Showing posts sorted by date for query credit. Sort by relevance Show all posts
Showing posts sorted by date for query credit. Sort by relevance Show all posts

Wednesday, March 27, 2024

Danny Kahneman (1934-2024)

 Danny Kahneman passed away today.

Here's the Washington Post obituary:

Daniel Kahneman, Nobel-winning economist, dies at 90. He found that people rely on shortcuts that often lead them to make wrongheaded decisions that go against their own best interest  By Chris Powe

"Daniel Kahneman, an Israeli-American psychologist and best-selling author whose Nobel Prize-winning research upended economics — as well as fields ranging from sports to public health — by demonstrating the extent to which people abandon logic and leap to conclusions, died March 27. He was 90.

"His death was confirmed by his stepdaughter Deborah Treisman, the fiction editor for the New Yorker. She did not say where or how he died.

...

"Dr. Kahneman took a dim view of people’s ability to think their way through a problem. “Many people are overconfident, prone to place too much faith in their intuitions,” he wrote in his popular 2011 book “Thinking, Fast and Slow.” “They apparently find cognitive effort at least mildly unpleasant and avoid it as much as possible.”

"Dr. Kahneman spent much of his career working alongside psychologist Amos Tversky, who he said deserved much of the credit for their prizewinning work. But Tversky died in 1996, and the Nobel is never awarded posthumously.

"Both men were atheist grandsons of Lithuanian rabbis, and both had studied and lectured at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Their three-decade friendship and close collaboration, chronicled in Michael Lewis’s 2016 book “The Undoing Project,” was a study in opposites.

"According to Lewis, Tversky was the life of the party; Dr. Kahneman never even went. Tversky had a mechanical pencil on his desk and nothing else; Dr. Kahneman’s office was full of books and articles he never finished. Still, Dr. Kahneman said, at times it was as if “we were sharing a mind.” They worked so closely together that they tossed a coin to decide whose name would go first on an article or a book.

"Their research helped establish the field of behavioral economics, which applies psychological insights to the study of economic decision-making, but also had a far-reaching effect outside the academy. "

Sunday, March 24, 2024

Conference in Jerusalem, in solidarity with Israeli academics

 I'm expecting to be back in California later today.  I gave three talks while in Israel, and met with many people, but the proximate cause of my trip was the economics conference organized by Effi Benmelech on behalf of Northwestern's Crown Family Israel Center for Innovation. It was organized as an expression of support for Israeli academics.


Here is the program

Wednesday, March 20 | Mishkenot Sha’ananim, Jerusalem

9:00-9:15 Welcome  Effi Benmelech, Northwestern University

9:15-10:00 Amir Yaron, Governor of the Bank of Israel

10:00-10:15 Break

Macro Session

10:15-11:00 Moving to Fluidity: Regional Growth and Labor Market Churn  Eran Hoffman, Hebrew University

11:00-11:45 Policy Design and Rates of Convergence in Learning Models  Martin Eichenbaum, Northwestern University

11:45-12:45 Lunch

Applied Micro Session

12:45-13:30 Fostering Soft Skills in Active Labor Market Programs: Evidence from a Large-Scale RCT  Analia Schlosser, Tel Aviv University

13:30-14:15 Decomposing the Rise of the Populist Radical Right  Roee Levy Tel Aviv University

14:15-14:30 Break

14:30-15:15 Why Has Construction Productivity Stagnated? The Role of Land-Use Regulation  Edward Glaeser, Harvard University

15:15-15:30 Break

Matching Markets Session

15:30-16:15 Organ Allocation for Transplants, Around the World and in Israel: Part I  Al Roth, Stanford University

16:15-17:00 Organ Allocation for Transplants, Around the World and in Israel: Part II  Itai Ashlagi, Stanford University

Thursday, March 21 Mishkenot Sha’ananim, Jerusalem

Industrial Organization Session

9:15-10:00 Selling Subscriptions Liran Einav, Stanford University

10:00-10:15 Break

10:15-11:00 An Empirical Analysis of Merger Efficiencies  Alon Eizenberg, Hebrew University

11:00-11:15 Break

11:15-12:00 Pharmaceutical Advertising in Dynamic Equilibrium  Ariel Pakes, Harvard University

12:00-13:00 Lunch

Economic History Session

13:00-13:45 Land Privatization and Business Credit: The Response of Bankruptcies to Land Enclosures in England 1750-1830  Karine van der Beek, Ben-Gurion University

13:45-14:00 Break

14:00-14:45 Diversity, Pluralism and Tolerance: The Roots of Economic Progress  Joel Mokyr, Northwestern University

14:45-15:00 Break

Experimental Economics

15:00-15:45 Describing Deferred Acceptance to Participants: Experimental Analysis  Yannai Gonczarowski, Harvard University

15:45 Adjourn


Saturday, March 9, 2024

Michael Kremer on market design by economists (and other essays on developments in economics)

 The March issue of the IMF publication Finance and Development (F&D) contains this essay by Michael Kremer.

ECONOMICS AND INNOVATION by MICHAEL KREMER, MARCH 2024

Here are his concluding paragraphs:

"Economists as innovators

"In addition to shedding light on the design of policies and institutions for innovation, economists can also participate directly in the innovation process. For example, economic theorists have used market design principles to design kidney transplant matching systems, and development economists are using experimental methods not just to test innovations, but also to help develop them. An analysis of Development Innovation Ventures (DIV)—the US Agency for International Development’s tiered evidence-based social innovation fund—found that 36 percent of awards went to innovations developed by teams including development economists, scaled to reach over 1 million users, compared with just 6 percent of awards to innovations without such involvement.

"Furthermore, 63 percent of DIV-supported innovations that had previously been tested in randomized controlled trials reached more than 1 million people, compared with only 12 percent of those without such trials. For example, economists helped develop a credit-scoring approach using psychometrics (psychological testing) to assess default risk for potential borrowers without credit histories, which scaled through adoption by commercial lenders.

"Just as biochemists and computer scientists often develop practical innovations in their fields, economists are increasingly developing social innovations in ours."

#########

The March issue also includes

NEW LESSONS FROM BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS, by ULRIKE MALMENDIER  and CLINT HAMILTON

and

RETHINKING MY ECONOMICS  by ANGUS DEATON

Saturday, February 24, 2024

Foreign surrogacy in Denmark is becoming less restrictive

 Above the Law has the story:

Denmark Passes New Pro-Surrogacy Regulations. The new rules in Denmark focus on two areas of surrogacy.  By ELLEN TRACHMAN  February 14, 2024

 "On February 5, 2024, the Danish government announced new surrogacy-supportive rules scheduled to come into effect on January 1, 2025. The rules address parentage for families formed by surrogacy — including commercial (compensated) surrogacy outside of Denmark — as well as for families formed by altruistic (noncompensated) surrogacy within Denmark.

...

"In Denmark, compensated surrogacy is illegal, and altruistic surrogacy has traditionally fallen into a legal gray area, pushing most hopeful parents who want to have a genetic connection to their child, but who are unable to carry a pregnancy themselves, to go abroad. The Danish government estimates that about 100 children are born to Danish parents each year by surrogacy outside of Denmark, while about five children each year are born within Denmark in altruistic surrogacy arrangements.

...

"Denmark has a history of denying parental rights to the intended parents of children born by surrogacy abroad. But on December 6, 2022, the European Court of Human Rights ruled against Denmark in K.K. and Others v. Denmark. In that case, a married heterosexual couple had twins with the assistance of a Ukrainian surrogate. Under Ukrainian law, both Danish intended parents were recognized as parents of the child, and the surrogate was not a parent of the child.

...

"The ECHR found that Denmark’s refusal to recognize the parent-child relationship between the mother and child was a human rights violation — not a violation of the mother’s human rights, but of the two children, to have a recognized legal relationship with their mother.


To its credit, Denmark is reacting to the ECHR’s definitive ruling. In the announcement by the Danish government last week, the government made it clear that the country’s new rules are intended to go beyond the minimum requirements of the ECHR to merely not violate the human rights of Danish children.  (The bare minimum requirement would be to just allow stepparent adoptions.) Instead, the Danish government’s new rules go farther to protect children and their parents.

...

"The new rules permit Danish family courts to quickly make a decision on parenthood in the case of a foreign surrogacy agreement, even permitting a court ruling to be made prior to the family’s return to Denmark. The rules also require that the court assess the best interest of the child, but with a presumption that it is, of course, in the child’s best interest to have a timely recognition of their parents.

"Moreover, the court decisions are permitted to be retroactive to the birth of the child, permitting parents to have access to parental leave work benefits, inheritance rights, and all other benefits of that legal relationship. And, in contrast to a stepparent adoption, the new rules will allow recognition of the parent-child relationship with the mother or nongenetic parent even if parents have separated, or if one parent died before they had a chance to apply for parenthood.

...

"In a stated attempt to address the risk of child trafficking, the rules require that at least one intended parent be genetically related to the child. Additionally, the surrogate is required to confirm in a notarized declaration after the birth that she wishes to transfer parenthood of the child to the intended parents."

Thursday, February 8, 2024

Morally contested markets on NPR's Planet Money (including kidneys, revenge and insider trading)

 The NPR show Planet Money discusses kidney sales, revenge, and insider trading. The hosts are enthusiastic about at least thinking about all of these.* 

They start with a discussion of organ transplants, and in the first 9 minutes of the show you can hear some parts of an interview with me, discussing tradeoffs (and possible titles for a book I'm working on).  Then they talk to Siri Isaksson about retaliation, and after that to Chester Spatt about insider trading.

 

They write:

"There are tons of markets that don't exist because people just don't want to allow a market — for whatever reason, people feel icky about putting a price on something. For example: Surrogacy is a legal industry in parts of the United States, but not in much of the rest of the world. Assisted end-of-life is a legal medical transaction in some states, but is illegal in others.

"When we have those knee-jerk reactions and our gut repels us from considering something apparently icky, economics asks us to look a little more closely.

"Today on the show, we have three recommendations of things that may feel kinda wrong but economics suggests may actually be the better way. First: Could the matching process of organ donation be more efficient if people could buy and sell organs? Then: should women seek revenge more often in the workplace? And finally, what if insider trading is actually useful?"

##########

*In their enthusiasm, they mis-state how few kidney exchanges were done before my colleagues and I got involved. (There weren't many, but more than two...)

As it happens, earlier this week I blogged about another interview, in the NYT, by Peter Coy (in print, not audio) that focused on kidney exchange:

Tuesday, February 6, 2024

Update (5pm): now I see that on the Planet Money site there's a transcript.  Here's the part that I participated in:

SYLVIE DOUGLIS, BYLINE: This is PLANET MONEY from NPR.

(SOUNDBITE OF COIN SPINNING)

MARY CHILDS, HOST:

A couple decades ago, Al Roth was working on solving this problem - people who needed kidneys weren't getting matched effectively with people who had kidneys to donate.

AL ROTH: Part of the kind of work I do is called matching theory.

GREG ROSALSKY, HOST:

Al helped create this, like, beautiful, elegant algorithm that would match kidney donors with recipients.

CHILDS: You obviously won a pretty big prize for this work.

ROTH: I did. I recommend it.

CHILDS: OK. Yeah (laughter). You like the prize. It's a good prize.

ROTH: Yeah.

CHILDS: That's good to know.

ROTH: A week long of parties.

CHILDS: The prize he won? - it was the Nobel Prize in economics.

ROSALSKY: As you might know, Al's matching work vastly improved the way people get kidneys and saved literally thousands of lives. Like, in the year 2000, before Al's work, there were only two paired kidney transplants - two. Thanks to Al's algorithm, there are now about a thousand per year.

CHILDS: But, Al says, his Nobel Prize-winning algorithm - it isn't even the best way to get people kidneys. Technically, he says, the best way is to grow kidneys in a lab, so it's not even the second-best way.

I'm just envisioning you doing all this matching work knowing that this is, like, a little goofy. Like...

ROTH: Oh.

CHILDS: ...There's a easier way.

ROTH: I hope it's a lot goofy...

CHILDS: (Laughter).

ROTH: ...The work I'm doing, anyway.

CHILDS: (Laughter).

ROTH: No, no. That's right. So could we figure out a way to have more donors to have fewer deaths? I bet we could.

ROSALSKY: OK, so there is a much easier, more efficient way to get people kidneys. It's the way people get most things - with money. Like, what if we could just buy and sell organs?

ROTH: Oh, we'd have a lot more organs. That's how we get most of our stuff. There's a famous passage quoted from Adam Smith, which I'm going to paraphrase, but it says something like, it's not through the generosity of the butcher and the baker that you get your food. You buy it from them. It's how they - that's how they sustain their families - is by selling you food. And that's how you get food, and that's why there's enough food.

CHILDS: Right. The kidney market already has supply and demand. It just doesn't have prices to balance them because buying and selling kidneys is illegal in basically the entire world. So here we are. We don't have enough kidneys. We desperately need more, and yet, we refuse to pay more than $0 for them.

ROSALSKY: And as Al saw while working on kidneys, people had moral objections to the idea of paying for organs. They had concerns that just didn't really make sense to him as an economist.

ROTH: But when I started to look, it turns out there are lots of markets like that.

CHILDS: Lots of markets where people just don't want to allow a market. They feel icky about putting a price on something. Al has a list - for example, surrogacy - a legal and flourishing industry in much of the U.S., not in much of the rest of the world; assisted end of life - perfectly fine medical transaction in Oregon, illegal where I am in Virginia.

ROSALSKY: Al is actually working on a book about all of this.

ROTH: Its working title is "Repugnant Transactions And Controversial Markets." And the idea is that sometimes economists have perfectly good ideas that other people don't think are perfectly good.

ROSALSKY: Al has sort of made his own little subdiscipline in economics about this.

ROTH: "Ickonomics" (ph), "Yuckonomics" (ph) - you know, I trade in book titles. I'm open to suggestions.

CHILDS: You can email Al with your book title suggestions, though honestly, that's kind of hard to beat. In the meantime, when we have those knee-jerk reactions and our gut repels us from considering the icky thing, economics would like to humbly submit that maybe we should.

(SOUNDBITE OF JORDACHE V. GRANT AND SKINNY WILLIAMS' "OLDER HEADS")

CHILDS: Hello, and welcome to PLANET MONEY. I'm Mary Childs.

ROSALSKY: And I'm Greg Rosalsky. Today on the show, we apply an elegant economic framework to Al's market, the trading of human organs, to whether or not we should exact revenge on our enemies, and to whether or not we should trade on inside information.

(SOUNDBITE OF JORDACHE V. GRANT AND SKINNY WILLIAMS' "OLDER HEADS")

CHILDS: When we face difficult situations that don't have an absolutely clear right answer, economist Al Roth says borrowing tools from economics can be useful.

ROTH: Economists deal in trade-offs, and one of the things about trade-offs is you have to say to yourself, supposing there's something we really don't like, what will happen if we ban it? And if the answer is it won't go away, but it'll go underground or become criminalized or become very irregular, then you might prefer to regulate it rather than ban it.

ROSALSKY: And there are real problems with banning things. For example, remember that time we tried to ban alcohol, like, in the 1920s and 1930s?

ROTH: We discovered that it gave rise to a big criminal economy and didn't completely wipe out alcohol at all. So we legalized it. And the legal market for alcohol, with all its problems, is a lot nicer in many ways, a lot more socially useful than the criminal market - you know, Al Capone and the Saint Valentine's Day massacre and, you know, Eliot Ness.

CHILDS: Alcohol, as you may know, is legal today. Selling kidneys - no, not legal - with kidneys, we are in our Prohibition era.

ROTH: There is a black market for kidneys. And often it's pretty terrible because the almost-universal laws against compensating kidney donors have driven that market underground. And what underground often means is out of the hospitals and into hotel suites and apartments...

CHILDS: Eugh (ph).

ROTH: ...And - yes, so medically very bad, as well as, you know, not just illegal but dealing with criminals - medically very bad, bad for the donors, bad for the recipients.

CHILDS: And that's what we have today. That's the market we have chosen. We have the black market with money and the legal market with no money.

ROSALSKY: So Al has been thinking about solutions to this. Like, what can we do realistically to incentivize more kidney donations? How else could we go about creating a market for kidneys to be, as Al likes to put it, more generous to kidney donors?

CHILDS: And when Al thinks about how to design a market, he prioritizes investigating what exactly it is that we're objecting to so he can build a market that fixes or avoids those problems. And in the case of kidneys...

ROTH: There are metaphysical objections. You know, it's just wrong. But the objections that seem to touch on the world seem to say that you can't do this without exploiting poor people because poor people are so vulnerable that just offering them money takes away their agency.

CHILDS: The first reaction is just a gut reaction, which doesn't help inform Al on design. The second reaction is that money can be coercive, that if people have no money and you offer them money to participate in a study, they might have to do the study, especially if you offer a huge amount, like a life-changing amount of money. It's just too compelling. They wouldn't have a choice.

ROSALSKY: This argument does strike Al as unreasonable.

ROTH: There's lots of jobs that we pay people to do because otherwise no one would do them. And you can earn a decent living being a meatpacker. But that's one of the things that bothers people. They say, why should we allow a market that will be mostly - most of the participants will be in the lower parts of the income range? And of course, that isn't very sympathetic to people who are lower income, right? In other words...

CHILDS: Right.

ROTH: ...We need jobs that people with lower income can get. That's why they have some income - is that there are jobs.

CHILDS: Luckily, there is a really obvious, easy solution to this objection - just solve poverty.

ROTH: There'd be a lot less repugnance to monetary transactions if there was no income inequality.

CHILDS: (Laughter).

ROTH: If you wanted to sell me your kidney, but we all had the same income and the same prospects, it just might not be a big thing.

CHILDS: OK, failing that, Al mentioned another way to create a kidney market, a way to get kidneys only from people who aren't that poor - a tax break.

ROTH: People who are wealthy enough to benefit from tax credits on income tax aren't the poorest of the poor. So it might be that the way to start paying kidney donors is to say, we will give you a tax break on everything after the first $10 million of income in the year that you - you know, and then only hedge fund managers would donate kidneys, and that would be repugnant.

CHILDS: But there's a twisted logic to it because at least they could - like, should something go awry in the surgery or in the...

ROTH: Yeah, they'd be fine. They'd be fine. Yeah.

ROSALSKY: Perfect. Like, now we have a few ideas of how to make this happen without paying people for kidneys. We could resolve income inequality, or we could just, you know, do a tax credit and receive only hedge fund manager kidneys. And - right? - there's something a little goofy about all this because these solutions are trying to account for objections that are just hard to design around 'cause those objections are at least partly stemming from some messy human feeling or intuition that just won't let us exchange things in the normal way.

CHILDS: So do you think there'll ever be a U.S. market for kidneys?

ROTH: Well, I think we're not doing a good job yet and that we ought to find a way to be more generous to donors so that we have more of them.

CHILDS: And what that looks like - you're open to suggestion?

ROTH: I'm open to suggestions.

Sunday, January 21, 2024

Legislative proposals to help living kidney donors

 Martha Gershun brings us up to date on various proposed pieces of legislation to help organ donors and increase access to transplants.

Legislative Efforts to Support Living Kidney Donors,  by Martha Gershun, Guest Blogger

"As a member of the Expert Advisory Panel to the Kidney Transplant Collaborative, I have been honored to provide input during the development of the organization’s priority legislation, the Living Organ Volunteer Engagement (LOVE) Act.  This legislation would help build a comprehensive national living organ donor infrastructure that would support a national donor education program, create a donor navigator system, ensure appropriate donor cost reimbursement, collect essential data, and improve all aspects of living organ donation across the country, substantially reducing barriers that limit participation today.

Key provisions of the LOVE Act would:

  • Provide reimbursement for all direct and indirect costs for living donation, including lost wages up to $2,500 per week.
  • Provide life and disability insurance for any necessary care directly caused by donation.
  • Modify NLDAC rules so neither the recipient’s income nor the donor’s income would be considered for eligibility.
  • Provide for new public education program on the importance and safety of living organ donation.
  • Provide for new mechanisms to collect and analyze data about living organ donation to enable evidence-based continuous process improvement.

Numerous other federal proposals are also currently vying for support to address barriers to living donation on a national level.  They include:

Living Donor Protection Act (H.R. 2923, S. 1384)

  • Prohibits insurance carriers from denying, canceling, or imposing conditions on policies for life insurance, disability insurance, or long-term care insurance based on an individual’s status as a living organ donor.
  • Specifies that recovery from organ donation surgery constitutes a serious health condition that entitles eligible employees to job-protected medical leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act.

Organ Donor Clarification Act (H.R. 4343)

  • Clarifies that reimbursement to living organ donation is not “valuable consideration” (I.e., payment), which is prohibited under the National Organ Transplant Act (NOTA)
  • Allows pilot programs to test non-cash compensation to living organ donors.
  • Modifies NLDAC rules so the recipient’s income would no longer be considered for eligibility.

Living Organ Donor Tax Credit Act (H.R. 6171)

  • Provides a $5,000 federal refundable tax credit to offset living donor expenses.

Honor Our Living Donor (HOLD) Act (H.R. 6020)

  • Modifies NLDAC rules so the recipient’s income would no longer be considered for eligibility.
  • Requires public release of annual NLDAC report.

Helping End the Renal Organ Shortage (HEROS) Act

  • Provides a $50,000 refundable federal tax credit over a period of five years for non-directed living kidney donors.
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And here's one more, from the Coalition to Modify NOTA



Friday, January 5, 2024

Coalition to Modify NOTA (the National Organ Transplant Act of 1984)

 Elaine Perlman forwards the following discussion points:


Coalition to Modify NOTA Talking Points

modifyNOTA.org

What is the Coalition to Modify NOTA proposing? The Coalition to Modify NOTA proposes providing a $50,000 refundable tax credit to remove all disincentives for American non-directed kidney donors who donate their kidney to a stranger at the top of the kidney waitlist in order to greatly increase the supply of living kidney transplants, the gold standard for patients with kidney failure.


What is the value of a new kidney? The value of a new kidney, in terms of quality of life and future earnings potential, is between $1.1 million and $1.5 million.


What is the American kidney crisis? Fourteen Americans on the waiting list for a kidney transplant die each day. That number does not include the many kidney failure patients who are not placed on the waiting list but would have benefited from a kidney transplant if we had no shortage. The total number of Americans with kidney failure will likely exceed one million by 2030. 

Why not rely on deceased donor kidneys to end the shortage? A living kidney transplant lasts on average twice as long as a deceased donor kidney. Fewer than 1 in 100 Americans die in a way that their kidneys can be procured. Currently, the 60% of Americans who are registered as deceased donors provide kidneys for 18,000 Americans annually. Even if 100% of Americans agreed to become organ donors, this would raise donations by only about 12,000 per year. In the USA, 93,000 Americans are on the kidney waitlist. A total of 25,000 people are transplanted annually, two-thirds from deceased donors and one-third from living donors. The size of the waitlist has nearly doubled in the past 20 years, while the number of living donors has not increased.

What is the extra value that non-directed kidney donors provide? Non-directed kidney donors often launch kidney chains that can result in a multitude of Americans receiving kidneys. Fewer than 5% of all living kidney donations are from non-directed kidney donors who are an excellent source of organs for transplantation because they are healthier than the general population. 

 

How much does the taxpayer currently spend on dialysis? Kidney transplantation not only saves lives; it also saves money for the taxpayer. The United States government spends nearly $50 billion dollars per year (1% of all $5 trillion collected in annual taxes) to pay for 550,000 Americans to have dialysis, a cost of approximately $100,000 per year per patient, a treatment that is far more expensive than transplantation.

 

How many more lives will be saved with the refundable tax credit for non-directed donors? The number of non-directed donors increased from 18 in 2000 to around 300 each year. After our Act becomes law, we estimate that we will add approximately 7,000 non-directed donor kidneys annually. That is around 70,000 new transplanted Americans by year ten. 

 

How much tax money will be saved once the Act is passed? The refundable tax credit will greatly increase the number of living donors who generously donate their kidneys to strangers. We estimate that in year ten after the Act is passed, the taxpayers will have saved $12 billion. 

 

What is a refundable tax credit? A refundable tax credit can be accessed by both those who do and those who do not pay federal taxes. 

 

What do Americans think about compensating living kidney donors? Most Americans favor compensation for living kidney donors  to increase donation rates. 

 

Who is able to donate their kidneys?  Donation requires potential organ donors to undergo a comprehensive physical and psychological evaluation, and each transplant center has its own rigorous criteria. Only around 5% of those who pursue evaluation actually end up donating, and only about one-third of Americans are healthy enough to be donors. Providing financial incentives will encourage more Americans to donate their kidneys to help those with kidney failure.

 Do kidney donors currently have expenses that result from their donation? The medical costs of donation are covered by the recipients' insurance, but donors are responsible for providing for the costs of their own travel, out-of-pocket expenses, and lost wages. Programs like the federal NLDAC and NKR's Donor Shield can help offset these costs, making donation less expensive.

Is it moral to compensate kidney donors? Compensation for kidney donors can be viewed as a way to address the current kidney shortage and save lives. Americans are compensated for various forms of donation such as sperm, eggs, plasma, and surrogacy, all of which involve giving life. 

How long do we need to compensate living kidney donors? Compensation should continue until a xenotransplant or advanced kidney replacement technology becomes available. In the meantime, it's crucial to prevent further loss of lives due to the shortage.

 Will incentivizing donors undermine altruism?  Financial compensation for donors can coexist with altruism. Donors can opt out of the funds from the tax credit or choose to donate those funds to charity. The majority of donors support financial compensation, and relying solely on altruism has led to preventable deaths.

 In addition to ending the kidney shortage, what are other benefits of the Act? The Act can help combat the black market for kidneys and reduce human trafficking because we will have an increased number of transplantable kidneys. It can also motivate individuals to become healthier to pass donor screening, potentially further reducing overall healthcare costs.

 Why provide non-directed donors with a refundable tax credit of $50,000? The compensation is designed to attract those who are both healthy and willing to donate. Given the commitment, time, and effort involved in the donation process, this compensation recognizes the value of those who save lives and taxpayer funds.

 When more donors step forward, can transplant centers increase the number of surgeries?  There is considerable unused capacity at most U.S. transplant centers, and increasing the number of donors is likely to lead to more surgeries. The goal is to perform more kidney transplants and reduce the waitlist, benefiting patients in need.

 In what way does the Act uphold The Declaration of Istanbul?  While the Act deviates from one principle of the Declaration of Istanbul by offering compensation, it aligns with the other principles and is expected to standardize compensation and reduce worldwide organ trafficking.

 What about dialysis as an alternative to transplant?  Dialysis, while a treatment option, can be a challenging and uncomfortable process for patients. For those who could have been transplanted if there were no kidney shortage, dialysis can result in needless suffering and an untimely death.

 Why not compensate living liver donors? Liver donation is riskier and not as cost-effective as kidney donation. While the Act currently focuses on kidney donors, it's possible that compensation for liver donors could be considered in the future.

 What about the argument that providing an incentive to donate will exploit the donors, especially low income donors? 

Primarily middle and low income kidney failure patients are dying due to the kidney shortage. People with lower incomes tend to have social networks with fewer healthy people because health is related to income level. In addition, being placed on a waitlist often costs money. Kidney donation also costs money, an estimated 10% of annual income. The refundable tax credit will help low income donors and recipients the most by making donation affordable and increasing the number of kidneys for those waiting the longest on the waitlist, frequently middle and low income Americans. The tax credit aims to help those most affected by the kidney shortage, as poorer and middle-income individuals often bear the brunt of the kidney crisis’s consequences. The Act will level the playing field, making it easier for those at all income levels to receive a life-saving kidney. 

Please examine this chart: