Here's a retrospective "virtual special issue" of experimental papers from GEB:
Games and Economic Behavior - Virtual Special Issue on Experimental Game Theory
Games and Economic Behavior - Virtual Special Issue on Experimental Game Theory
I'll post market design related news and items about repugnant markets.See also my Game theory, experimental economics, and market design page. I have a general-interest book on market design: Who Gets What--and Why The subtitle is "The new economics of matchmaking and market design."
Perspective: Matching, Mate Choice, and Speciation
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Author(s): Puebla, O., Bermingham, E., Guichard, F.
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Source: INTEGRATIVE AND COMPARATIVE BIOLOGY Volume: 51 Issue: 3 Pages: 485-491 SEP 2011
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Abstract: Matching was developed in the 1960s to match such entities as residents and hospitals, colleges and students, or employers and employees. This approach is based on "preference lists," whereby each participant ranks potential partners according to his/her preferences and tries to match with the highest-ranking partner available. Here, we discuss the implications of matching for the study of mate choice and speciation. Matching differs from classic approaches in several respects, most notably because under this theoretical framework, the formation of mating pairs is context-dependant (i.e., it depends on the configuration of pairings in the entire population), because the stability of mating pairs is considered explicitly, and because mate choice is mutual. The use of matching to study mate choice and speciation is not merely a theoretical curiosity; its application can generate counter-intuitive predictions and lead to conclusions that differ fundamentally from classic theories about sexual selection and speciation. For example, it predicts that when mate choice is mutual and the stability of mating pairs is critical for successful reproduction, sympatric speciation is a robust evolutionary outcome. Yet the application of matching to the study of mate choice and speciation has been largely dominated by theoretical studies. We present the hamlets, a group of brightly colored Caribbean coral reef fishes in the genus Hypoplectrus (Serranidae), as a particularly apt system to test empirically specific predictions generated by the application of matching to mate choice and speciation.
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Rebecca B. Morton | Rebecca B. Morton is professor of politics at the New York University. She is a leading researcher in experimental political sciences, in particular voting behavior and electoral processes. She has published in the best journals in both economics and political sciences. Her most recent publications focus, inter alia, on the decision making of swing voters and the behavior in standing expert committees. (http://politics.as.nyu.edu/object/RebeccaBMorton) |
Frans van Winden | Frans van Winden is professor of economics at the Amsterdam School of Economics and at the Cognitive Science Center Amsterdam. Excellent publications document his main research interests in the fields of political economy, behavioral economics, neuroeconomics and experimental economics. In his recent projects he investigates, for example, the behavioral economics of crime and of social ties or compares tax regimes experimentally. (http://www.creedexperiment.nl/creed/people/winden) |
February 1, 2012 | Submission deadline |
March 1, 2012 | Notification of acceptance |
March 15, 2012 | Registration deadline for presenters |
April 2, 2012 | Registration deadline for non-presenting participants |