Congestion in vaccine delivery, and shortage of overall supply: latest news, and a call for increased production

Covid vaccines in many parts of the U.S. are being distributed only slowly, while other places are experiencing shortages.

 The NY Times brings us up to date:

New Pandemic Plight: Hospitals Are Running Out of Vaccines.  Health officials are frustrated that available doses are going unused while the virus is killing thousands of people each day. Many vaccine appointments have been canceled.   By Simon Romero and Giulia McDonnell Nieto del Rio

"In the midst of one of the deadliest phases of the pandemic in the United States, health officials in Texas and around the country are growing desperate, unable to get clear answers as to why the long-anticipated vaccines are suddenly in short supply. Inoculation sites are canceling thousands of appointments in one state after another as the nation’s vaccines roll out through a bewildering patchwork of distribution networks, with local officials uncertain about what supplies they will have in hand.

...

"Health officials trying to piece together why this is happening are puzzled by reports that millions of available doses are going unused. As of Friday morning, nearly 39.9 million doses of the Pfizer-BioNTech and Moderna vaccines had been distributed to state and local governments, but only about 19.1 million doses had been administered to patients, according to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention....

...

"“Right now, in many cities and counties when an announcement of available vaccinations is made, website sign-up pages crash and phone calls go unanswered"

...

"The public health department in San Francisco and hospitals in the city were “caught by surprise” by the lack of doses, Dr. Rutherford said, and by the eligibility expansion to those 65 and older, which likely strained the system. Varying vaccine distribution channels — such as Kaiser Permanente and the University of California, San Francisco — receive the doses on their own, he said, further complicating an already convoluted distribution system.

“So it’s a little hard for the city to understand exactly what’s left over, what they need to do, where the holes are to fill,” Dr. Rutherford said. Still, new vaccination sites are opening in San Francisco, which Dr. Rutherford said would help speed the process along once more doses become available. “There’s this tension between efficiency and equity,” he said. “It’s never easy.”

*****************

Here's a paper that points out that getting people vaccinated fast would have enormous benefits in terms of saving lives and reopening the economy, and that once we get the kinks out of vaccine distribution, it makes sense to invest in production facilities much faster than the pharma companies might feel it was necessary to do on their own.

Preparing for a Pandemic: Accelerating Vaccine Availability  By AMRITA AHUJA, SUSAN ATHEY, ARTHUR BAKER, ERIC BUDISH, JUAN CAMILO CASTILLO, RACHEL GLENNERSTER, SCOTT DUKE KOMINERS, MICHAEL KREMER, JEAN LEE, CANICE PRENDERGAST, CHRISTOPHER M. SNYDER, ALEX TABARROK, BRANDON JOEL TAN, WITOLD WIECEK

Abstract: Vaccinating the world’s population quickly in a pandemic has enormous health and economic benefits. We analyze the problem faced by governments in determining the scale and structure of procurement for vaccines. We analyze alternative approaches to procurement, arguing that buyers should directly fund manufacturing capacity and shoulder most of the risk of failure, while maintaining some direct incentives for speed. We analyzed the optimal portfolio of vaccine investments for countries with different characteristics as well as the implications for international cooperation. Our analysis, considered in light of the experience of 2020, suggests lessons for future pandemics.

Fuhito Kojima wins the 2021 Japanese Economic Association Nakahara Prize

 Congratulations to Fuhito Kojima, who is the 2021 winner of the Nakahara Prize of the Japanese Economic Association, which is awarded each year to an exceptional economist under the age of 45.

You can find the announcement (in Japanese) here. Google translate works well, and you can see the list of previous winners.

Here's part of the English announcement (which I can't find on the web...)

"The 2021 Japanese Economic Association Nakahara Prize

Professor Fuhito Kojima

"The Nakahara prize was established in 1995 and is funded by a donation from Mr. Nobuyuki Nakahara. The aim of the prize is to honor and encourage young researchers under the age of 45 to publish internationally recognized research. 

It is a great pleasure to announce that the 2021 Nakahara prize has been awarded to Professor Fuhito Kojima. Born in 1979, Professor Kojima received BA in economics from the University of Tokyo, and earned Ph.D. in economics from Harvard University in 2008. He was Assistant, Associate and then Full Professor of Economics at Stanford University, and he is Professor of Economics at the University of Tokyo from September 2020.

Professor Kojima’s research is focused on matching theory and market design. He has made a number of important contributions to the field. Many of his researches are motivated by various kinds of constraints imposed on matching problems in real life. His research significantly contributes to widening applicability of the theory to real matching markets.

...

"Selected Publications

1. “Job Matching under Constraints” (2020), joint with Ning Sun and Ning Neil Yu,  conditionally accepted, American Economic Review.

2. “Stable Matching in Large Economies” (2019), with Yeon-Koo Che and Jinwoo Kim, Econometrica, 87-1, pp65-110.

3. “Efficient Matching Under Distributional Constraints: Theory and Applications” (2015), with Yuichiro Kamada, American Economic Review, 105, pp 67-99.

4. “Matching with Couples: Stability and Incentives in Large Matching Markets” (2013), with Parag A. Pathak and Alvin E. Roth, Quarterly Journal of Economics 128, pp 1585-1632.

5. “Designing Random Allocation Mechanisms: Theory and Applications” (2013), with Eric Budish, Yeon-Koo Che, and Paul Milgrom, American Economic Review 103, pp 585-623.

6. “Asymptotic Equivalence of Probabilistic Serial and Random Priority Mechanisms” (2010), with Yeon-Koo Che, Econometrica 78, pp 1625-1672.

7. “Axioms for Deferred Acceptance” (2010), with Mihai Manea, Econometrica 78, pp 633-653.

8. “Incentives and Stability in Large Two-Sided Matching Markets” (2009), with Parag A. Pathak, American Economic Review 99, pp 608-27.

SELECTION COMMITTEE

Kosuke Aoki (Chair) (University of Tokyo), Anton Braun (Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta), Federico Echenique (California Institute of Technology), Yuichi Kitamura (Yale University), Fumio Ohtake (Osaka University), Tadashi Sekiguchi (Kyoto University), Mototsugu Shintani (University of Tokyo)

************

By a strange coincidence,  in 2013 I was the recipient of a non-academic award signed by Mr. Nobuyuki Nakahara, whose interests extend beyond economics.

Cognomos--course allocation software by Eric Budish et al.

Cognomos is a site that will put school administrators in touch with the designers of  Wharton's Course Match, which I've blogged about here and here with links to the underlying academic papers.

You can hear Eric Budish talk about it in the videos below.

Market designs to reduce the costs of high frequency trading, by Baldauf and Mollner

A forthcoming paper by Markus Baldauf and Joshua Mollner considers two designs to reduce the costs of (and incentives for) very high frequency trading. One is frequent batch auctions (on also which see Budish et al.), and the other is allowing market  participants to cancel bids or asks while imposing a delay on acceptances of those bids or asks, so that spreads will not have to be widened to defend against faster traders.

High-Frequency Trading and Market Performance
Journal of Finance, Forthcoming
Last revised: 25 Jan 2020
Markus Baldauf
University of British Columbia (UBC) - Division of Finance
and
Joshua Mollner
Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management



Abstract
We study the consequences of high-frequency trading (HFT) — and potential policy responses — via the tradeoff between liquidity and information production. Faster speeds facilitate HFT with consequences for this tradeoff: information production diminishes because informed traders have less time to trade before HFTs react, but liquidity (measured by the bid-ask spread) improves because informational asymmetries decline. HFT also pushes outcomes inside the frontier of this tradeoff. However, outcomes can be restored to the frontier by replacing the limit order book (LOB) with either of two alternative mechanisms: delaying all orders except cancellations or frequent batch auctions.

What is the cost of high frequency trading? by Aquilina, Budish, and O'Neill

A recent WSJ article highlights a paper by Aquilina, Budish, and O'Neill:

Ultrafast Trading Costs Stock Investors Nearly $5 Billion a Year, Study Says
U.K. regulator’s study says ‘latency arbitrage’ imposes a small but significant tax on investors
"High-frequency traders earn nearly $5 billion on global stock markets a year by taking advantage of slightly out-of-date prices, imposing a small but significant tax on investors, a new study says."
********

And here's the original paper from Britain's Financial Conduct Authority:

Quantifying the High-Frequency Trading 'Arms Race': A new methodology and estimates
Occasional papers 27/01/2020
by Matteo Aquilina, Financial Conduct Authority,
Eric Budish, University of Chicago Booth School of Business and NBER and Peter O’Neill, Financial Conduct Authority


"The authors use stock exchange message data to quantify the negative aspect of high-frequency trading, known as 'latency arbitrage.' The key difference between message data and widely-familiar limit order book data is that message data contain attempts to trade or cancel that fail."

 Summary:
"The authors use stock exchange message data to quantify the negative aspect of high-frequency trading, known as “latency arbitrage.” The main results show:

• races are frequent, fast and worth only small amounts per race
• a large proportion of daily trading volume is in races
• race participation is concentrated
• in aggregate, these small races make up a meaningful proportion of price impact
• in aggregate, these small races add up to meaningful harm to liquidity
• in aggregate, these small races add up to a meaningful total ‘size of the prize’
• The paper finds that while there is only a small detriment per transaction as a result, it adds up to a 17% reduction in the cost of liquidity and $5bn a year in tax on trading volume."

Market Design at 25, May 14-15 in Washington DC

The NBER is holding a conference in May, in Washington.

"The conference, which has been organized by Irene Lo, Michael Ostrovsky, and Parag Pathak, is timed to roughly commemorate the 25th anniversary of the first FCC spectrum auction, in 1994, the redesign of the National Resident Match Program (begun in 1995, completed in 1998), and the launch of the sulphur dioxide allowance-trading program under Title IV of the Clean Air Act Amendments (amended in 1990, initiated in 1995).  The conference goal is to assess the key contributions of market design in a number of specific fields and policy areas, and to identify key open questions that are priorities for future research."

Market Design @ 25

Authors Please upload your paper and slides here.

Irene Y. Lo, Michael Ostrovsky, and Parag A. Pathak, Organizers

May 14-15, 2020

JW Marriott Hotel, 1331 Pennsylvania Avenue, Washington, DC

Conference Code of Conduct

Thursday, May 14
8:00 am	Continental Breakfast
8:30 am	Spectrum Auctions
	- Opening speaker: Jessica Rosenworcel, FCC Commissioner
	- Overview: Paul Milgrom, Stanford University
	- Viewpoint: Evan Kwerel, FCC
9:55 am	Break
10:10 am	Matching and Broadening the Definition of Markets
	- Overview: Alvin Roth, Stanford University and NBER
	- Viewpoint 1: Edward Glaeser, Harvard University and NBER
	- Viewpoint 2: Susan Athey, Stanford University and NBER
11:20 am	Break
11:35 am	Market Design for the Environment
	- Overview: Michael Greenstone, University of Chicago and NBER
	- Viewpoint 1: Richard Schmalensee, Massachusetts Institute of Technology and NBER
	- Viewpoint 2: Nathan Keohane, Environmental Defense Fund
12:45 pm	Lunch
2:15 pm	Market Design in Healthcare
	- Overview: Amy Finkelstein, Massachusetts Institute of Technology and NBER
	- Viewpoint 1: Marc Miller, LJAF / Former MedPac
	- Viewpoint 2: Kate Ho, Princeton University and NBER
3:25 pm	Market Design in Transportation
	- Overview: Michael Ostrovsky, Stanford University and NBER
	- Viewpoint 1: David Shmoys, Cornell University
	- Viewpoint 2: TBA
4:35 pm	Break
4:50 pm	Market Design in Developing Countries
	- Overview: Kevin Lleyton-Brown, University of British Columbia
	- Viewpoint 1: Tavneet Suri, Massachusetts Institute of Technology and NBER
	- Viewpoint 2: Jishnu Das, Georgetown University
6:00 pm	Adjourn
6:30 pm	Conference Dinner
Friday, May 15
7:45 am	Continental Breakfast
8:15 am	Market Design for Education
	- Overview: Parag Pathak, Massachusetts Institute of Technology and NBER
	- Viewpoint 1: Derek Neal, University of Chicago and NBER
	- Viewpoint 2: Neerav Kingsland, City Fund
9:25 am	Break
9:40 am	Market Design for Organ Transplantation
	- Overview: Tayfun Sonmez, Boston College
	- Viewpoint 1: Nikhil Agarwal, Massachusetts Institute of Technology and NBER
	- Viewpoint 2: Jennifer Erickson, formerly White House OSTP
10:50 am	Break
11:05 am	Market Design for Public Housing
	- Overview: Nathan Hendren, Harvard University and NBER
	- Viewpoint 1: Winnie van Dijk, University of Chicago and NBER
	- Viewpoint 2: Marge Turner, Urban Institute
12:15 pm	Lunch
1:15 pm	Electricity Market Design
	- Overview: Mar Reguant, Northwestern University and NBER
	- Viewpoint 1: Bob Wilson, Stanford University
	- Viewpoint 2: Shmuel Oren, University of California at Berkeley
2:25 pm	Market Design in Online Markets
	- Overview: Preston McAfee, formerly Caltech and Microsoft
	- Viewpoint 1: Hal Varian, Google
	- Viewpoint 2: Irene Lo, Stanford University
3:35 pm	Break
3:50 pm	Market Design in Financial Markets
	- Overview: Darrell Duffie, Stanford University and NBER
	- Viewpoint 1: Eric Budish, University of Chicago and NBER
	- Viewpoint 2: Gary Gensler, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
5:00 pm	Adjourn

Reforming stock exchange governance, from the SEC

It's good to know that sometimes the SEC reads papers by market designers (in this case Budish et al.):

Statement on Reforming Stock Exchange Governance by Commissioner Robert J. Jackson Jr., Jan. 8

"As today’s release explains, America’s stock markets are riven by a fundamental conflict of interest: exchanges both operate public data feeds and profit from selling superior private ones.[1] Because exchanges have no economic reason to produce robust public data on stock prices, investors have long demanded a vote on how the public feeds are run.[2] Rather than give investors a real say over the data that drives our markets, today’s release merely invites for-profit exchanges to draft their own rules on these questions. Because that approach has failed investors before, and there’s no reason to expect it to succeed now, I respectfully dissent.

*          *          *          *

In 1934, American investors struck a fundamental bargain with our stock exchanges. The Commission was created to oversee the markets, and nonprofit exchanges were given the special legal status they needed to play a role in protecting ordinary investors.[3] But over a decade ago the deal changed: Exchanges became for-profit entities with powerful incentives to maximize profits, not protect investors.

That’s how we ended up with the two-tiered system for market data we have today. Congress mandated the creation of a public feed when exchanges were still nonprofits, but today’s for-profit exchanges also sell their own private feeds. So it’s unsurprising that exchanges underinvest in the public feed—it’s a product they directly compete with. The only question is what the Commission should do about it. Rather than recognize the reality of the exchanges’ incentives, the Commission today chooses hope over experience, asking exchanges to act contrary to their own economic interests.[4] For two reasons, we should not expect that approach to produce the robust public data that American investors deserve.

First, by proposing an order under a national market system (NMS) plan, we’re asking the exchanges to tell us how best to address the conflicts of interests that currently allow them to profit by controlling the public feed while selling superior private data.[5] No one should be surprised when the exchanges respond that, rather than give investors votes on the operation of the public feed, they’d rather continue controlling it themselves.[6] Instead of a clear solution to an obvious problem, today’s proposal will produce little more than a long process that will benefit lobbyists and lawyers—but not the ordinary investors living with the tax of rising data costs in our markets.[7]

Second, our history governing markets through NMS plans is hardly encouraging. One need look no further than the consolidated audit trail to see what happens when the Commission replaces real regulation with mere hope that stock exchanges will act against their own interests. The CAT was launched in the wake of a terrifying market event nearly a decade ago. Both Chairman Clayton and Director Redfearn have done tremendous work to move it forward. But our predecessors left the construction of the CAT to the NMS process. And the CAT will protect investors, not produce profits. So it’s no surprise that the CAT is still not complete.[8] I hope our successors won’t someday say the same about today’s attempt to reform exchange governance.

*          *          *          *

Those who, like me, are frustrated by today’s failure to require real reform may be tempted to direct their ire towards our stock exchanges. But it’s a mistake to blame private enterprises for maximizing the profit opportunities the law gives them.[9] Instead, we should change the law to address the incentives produced by giving exchanges both control over our public feeds and the opportunity to profit by selling private ones.[10] Without changing those incentives, we cannot and should not expect the market to fix the market.[11]

That’s why I hope commenters will come forward and urge the Commission to do more than merely hope that stock exchanges will act contrary to their private interests. Until we do, our stock markets will continue to fall short of the level playing field that ordinary American investors deserve."

....

"[11] Important recent research shows that, even when the market for trading is perfectly competitive, exchanges can extract supra-competitive rents from selling speed technology in the form of proprietary data feeds. See Eric Budish, Robin S. Lee & John J. Shim, Will the Market Fix the Market? A Theory of Stock Exchange Competition and Innovation, National Bureau of Economic Research Paper No. w25855 (2019)."

ASSA meetings in San Diego--Market design on Friday

The ASSA meetings are a cornucopia.  Here are some sessions related to market design that caught my eye in the preliminary program for the first day of conferencing, Friday January 3. No one can go to all of them, aside from interviewing junior market candidates, some of these sessions conflict with each other...:-(

Frontiers in Market Design
Paper Session
 Friday, Jan. 3, 2020   8:00 AM - 10:00 AM
 Marriott Marquis San Diego, Catalina
Hosted By: ECONOMETRIC SOCIETY
Chair: Eric Budish, University of Chicago
Targeting In-Kind Transfers through Market Design: A Revealed Preference Analysis of Public Housing Allocation
Daniel Waldinger, New York University

Approximating the Equilibrium Effects of Informed School Choice
Claudia Allende, Columbia University and Princeton University
Francisco Gallego, Pontifical Catholic University of Chile
Christopher Neilson, Princeton University

The Efficiency of A Dynamic Decentralized Two-Sided Matching Market
Tracy Liu, Tsinghua University
Zhixi Wan, Didi Chuxing
Chenyu Yang, University of Rochester

Will the Market Fix the Market? A Theory of Stock Exchange Competition and Innovation
Eric Budish, University of Chicago
Robin Lee, Harvard University
John Shim, University of Chicago

When Do Cardinal Mechanisms Outperform Ordinal Mechanisms?: Operationalizing Pseudomarkets
Hulya Eraslan, Rice University
Jeremy Fox, Rice University
Yinghua He, Rice University
Yakym Pirozhenko, Rice University
*********
Search and Matching in Education Markets
Paper Session
 Friday, Jan. 3, 2020   10:15 AM - 12:15 PM (PST)
 Marriott Marquis San Diego, Rancho Santa Fe 2
Hosted By: AMERICAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION
Chair: Eric Budish, University of Chicago

Simultaneous Search: Beyond Independent Successes
Ran Shorrer, Pennsylvania State University

Search Costs, Biased Beliefs and School Choice under Endogenous Consideration Sets
Christopher Neilson, Princeton University
Claudia Allende, Columbia University
Patrick Agte, Princeton University
Adam Kapor, Princeton University

Facilitating Student Information Acquisition in Matching Markets
Nicole Immorlica, Microsoft Research
Jacob Leshno, University of Chicago
Irene Lo, Stanford University
Brendan Lucier, Microsoft Research

Why Are Schools Segregated? Evidence from the Secondary-School Match in Amsterdam
Hessel Oosterbeek, University of Amsterdam
Sandor Sovago, University of Groningen
Bas van der Klaauw, VU University Amsterdam

***********
Market Design
Paper Session
 Friday, Jan. 3, 2020   10:15 AM - 12:15 PM
 Marriott Marquis San Diego, Del Mar
Hosted By: ECONOMETRIC SOCIETY
Chair: Sergei Severinov, University of British Columbia

Market Design and Walrasian Equilibrium
Faruk Gul, Princeton University
Wolfgang Pesendorfer, Princeton University
Mu Zhang, Princeton University

Repeat Applications in College Admissions
Yeon-Koo Che, Columbia University
Jinwoo Kim, Seoul National University
Youngwoo Koh, Hanyang University

Entry-Proofness and Market Breakdown under Adverse Selection
Thomas Mariotti, Toulouse School of Economics

Who Wants to Be an Auctioneer?
Sergei Severinov, University of British Columbia
Gabor Virag, University of Toronto
**********
Transportation Economics
Paper Session
 Friday, Jan. 3, 2020   10:15 AM - 12:15 PM (PST)
 Marriott Marquis San Diego, La Costa
Hosted By: ECONOMETRIC SOCIETY
Chair: Tobias Salz, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

The Selection of Prices and Commissions in a Spatial Model of Ride-Hailing
Cemil Selcuk, Cardiff University

The Welfare Effect of Road Congestion Pricing: Experimental Evidence and Equilibrium Implications
Gabriel Kreindler, University of Chicago

Customer Preference and Station Network in the London Bike Share System
Elena Belavina, Cornell University
Karan Girotra, Cornell University
Pu He, Columbia University
Fanyin Zheng, Columbia University

Platform Design in Ride Hail: An Empirical Investigation
Nicholas Buchholz, Princeton University
Laura Doval, California Institute of Technology
Jakub Kastl, Princeton University
Filip Matejka, Charles University and Academy of Science
Tobias Salz, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
**********

Information (Design), Black Markets, and Congestion
Paper Session
 Friday, Jan. 3, 2020   2:30 PM - 4:30 PM
 Manchester Grand Hyatt San Diego, Torrey Hills AB
Hosted By: ECONOMIC SCIENCE ASSOCIATION
Chair: Dorothea Kuebler, WZB Berlin Social Science Center
An Experimental Study of Matching Markets with Incomplete Information
Marina Agranov, California Institute of Technology
Ahrash Dianat, University of Essex
Larry Samuelson, Yale University
Leeat Yariv, Princeton University

Information Design in Dynamic Contests: An Experimental Study
Yan Chen, University of Michigan
Mohamed Mostagir, University of Michigan
Iman Yeckehzaare, University of Michigan

How to Avoid Black Markets for Appointments with Online Booking Systems
Rustamdjan Hakimov, University of Lausanne
C.-Philipp Heller, NERA Economic Consulting
Dorothea Kuebler, WZB Berlin Social Science Center
Morimitsu Kurino, Keio University

Application Costs and Congestion in Matching Markets
Yinghua He, Rice University
Thierry Magnac, Toulouse School of Economics

Discussant(s)
Christian Basteck, ECARES Brussels
Lionel Page, University of Technology Sydney
Robert Hammond, University of Alabama
Ahrash Dianat, University of Essex
*******

Tech Economics
Paper Session
 Friday, Jan. 3, 2020   2:30 PM - 4:30 PM
 Marriott Marquis San Diego, San Diego Ballroom A
Hosted By: NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR BUSINESS ECONOMICS
Chair: Michael Luca, Harvard Business School

GDPR and the Home Bias of Venture Investment
Jian Jia, Illinois Institute of Technology
Ginger Jin, University of Maryland
Liad Wagman, Illinois Institute of Technology

New Goods, Productivity and the Measurement of Inflation: Using Machine Learning to Improve Quality Adjustments
Victor Chernozhukov, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Patrick Bajari, Amazon

Double Randomized Online Experiments
Guido Imbens, Stanford University
Patrick Bajari, Amazon

Private equity races for young talent even earlier this year

Eric Budish sends me this pointer to the continued unraveling of the recruiting of young investment bankers into private equity firms:

Private-equity firms are already interviewing 22-year-old bankers who will start in 2 years. Their earliest-ever hiring kickoff shows how crazy the battle for talent has gotten.  

"Private-equity firms are already interviewing first-year investment-banking analysts to fill 2021 associate positions, marking the earliest-ever kickoff to recruiting for those roles, sources told Business Insider.

...

"Last year, firms started interviewing in late October, recruiters said. This year, the PE firms are already moving in after analysts — typically 22-year-olds who just graduated from college the previous spring — who have only a few weeks of work experience under their belts.  

"Sources including academic advisers, recruiters, and insiders at PE firms told Business Insider that the activity was widespread, including at firms such as Thoma Bravo and TA Associates that were early movers last year but also at some of the largest firms including Warburg Pincus, TPG, and KKR. 

...

"Private-equity firms have pushed up the recruiting timeline over the past several years, despite how difficult it is to assess bankers so early in their careers. Still, they feel the need to remain competitive and get first dibs on the best talent.  "

School choice at Chicago Booth

The University of Chicago's Booth school reviews school choice, with particular attention to Booth scholars:

Economics is changing how public schools and students choose each other

"Chicago Booth’s Seth Zimmerman got interested in school lotteries as an economics graduate student at Yale in the late 2000s. 
...
"Chicago Booth’s Eric Budish and UPenn’s Judd Kessler have found similar results [about families confused by complexity] for course allocation at the Wharton School at the University of Pennsylvania (see “You can’t always say what you want,” below). 
...
"In their research on New Haven’s schools, Zimmerman and his coresearchers wanted to quantify the effects of this sort of inequality, and particularly to understand how it played out in a system even more strategically complicated than New York’s. Past research assumed either that students and their families were strategizing correctly or that they were making one of a limited number of possible mistakes, such as not knowing their own priority group or playing naively by simply listing their choices in order of their preferences. 
...
"The researchers tried developing an app that would increase families’ understanding of their odds and help them strategize accurately. But they soon saw that simply adopting a truth-telling approach made more sense. Their work found an audience in New Haven Public Schools, and for the 2019--–20 school year, the city began employing a matching algorithm similar to New York’s.
...
"Chicago Booth’s Jacob Leshno says that currently most districts don’t use TTC systems, and he suggests a potential reason many have opted for DA instead: TTC systems are harder to explain to students who don’t get the schools they want. 
...
"However, Leshno and Stanford’s Irene Lo wanted to help administrators make full use of their options for school-matching systems by providing tools to help explain how TTC school-assignment algorithms work. Their research demonstrates it’s possible to explain matches under TTC systems to students and parents using the same palatable notion that applies to DA systems, removing a big impediment to their implementation." 

Why is it hard for securities exchanges to restore price competition (instead of speed competition)?

Many stock exchanges earn rents by giving privileged access to high speed algorithmic traders.  Why doesn't a new exchange enter the market with a design that would privilege price competition over speed competition?  Budish, Lee and Shim have some thoughts on that:

Will the Market Fix the Market?A Theory of Stock Exchange Competition and Innovation
 Eric Budish, Robin S. Lee and John J. Shim
February 27, 2019

Abstract As of early 2019, there are 13 stock exchanges in the U.S., across which over 1 trillion shares ($50 trillion) are traded annually. All 13 exchanges use the continuous limit order book market design, a design that gives rise to latency arbitrage—arbitrage rents from symmetrically observed public information—and the associated high-frequency trading arms race (Budish, Cramton and Shim, 2015). Will the market adopt new market designs that address the negative aspects of high-frequency trading? This paper builds a theoretical model of stock exchange competition to answer this question. Our model, shaped by institutional details of the U.S. equities market, shows that under the status quo market design: (i) trading behavior across the many distinct exchanges is as if there is just a single “synthesized” exchange; (ii) competition among exchanges is fierce on the dimension of traditional trading fees; but (iii) exchanges capture and maintain significant economic rents from the sale of speed technology—arms for the arms race. Using a variety of data, we document seven stylized empirical facts that align with these predictions. We then use the model to examine the private and social incentives for market design innovation. We show that the market design adoption game among exchanges is a repeated prisoner’s dilemma. If an exchange adopts a new market design that eliminates latency arbitrage, it would win share and earn economic rents; perhaps surprisingly, the usual coordination problems associated with getting a new market design off the ground are not central. However, imitation by other exchanges would result in an equilibrium that resembles the status quo with competitive trading fees, but now without the rents from the speed race. We conclude that although the social returns to adoption are large, the private returns are much smaller for an entrant exchange and negative for an incumbent that currently derives rents from the inefficiencies that the new design eliminates. Nevertheless, our analysis does not imply that a market-wide market design mandate is necessary. Rather, it points to a more circumscribed policy response that would tip the balance of incentives and encourage the “market to fix the market.” 

NBER Market Design Conference at Stanford, October 19-20

Here's the program and participant list:

Friday, October 19
8:30 am	Continental Breakfast
9:00 am	Olivier Terceiux, Top Trading Cycles in Prioritized Markets, a synthesis of:
	Yeon-Koo Che, Columbia University Olivier Tercieux, Paris School of Economics Top Trading Cycles in Prioritized Matching: An Irrelevance of Priorities in Large Markets
	Atila Abdulkadiroglu, Duke University and NBER Yeon-Koo Che, Columbia University Parag A. Pathak, Massachusetts Institute of Technology and NBER Alvin E. Roth, Stanford University and NBER Olivier Tercieux, Paris School of Economics Minimizing Justified Envy in School Choice: The Design of New Orleans’ OneApp
9:45 am	Surender Baswana, IIT Kanpur Partha Pratim Chakrabarti, IIT Kharagpur Sharat Chandran, IIT Bombay Yash Kanoria, Columbia University Utkarsh Patange, Columbia University Centralized Admissions for Engineering Colleges in India
10:30 am	Break
11:00 am	Onur Kesten, Carnegie Mellon University Selcuk Ozyurt, Sabanci University Efficient and Incentive Compatible Mediation: An Ordinal Market Design Approach
11:45 am	Dirk Bergemann, Yale University Benjamin A. Brooks, University of Chicago Stephen Morris, Princeton University Revenue Guarantee Equivalence
12:30 pm	Lunch Talk Michael Schwarz, Microsoft Market Design, Reputation Systems, UX, and the Cost of User Time
2:00 pm	Xiao Liu, Tsinghua University Zhixi Wan, Didi Chuxing Technology Co. Chenyu Yang, University of Rochester The Efficiency of A Dynamic Decentralized Two-Sided Matching Market
2:45 pm	Hongyao Ma, Harvard University Fei Fang, Carnegie Mellon University David Parkes, Harvard University Spatio-Temporal Pricing for Ridesharing Platforms
3:30 pm	Break
4:00 pm	Mohammad Akbarpour, Stanford University Farshad Fatemi, Sharif University of Technology Negar Matoorian, Stanford University A Monetary Market for Kidneys
4:45 pm	Alvin E. Roth, Stanford University and NBER Recent Developments in Kidney Exchange: Market Design in a Large World
5:30 pm	Adjourn
6:30 pm	Dinner Joya Restaurant 339 University Avenue Palo Alto, CA
Saturday, October 20
8:30 am	Continental Breakfast
9:00 am	Atila Abdulkadiroglu, Duke University and NBER Joshua Angrist, Massachusetts Institute of Technology and NBER Yusuke Narita, Yale University Parag A. Pathak, Massachusetts Institute of Technology and NBER Impact Evaluation in Matching Markets with General Tie-Breaking
9:45 am	Yuichiro Kamada, Harvard University Fuhito Kojima, Stanford University Fair Matching under Constraints: Theory and Applications (slides)
10:30 am	Break
11:00 am	Tamas Fleiner, Budapest University of Technology and Economics Ravi Jagadeesan, Harvard University Zsuzsanna Jankó, Corvinus University Alexander Teytelboym, University of Oxford Trading Networks with Frictions
11:45 am	Piotr Dworczak, Northwestern University Scott Duke Kominers, Harvard University Mohammad Akbarpour, Stanford University Redistribution through Markets
12:30 pm	Adjourn

Participant List

Atila Abdulkadiroglu Duke University and NBER

Nikhil Agarwal Massachusetts Institute of Technology and NBER

Mohammad Akbarpour Stanford University

Nick Arnosti Columbia University

Susan Athey Stanford University and NBER

Lawrence Ausubel University of Maryland

Moshe Babaioff Microsoft Research

Aaron L. Bodoh-Creed University of California at Berkeley

Eric Budish University of Chicago and NBER

Jeremy I. Bulow Stanford University and NBER

Gabriel Carroll Stanford University

Yeon-Koo Che Columbia University

Laura Doval California Institute of Technology

Jeremy T. Fox Rice University and NBER

Guillaume Haeringer Baruch College

Jonathan Hall Uber Technologies

John W. Hatfield University of Texas, Austin

Yinghua He Rice University

Ravi Jagadeesan Harvard University

Yuichiro Kamada Harvard University

Yash Kanoria Columbia University

Adam Kapor Princeton University and NBER

Jakub Kastl Princeton University and NBER

Onur Kesten Carnegie Mellon University

Fuhito Kojima Stanford University

Scott Duke Kominers Harvard University

Nicolas S. Lambert Stanford University

Shengwu Li Harvard University

Shuya Li Carnegie Mellon University

Hongyao Ma Harvard University

Mohammad Mahdian Google Research

Negar Matoorian Stanford University

Stephen Morris Princeton University

Yusuke Narita Yale University

Hamid Nazerzadeh University of Southern California

Afshin Nikzad Stanford University

Michael Ostrovsky Stanford University and NBER

Selcuk Ozyurt Sabanci University

Utkarsh Patange Columbia University

Parag A. Pathak Massachusetts Institute of Technology and NBER

Ali O. Polat Carnegie Mellon University

Daniel Quint University of Wisconsin

David H. Reiley Jr. Pandora Media, Inc

Alvin E. Roth Stanford University and NBER

Daniela Saban Stanford University

Michael Schwarz Microsoft

Ilya Segal Stanford University

Sven Seuken University of Zurich

Kane Sweeney eBay Research Labs

Steven Tadelis University of California at Berkeley and NBER

Olivier Tercieux Paris School of Economics

Zhixi Wan Didi Chuxing Technology Co.

Robert Wilson Stanford University

Xingye Wu Tsinghua University

Chenyu Yang University of Rochester

Haoxiang Zhu Massachusetts Institute of Technology and NBER