Showing posts sorted by relevance for query Parag. Sort by date Show all posts
Showing posts sorted by relevance for query Parag. Sort by date Show all posts

Friday, April 20, 2018

Parag Pathak wins the American Economic Association's Clark Medal

Here's the announcement, which describes Parag's work well:
Parag Pathak, Clark Medalist 2018

Parag Pathak

See my earlier posts involving Pathak here.

Congratulations Parag, on a well deserved award!
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Update:
Here's MIT's celebration of Parag:
Parag Pathak wins John Bates Clark Medal
MIT economist lauded for work on education, market-design mechanisms.
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here's an interview with Parag in the WSJ
Q&A: How an Economist Unlocked Hidden Truths About School Choice
Parag Pathak of MIT, winner of the John Bates Clark Medal for the nation’s most impressive economist under 40, says he 'fell into the topic'

Here's the Economist's coverage:
A market-design economist wins the John Bates Clark medal
Parag Pathak’s market designs have influenced the lives of 1m schoolchildren

Here's the local angle:
Corning native wins John Bates Clark Medal
"The American Economic Association recently announced its decision to award the Clark Medal to Dr. Parag Pathak, a Corning native and graduate of Corning-Painted Post High School."

Tuesday, February 22, 2011

NYC school choice--cost overruns

David Chen in the NY Times has an article on cost overruns for the new school choice system which includes the high school choice system that Atila Abdulkadiroglu, Parag Pathak, and I helped design. (This is a good place to point out that we did our work pro bono--we didn't charge a penny. What we did get was the relevant choice data and the freedom to use it when we published papers based on our work.) More on our collaboration with NYC Dept of Ed, and our interaction with one of their software vendors, after the Times story, at which point I'll also draw some lessons about software vendors for school districts interested in designing better school choice systems. The article makes clear that the new high school choice system in NYC is viewed as a great success, but that the city had big problems with its software contractors.

Cost Overruns Found in Technology for Placement of High School Students

"For the last several years, the city’s Department of Education has boasted about its record of placing students in the high schools of their choice, thanks to a new computerized process. But if the ends were successful, the means were anything but, according to the city comptroller.

"In an audit released Thursday, the comptroller, John C. Liu, criticized the department’s handling of the finances of the computer system, which is modeled after a system that matches medical school graduates with residency programs.

"Instead of adhering to its original contract of $3.6 million for the system’s development, the audit found, the department spent $13.5 million. Then the original project was deemed insufficient and it had to be scrapped and the city had to spend an additional $9.4 million — and counting — for a new system.

"The gulf of more than $19 million between expected and projected costs reflected “poor planning” and raised concerns, the comptroller’s office said, about “similar cost overruns” for all technology projects.

"The city’s original contract was with Spherion, a company whose reputation was sullied in December when several of its consultants were indicted by federal prosecutors. The consultants were accused of concocting an $80 million corruption scheme related to another technological initiative, an automated payroll system called CityTime. The city hired a new vendor for the Education Department in 2008.

"In a letter to Cathleen P. Black, the schools chancellor, H. Tina Kim, the city’s deputy comptroller for audits, wrote, “Clearly, savings could have been achieved with better planning and coordination.”
...
"In response to the audit, city officials said that fast-moving changes in facets of education had necessitated upgrades — at additional costs — to the computer system. The program had to accommodate middle-school choices, prekindergarten admissions and programs for gifted elementary-school children.

"Jack Zarin-Rosenfeld, a spokesman for the Education Department, said: “Before this administration, we had a high school admissions system that was rife with political patronage and too often gamed by the well-connected, leaving students with the most need behind. Thanks to our policy changes and investments, we have greatly expanded equity and choice for all of our families, and provided more high-quality opportunities on a scale larger than any other city in the country.

"With the advent of mayoral control of the schools shortly after Mr. Bloomberg took office in 2002, the Education Department overhauled the nerve-wracking and lotterylike process by which students were admitted to high schools. In the past, students could select only five schools, but some students were admitted to more than one, leaving the city’s best students to mull over their options after applying. But under the new High School Application Processing System, students are allowed to list 12 choices, and are matched to just one school.

"For the 2010-11 school year, 52 percent of the roughly 80,000 high-school-bound students who applied were matched to their first choices; in 2004, by contrast, that figure was 33.6 percent.

"In 2005, Joel I. Klein, then the schools chancellor, praised the new system, saying “this process, frankly, was a long time quite broken.”

"The original contract was amended eight times between 2003 and 2008, adding almost $10 million in costs, chiefly to adjust to changes in school policies. And those amendments, according to Ms. Kim’s letter, “reflect poor planning” and “appear to be an admission that the changes that occurred in D.O.E. were not expected or considered” in developing the new system.

"By 2008, the city had concluded that it needed a new vendor to develop a new and more flexible technology system, and hired Vanguard Direct Inc., under a contract expiring in 2013. "

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The story reminds me of how in 2003, when I was first contacted by Jeremy Lack at the New York City Department of Education and asked to design a choice process, the city had already contracted with Spherion to be its software provider. It quickly became apparent that Spherion's core competence was getting contracts with the city. There were a number of indications that they were going to be difficult to work with. Two incidents stand out in my memory.

First, Spherion had prepared a plan that called for programming lots of modules to knit together different aspects of school choice. I recall a conference call in which several Spherion people participated together with Jeremy Lack, me and Parag Pathak, in which Parag and I pointed out that the (deferred acceptance algorithm) architecture we proposed would require vastly less programming to accomplish than the original contract allowed for. One of the Spherion people pointed out that, in that case, a contract modification would have to be negotiated, at additional cost to the city.

Second, the way the project progressed is that, as we agreed on particular design elements, Parag and Atila would each program a version (in Matlab and Perl, respectively) that they would check against each other by running test problems, and the algorithm would be passed on to Spherion. At one point we asked Spherion how they were planning to check that their programming was accurate, and they replied that checking the software wasn't called for in the contract (and, besides, they explained, there was a logical inconsistency in the notion that you could check the accuracy of software, since you would have to design software to do that, and that software would have to be checked...). So Parag and Atila did the software checking too.

Of course we programmed only the fun stuff, the choice algorithm, and a delivered system has to have lots of data entry and processing software, so that preference lists can be entered by middle school guidance counselors, etc. Still, I'm staggered by the cost figures reported by the Times. It's hard to imagine that a gold plated system, with 100% profit margins for the contractors, couldn't have come in at 10% of the reported cost.

Part of the problem, I suspect, is that the contract with Spherion didn't give the software to NYC, but left it with Spherion which was supposed to run the match, which I think increased charges each year. When we subsequently helped Boston redesign its school choice algorithm (with Tayfun Sonmez now also playing a critical role on the team), we worked in a similar way, but Boston ended up owning the software and running the match itself. This is a better financial/ownership model.

Neil Dorosin, the NYC DOE official who had the hands-on responsibility for implementing the new high school match, subsequently left the DOE to form a non profit institute to help school districts implement choice plans, the Institute for Innovation in Public School Choice (IIPSC). Atila, Parag and I are on his Board. Building on his considerable NYC experience, Neil probably now knows as much as anyone about the details of building a school choice system, and how the parts fit together, based on his experience not only in NY but in school districts around the country with whom he's been in contact.


Here's a paper in which the NYC high school choice system is described in detail, along with some details of its performance:
Abdulkadiroglu, Atila , Parag A. Pathak, and Alvin E. Roth, "Strategy-proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the NYC High School Match,'' American Economic Review, 99, 5, Dec. 2009, pp1954-1978. And here are the AER links at which you can access the Appendix and Download the Data Software

Sunday, August 1, 2021

Market design, redesigned (in startups and university labs)

Market design is evolving, and new ways of organizing it are being explored. 

In my post yesterday, I talked about the early work on school choice that Atila Abdulkadiroglu, Parag Pathak, Tayfun Sonmez and I did under the auspices of Boston schools Superintendent Tom Payzant. The market design by economists in Boston, as with the earlier successful effort in New York City, was conducted as part of our research work as professors.  Not a penny changed hands, and we all felt good about that.

But if there was a flaw in that working arrangement, it was that no contracts were signed, and so as staff turnover took place in school districts, and the individuals we had dealt with departed, the district's institutional memory eroded, and they didn't always remember to turn to us when difficulties arose that we could have helped them with. Partly to address that, and to have at least one person able to devote time to approaching school districts, Parag and Atila and I supported Neil Dorosin in founding the non-profit  Institute for Innovation in Public School Choice, which during its lifetime helped school choice in a number of American cities, including Denver, New Orleans, and Washington D.C.

Parag and Atila went on to be founding members of MIT's School Effectiveness and Inequality Intiative, which just this week was "relaunched" with a different team as MIT Blueprint Labs, which aims to build on MIT's strengths not just in school choice but in a much wider area of market design and policy analysis, and to be a lab with a large staff and extensive fundraising:

Launch announcement of MIT Blueprint Labs


Featuring



 
Professor Parag Pathak
Faculty Director
MIT SEII / Blueprint Labs
Research spotlight: K-12 education

 


 
Professor Joshua Angrist
Faculty Director
MIT SEII / Blueprint Labs
Research spotlight: Higher education and the workforce

 


 
Professor Nikhil Agarwal
Faculty Director, Health Care
MIT SEII / Blueprint Labs
Research spotlight: Health care




 
Eryn Heying
Executive Director
MIT SEII / Blueprint Labs

 

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Update: and here's the Blueprint Labs new (announced Aug. 11) website: https://blueprintlabs.mit.edu/

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In a related development, Parag has cofounded a new for-profit Ed-tech startup called Avela, that plans to spread the technologies he's helped pioneer.  A for-profit firm has some funding, employment and investing opportunities that aren't available to non-profits or university labs, let alone to teams of professors organized informally. And as in the Blueprint Lab, they hope that the tools they will develop will be readily applicable to quite a broad range of matching markets and market designs.

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These various efforts look to me like design experiments themselves, in the search for sustainable ways of making market design a permanent part of not only the research that economists do, but of the practical effects we hope to foster.

Observing all this from the West Coast, and over several decades, I can't help noticing that these institutional changes have been accompanied by team changes, and shifting collaborations among market designers.  

There are also a growing number of different kinds of economists (and computer scientists, operations researchers and businesses) involved in designing and assessing markets, and market design has not only changed markets, but changed the way economists work, in many small and large ways.  Econometricians and development economists have led the way in organizing large labs, and market design may be heading in that direction as well. Big and small tech firms have also started to think of market design as among their core competencies, and as a discipline they should be hiring.
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Here in California, I'd be remiss if I didn't mention that my colleague Paul Milgrom has for a long time engaged in auction design through his for-profit company Auctionomics.
And Susan Athey is the faculty director of a big lab at Stanford using different technologies in other areas of market design:  the Golub Capital Social Impact Lab, which describes itself this way:

"We use digital technology and social science research to improve the effectiveness of leading social sector organizations.

"Based out of Stanford GSB, the lab is a research initiative of affiliated academics and staff, as well as researchers and students, who are passionate about conducting research that guides and improves the process of innovation.

"Research Approach

We collaborate with a wide range of organizations, from large firms to smaller startups, for-profits to nonprofits, and NGOs to governments, to conduct research. Then, we apply and disseminate our insights to achieve social impact at large scale."

Saturday, July 31, 2021

Tom Payzant, Boston schools superintendent who reformed school choice, dies at 80

 Tom Payzant played a critical role in transforming Boston's school choice from an immediate acceptance algorithm that exposed students and families to complex strategic risk when navigating the system, to a deferred acceptance algorithm that simplified their participation. As Superintendent of Boston Public Schools, Tom came to understand those issues well, and acted on them.

Here's his obit in the Boston Globe.

Thomas Payzant, whose education vision lifted Boston’s schools, dies at 80, By Bryan Marquard

and here's the statement from Boston Public Schools:

SUPERINTENDENT'S STATEMENT ON THE PASSING OF TOM PAYZANT


Here's a pic I took of Atila Abdulkadiroglu, Parag Pathak, and Tayfun Sonmez when we met with Payzant and his colleagues at Boston Public School headquarters, during the years we worked with BPS, starting around 2003.

Atila Abdulkadiroglu, Parag Pathak and Tayfun Sonmez at Boston Public School headquarters

Here's a paper that came out of those meetings, describing the deliberations that ultimately led BPS to adopt a deferred acceptance algorithm design for it's school choice system.


Over the course of those years, I was privileged to watch Parag evolve from a super smart young grad student to being a leader in the design of school choice.

I'll post tomorrow about some of Parag's latest efforts to bring the work associated with the design and evaluation of school choice, and market design more generally, into the world of startup companies and big university labs.

Sunday, December 6, 2015

Improving Schools in MA: conference in Boston tomorrow

The conference in Boston tomorrow looks like a nice mix of academic researchers and education officials:
 Leveraging Research and Policy to Improve K-12 Education in Massachusetts
December 7, 2015, 8:00am - 5:30pm

Overview:
A num­ber of impor­tant issues are now on the state K-12 edu­ca­tion pol­icy agenda. In the past few years, schol­ars have pro­duced a wide range of results highly rel­e­vant for this agenda. The con­fer­ence is meant to bring mul­ti­ple stake­hold­ers together for a dis­cus­sion of research find­ings and future work that will be help­ful at this vital time.

Audience:
Policymakers, researchers, non-profit lead­ers and edu­ca­tion jour­nal­ists will be invited.

Agenda:
Click here for the agenda.

Registration:
Registration is now closed. Any jour­nal­ists who wish to attend should con­tact Annice Correia Gabel (acorreia@mit.edu).

Location:Federal Reserve Bank of Boston
600 Atlantic Ave #100
Boston, MA 02210

Keynote Speaker:Roland Fryer, Henry Lee Professor of Economics at Harvard University and fac­ulty direc­tor of the Education Innovation Laboratory.

Conference Organizers:
Katharine Bradbury, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston
Mary Burke, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston
Robert Triest, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston
Joshua Angrist, MIT and SEII
Parag Pathak, MIT and SEII

Contact:Please address any ques­tions to acorreia@mit.edu.

Among the talks are some that touch on school choice: 

Charters Without Lotteries: Testing Takeovers in New Orleans and Boston Atila AbdulkadiroÄŸlu, Duke University Joshua Angrist, Massachusetts Institute of Technology and NBER Peter Hull, Massachusetts Institute of Technology* Parag A. Pathak, Massachusetts Institute of Technology and NBER

Leveraging Lotteries for School Value-Added: Testing and Estimation Joshua Angrist, Massachusetts Institute of Technology and NBER* Peter Hull, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Parag A. Pathak, Massachusetts Institute of Technology and NBER Christopher Walters, University of California, Berkeley and NBER

Overview of Unified Enrollment in American Cities Parag A. Pathak, Massachusetts Institute of Technology and NBER


Monday, December 3, 2018

Arrow Lecture at Columbia (video): Market design (with discussion by Parag Pathak and Joe Stiglitz)

Here's a video of the lecture I gave on Columbia on November 8, in honor and in memory of Ken Arrow. My title was "Market Design in Large Worlds: The Example of Kidney Exchange."
My discussants were Parag Pathak and Joe Stiglitz, and you can see them too.
I used slides (and so did Parag), but they don't seem to have made it fully onstage in the video.  But the audio is good, and you can see how good looking we all are...



The theme of my talk is that one big lesson of market design is that participants have big strategy sets, and this has implications for, among other things, how marketplaces need to be adaptively maintained.  One of Parag's examples in his discussion is how more NYC schools have begun to screen students since more effective choice was introduced, and how this may sometimes work against the goals that increased choice was intended to achieve (so that the NYCDOE is working to reduce screening by schools...).

Thursday, October 3, 2019

Parag Pathak celebrated in Science News

Science News advises us that Parag Pathak is worth watching...

Parag Pathak uses data and algorithms to make public education fairer
After designing school choice systems, he’s studying student performance

(https://www.sciencenews.org/article/parag-pathak-sn-10-scientists-to-watch)


"If he could be granted one wish, he says he would design a school system from scratch. How, he asks, would you set up that system to be as equitable as possible?"


Wednesday, May 27, 2015

Fuhito Kojima and Parag Pathak receive the 2016 Social Choice and Welfare Prize

 Congrats to Fuhito and Parag:)

FUHITO KOJIMA AND PARAG PATHAK RECEIVE THE HEIGHT SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE PRIZE

A jury composed of Claude d'Aspremont (chair, President-elect of the Society for Social Choice and Welfare), Vincent Conitzer, Bhaskar Dutta (President of the Society for Social Choice and Welfare), Marc Fleurbaey and Tim Roughgarden has chosen to award the height Social Choice and Welfare Prize jointly to Fuhito Kojima (Stanford  University) and Parag Pathak(MIT).

The purpose of the Social Choice and Welfare Prize is to honour young scholars of excellent accomplishment in the area of social choice theory and welfare economics. The laureate should be 40 years or less as of January of the year when the International Meeting of the Society for Social Choice and Welfare is scheduled to take place. During this meeting, the prize winner(s) will give a one-hour lecture.

The SCW prize medal "La Pensée" ("The Thought") is due to Raymond Delamarre (1890-1986), a rather well-known French sculptor associated with what has been called "Art Deco" (Chrysler Building and Empire State Building in New York, the architects Mallet-Stevens or Le Corbusier in France). He is in particular famous for his work at the entrance of the Suez Canal. A web site: www.atelier-raymond-delamarre.fr.



PAST LAUREATES :

2014: VINCENT CONITZER and TIM ROUGHGARDEN

2012 : LARS EHLERS and ADAM MEIROWITZ

2010 :  FRANZ DIETRICH and CHRISTIAN LIST

2008 :  TAYFUN SOMNEZ

2006  : JOHN DUGGAN

2004 :  FRANCOIS MANIQUET

2002 : MATTHEW JACKSON

Wednesday, December 9, 2020

Top trading cycles (and recollections of New Orleans), in AER:Insights, by AbdulkadiroÄŸlu, Che, Pathak, Roth and Tercieux

A decade ago I was part of the team that designed the new school choice system for the New Orleans Recovery School District.  On the District side, the effort was led by Gabriela (Gaby) Fighetti. The design team was organized by the (then) Institute for Innovation in Public School Choice (IIPSC), led by Neil Dorosin. The heavy lifting on the design was done by Atila AbdulkadiroÄŸlu and Parag Pathak.  Until the district expanded and developed more complex requirements for expressing priorities (and we had to switch to a deferred acceptance algorithm) the design was based on a top trading cycles (TTC) mechanism. It was the first time I know of that TTC was adopted and deployed in a widely used market design. It came to be called OneApp (since it replaced the old system of applications to each school with one application followed by the matching algorithm).

Some of the data from that system make their way into this new (primarily theory) paper, about some of the distinctive virtues of top trading cycles. The paper itself is a merged effort between the New Orleans design team, and work on TTC initiated separately by various combinations of Che, Tercieux and AbdulkadiroÄŸlu.

Efficiency, Justified Envy, and Incentives in Priority-Based Matching

By Atila AbdulkadiroÄŸlu, Yeon-Koo Che, Parag A. Pathak, Alvin E. Roth and Olivier Tercieux, 

American Economic Review: Insights, December, 2020, 2, (4), 425–442.

Abstract: Top Trading cycles (TTC) is Pareto efficient and strategy-proof in priority-based matching, but so are other mechanisms including serial dictatorship. We show that TTC minimizes justified envy among all Pareto-efficient and strategy-proof mechanisms in one-to-one matching. In many-to-one matching, TTC admits less justified envy than serial dictatorship in an average sense. Empirical evidence from New Orleans OneApp and Boston Public Schools shows that TTC has significantly less justified envy than serial dictatorship. 

The first footnote of the paper suggests something of it's long history, and says in part:

"This paper supersedes “The Role of Priorities in Assigning Indivisible Objects: A Characterization of Top Trading Cycles,” cited by others as Abdulkadiroglu, Atila, and ˇ Yeon-Koo Che (2010) or Abdulkadiroglu, Atila, ˇ Yeon-Koo Che, and Olivier Tercieux (2010), and “Minimizing Justified Envy in School Choice: The Design of New Orleans’ OneApp” (2017) by Abdulkadiroglu, Atila, ˇ Yeon-Koo Che, Parag A. Pathak, Alvin E. Roth, and Olivier Tercieux. Roth is a member of the scientific advisory board of the Institute for Innovation in Public School Choice (IIPSC). IIPSC was involved in designing OneApp in New Orleans. Abdulkadiroglu, Pathak, and Roth also advised Boston Public Schools and New York City’s Department of Education on designing their student assignment systems, discussed herein. This article does not represent the views of the New Orleans Recovery School District or any other school district."

And here's a paragraph that offers a different kind of historical context:

"In 2011–2012, the New Orleans Recovery School District pioneered a unified enrollment process called OneApp, integrating admissions to all types of schools under a single offer system. Officials identified three major priority groups: sibling, applying from a closing school, and geography. The discussion about mechanism centered on the trade-off between efficiency and eliminating justified envy, and eventually TTC was selected based on the desire for “as many students as possible to get into their top choice school” (New Orleans Recovery School District 2012a). Vanacore (2011) and Vanacore (2012) provide additional details."


In conclusion:

"In the field, there is growing momentum for DA over TTC (see Abdulkadiroglu 2013 and Pathak 2017). This trend may be driven by a first-mover advantage of DA and its use in other contexts. New York City and Boston adopted DA in 2003 and 2005, and DA is widely used in residency matching (Roth and Peranson 1999). In 2013, New Orleans also switched from TTC to DA. One of the most important reasons for this switch involved challenges in explaining how TTC handles priorities.  Under DA, officials could explain that an applicant did not obtain an assignment at a higher ranked seat because another applicant with higher priority was assigned to that seat. At the time of the change, a clear explanation of how TTC reflects priorities was not available.

"It remains to be seen whether TTC will be used in the field again. But policymakers cannot ignore efficiency, which TTC delivers but DA does not. For this reason, TTC should remain a serious policy option. Our formal results may make it easier to explain how TTC incorporates priorities. It’s possible that TTC would have been chosen in some settings with knowledge of this result, and at the very least, advocates now have a new argument in its favor."

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Some long ago posts on school choice in New Orleans:


Saturday, November 19, 2011

Thursday, February 2, 2012

Tuesday, February 7, 2012

Sunday, May 12, 2013

Looking back at the first year of New Orleans' One App school choice system


Tuesday, October 1, 2013

Wednesday, February 11, 2015

Tuesday, August 18, 2015

A look back at school choice in New Orleans

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Principal Investigator(s):  r Principal Investigator(s) Atila Abdulkadiroglu, Duke University; Yeon-Koo Che, Columbia University; Parag Pathak, MIT; Alvin Roth, Stanford University; Olivier Tercieux, Paris School of Economics
 

Monday, July 23, 2012

Parag Pathak wins Presidential Early Career Award for Scientists and Engineers

It was announced in Washington today that Parag Pathak (who is in Istanbul giving the Shapley Lecture at the World Congress of the Game Theory Society) is one of the winners of the Presidential Early Career Awards for Scientists and Engineers: President Obama Honors Outstanding Early-Career Scientists

"President Obama today named 96 researchers as recipients of the Presidential Early Career Awards for Scientists and Engineers, the highest honor bestowed by the United States Government on science and engineering professionals in the early stages of their independent research careers."


I've had lots of occasions to blog about Parag and his work...

Wednesday, May 20, 2015

IIPSC: the Institute for Innovation in Public School Choice

Over at the Dell Foundation (which funds a lot of work on public school choice), they have a Q&A on school choice and enrollment: Neil Dorosin and Gaby Fighetti from The Institute for Innovation in Public School Choice

"The Institute for Innovation in Public School Choice (IIPSC) is a nonprofit organization with a mission to support groups of people in cities in designing and implementing school choice and enrollment processes. They work with consortiums of people in cities to bring them through a process they call market design: creating a group of policies and operations that, when taken together as a whole, govern the way kids apply to and are accepted to schools.
IIPSC is hosting a conference on May 20, 2015 where education leaders from all over theIIPSC_QSO_051915_Blog_callout2 country will gather to immerse themselves in unified enrollment theory and practice. Practitioners from cities that have already implemented or are implementing unified enrollment – Cleveland, Chicago, Denver, Detroit, Indianapolis, New Orleans, New York City, Newark, Oakland, and Washington DC – will be on hand to share their knowledge and experiences. The goal is for all participants to emerge from the conference with a concrete set of knowledge and tools to use in advancing this critical work in their own cities.
Neil Dorosin is the Executive Director and Gaby Fighetti is the Deputy Executive Director of IIPSC. Read more about their work below.
...
How has IIPSC effectively launched this current reform movement with unified enrollment?
Neil: IIPSC principals first worked together in New York City in the very early Joel Klein years, and in this environment there were almost no charter schools. This illustrates that the ideas within unified enrollment are not specific to any particular type of school- charter schools, district schools, non-public schools, etc. They are ideas that allow administrators to serve families better. To bring efficiency, equity, and transparency to enrollment and choice systems.
When we began working with Denver we realized that what we were doing requires district and charter sectors to work together in a whole new way, and these changes are fundamental to the way cities manage school choice and then hopefully implement portfolio reform strategy. We are committed to political neutrality and always make sure that people in cities know that our work is meant to advance healthy choice processes, not to advance any political position. We love the fact that people in cities all over the country now see the ideas and guiding principles of unified enrollment systems as things that they believe in and want to advance in their cities.
Tell us about the team who helped design the unified enrollment system.
NeilAl Roth shared the Nobel Prize in economics for applying matching theory science to solve real world problems. Most famous examples include the Medical Residency match (matching residents and hospitals), kidney donor exchange programs (identifying compatible pairs of donors and recipients from VERY long waitlists, and saving many lives), and for unified enrollment work.Parag Pathak was his student, and is now a full professor at MIT. Atila Abdulkadiroglu co-wrote the seminal paper on the market design approach to school choice in 2003 and joined Al and Parag in the first schools project – in New York City in 2003. Al, Parag and Atila are all now members of our advisory board and active participants in our projects with cities.
It turns out that matching science can be adapted to solve these and other problems, and to make people’s live better in real and meaningful ways. We are motivated by this every day."

Saturday, June 8, 2019

Matching in Practice Workshop in October, in Gothenburg, with Parag Pathak. Call for papers.

The 16th Matching in Practice Workshop will be in Gothenburg. The workshop will begin with lunch (12pm) on the 4th of October finishing early afternoon 5th of October (around 4pm), 2019.
The workshop will bring together researchers working on the various aspects of assignment and matching in education, labour and related markets, with a view to actively foster interactions between the various approaches used in this area of research (theory, experiments, analysis of field data, policy/market design) and to share expertise on the actual functioning of these markets in Europe.

The workshop will include presentations from presenters of selected papers, a keynote delivered by Parag Pathak (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) and a policy roundtable on “School choice in practice”, which will bring together policy makers and practitioners.
Interested participants should submit their papers to mip2019@economics.gu.se before 15 August 2019. The programme will be announced shortly afterwards.

Keynote speakers

Parag Pathak, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Participants

Researchers working on the various aspects of assignment and matching, primarily in (but not limited to) education and related labour markets are invited to attend the workshop. There is no participation fee. Travel and accommodation expenses can only be covered for presenters of selected papers. PhD students or early stage researchers who would like to participate the workshop can contact us for possible financial support for travel and accommodation.

Practicalities

The conference will take place at the School of Business, Economics and Law (Handelshögskolan), Vasagatan 1, Gothenburg.

Scientific Committee

Thilo Klein (ZEW Mannheim), Alex Westkamp (University of Cologne), Li Chen (University of Gothenburg), Joseph Vecci (University of Gothenburg).

Important dates

15 August: Deadline for submission
1 September: Notification about acceptance
3 September: Registration deadline

Sunday, July 1, 2018

Ariel Pakes gives the Arrow Lecture in Jerusalem

If you're in Jerusalem tomorrow, you have a chance to hear Ariel Pakes' Arrow Lecture:

17:00-18:00 Ariel Pakes, Arrow lecture:
Learning and Equilibrium in A New Market

It is part of

The 29th Jerusalem Summer School of Economics

Industrial Organization

Event date: June 26 - July 5, 2018 

Organizers:
    Eric Maskin, General Director (Harvard University)
    Ariel Pakes, Codirector (Harvard University)
    Elchanan Ben-Porath,Codirector (The Hebrew University)


    Industrial Organization studies how markets are structured and the way they respond to changes in conditions (e.g., to policy revisions). The field draws heavily on both theory and empirical work, and both will be amply represented in the Summer School. We will focus on several topics of current research interest: vertical markets, allocation in markets without prices, market dynamics, and regulation.

      
    List of speakers:
    NAMEAFFILIATIONEMAILTOPICS
    Nikhil AgarwalMassachusetts Institute of Technologyagarwaln@mit.eduThe analysis of centralized market allocation mechanisms
    John AskerThe University of Californiajohnaskecr@econ.ucla.eduThe analysis of regulation
    Alon Eizenberg The Hebrew University of Jerusalem      aloneiz@mscc.huji.ac.ilThe analysis of regulation
    Myrto KalouptsidiHarvard University myrto@fas.harvard.eduThe analysis of market dynamics
    Robin LeeHarvard Universityrobinlee@fas.harvard.eduThe   analysis of   vertical markets
    Eric Maskin         Harvard Universityemaskin@fas.harvard.edu The analysis of market dynamics
    Ariel PakesHarvard Universityapakes@fas.harvard.eduThe analysis of market dynamics
    Parag PathakMassachusetts Institute of Technologyppathak@mit.eduThe analysis of centralized market allocation mechanisms
    Mike WhinstonMassachusetts Institute of Technologywhinston@mit.eduThe analysis of vertical markets
    Ali YurukogluStanford Universityayurukog@stanford.eduThe analysis of regulation
Here's a link to the full program.

There will be several sessions on matching markets:
Wednesday, July 4
9:30-11:00 Parag Pathak: Introduction to Matching Theory
11:00-11:30 Coffee Break
11:30-13:00 Nikhil Agarwal: Revealed Preference for Matching Markets

Thursday, July 5
9:30-11:00 Parag Pathak: Market Design Meets Research Design
11:00-11:30 Coffee break

11:30-13:00 Nikhil Agarwal: The Organization of Organ Markets