics & Computer Science

2005 Winner(s)

Robert J. Aumann, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Center for Rationality

2004 Winner(s)

J. Michael Harrison, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business

2003 Winner(s)

Arkadi Nemirovski, Georgia Institute of Technology, School of ISyEMichael J. Todd, Cornell University
School of Operations Research and Information

2002 Winner(s)

Cyrus Derman, Professor Operations Research, Columbia UniversityDonald L. Iglehart, Stanford University

2001 Winner(s)

Ward Whitt, Columbia University, Industrial Engineering & Operations Research Dept.

2000 Winner(s)

Ellis L. Johnson, School of Industrial & Systems Engineering, Georgia Institute of TechnologyManfred W. Padberg, New York University, Stern School of Business

1999 Winner(s)

R. Tyrrell Rockafellar, University of Washington, Dept. of Mathematics

1998 Winner(s)

Fred W. Glover, OptTek Systems, Inc.

1997 Winner(s)

Peter Whittle

1996 Winner(s)

Peter C. Fishburn

1995 Winner(s)

Egon Balas, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business

1994 Winner(s)

Lajos Takacs

1993 Winner(s)

Robert Herman, University of Texas-Austin

1992 Winner(s)

Alan J. Hoffman, IBMPhilip S. Wolfe, IBM

1991 Winner(s)

Richard E. Barlow, University of California-BerkeleyFrank Proschan

1990 Winner(s)

Richard M. Karp, University of California - Berkeley, Dept. of Electrical Engineering & Computer Science

1989 Winner(s)

Harry M. Markowitz , Baruch College

1988 Winner(s)

Herbert A. Simon

1987 Winner(s)

Samuel Karlin , Stanford University
Dept of Mathematics

1986 Winner(s)

Kenneth J. Arrow , Stanford University, Dept. of Economics

1985 Winner(s)

Jack Edmonds, University of Waterloo, Dept. of Combinatorics & Optimization

1984 Winner(s)

Ralph E. Gomory , Alfred P. Sloan Foundation

1983 Winner(s)

Herbert E. Scarf, Yale University

1982 Winner(s)

Abraham CharnesWilliam W. Cooper, University of Texas - Austin, MSIS DepartmentRichard J. Duffin

1981 Winner(s)

Lloyd S. Shapley , University of California - Los Angeles, Dept. of Economics

1980 Winner(s)

David GaleHarold W. Kuhn, Princeton UniversityAlbert W. Tucker

1979 Winner(s)

David Blackwell , University of California - Berkeley

1978 Winner(s)

John F. Nash, Princeton University, Mathematics Dept.Carlton E. Lemke

1977 Winner(s)

Felix Pollaczek

1976 Winner(s)

Richard Bellman

1975 Winner(s)

George B. Dantzig, Stanford University

Matching and Market Design at INFORMS in San Francisco, Monday, Nov 10

More matching and market design today:

Cluster :	Auctions
Session Information		: Monday Nov 10, 13:30 - 15:00
Title:	Analysis of Matching Markets
Chair:	Thayer Morrill,NC State University, NC, thayer_morrill@ncsu.edu
Abstract Details
Title:	New Algorithms for Fairness and Efficiency in Course Allocation
	Presenting Author:	Hoda Atef Yekta,PhD Candidate, University of Connecticut, School of Business, 2100 Hillside Road Unit 1041, Storrs CT 06269, United States of America, Hoda.AtefYekta@business.uconn.edu
	Co-Author:	Robert Day,University of Connecticut, 2100 Hillside Road, U-1041, Storrs CT, United States of America, Bob.Day@business.uconn.edu
Abstract:		This research formulates the course allocation problem as a multi objective mathematical model considering both efficiency and measures of fairness. Results of four proposed heuristic algorithms are compared with existing mechanisms and we show that our new algorithms can improve both efficiency and fairness of the results.
Title:	Internally Stable Matchings and Exchanges
	Presenting Author:	Yicheng Liu,liuyicheng1991@hotmail.com
	Co-Author:	Pingzhong Tang,Assistant Professor, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China, kenshinping@gmail.com
Abstract:		We propose an alternative notion of stability for matchings and exchanges, coined internal stability, which only requires stability among matched agents. For internal stability, we analyze the social welfare bounds and computational complexity. Our results indicate that internal stability addresses both the social welfare and computational difficulties associated with traditional stability.
Title:	The Secure Boston Mechanism
	Presenting Author:	Thayer Morrill,NC State University, NC, thayer_morrill@ncsu.edu
	Co-Author:	Umut Dur,umutdur@gmail.com
		Robert Hammond,robert_hammond@ncsu.edu
Abstract:		We introduce a new algorithm that is a hybrid between the Boston and Deferred Acceptance algorithm. While not strategy-proof, this ``secure’’ Boston algorithm significantly reduces the incentive for students to strategically manipulate their reported preferences while maintaining the desirable feature of the Boston mechanism of assigning as many students as feasible to their favorite school. We run an experiment in order to test the performance of our new assignment procedure.
Title:	Two-sided Matching with Incomplete Information
	Presenting Author:	Sushil Bikhchandani,UCLA Anderson School of Management, University of California, Los Angeles CA, United States of America, sushil.bikhchandani@anderson.ucla.edu
Abstract:		Stability in a two-sided matching model with non-transferrable utility (NTU), interdependent preferences, and one-sided incomplete information is investigated. The notion of incomplete-information stability used here is similar to that of Liu et al. (2014). With anonymous preferences, all strictly individually-rational matchings are incomplete-information stable. An ex post incentive-compatible mechanism exists for this model. Extensions to two-sided incomplete information are investigated.

Cluster :	Applied Probability Society
Session Information		: Monday Nov 10, 08:00 - 09:30
Title:	Matching in Markets
Chair:	Ciamac Moallemi,Barbara and Meyer Feldberg Associate Professor of Business, Columbia Business School, 3022 Broadway, Uris 416, New York NY 10027, United States of America, ciamac@gsb.columbia.edu
Co-Chair:	Costis Maglaras,Columbia Business School, New York NY, United States of America, cm479@columbia.edu
Abstract Details
Title:	Dynamic Matching Markets with an Application in Residential Real Estate
	Presenting Author:	Hua Zheng,Columbia Business School, 3022 Broadway, Uris 4S, New York NY 10027, United States of America, hzheng14@gsb.columbia.edu
	Co-Author:	Costis Maglaras,Columbia Business School, New York NY, United States of America, cm479@columbia.edu
		Ciamac Moallemi,Barbara and Meyer Feldberg Associate Professor of Business, Columbia Business School, 3022 Broadway, Uris 416, New York NY 10027, United States of America, ciamac@gsb.columbia.edu
Abstract:		We study a dynamic microstructure model of a dynamic market where buyers and sellers arrive stochastically over time, and are heterogeneous with respect to their product characteristics and preferences and their idiosyncratic financial information. We analyze its dynamics, market depth, and buyer/seller bidding strategies. The motivating application stems from residential real estate.
Title:	Optimal Allocation without Money: An Engineering Approach
	Presenting Author:	Itai Ashlagi,MIT, 100 Main st., Cambridge MA, United States of America, iashlagi@mit.edu
	Co-Author:	Peng Shi,MIT, 70 Pacific St, Apt. 348C, Cambridge MA 02139, United States of America, pengshi@mit.edu
Abstract:		We study the allocation of heterogeneous services to agents without monetary transfers under incomplete information. The social planner's goal is to maximize a possibly complex public objective. We take an ``engineering'' approach, in which we solve a large market approximation, and convert the solution into a feasible finite market mechanism that still yields good results. We apply this framework to real data from Boston to design a mechanism that assigns students to public schools.
Title:	Managing Congestion in Dynamic Matching Markets
	Presenting Author:	Nick Arnosti,Stanford University, Stanford CA, United States of America, narnosti@stanford.edu
	Co-Author:	Ramesh Johari,Stanford University, Huang 311, Stanford CA, United States of America, ramesh.johari@stanford.edu
		Yash Kanoria,Columbia Business School, 404 Uris Hall, New York NY 10027, United States of America, ykanoria@columbia.edu
Abstract:		It is often costly for agents in matching markets to determine whether potential partners are interested in forming a match. This creates friction in the marketplace, lowering welfare for all participants. We use a dynamic model to quantitatively study this effect. We demonstrate that by reducing visibility, the market operator may benefit both sides of the market. Somewhat counter-intuitively, benefits of showing fewer sellers to each buyer are greatest when there is a shortage of sellers.

Cluster :	Auctions
Session Information		: Monday Nov 10, 16:30 - 18:00
Title:	Dynamic Matching Markets
Chair:	John Dickerson,CMU, 9219 Gates-Hillman Center, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh PA 15213, United States of America, dickerson@cs.cmu.edu
Abstract Details
Title:	Dynamic Matching Using Approximate Dynamic Programming
	Presenting Author:	Nikhil Bhat,Columbia University, nbhat15@gsb.columbia.edu
	Co-Author:	Ciamac Moallemi,Barbara and Meyer Feldberg Associate Professor of Business, Columbia Business School, 3022 Broadway, Uris 416, New York NY 10027, United States of America, ciamac@gsb.columbia.edu
Abstract:		We provide tractable algorithms for a large number of challenging dynamic decision making problems such as 1) Allocation of cadaveric kidneys to patients, 2) Matching ads with impressions, 3) Cyclic paired transfer of kidneys, by analyzing them using a general model. Our policies are easy to compute and interpret, and further come with approximation guarantees. With simulation experiments on kidney allocation, we show that we obtain gain over existing algorithms in literature.
Title:	Dynamic Matching Market Design
	Presenting Author:	Mohammad Akbarpour,Stanford University, 579 Serra Mall, 265F, Stanford CA 94305, United States of America, mohamwad@stanford.edu
	Co-Author:	Shengwu Li,Stanford University, 579 Serra Mall, 265B, Stanford CA 94305, United States of America, shengwu@stanford.edu
		Shayan Oveis Gharan,UC Berkeley, Berkeley Ca 94105, United States of America, oveisgharan@berkeley.edu
Abstract:		We show that, in dynamic matching markets, waiting to thicken the market can be substantially more important than increasing the speed of transactions. In particular, simple local algorithms that wait to thicken the market can perform very close to optimal algorithms. We prove our claims by analyzing a simple but illuminating model of dynamic matching in networked markets where agents arrive and depart stochastically.
Title:	The Roles of Common and Private Information in Two-Sided Matching with Interviews
	Presenting Author:	Sanmay Das,Associate Professor, Washington University in St. Louis, sanmay@seas.wustl.edu
	Co-Author:	Zhuoshu Li,Washington Univ. in St. Louis, One Brookings Dr, CB 1045, Saint Louis MO 63130, United States of America, zhuoshuli@wustl.edu
Abstract:		We consider two sided matching markets where employers have a fixed budget for the number of applicants they may interview. Employers receive noisy signals of how good each applicant is, and these signals include common and private components. We analyze how the strengths of these two components affect matching outcomes (both differentially across different quality candidates, and in the aggregate number of matches) when decisions about whom to interview are strategic.
Title:	FutureMatch: Learning to Match in Dynamic Environments
	Presenting Author:	John Dickerson,CMU, 9219 Gates-Hillman Center, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh PA 15213, United States of America, dickerson@cs.cmu.edu
	Co-Author:	Tuomas Sandholm,Carnegie Mellon University, 5000 Forbes Ave., Pittsburgh PA 15213, United States of America, sandholm@cs.cmu.edu
Abstract:		Kidney exchange, an innovation where willing but incompatible donor-patient pairs can exchange organs, is inherently dynamic. We present FutureMatch, an empirical framework for learning to match in a general dynamic model. We validate it on real data. Not only does dynamic matching result in more expected transplants than myopic, but even dynamic matching under economically inefficient (equitable) objectives can result in significant increases in social welfare over efficient myopic matching.

Matching and Market Design at INFORMS in San Francisco, Sunday November 9

There's a lot of market design at the INFORMS annual meeting, Nov 9-12.

On Sunday I'll start the day off with a talk from  10-10:50 called
"Market Design and the Economist as Engineer."

That will be followed by a cluster of talks organized by Itai Ashlagi called (embarrassingly)
Matching and Market Design (in honor of Al Roth), consisting of the following sessions

Cluster :	Matching and Market Design (in honor of Al Roth)
Session Information		: Sunday Nov 09, 11:00 - 12:30
Title:	Empirical Market Design
Chair:	Ramesh Johari,Stanford University,
Abstract Details
Title:	Quality Externalities and the Limits of Reputation in Two-Sided Markets
	Presenting Author:	Steve Tadelis,Professor, UC Berkeley, Haas School of Business, 2220 Piedmont Ave, Berkeley, United States of America, stadelis@haas.berkeley.edu
	Co-Author:	Chris Nosko,Booth School of Business, University Of Chicago, Chicago, United States of America, cnosko@chicagobooth.edu
Abstract:		Using data from eBay, we argue that platforms can mitigate externalities by actively screening sellers and promoting the prominence of better quality sellers. Exploiting the bias in feedback, we create a measure of seller quality and demonstrate the benefits of our approach through a controlled experiment that prioritizes better quality sellers to a random subset of buyers. .
Title:	On the Near Impossibility of Measuring the Returns to Advertising
	Presenting Author:	Randall Lewis,Economic Research Scientist, Google Inc., 1600 Amphitheatre Parkway, Mountain View Ca 94043, United States of America, randall@econinformatics.com
	Co-Author:	Justin Rao,Economic Research Scientist, Microsoft Research, New York City NY, United States of America, Justin.Rao@microsoft.com
Abstract:		Firms have a hard time measuring the causal impact of advertising expenditures on profit. In twenty-five online field experiments, individual-level sales are volatile relative to the per capita cost of a campaign--a small impact on a noisy dependent variable can generate positive returns. Experiments can need more than ten million person-weeks. Further, small selection biases can severely bias observational estimates. Weak informational feedback and technological advances shape ad marketplaces.
Title:	Corporate Prediction Markets: Evidence from Google, Ford, and Firm X
	Presenting Author:	Bo Cowgill,UC Berkeley, 1931 Diamond St Apt 3, SAN FRANCISCO Ca 94131, United States of America, bo.cowgill@gmail.com
	Co-Author:	Eric Zitezwitz,Dartmouth College, 6106 Rockefeller Hall, Hanover NH, United States of America, zitzewitz@dartmouth.edu
Abstract:		We examine data from prediction markets run by Google, Ford and Firm X (a large private materials company). Despite theoretically adverse conditions, we find these markets are relatively efficient, and improve upon the forecasts of experts at all three firms by as much as a 25% reduction in MSE. The most notable inefficiency is an optimism bias in the markets at Google and Ford. The inefficiencies that do exist become smaller over time for reasons we document.
Title:	At What Quality and What Price? Inducing Separating Equilibria as a Market Design Problem
	Presenting Author:	John Horton,Professor, NYU Stern School of Business, Kaufman Management Center, 44 West Fourth St, 8-81, New York NY 10012, United States of America, john.joseph.horton@gmail.com
	Co-Author:	Ramesh Johari,Stanford University, Huang 311, Stanford, United States of America, ramesh.johari@stanford.edu
Abstract:		A tool to promote revelation of buyers' price/quality preferences was experimentally introduced into an online labor market. In the treatment cells of the experiment, upon posting a job, buyers chose what price/quality level they were seeking from sellers. We find that buyers readily reveal their preferences and that this revelation---which itself was experimentally manipulated---strongly induced seller-side sorting.

Title:	******** Matching and Market Design
Chair:	Jacob Leshno,Columbia University,
Abstract Details
Title:	Matching in Networks
	Presenting Author:	Michael Ostrovsky,Associate Professor of Economics, Stanford Graduate School of Business, 655 Knight Way, Stanford CA 94305, United States of America, ostrovsky@stanford.edu
Abstract:		In this talk, I will present results on the existence and properties of stable outcomes in trading networks.
Title:	Matching with Peers in School Choice
	Presenting Author:	Atila Abdulkadiroglu,Professor, Duke University, 213 Social Sciences Building, Durham NC 27708, United States of America, atila.abdulkadiroglu@duke.edu
Abstract:		We develop a theory for matching of students to schools with peers and study various matching mechanisms with field data.
Title:	Endogenous preferences and the role of the mechanism in school choice
	Presenting Author:	Estelle Cantillon,Senior Research Fellow, Université Libre de Bruxelles (ECARES), 50, av FD Roosevelt, CP 114, Brussels 1050, Belgium, Estelle.Cantillon@ulb.ac.be
Abstract:		We consider a school choice model where preferences over schools are endogenous because students care about the quality of their peers. In such a setting, the mechanism affects the degree of preference polarization. We show how mechanisms can be designed to reduce polarization and improve the distribution of ranks of assigned schools in students’ preferences. A policy change in the city of Ghent (Belgium) provides a test for the predictions of the theory.
Title:	Evidence of Strategic Behavior in Hospital Claims Reporting
	Presenting Author:	Hamsa Bastani,Stanford University, Stanford, Stanford, United States of America, hsridhar@stanford.edu
	Co-Author:	Mohsen Bayati,Stanford Graduate School of Business, Stanford CA 94305, United States of America, bayati@gsb.stanford.edu
		Joel Goh,joelgoh@stanford.edu
		Stefanos Zenios,Charles A. Holloway Professor of Operations, Information, and Technology and Professor of Health Care Management, Stanford Graduate School of Business, 655 Knight Way, Stanford CA 94305, United States of America, stefzen@GSB.Stanford.Edu
Abstract:		We provide evidence from Medicare claims data that hospitals engage in upcoding behavior when reporting hospital-acquired infections that are no longer reimbursed by Medicare. In particular, we show that hospitals sometimes mark a hospital-acquired infection as present-on-admission, presumably in order to collect greater reimbursement.

*******

Title:	Matching Markets
Chair:	Yash Kanoria,Columbia Business School,
Abstract Details
Title:	Stable Matching in Large Economies
	Presenting Author:	Fuhito Kojima,Stanford University, 579 Serra Mall, Stanford CA 943055007, United States of America, fkojima@stanford.edu
Abstract:		Complementarities of preferences have been known to jeopardize stability of two-sided matching markets, yet they are a pervasive feature in many matching markets. In large markets, we demonstrate that if each firm's choice changes continuously as the set of available workers changes, then there exists a stable matching even if firm preferences exhibit complementarity. Building on this result, we show that there exists an approximately stable matching in any large finite economy.
Title:	The Prior-Independence Approach
	Presenting Author:	Inbal Talgam-Cohen,PhD Candidate, Stanford University, 86 Hulme Ct, Apt 108, Stanford CA 94305, United States of America, italgam@stanford.edu
	Co-Author:	Tim Roughgarden,Stanford, 353 Serra Street, Stanford, United States of America, tim@cs.stanford.edu
Abstract:		The matching literature has recently begun to consider priors on agents’ utilities. One of the barriers to adopting this potentially very fruitful approach is that priors add significant informational assumptions to the model. We survey a successful alternative approach from mechanism design called prior independence, which alleviates such assumptions while still reaping most benefits. We discuss both sampling-based methods and methods based on ensuring sufficient competition in the market.
Title:	The structure of the core in assignment markets
	Presenting Author:	Yash Kanoria,Columbia Business School, 404 Uris Hall, New York NY 10027, United States of America, ykanoria@columbia.edu
	Co-Author:	Daniela Saban,Columbia University, Uris Hall, 4I, New York, United States of America, dhs2131@columbia.edu
		Jay Sethuraman,Columbia University, IEOR Department, New York, United States of America, jay@ieor.columbia.edu
Abstract:		Assignment markets (Shapley & Shubik 1971) involve matching with transfers, as in labor markets and housing markets. We consider a two-sided assignment market with agent types and stochastic structure similar to models used in empirical studies. Each agent has a randomly drawn "productivity" associated with each type on the other side. We characterize how the structure of the core, i.e., the set of stable outcomes, is determined by market characteristics.

Medically assisted dying in Oregon: Brittany Maynard, RIP

Here's the story from NBC
Death With Dignity Advocate Brittany Maynard Dies in Oregon

"Brittany Maynard fulfilled her final wish Saturday, purposely ending her own life on her own schedule, activists close to her family confirmed Sunday night.

She was 29. She was diagnosed earlier this year with a fatal brain tumor — told the cancer likely would kill her in six months. But she had no intention, she said, of allowing the disease to control how she lived, or how she died."

Here are some related websites with further information on Ms. Maynard and on the death with dignity movement:
THE BRITTANY MAYNARD FUND
To expand the death-with-dignity option to all

Compassion and Choices


My previous posts on the debates and developments surrounding dignity in dying/ assisted suicide are here.

Kidney exchange in Spain: now more than 100 transplants

Here's some good news about kidney exchange, from Spain.

The programme was launched in 2009

First 100 cross-over kidney transplants performed in Spain, now becomes standard practice in the country

Wednesday 29 October 2014

Live-donor cross-over kidney transplants, which basically comprise an exchange of kidney donors between two or more donor-recipient couples, are gaining popularity and becoming standard practice in Spain.

​Spain recently performed its 100th cross-over kidney transplant, the acceptance of which in society is increasing every day. According to data from the ONT, a total of 101 cross-over kidney transplants had been performed in Spain at 1 October 2014, 35 of them this year.
54 of the transplant recipients were women and 47 were men.
This type of transplant has increased five-fold in the last four years and now accounts for 11% of all live-donor kidney transplants.
In Spain, the most recent cross-over kidney transplant was performed at the end of September and comprised an exchange between three donor-recipient couples undergoing surgery in Malaga and Zaragoza.
A few days earlier, a transplant chain involving a 'good samaritan' donor had taken place during a complicated process that involved medical teams, donors and recipients from Murcia, Andalusia and Catalonia.
Spain is also seeing an increase in the number of effective 'good samaritan' donors. To date, this type of donor has enabled five cross-over kidney transplant chains to be initiated, involving a total of 17 transplant recipients.

Living-donor kidney transplantation

Cross-over kidney transplants basically comprise an exchange of live kidney donors between two or more donor-recipient couples. The goal is to offer patients with chronic renal failure the chance to receive an organ from a living donor, even when their partner or family members are incompatible. This is a highly developed form of treatment in countries with a high living-donor kidney transplantation rate. This is the case in South Korea, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada and the United States, where this type of transplant has been performed for over a decade with excellent results.
The use of increasingly less invasive surgical techniques and the study and care of donors (before, during and after the operation) have enabled this type of transplant to become more common, given that the possible complications for the donor have been reduced considerably and kidney extraction from live donors is now considered a low-risk procedure.
This type of transplant involves a complicated logistics process that requires full cooperation between the central ONT office, the regional transplant coordinators, the hospitals and the medical teams taking part in the operation.
The first cross-over kidney transplant in Spain was performed in July 2009. For this milestone to be achieved, the ONT first worked with a multidisciplinary task force on developing a joint protocol that carefully examines every aspect of a cross-over live kidney transplant.

Register of donor-recipient couples

One fundamental aspect of this programme is the National Register of Donor-Recipient Couples and a computer application that enables possible exchanges between couples on the register to be quickly identified. It should be noted that those patients who register with this programme still remain on the waiting list for a deceased donor.
Since 2009, a total of 340 patients and their respective donors have been registered on this system at one time or another. 114 of those were active at 1 October, which means that possible combinations involving the various couples are currently being assessed. This latest crossover will enable the number of transplants to be increased by the end of the year.
23 hospitals throughout Spain and 16 histocompatibility laboratories are involved in the cross-over kidney transplant programme.

Ranking by hospital

The top hospitals in terms of the number of cross-over kidney transplants performed are as follows: Fundación Puigvert in Barcelona (17); Hospital Clínic i Provincial in Barcelona (15); Hospital Carlos Haya in Malaga (11); Hospital de Cruces in Bilbao ( 9); and Hospital Puerta del Mar in Cadiz (9).
The cross-over kidney transplant is one of the living-donor kidney transplantation methods being promoted by the ONT as part of its Donation 40 strategic plan.
Last year, 382 live-donor kidney transplants were performed in Spain, representing 15% of the total target set by the Spanish National Transplant Organisation.

Further discussion of incentives and kidney donation, including "capitalism as a threat to humanity"

A paper  in the October American Journal of Kidney Diseases by a group of Australian researchers reports on surveys of a sample of transplant docs with predominantly negative opinions about compensating donors, but positive opinions about reimbursing expenses. (I couldn't help noting that one of the negative themes reported views "capitalism as a threat to humanity")

American Journal of Kidney Diseases
Perspectives of Transplant Physicians and Surgeons on Reimbursement, Compensation, and Incentives for Living Kidney Donors
Allison Tong, PhD, Jeremy R. Chapman, FRCP, Germaine Wong, PhD, Jonathan C. Craig, PhDDisclosures
Am J Kidney Dis. 2014;64(4):622-632.

"Abstract

Background: The shortage of donors for organ transplantation has stimulated debate on financial incentives for living kidney donors. This study aims to describe the range of attitudes and opinions of transplant physicians on financial reimbursement, compensation, and incentives in living kidney donation.

Study Design: Qualitative study.

Setting & Participants: 110 transplant nephrologists and surgeons from 12 countries across 43 transplantation units in Europe, Australasia, and North America.

Methodology: Face-to-face semistructured interviews were conducted.

Analytical Approach: Transcripts were thematically analyzed.

Results: We identified 7 major themes. Prioritizing the removal of disincentives for living kidney donors was largely deemed acceptable. By contrast, provision of financial incentives raised concerns about undermining benevolence, compromising human dignity and value, and traversing market forces. Some contended that financial incentives potentially were legitimate if regulated, arguing that this would maximize utility in transplantation, but most also acknowledged the difficulty and that operational feasibility of a regulated system of financial incentivization may be limited.

Limitations: Participants were English speaking and from Western high-income countries; therefore, the transferability of our findings may be limited.

Conclusions: Transplantation specialists believed that minimizing disincentives would support equity and justice in living kidney donation. Direct financial incentivization for living kidney donors, even in the context of a regulated market, was regarded by most as unjustified because of the potential moral consequences and uncertain feasibility. Removing financial disincentives and safeguarding the intrinsic volunteerism, value, and meaning of donation were viewed to uphold integrity in living kidney donation."

Capitalism as a threat to humanity

“It's the worst thing ever and that's a complete commercialism and the victory of capitalism over humanity. So I'm very negative about it.” (Male nephrologist, 50s, Europe) “If you start with compensation and if you start money with different things, the end of the road will be commercialization—will be money and will be I give you kidney and you give me a house, a car—I don't know—sex, money—what you want? So forget it. You don't need to compensate the donors. If you compensate—if you go on these game[s], and you start compensation with different things, at the end of the road, it's money. It's money—it’s commercialization.” (Male nephrologist, 50s, Europe)

Death with dignity developments in Britain

In the Telegraph: Assisted suicide guidelines relaxed by Director of Public Prosecutions
Doctors and nurses who help severely disabled or terminally ill people to take their own lives are less likely to face criminal charges

"Until now all health care professionals faced a greater chance than others of being prosecuted for helping people to die because of the trust their patients placed in them.
Alison Saunders, the Director of Public Prosecutions, said this special deterrent would now only apply to those directly involved in a person's care.
Anti–euthanasia campaigners accused Ms Saunders of "decriminalising" assisted suicide by health care professionals "at a stroke of her pen".
Dr Michael Irwin, the former GP nicknamed "Dr Death" for helping several people kill themselves, said the change was a "wonderful softening" that would "make life easier" for people like him."

College applications and college apps

The Chronicle of Higher Ed has the story: Elite Colleges Explore Alternative to Common App

"Admissions officials at some of the nation’s most-selective colleges seek to create a new online application system, according to documents obtained by The Chronicle. Although the platform would rival the Common Application, its members apparently would include only private colleges with robust financial-aid budgets, and public institutions with high graduation rates.

Earlier this year, an "exploratory committee" comprising representatives of Harvard, Princeton, and Yale Universities, among several other institutions, sent out a request for proposals describing their interest in "an application solution to ensure that students can apply when another application mode experiences difficulties or system failure," according to a May 12 draft of the RFP. "There is also interest," the document says, "in establishing a new collaborative option for individual higher-education institutions as they work in their own ways to enroll the very best and most diverse freshman classes they can." If built, the system could go live as early as next year.

The plans mark the latest chapter in the unfolding saga of the Common App, which was plagued by various technical difficulties at the height of last year’s admissions cycle. Following months of glitches, admissions leaders at colleges that had used the Common App exclusively said they worried about placing all of their eggs in one basket."

New markets for restaurant reservations

Move over, Open Table.  Matt Buchanan has the story in the NY Times: Can You Uber a Burger?

"In recent months, as retail rents have risen in cities like New York and San Francisco, and as food prices have simultaneously hit three-year highs, various companies have been trying to find new ways to monetize the restaurant experience. Inspired by how we pay for concerts, airline tickets and, more recently, transportation through the car-hailing service Uber, more and more apps and reservation systems have homed in on disrupting a fundamental ritual: how we book a table.  Table 8 in San Francisco sells reservations at popular restaurants just days in advance; Zurvu scours the best open tables on OpenTable; Reserve, a start-up created by founders of Uber and Foursquare, aims to be a full-fledged digital concierge; SeatMe, which was acquired by Yelp, allows restaurants to ping eager diners if tables open up at the last minute. “This is a space that hasn’t seen a lot of innovation since 1998,” which is “when OpenTable first started taking online reservations,” says Brian Mayer, the founder of ReservationHop, yet another new reservation-­selling service. This summer, McNally’s restaurant group teamed up with Resy, a service that sells reservations for tables at peak times.
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"Nick Kokonas, a former derivatives trader who is an owner of the exclusive Chicago restaurants Next and Alinea, has found perhaps the most clever way to solve this problem. Kokonas has developed a system that requires diners to pay for a ticket to reserve their spot, with that money deducted from their final bill. While he has employed a version of the system for his expensive tasting menus, he expects tickets at more casual restaurants to take the form “of a deposit ticket of $5 to $10, fully applied to the bill.” According to Kokonas, restaurants using pilot versions of his system have seen no-show rates drop to less than 2 percent.
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"a number of services have emerged to book reservations without a restaurant’s knowledge and sell them to diners, while cutting the restaurant entirely out of the transaction. Sophie McNally, the operations manager of her father’s restaurants, described these services as “basically scalpers.” Some, like Today’s Epicure, frame themselves as a concierge service, charging a large annual fee. Killer Rezzy, which charges its 6,103 members $25 per reservation, books tables at 78 restaurants — a sizable fraction of which have teamed up with the service. Killer Rezzy tries to lure restaurants, however, through revenues from the reservations it sells and access to the profiles of its members, enabling them to better target potential diners. Sasha Tcherevkoff, its founder, said that roughly 40 percent of the restaurants that initially asked him to remove their reservations from his site ultimately either signed on for a trial or became partners.
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"Kokonas, Leventhal and Tcherevkoff all have much larger plans for their services as logistics with a broad range of applications. “Nonemergency medicine, spas, your personal trainer,” Kokonas says. “Anything that’s a time-slotted business.” Have your tickets ready."