Blood donation, in China

Here's a paper on incentivizing blood donation, with data from China.

Solving Shortage in a Priceless Market: Insights from Blood Donation
by Tianshu Sun, Susan Feng Lu, and Ginger Zhe Jin
November 2014

Abstract:

Blood shortage is common in many countries but it cannot be solved by price adjustment given the WHO recommendation for 100% unpaid voluntary donation. In this paper, we evaluate two non-price methods that blood banks often use to address shortage. The first method is informing existing donors of the current shortage via mobile message and encouraging them to donate voluntarily. The second method is asking the patient’s family or friends to donate in a family replacement program. Using 472,342 individual donation records from a large Chinese blood bank, we show that both methods are effective in addressing blood shortage in the short run but the two methods target different audiences and therefore have different implications for total blood supply. 

In the conclusion, the authors note that shortage messages reach existing donors, while family replacement programs primarily draw in new donors.

"Overall, the back-of-envelope calculation suggests that shortage message can be used in places

where the donor population is large and the shortage is small. In comparison, FR could be more

useful when the donor population is small and the shortage is severe. In this sense, our data suggests a more optimistic picture for FR than the WHO recommendation. However, in a society with a low donation rate (which could be the reason for severe shortage to begin with), most FR donors will be no-history FR donors and the FR treatment may discourage voluntary donation in

the long run by generating either distrust or crowd-out. Although a broader introduction of FR

can bring more blood supply in the short run, it may exacerbate shortage problem in the long run.

Like the WHO, we reach a cautionary conclusion for the FR program but for a reason different

from quality concerns. "

Can high pay be coercive and repugnant?

Sandro Ambuehl* will be presenting this paper at the AEA meetngs today:

More Money, More Problems? Can High Pay be Coercive and Repugnant?
By SANDRO AMBUEHL, MURIEL NIEDERLE, AND ALVIN E. ROTH

"Sometimes two people would voluntarily agree to transact a good or service for compensation, but an unaffected third party would prefer to prevent this transaction. Paid kidney donation, surrogate motherhood, prostitution, and paid participation in medical trials are examples.  We use a vignette study to explore how respondents' assessments of such repugnant transactions change as we alter the seller's compensation. We then sketch a model of how people judge the morality of such transactions."


*You'll have to wait until next year to hire him.

Market design at the AEA meetings in Boston

Here are some market-design-related sessions that caught my eye on first glance through the big program. (Three of them are at the same time:)

Jan 03, 2015 8:00 am, Hynes Convention Center, Room 209 
American Economic Association

Empirical Market Design (D4)

Presiding: RAMESH JOHARI (Stanford University)

Quality Externalities and the Limits of Reputation in Two-Sided Markets

CHRIS NOSKO (University of Chicago)

STEVEN TADELIS (University of California-Berkeley)

[View Abstract]

At What Quality and What Price? Inducing Separating Equilibria as a Market Design Problem

JOHN JOSEPH HORTON (New York University)

RAMESH JOHARI (Stanford University)

[View Abstract]

Changing the Course Allocation Mechanism at Wharton

ERIC BUDISH (University of Chicago)

JUDD KESSLER (University of Pennsylvania)

[View Abstract] [Download Preview]

The Economics of the Common Application

CHRISTOPHER AVERY (Harvard University)

PARAG A. PATHAK (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)

[View Abstract]

Discussants:

ALI HORTACSU (University of Chicago)

STEVEN TADELIS (University of California-Berkeley)

EDUARDO AZEVEDO (University of Pennsylvania)

ERIC BUDISH (University of Chicago)

******

Jan 03, 2015 2:30 pm, Sheraton Boston, Beacon E 
Econometric Society

Empirical Analyses of Selling Mechanisms in Dynamic Environments (D4)

Presiding: GLENN ELLISON (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)

An Empirical Analysis of Informationally Restricted Dynamic Auctions of Used Cars

SUNGJIN CHO (Seoul National University)

HARRY JOHN PAARSCH (Amazon)

JOHN RUST (Georgetown University)

[View Abstract]

Invest in Information or Wing It? A Model of Dynamic Pricing with Seller Learning

GUOFANG HUANG (Carnegie Mellon University)

HONG LUO (Harvard Business School)

JING XIA (Harvard University)

[View Abstract]

Primary-Market Auctions for Event Tickets: Eliminating the Rents of "Bob the Broker"

ERIC BUDISH (University of Chicago)

[View Abstract] [Download Preview]

Discussants:

JAKUB KASTL (Stanford University)

BRADLEY LARSEN (Stanford University)

GLENN ELLISON (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)

*********

Jan 04, 2015 8:00 am, Hynes Convention Center, Room 206 
American Economic Association

Electronic Commerce and Big Data (L8, M2)

Presiding: JUSTIN RAO (Microsoft Research)

Sales Taxes Shielding on the Amazon.com Platform

ALEJANDRO MOLNAR (Vanderbilt University)

PAULO SOMAINI (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)

[View Abstract]

Salience and Quality Choice

BRADLEY LARSEN (Stanford University )

DOMINIC COEY (eBay Research Labs)

KANE SWEENEY (eBay Research Labs)

[View Abstract]

Do-Not-Track and the Economics of Third-Party Advertising

GIORGOS ZERVAS (Boston University)

JUSTIN RAO (Microsoft Research)

SHARAD GOEL (Microsoft Research)

CEREN BUDAK (Microsoft Research)

[View Abstract] [Download Preview]

Big Data to the Rescue? Machine Learning and Causal Inference in Online Advertising

RANDALL LEWIS (Google, Inc.)

MICHAEL HANKIN (University of Southern California)

[View Abstract]

Discussants:

DAVID REILEY (Google, Inc.)

MICHAEL OSTROVSKY (Stanford University)

STEVEN TADELIS (University of California-Berkeley and eBay Research Labs)

DENIS NEKIPELOV (University of California-Berkeley)

************

Jan 04, 2015 10:15 am, Sheraton Boston, Commonwealth 
American Economic Association

Moral Values and Economic Behavior (A1, Z1)

Presiding: ALVIN E. ROTH (Stanford University)

Forbidden Fruits: The Political Economy of Science, Religion, and Growth

ROLAND BENABOU (Princeton University)

DAVIDE TICCHI (Institute for Advanced Studies-Lucca)

ANDREA VINDIGNI (Institute for Advanced Studies-Lucca)

[View Abstract] [Download Preview]

Combating Vote-Selling: A Field Experiment in the Philippines

ALLEN HICKEN (University of Michigan)

STEPHEN LEIDER (University of Michigan)

NICO RAVANILLA (University of Michigan)

DEAN YANG (University of Michigan)

[View Abstract] [Download Preview]

More Money, More Problems? Can High Pay Be Coercive And Repugnant?

SANDRO AMBUEHL (Stanford University)

MURIEL NIEDERLE (Stanford University)

ALVIN E. ROTH (Stanford University)

[View Abstract] [Download Preview]

Are Attitudes about Morally Controversial Transactions Affected by Information? The Case of Payments for Human Organs

JULIO J. ELIAS (Universidad del CEMA)

NICOLA LACETERA (University of Toronto)

MARIO MACIS (Johns Hopkins University)

[View Abstract] [Download Preview]

Discussants:

ANDREI SHLEIFER (Harvard University)

JUDD KESSLER (University of Pennsylvania)

THEODORE BERGSTROM (University of California-Santa Barbara)

RODNEY GARRATT (Federal Reserve Bank of New York)

**********

Jan 04, 2015 10:15 am, Boston Marriott Copley, Vermont 
Economic Science Association

Political Engineering (D7, D6)

Presiding: T. NICOLAUS TIDEMAN (Virginia Tech)

Quadratic Voting

STEVEN P. LALLEY (University of Chicago)

E. GLEN WEYL (Microsoft Research New England)

[View Abstract] [Download Preview]

Aggregating Local Preferences To Guide Policy

DANIEL BENJAMIN (Cornell University)

GABRIEL CARROLL (Stanford University)

ORI HEFFETZ (Cornell University)

MILES KIMBALL (University of Michigan)

[View Abstract] [Download Preview]

Storable Votes and Judicial Nominations in the United States Senate.

ALESSANDRA CASELLA (Columbia University)

SEBASTIEN TURBAN (California Institute of Tecnology)

GREGORY WAWRO (Columbia University)

[View Abstract] [Download Preview]

Purchasing Votes without Cash: Implementing Quadratic Voting Outside the Lab

ROMAN DAVID ZARATE (University of California-Berkeley)

CESAR MANTILLA (Toulouse School of Economics)

JUAN CAMILO CÁRDENAS (Universidad de los Andes)

[View Abstract] [Download Preview]

Discussants:

ERIC S. MASKIN (Harvard University)

RICHARD J. ZECKHAUSER (Harvard University)

JOHN MORGAN (University of California-Berkeley)

ERIK SNOWBERG (California Institute of Technology)

**********

Jan 04, 2015 10:15 am, Boston Marriott Copley, Simmons 
Industrial Organization Society

Frontiers of Empirical Industrial Organization (L1)

Presiding: MARC RYSMAN (Boston University)

Drip Pricing When Consumers Have Limited Foresight: Evidence from Driving School Fees

DAVID MUIR (University of Pennsylvania)

KATJA SEIM (University of Pennsylvania)

MARIA ANA VITORINO (University of Minnesota)

[View Abstract] [Download Preview]

The Welfare Effects of Congestion in Uncoordinated Assignment: Evidence from the NYC HS Match

ATILA ABDULKADIROGLU (Duke University)

NIKHIL AGARWAL (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)

PARAG A. PATHAK (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)

[View Abstract]

Deposit Competition and Financial Fragility: Evidence from the United States Banking Sector

MARK EGAN (University of Chicago)

ALI HORTACSU (University of Chicago)

GREGOR MATVOS (University of Chicago)

[View Abstract]

Information Frictions and the Welfare Consequences of Adverse Selection

BENJAMIN HANDEL (University of California-Berkeley)

JONATHAN KOLSTAD (University of Pennsylvania)

JOHANNES SPINNEWIJN (London School of Economics)

Discussants:

CHRIS CONLON (Columbia University)

FRANCESCO DECAROLIS (Boston University)

GINGER ZHE JIN (University of Maryland)

DAN ACKERBERG (University of Michigan)

******

Jan 04, 2015 12:30 pm, Sheraton Boston, Riverway 
Korea-America Economic Association/American Economic Association

The Economics of the Internet (L8, D8)

Presiding: JAY PIL CHOI (University New South Wales and Michigan State University)

Social Media and News Consumption

SUSAN ATHEY (Stanford University)

MARKUS MOBIUS (Microsoft Research)

JENO PAL (Central European University)

[View Abstract]

Net Neutrality, Business Models, and Internet Interconnection

JAY PIL CHOI (University New South Wales and Michigan State University)

DOH-SHIN JEON (Toulouse School of Economics)

BYUNG-CHEOL KIM (Georgia Institute of Technology)

[View Abstract] [Download Preview]

Match Quality, Search, and the Internet Market for Used Books

GLENN ELLISON (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)

SARA ELLISON (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)

[View Abstract]

An Empirical Analysis of Consumer Online Search

THOMAS BLAKE (eBay Research Labs)

CHRIS NOSKO (University of Chicago)

STEVEN TADELIS (University of California-Berkeley)

[View Abstract]

Discussants:

KYOO IL KIM (Michigan State University)

JOSHUA GANS (University of Toronto)

MINJAE SONG (Bates White)

YUN JEONG CHOI (Yonsei University)

*******

Jan 04, 2015 2:30 pm, Hynes Convention Center, Room 204 
American Economic Association

Recent Advances in the Analysis of Auction Data (L1, D4)

Presiding: KEN HENDRICKS (University of Wisconsin-Madison)

The Bidder Exclusion Effect

DOMINIC COEY (eBay Research Labs)

BRADLEY LARSEN (Stanford University)

KANE SWEENEY (eBay Research Labs)

[View Abstract] [Download Preview]

Collusion and Reciprocity in First-Price Procurements

PAULO SOMAINI (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)

[View Abstract]

Simultaneous First-Price Auctions with Preferences over Combinations

MATTHEW GENTRY (London School of Economics)

TATIANA KOMAROVA (London School of Economics)

PASQUALE SCHIRALDI (London School of Economics)

[View Abstract]

A Simple Test for Moment Inequality Models with an Application to English Auctions

ANDRES ARADILLAS-LOPEZ (Pennsylvania State University)

AMIT GANDHI (University of Wisconsin-Madison)

DANIEL QUINT (University of Wisconsin-Madison)

[View Abstract] [Download Preview]

Discussants:

TATIANA KOMAROVA (London School of Economics)

SERAFIN GRUNDL (Federal Reserve Board)

PAULO SOMAINI (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)

ALEJANDRO MOLNAR (Vanderbilt University)

***********

an 04, 2015 2:30 pm, Sheraton Boston, Beacon F 
Econometric Society

Advances in Collusion and Antitrust Policy (K2, L4)

Presiding: JUDITH CHEVALIER (Yale University)

Co-Opetition: Some Antitrust of Arrangements Between Competitors

JEAN TIROLE (Toulouse School of Economics)

[View Abstract] [Download Preview]

Effects of Antitrust Leniency on Concealment Effort by Colluding Firms

LESLIE MARX (Duke University)

CLAUDIO MEZZETTI (University of Melbourne)

[View Abstract] [Download Preview]

Cooperation, R&D Spillovers and Antitrust Policy

ANGEL LOPEZ (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona)

XAVIER VIVES (IESE Business School)

[View Abstract] [Download Preview]

Discussants:

BARRY NALEBUFF (Yale University)

JOSEPH E. HARRINGTON (University of Pennsylvania)

LUIS CABRAL (New York University)

*******

Jan 05, 2015 8:00 am, Sheraton Boston, Constitution Ballroom B 
American Economic Association

Patent Economics (K2, O3)

Presiding: JOSHUA LERNER (Harvard University)

Standard-Essential Patents

JOSHUA LERNER (Harvard University)

JEAN TIROLE (Toulouse School of Economics)

[View Abstract] [Download Preview]

Do Firms Underinvest in Long-Term Research? Evidence from Cancer Clinical Trials

ERIC BUDISH (University of Chicago)

BENJAMIN ROIN (Harvard University)

HEIDI WILLIAMS (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)

[View Abstract] [Download Preview]

Intellectual Property Rights and Access to Innovation: Evidence from TRIPS

MARGARET KYLE (Toulouse School of Economics)

YI QIAN (Northwestern University)

[View Abstract] [Download Preview]

Discussants:

UFUK AKCIGIT (University of Pennsylvania)

PETRA MOSER (Stanford University)

PIERRE AZOULAY (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)

LOUIS KAPLOW (Harvard University)

*******

Jan 05, 2015 8:00 am, Sheraton Boston, Beacon G 
Econometric Society

Theory of Matching Markets (C1)

Presiding: RAMESH JOHARI (Stanford University)

Stable Matching in Large Economies

YEON-KOO CHE (Columbia University)

JINWOO KIM (Seoul National University)

FUHITO KOJIMA (Stanford University)

[View Abstract] [Download Preview]

Efficiency and Stability in Large Matching Markets

YEON-KOO CHE (Columbia University)

OLIVIER TERCIEUX (Paris School of Economics)

[View Abstract]

Managing Congestion in Dynamic Matching Markets

NICK ARNOSTI (Stanford University)

RAMESH JOHARI (Stanford University)

YASH KANORIA (Columbia University)

[View Abstract] [Download Preview]

Matching with Peers in School Choice

ATILA ABDULKADIROGLU (Duke University)

[View Abstract]

Discussants:

PARAG A. PATHAK (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)

ITAI ASHLAGI (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)

JOHN JOSEPH HORTON (New York University)

JACOB LESHNO (Columbia University)

*******

The effect of charter schools in New Orleans and Boston: Abdulkadiroglu, Angrist, Hull and Pathak

Two of the pioneers of market design for school choice, Atila Abdulkadiroglu and Parag Pathak, have teamed up with colleagues to analyse the effects of charter schools, using data from the school choice programs they helped design in Boston and New Orleans.


CHARTERS WITHOUT LOTTERIES: TESTING TAKEOVERS IN NEW ORLEANS AND BOSTON
Atila Abdulkadiroğlu, Joshua D. Angrist, Peter D. Hull, and Parag A. Pathak
Working Paper 20792
http://www.nber.org/papers/w20792

ABSTRACT
Lottery estimates suggest oversubscribed urban charter schools boost student achievement markedly. But these estimates needn’t capture treatment effects for students who haven’t applied to charter schools or for students attending charters for which demand is weak. This paper reports estimates of the effect of charter school attendance on middle-schoolers in charter takeovers in New Orleans and Boston. Takeovers are traditional public schools that close and then re-open as charter schools. Students enrolled in the schools designated for closure are eligible for “grandfathering” into the new schools; that is, they are guaranteed seats. We use this fact to construct instrumental variables estimates of the effects of passive charter attendance: the grandfathering instrument compares students at schools designated for takeover with students who appear similar at baseline and who were attending similar schools not yet closed, while adjusting for possible violations of the exclusion restriction in such comparisons. Estimates for a large sample of takeover schools in the New Orleans Recovery School District show substantial gains from takeover enrollment. In Boston, where we can compare grandfathering and lottery estimates for a middle school, grandfathered students see achievement gains at least as large as the gains for students assigned seats in lotteries. Larger reading gains for grandfathering compliers are explained by a worse non-charter fallback.
*************

School choice in New Orleans is one of the design projects undertaken by the Institute for Innovation in Public School Choice (IIPSC).

The design of Boston's school choice system predated IIPSC; here's an early paper on that: The Boston Public School Match.

Black Market Kidney Broker Is Released From Prison

Black Market Kidney Broker Is Released From Prison

"A man who prosecutors said styled himself as 'the Robin Hood of kidneys" is out of prison after being the first person convicted in federal court of profiting from the illegal sale of human organs.

"Levy Izhak Rosenbaum, an Israeli citizen, won't be deported because federal immigration officials found that his crime was not one of "moral turpitude" that would have subjected him to being kicked out of the U.S., lawyer Edward Schulman said.

"It illustrates the intersection between legality and morality," Shulman said.

"Rosenbaum, now 63, was arrested in 2009 in what became the biggest corruption case ever in New Jersey. He had been living legally in the U.S.

"He pleaded guilty to illegally selling human organs in 2011 and served more than two years in prison.

"He was released this week from the federal correctional facility at New Jersey's Fort Dix, and Shulman said he has returned to his home in New York City's Brooklyn borough.

"Shulman said immigration officials decided not to send the case to a court to sort out because it was clear Rosenbaum's offense was not a deportable crime.

"Rosenbaum pleaded guilty to brokering the sale of three kidneys ? buying them from people in Israel for as little as $10,000, then selling them to U.S. patients who did not qualify for transplants or did not want to wait. The cost of the sale was over $100,000, and the operations were performed at top U.S. hospitals.

"While he pleaded guilty to three counts, authorities said he brokered many more kidney transplants and made millions from the deals.

"If he was drugging the people or knocking them out" to get their kidneys, Shulman said, that would have been a deportable offense. But, he said, that was not the case. "Both participants were willing."

"Shulman said his client's deals saved lives.

"One could contend that letting somebody die," Shulman said, "is also immoral."

The market for college football

The NY Times brings us up to date on the business which is college football:

What Made College Football More Like the Pros? $7.3 Billion, for a Start
By MARC TRACY and TIM ROHAN

"The story of college football’s gold rush can be told through television contracts. Under the championship playoff format that began this season, ESPN is paying $7.3 billion over 12 years to telecast seven games a year — four major bowl games, two semifinal bowl games and the national championship game. (In the first semifinal on Thursday, Oregon will play Florida State in the Rose Bowl; the title game is on Jan. 12.)

Each of the five major conferences — the Southeastern, the Atlantic Coast, the Pacific-12, the Big 12 and the Big Ten — will see its base revenue increase to about $50 million, from about $28 million under last season’s system. The base revenue will nearly triple for the five conferences that make up the next tier of college football."

Happy 500th birthday to Vesalius

Andreas Vesalius, son of an apothecary to Emperor Maximillian and to Charles V, was born in Brussels on December 31, 1514.

and this:

"Thus, the young, inquisitive, and impetuous Vesalius began his own studies of anatomy with a single-minded determination, frequently raiding the Cemetery of the Innocents and the gibbits of Montfaucon and storing the bodies in his bedroom. When news arrived of impending war between France and the Holy Roman Empire, Vesalius relocated to Padua, where he received his medical degree in 1537 and was appointed Professor of Surgery at the university."

In any event, he made a revolution in the scientific study of anatomy...

Early admissions come to English universities

The Guardian has the story:
Top universities 'ignoring final A-level grades' in race to sign up students
"Universities such as Lancaster and Birmingham are making record numbers of "unconditional offers" – places awarded irrespective of final A-level grades – in 2015"

"Leading universities have been accused of undermining A-levels by accepting students before they sit their final exams in a “desperate” rush to fill places.

"Research by the Telegraph shows universities are preparing to make increasing numbers of “unconditional offers” to sixth-formers next year.

"Top research institutions including Birmingham, Lancaster, Nottingham, Leicester, Sussex and Queen Mary, University of London, will admit students en masse in some subjects without waiting for results in August.

"Numbers are expected to significantly exceed the 12,000 unconditional offers made across the UK this year, with one university alone saying it will make 10,000 in 2015.
The move coincides with a government decision to abolish all restrictions on student recruitment in England for the first time in 2015 – creating a free market in undergraduate admissions.

"It has led to intense competition between universities to sign up the most talented sixth-formers before they are attracted to opposing institutions.

"In most cases, admissions tutors will make places available to candidates based on past performance in GCSEs and their predicted A-level grades, meaning students will win places even if they go on to fail their summer exams."

Uber apologizes to Sydney for surge pricing during the Sydney Siege

Ben Greiner writes from down under:

Here is something interesting, I am not sure if you followed the story. During the Sydney Siege last week, when companies closed down their offices and sent people home, Uber's price mechanism kicked in and raised Uber cab prices to get out of the city to as much as $200. People found that very repugnant, even though Uber argued that the high prices would increase cab supply when it was needed in such difficult moments ... Anyway, Uber just sent below email to its customers about 2 days ago.

Here is also an article arguoing that in general people do not like variable pricing.
http://www.vox.com/2014/12/15/7394323/uber-surge-pricing-psychology

Cheers from Sydney

/ben

---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: David at Uber Sydney <supportsydney@uber.com>
Date: Wed, Dec 24, 2014 at 9:34 AM
Subject: An apology
To: bgreiner.mail@gmail.com

The events of last week in Sydney were upsetting

AN APOLOGY FROM UBER SYDNEY The events of last week in Sydney were upsetting for the whole community and we are truly sorry for any concern that our process may have added.  Our priority was to help get as many people out of the CBD safely in the midst of a fast-moving event. The decisions we made were based only on helping to achieve this but we communicated this poorly, leading to a lot of misunderstanding about our motivations. Surge pricing is algorithmic and kicks in automatically when demand for rides outstrips the supply of cars that are on the road. This encourages more drivers to the area where people are requesting rides. As an increasing number of people were requesting rides that morning in the CBD, surge pricing came into effect automatically and this is when you might have seen higher prices. We didn't stop surge pricing immediately. This was the wrong decision. We quickly reversed course and provided free rides to people needing to leave the CBD. In the end, no rider was charged to leave the CBD on Monday and all higher fares resulting from surge pricing earlier in the day were fully refunded. It's unfortunate that the perception is that Uber did something against the interests of the public. We certainly did not intend to. We will learn from this incident and improve as a result of this lesson. Uber is committed to ensuring users have a reliable ride when they need it most - including and especially during disasters and relevant states of emergency. We take our community commitment very seriously in the 250+ cities Uber serves around the globe. Please know that we have listened to the feedback and we are working to standardise a global policy to ensure we're serving communities in the most efficient, effective and helpful way possible at all times. Our thoughts and prayers remain with the victims' families, those that were injured and the Sydney community of which we are so proud to be a part. Have a happy holidays,  David and the team at Uber Sydney