SITE 2023 Conference Call For Papers

 There are 18 sessions at Stanford SITE this summer, something for everyone. (You can submit papers at the link.)  Regular readers of this blog may be particularly interested in Session 3: Market Design; Session 4: Dynamic Games, Contracts, and Markets; Session 5: Psychology and Economics; Session 6: Experimental Economics, all described below.

SITE 2023 Conference Call For Papers

Session 1: Empirical Implementation of Theoretical Models of Strategic Interaction and Dynamic Behavior

Wednesday, July 12, 2023, 9:00am - Friday, July 14, 2023, 5:00pm

Landau Economics Building, 579 Jane Stanford Way, Stanford, CA 94305

The unifying theme of the papers for this session is a theoretical model of an economic interaction and an empirical implementation of this theoretical model using actual data.  This year will have a more concentrated focus on topics where the theoretical economic model must also respect both technology and legal institutions governing the economic environment as well as the optimizing behavior and strategic behavior of economic agents. For example, in the case of wholesale electricity markets with significant amounts intermittent renewables and storage devices that can either inject or withdraw electricity, simplified economic models that do not account for the physics of power flows, non-convexities dispatchable generation units operate (such as start-up costs, limited range of output levels, and limited rates of change in their output levels), and how forward financial markets can limit the impact of these non-convexities and intermittency risks are increasingly ill-suited for policy analysis or the assessment of market design changes. Recent experience with the simplified markets for both natural gas and electricity in Australia, Europe and the United States provide ample real-world evidence of the need for economic models that incorporate these factors for effective policy analysis and market design.  There is an increasing number of engineers that recognize strategic behavior by market participants that understand the physics of power systems and natural gas systems operation can create economically and environmentally harmful market outcomes.

The goal of this session is to encourage cross-field interaction between the increasing number of engineers with some knowledge of economic models of strategic behavior and economists that understand how to use data to estimate theory-based econometric models of strategic behavior in complex economic environments but do not understand how to incorporate into the empirical models the physical constraints and legal framework that are having a first-order impact on market participant behavior and market outcomes. There are many other examples where these same issues arise in modeling strategic behavior such as air travel and freight transportation where this same interaction between engineers and economist would be particularly fruitful.  The session welcomes these kinds of papers from both economists and engineers as well.

ORGANIZED BY: Christoph Graf, New York University, Frank Wolak, Stanford University

DEADLINE FOR PAPER SUBMISSION April 15, 2023

Session 2: International Macroeconomics and Finance

Monday, July 31, 2023, 9:00am - Tuesday, August 1, 2023, 5:00pm

This session is on international macroeconomics and finance, focusing on global capital allocations, the role of the dollar, the emergence of China, and tax havens. Both empirics and theory.

ORGANIZED BY: Antonio Coppola, Stanford University  Matteo Maggiori, Stanford University  Jesse Schreger, Columbia University  Chenzi Xu, Stanford University

DEADLINE FOR PAPER SUBMISSION May 1, 2023

Session 3: Market Design

August 3, 2023, 9:00am - Friday, August 4, 2023, 5:00pm

Landau Economics Building, 579 Jane Stanford Way, Stanford, CA 94305

This session seeks to bring together researchers in economics, computer science, and operations research working on market design.  We’re aiming for a roughly even split between theory papers and empirical and experimental papers.  In addition to faculty members, we also invite graduate students on the job market to submit their paper for shorter graduate student talks.

ORGANIZED BY: Mohammad Akbarpour, Stanford University  Piotr Dworczak, Northwestern University  Ravi Jagadeesan, Stanford University  Shengwu Li, Harvard University  Ellen Muir, Harvard University

DEADLINE FOR PAPER SUBMISSION May 1, 2023

Session 4: Dynamic Games, Contracts, and Markets

Monday, August 7, 2023, 9:00am - Wednesday, August 9, 2023, 5:00pm

This session is to bring together microeconomic theorists working on dynamic games and contracts with more applied theorists working in macro, finance, organizational economics, and other fields. There are two aims. First, this is a venue to discuss the latest questions and techniques facing researchers working in dynamic games and contracts. Second, to foster interdisciplinary discussion between scholars working on parallel topics in different disciplines and help raise awareness among theorists of the open questions in other fields.

ORGANIZED BY: Arjada Bardhi, Duke University  Simon Board, University of California Los Angeles  Erik Madsen, New York University  Joao Ramos, University of Southern California  Andrzej Skrzypacz, Stanford University  Takuo Sugaya, Stanford University

DEADLINE FOR PAPER SUBMISSION  April 15, 2023

Session 5: Psychology and Economics

Tuesday, August 8, 2023, 9:00am - Wednesday, August 9, 2023, 5:00pm

LOCATION: John A. and Cynthia Fry Gunn Building, 366 Galvez Street, Stanford

This session brings together researchers working on issues at the intersection of psychology and economics. The segment will focus on evidence of and explanations for non-standard choice patterns, as well as the positive and normative implications of those patterns in a wide range of economic decision-making contexts, such as lifecycle consumption and savings, workplace productivity, health, and prosocial behavior. The presentations will frequently build upon insights from other disciplines, including psychology and sociology. Theoretical, empirical, and experimental studies will be included. 

ORGANIZED BY: B. Douglas Bernheim, Stanford University  John Beshears, Harvard University  Vincent Crawford, University of Oxford & University of California San Diego  David Laibson, Harvard University  Ulrike Malmendier, University of California Berkeley

DEADLINE FOR PAPER SUBMISSION  May 8, 2023

Session 6: Experimental Economics

Thursday, August 10, 2023, 9:00am - Friday, August 11, 2023, 5:00pm

LOCATION: John A. and Cynthia Fry Gunn Building, 366 Galvez Street, S

This session will be dedicated to advances in experimental economics combining laboratory and field-experimental methodologies with theoretical and psychological insights on decision-making, strategic interaction and policy. We are inviting papers in lab experiments, field experiments and their combination that test theory, demonstrate the importance of psychological phenomena, and explore social and policy issues. In addition to senior faculty members, invited presenters will include junior faculty as well as graduate students.

ORGANIZED BY:  Christine Exley, Harvard University  Kirby Nielsen, California Institute of Technology  Muriel Niederle, Stanford University  Alvin Roth, Stanford University  Lise Vesterlund, University of Pittsburgh

DEADLINE FOR PAPER SUBMISSION May 8, 2023

Session 7: Political Economic Theory

Thursday, August 10, 2023, 9:00am - Friday, August 11, 2023, 5:00am

LOCATION: Stanford Graduate School of Business, M104,

This session will bring together researchers from political science and economics who apply economic theory to the study of politics. This includes work in the areas of voting theory, political bargaining, policy-making and implementation, lobbying and regulation, and the media and information environment in which politics takes place. The session will encourage productive dialogue between researchers in economic theory that have developed ideas and tools relevant to the study of politics, and those in political science who study questions and topics that can be addressed by economic theory.

ORGANIZED BY: Nina Bobkova, Rice University  Steven Callander, Stanford University Hülya Eraslan, Rice University  Dana Foarta, Stanford University  Federica Izzo, University of California San Diego

DEADLINE FOR PAPER SUBMISSION May 10, 2023

Session 8: Politically Feasible Environmental and Energy Policy

Monday, August 14, 2023, 9:00am - Tuesday, August 15, 2023, 5:00pm

LOCATION: Landau Economics Building, 

This session will feature empirical papers evaluating environmental and energy (E&E) policy decisions by both governments and firms. The session will focus on papers that deliver useful and politically feasible insights on how to make E&E policy more efficient and equitable. We welcome papers studying topics such as the following:

Quantitative evaluations of past or potential future E&E policy changes, 

How to improve the public appeal of economically efficient E&E policies,

Evaluations of voluntary corporate actions such as net-zero commitments and ESG investing screens, and

Empirical evaluations of utility programs, such as energy efficiency, load management, and pricing reform.

One potential downstream impact of this session could be a concrete set of politically feasible suggestions for efficient and equitable E&E policy reforms for governments and firms.

In addition to standard paper presentations, we will leave time for structured conversations to encourage new interactions and collaborations.

ORGANIZED BY: Hunt Allcott, Stanford University  Meredith Fowlie, University of California Berkeley  Lawrence Goulder, Stanford University  Joe Shapiro, University of California Berkeley

DEADLINE FOR PAPER SUBMISSION May 15, 2023

Session 9: Climate Finance, Innovation, and Challenges for Policy

Wednesday, August 16, 2023, 9:00am - Thursday, August 17, 2023, 5:00pm

LOCATION: Landau Economics Building, 579 Jane Stanford Way, Stanford, CA 94305

The session would bring together research on how to best finance companies that innovate on green technologies, the pricing of climate risks in financial markets, banks' exposures to climate risk and their regulation, the impact of monetary policy on climate change, and policies more broadly that help mitigate climate changes.

ORGANIZED BY:

Juliane Begenau, Stanford University    Stefano Giglio, Yale University  Lars Peter Hansen, University of Chicago  Monika Piazzesi, Stanford University

DEADLINE FOR PAPER SUBMISSION May 15, 2023

Session 10: Fiscal Sustainability

Monday, August 21, 2023, 9:00am - Tuesday, August 22, 2023, 5:00pm

As governments emerge from the pandemic, they are dealing with major challenges in regards to fiscal sustainability. We want to organize a session that focuses on topics at the intersection of monetary policy, fiscal policy and sustainability, and the valuation of government debt. What role do central banks play in creating fiscal space for governments? Is there a possibility of fiscal dominance going forward? How does this possibility affect asset prices and the creation of safe assets? Could the erosion of the U.S. fiscal position threaten its reserve currency role? 

ORGANIZED BY: Francesco Bianchi, Johns Hopkins University  Arvind Krishnamurthy, Stanford University  Hanno Nico Lustig, Stanford University

DEADLINE FOR PAPER SUBMISSION May 22, 2023

Session 11: Financial Regulation

Monday, August 28, 2023, 9:00am - Wednesday, August 30, 2023, 12:00pm

LOCATION: Landau Economics Building, 579 Jane Stanford Way, Stanford, CA 94305

This session discusses the latest advances in theoretical and empirical issues related to financial regulation, defined broadly. Topics will include, but will not be limited to, connections of regulation for intermediaries, households and policymakers in the US and outside the US. 

ORGANIZED BY:  Gregor Matvos, Northwestern University  Amit Seru, Stanford University

DEADLINE FOR PAPER SUBMISSION May 29, 2023

Session 12: IO of Healthcare and Credit Markets

Wednesday, August 30, 2023, 1:00pm - Thursday, August 31, 2023, 5:00pm

LOCATION: Landau Economics Building, 579 Jane Stanford Way, Stanford, CA 94305

This session will bring together researchers working on the IO of healthcare and credit markets. These markets share similar features, including selection, market power, behavioral consumers, among others. We believe there are opportunities for fruitful interaction between researchers studying these environments. 

ORGANIZED BY: Jose Ignacio Cuesta, Stanford University  Liran Einav, Stanford University  Gaston Illanes, Northwestern University Pietro Tebaldi, Columbia University

DEADLINE FOR PAPER SUBMISSION May 22, 2023

Session 13: The Macroeconomics of Uncertainty and Volatility

Wednesday, September 6, 2023, 9:00am - Friday, September 8, 2023, 5:00pm

LOCATION: John A. and Cynthia Fry Gunn Building, 366 Galvez Street 

The session will cover recent work on the causes and effects of changes in volatility and uncertainty. This can cover everything from the COVID pandemic, Monetary, Fiscal shocks to Wars, and Regulatory changes. This session will focus on measuring changes in uncertainty, evaluating its mechanisms and impacts on firms, consumers, national or global economies, discussing policy responses and any other related topics. The mix of academics and policy makers across multiple institutions reflects this broad interest. Papers or presentation slides are required (abstracts only will not be accepted).

ORGANIZED BY:  Nicholas Bloom, Stanford University  Steven Davis, University of Chicago  Jesus Fernandez-Villaverde, University of Pennsylvania  Zheng Liu, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco  Bo Sun, University of Virginia  Nancy R. Xu, Boston College

DEADLINE FOR PAPER SUBMISSION June 5, 2023

Session 14: New Frontiers in Asset Pricing

Wednesday, September 6, 2023, 9:00am - Friday, September 8, 2023, 5:00pm

This session is for asset pricing papers on the frontier of the discipline. Particular areas of focus are macrofinance, computation, machine learning, and climate finance. Possible topics include but are not limited to the following: asset pricing, investor heterogeneity, learning and ambiguity, new preference structures for pricing models, or using machine learning to understand the cross-section of returns. A particular area of interest is climate finance, where both climate change and the policy responses to climate change present new risks in asset pricing markets.  Topics of interest include asset pricing with heterogeneous agents and disaster risks, credit risk modeling for possibly stranded assets, the implications of integrated assessment models for financial risks, and methodological advances in solution methods for complex analyses of climate finance models. As the analysis of such models often requires the use of computational methods, we encourage submissions that develop and make use of new numerical techniques.

ORGANIZED BY: Kenneth Judd, Hoover Institution at Stanford University Walter Pohl, Norwegian School of Economics Karl Schmedders, IMD Lausanne Ole Wilms, University of Hamburg & Tilburg University

DEADLINE FOR PAPER SUBMISSION June 5, 2023

Session 15: The Micro and Macro of Labor Markets

Thursday, September 7, 2023, 9:00am - Friday, September 8, 2023, 5:00pm

LOCATION: Landau Economics Building, 579 Jane Stanford Way, Stanford, CA 94305

The idea of this session is to bring together labor economists and macroeconomists with interests in labor markets with two goals. The first goal is to be a venue to discuss the latest research about labor markets. The second goal is to promote intellectual exchange among scholars working on similar topics, but with different approaches. Specific topics will depend on the submissions. 

ORGANIZED BY: Gregor Jarosch, Duke University  Isaac Sorkin, Stanford University

DEADLINE FOR PAPER SUBMISSION May 15, 2023

Session 16: Frontiers of Macroeconomic Research

Monday, September 11, 2023, 9:00am - Wednesday, September 13, 2023, 5:00pm

LOCATION: Landau Economics Building, 579 Jane Stanford Way, Stanford, CA 94305

The goal of the session is to bring together researchers working in macroeconomics, broadly defined. The session will focus on both short-run macroeconomic fluctuations, as well as open questions in economic growth. We welcome submissions that are quantitative, theoretical or empirical in nature. We hope that the diverse research topics within macroeconomics covered in the session will foster engaging and productive discussion. 

ORGANIZED BY: Adrien Auclert, Stanford University Luigi Bocola, Stanford University  Kurt Mitman, Stockholm University

DEADLINE FOR PAPER SUBMISSION June 12, 2023

Session 17: Labor Markets and Policies

Thursday, September 14, 2023, 9:00am - Saturday, September 16, 2023, 5:00pm

This session offers a forum for scholars interested in the use of general equilibrium models disciplined by micro data to carefully analyze important labor market issues and reforms to address them. The use of these models to conduct comprehensive quantitative analyses of policy reforms is still in its infancy. The goal of this session is to bring together a diverse group of scholars, both young and established, engaged in frontier research in this area. The session is organized around three themes, all of which have implications for the observed increase in wage and wealth inequality in the United States. The first theme is about the dynamic effects of increases in the minimum wage and of the taxation of wealth of the types now being discussed and implemented in the United States, in both the short and the long run. The second theme is about how the growth and diffusion of automation will lead to changes in the structure of wages, work, and employment in developed industrial economies. The third theme is about the effect on labor markets of the adoption of trade reforms that differentially expose some sectors of an economy to much more intense international competition.

ORGANIZED BY:  Erik Hurst, University of Chicago  Patrick Kehoe, Stanford University Elena Pastorino, Stanford University

DEADLINE FOR PAPER SUBMISSION June 30, 2023

Session 18: Gender

Friday, September 15, 2023, 9:00am - Saturday, September 16, 2023, 5:00pm

LOCATION: Landau Economics Building, 579 Jane Stanford Way, Stanford, CA 94305

This session will be dedicated to understanding how gender influences economic outcomes and decision-making. We invite submissions of papers whose main focus is on gender, regardless of field, to foster dialogue across fields. In addition to senior faculty members, invited presenters will include junior faculty as well as graduate students. 

ORGANIZED BY:

Alejandro Martinez-Marquina, University of Southern California  Muriel Niederle, Stanford University  Alessandra Voena, Stanford University

DEADLINE FOR PAPER SUBMISSION June 16, 2023

Democracy & “Noxious” Markets, by Debra Satz

 The Winter 2023 issue of Daedalus is about Creating a New Moral Political Economy, edited by Margaret Levi & Henry Farrell.

The article by Debra Satz will strike a chord with market designers: she takes very seriously that markets are tools that need thoughtful design.

Democracy & “Noxious” Markets, by Debra Satz

"my argument is not a lawyer’s brief against markets. No large democratic society can or should entirely dispense with markets. Not only are markets among the most powerful tools we have for generating growth in living standards and incentivizing innovation, but also Smith was right to see their democratic potential as ways of enabling cooperation among independent, free, and equal individuals. As tools, however, we should think carefully about where to use them and how to design them when we do. While a neoliberal worldview sees efficient markets enhancing freedom and well-being everywhere, the reality is more complex. Some markets foreclose options that would better support democratic institutions and culture. Sometimes, closing off market options makes everyone better off. Consider that if individuals are free not to purchase health insurance on the market, the cost of publicly provided insurance will increase: healthy individuals are more likely to opt out of health insurance, leaving sicker individuals in the pool to be insured and raising the costs of their insurance, leading more people to forgo holding such insurance, driving the prices up even higher."

Among the markets she is concerned about are school choice, and military service:

"some of the ways parents prioritize their own children can lead to worse outcomes for other children and to the furthering of educational inequities, as well as to other social ills like instability and conflict. Evidence indicates, for example, that choice schools in the United States are more homogenous than public schools with respect to social class and race. Researchers have also shown that when public school choice is available, educated parents are especially likely to factor child demographics in their school selections.11 This may be because school quality is very hard to judge and parents default to markers such as the reading and math levels of other students. These levels, in turn, are heavily influenced by social class. It is likely that some parents take race and class directly as proxies for school quality."

...

"Extending the reach of markets even more, war has been further outsourced to private military contractors: in 2009, there were more private military contractors in Afghanistan than U.S. military troops.17 Hiring private mercenaries and outsourcing national security to a subsection of our population might spare our citizens, but as political philosopher Michael Sandel has noted, it changes the meaning of citizenship.18 In what sense are we “all in this together” if most citizens never need to think hard about decisions to go to war? Whatever the efficiency pros and cons of the decision to outsource fighting and allocate military service through market means, doing so changes our relationships with one another and our sense of a common life."

"My argument so far suffers from treating the state and market as two stark alternatives for the allocation of goods and services in society. So I now want to consider ways in which the benefits of markets can be harnessed—through design—to better serve important democratic goals. "

...

"One important mechanism is providing greater roles for worker voice. This can be done through such reforms as changing labor laws to support forms of worker association, like trade unions, allowing worker representatives on company boards, and strengthening democracy at work through diverse forms of ownership including worker-managed and -owned firms. Empowering the associational organization of labor would also help redress the background social conditions that render workers vulnerable to the oligarchic power of their employers.

"There are other examples in which careful design and policy can limit the “noxiousness” of a particular market for democracy. Policies such as a negative income tax can strengthen the power of workers, and campaign finance laws can diminish the power of money in elections. Others have argued for reforms to our current system of commodified legal representation within an adversarial system, and for single-payer health care systems."

Here's her concluding paragraph:

"Beyond education, we need to pay special attention to particular markets that affect democratic functioning and stability. Such markets include but are not limited to markets in legal representation, media and news markets, markets relating to national defense, and markets governing political rights. Politicians and other commentators usually write unreflectively, as if all markets were the same. They are not. Markets affect not only the distribution of income and wealth, but also our capacities, and our views of each other. Their strengths but also their limits depend on the fact that they are radically individualizing. But in some contexts, that individualizing threatens the practice of democracy. Markets have moral and even “spiritual” consequences relevant to our shared public life, and our evaluations of them must also attend to those consequences. A new political economy needs to take this larger evaluative frame into account."

******

The next article in the issue is a thoughtful essay on markets for personal care of the young and the elderly, organized in various ways, including care within families, written as a commentary on the Satz article: 

Is There a Proper Scope for Markets?  by Marc Fleurbaey

Advice on dealing with exploding offers in the Economics job market

 The market for new Economics Ph.D.s is in flux, with interviews this year being conducted remotely by Zoom rather than in person at the annual January conference. (Zoom interviews were a Covid innovation that seems likely to stay--mostly because remote interviews seemed to work well.)  But issues of timing can be delicate, and there's some concern that, now that initial interviews aren't being synchonized with the annual meetings, we're seeing more early interviews, flyouts (subsequent in-person, on campus interviews) and offers than in previous years, including more offers that require replies very quickly--exploding offers.  Exploding offers cause difficulties to those who receive them, and they contribute to market-wide difficulties, as they can cause the market to move earlier from year to year, i.e. to unravel into very early offers at diffuse times, so that the market loses thickness.

So...I wasn't too surprised to get an email this week from a colleague who has a student on the market who presently has two exploding offers, each with a one-week deadline.  My colleague writes that his student  presently has flyouts scheduled with other schools through February, and so won't even have visited them by the time his exploding offers expire. "He would much prefer an offer from several of them to these 2 current offers--but I have no idea what is the likelihood of getting offers from them."

He asks me "Does any entity such as the ASSA, Stanford, etc. have a policy that I can mention to these schools? "  And he asks for my advice.  I don't have great advice, but here's my slightly redacted reply:

"The AEA doesn’t have a good policy on this, but the AFA does: see my blog post here

Tuesday, August 2, 2022 American Finance Association guidelines to prevent unravelling of the job market  (it says) “the AFA promotes the following professional norm: If a job candidate receives and accepts a coercive exploding offer (i.e., one that expires before February 20), the AFA does not consider such an acceptance to be binding.”

 "That said, talking to the schools that have issued coercive exploding offers is a good idea, and it may or may not help.  I think there are three main reasons they might make exploding offers.

• 1.       Pure evil: they think your student might get a better offer if they wait, and want to capture him before that.
• 2.       Fear that their other candidates will disappear: they may have a second choice candidate who already has an exploding offer, in which case they may be able to tell you when that offer explodes.  But maybe their fear is less focused than that, in which case you might get them to extend the offer on the understanding that they can make it explode later.
• 3.       Boilerplate: they may have just copy-pasted from some template that had a short fuse offer. In this case there’s a good chance they’ll relax the drop dead date.

 "I’ve encountered other reasons as well. In the 2008 financial crisis some of our students got exploding offers, and when I called one school to inquire, was told that their dean wouldn’t allow them to schedule any more flyouts until/unless they’d been rejected by our student.

 "There are labor markets that suffer a great deal from exploding offers (e.g. private equity right now, among others).  But it’s still not the norm in economics, so I think you have a good chance of getting some more time by asking for it."

School choice, by Atila Abdulkadiroğlu and Tommy Andersson

 Here's what looks to be a magisterial survey of school choice by two pioneers of the theory and practice of market design.

School choice by Atila Abdulkadiroğlu and Tommy Andersson, Handbook of the Economics of Education, Available online 3 January 2023, https://doi.org/10.1016/bs.hesedu.2022.11.001 

Abstract: School districts in the United States and around the world are increasingly moving away from traditional neighborhood school assignment, in which pupils attend closest schools to their homes. Instead, they allow families to choose from schools within district boundaries. This creates a market with parental demand over publicly-supplied school seats. More frequently than ever, this market for school seats is cleared via market design solutions grounded in recent advances in matching and mechanism design theory. The literature on school choice is reviewed with emphasis placed on the trade-offs among policy objectives and best practices in the design of admissions processes. It is concluded with a brief discussion about how data generated by assignment algorithms can be used to answer contemporary empirical questions about school effectiveness and policy interventions.

Amnon Rapoport (1936-2022)

 Amnon Rapoport, a pioneer of experimental game theory, has died. 

Here's a brief obituary:

Amnon Rapoport, Distinguished Professor Emeritus of Management and Organizations at the University of Arizona, passed away on December 6th

I don't find his date of birth on the web, but in August of 1996 I participated in a conference in honor of his 60th birthday, at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, where he had both studied and taught in the Department of Psychology.  Amnon had already had several heart attacks by then, and his students, who loved him, thought it prudent to have a celebration of his work at that relatively young age, but that caution proved unnecessary. 

Here's the volume of papers presented at that conference, edited by three of his students:

Budescu, David V., Ido Erev, and Rami Zwick, eds. Games and human behavior: Essays in honor of Amnon Rapoport. Erlbaum, 1999.

I first learned of his work when, as a grad student, I took a course in game theory taught by Michael Maschler, who told us about Amnon's experiments on the bargaining set.

He was a man ahead of his time, and maybe situated in the wrong discipline.  It seemed to him natural that psychologists should take a leading role in the experimental study of game theory, and he noted with some regret that instead that literature had been ceded to economists. Here's a paragraph from the introduction to 

Rapoport, Amnon. Experimental studies of interactive decisions. Vol. 5. Springer Science & Business Media, 2012.

"The history of experimentation in psychology is rich and old. It would have been quite natural and highly desirable for psychologists to extend their scope of research and assume a major role in the study of economic decision behavior. Psychology professes to be the general study of human behavior. Most psychologists are trained to regard their discipline as an observational science; they do not have to overcome the conditioning of many economists who think of economics as an a priori science. Psychologists' knowledge of experimental techniques is comprehensive. and their experience in conducting experiments. analyzing data. and discovering empirical regularities exceeds that of most economists. However. with the exception of research on individual choice behavior - where psychologists like Tversky, Kahneman, and Slovic have played a major role - psychologists have not contributed in any significant way to the growing research in experimental economics. Social psychologists for whom interactive behavior is the core of their discipline, have virtually abandoned the study of economic decisions in small groups to their colleagues in economics and related disciplines. "

Here's his cv as of 2017, and his google scholar page.

**********

Update: here's an email that Rami Zwick sent to the Economic Science Association (ESA):

"Dear ESA community,

It is with great sadness that we announce the passing of our teacher, mentor, colleague, co-author and friend, Professor Amnon Rapoport, in Tucson Arizona on December 6, 2022. 

Professor Rapoport served on the faculty of the University of California, Riverside School of Business; University of Arizona; UNC Chapel Hill; University of Haifa, Israel; and the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel. He earned his Bachelor of Arts degree in psychology and philosophy from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, then went on to earn his M.A. and Ph.D. in quantitative psychology at UNC Chapel Hill. 

Professor Rapoport was one of the pioneers and leaders in the experimental study and quantitative modeling of human decisions in social and interactive contexts. During his distinguished career, he published four books (and edited others) and more than 300 research papers and chapters in leading psychological, management, operation, marketing, decision theory, economics, and political science journals, and is recognized as a leading authority in many of these areas. His most important and influential work was on experimental studies of interactive decision-making behavior. This includes theoretical and empirical research on: 

• Coalition formation 

• Bargaining 

• Social dilemmas 

• Behavioral operations management 

• Behavioral game theory 

• Dynamic pricing 

• Directed networks 

 Professor Rapoport’s work was theory-driven, and, in most cases, the theory was represented formally by mathematical (primarily, but not exclusively, game theoretical) models. At the same time, he was a meticulous and rigorous, yet imaginative and creative experimentalist. In fact, he was one of the pioneers of computerized experimentation in the domain of individual and group decision making. 

With a career spanning over 60 years, Professor Rapoport nurtured and supported the careers of generations of scholars and researchers. He will be greatly missed by his family, friends, colleagues, co-authors, and students."

NBER Market Design Working Group Meeting, Fall 2022, at Stanford, today and tomorrow

 While I'm away, the NBER Market Design meeting will convene at Stanford today and tomorrow.  The first paper is presented by Alex Chan (who you could hire, he's on the market).

Market Design Working Group Meeting, Fall 2022  November 4-5, 2022 (US Pacific Time) (more papers are linked at the above link and all presentations will be livestreamed on YouTube at https://www.youtube.com/nbervideos)

LOCATION Stanford University Graduate School of Business, Vidalakis Dining Hall, Schwab Residential Center, 680 Jane Stanford Way, Stanford, CA and YouTube 

ORGANIZERS Eric Budish, Jakub Kastl, and Marzena Rostek

 NBER conferences are by invitation. All participants are expected to comply with the NBER's Conference Code of Conduct.

Friday, November 4

Session 1. Matching Markets

9:00 am

Regulation of Organ Transplantation and Procurement: A Market Design Lab Experiment by Alex Chan, Stanford University and Alvin E. Roth, Stanford University and NBER

Measuring the Welfare Gains from Cardinal-Preference Mechanisms in School Choice(slides)  by Hulya Eraslan, Rice University and NBER by Jeremy T. Fox, Rice University and NBER, YingHua He, Rice University, Yakym Pirozhenko, Rice University

10:20 am Coffee Break

Session 2. Markets and Algorithms

11:00 am Market Opacity and Fragility by Giovanni Cespa, City University London, Xavier Vives, IESE Business School

Artificial Intelligence and Pricing: The Impact of Algorithm Design by John Asker, University of California, Los Angeles and NBER Chaim Fershtman, Tel Aviv University, Ariel Pakes, Harvard University and NBER

12:20 pm  Lunch - Vidalakis Courtyard

Session 3: Young Scholars Session I: Financial Market Design

2:00 pm Intermediary Asset Pricing: Capital Constraints and Market Power(slides), Jason Allen, Bank of Canada, Milena Wittwer, Boston College

Endogenous Market Structure: Over-the-Counter versus Exchange Trading by Ji Hee Yoon, University College London

3:20 pm Coffee Break

Session 4: Young Scholars Session II: Market Design Theory

4:00 pm Strategyproofness-Exposing Mechanism Descriptions, by Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Harvard University, Ori Heffetz, Cornell University and NBER, and Clayton Thomas, Princeton University

Matching and Prices by Ravi Jagadeesan, Stanford University, Alexander Teytelboym, University of Oxford

Saturday, November 5

Session 5. Non-Market Allocation Mechanisms

9:00 am Optimal Queue Design by Yeon-Koo Che, Columbia University, Olivier Tercieux, Paris School of Economics

Fraud-proof Non-market Allocation Mechanisms by Eduardo Perez-Richet, Sciences Po, Vasiliki Skreta, UT Austin & UCL

10:20 am Coffee Break

Session 6. Environment and Transportation

11:00 am Pollution Permits: Efficiency by Design by Marek Pycia, University of Zurich, Kyle Woodward, University of North Carolina

Optimal Urban Transportation Policy: Evidence from Chicago(slides) by Milena Almagro, University of Chicago, Felipe Barbieri, University of Pennsylvania, Juan Camilo Castillo, University of Pennsylvania, Nathaniel G. Hickok, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Tobias Salz, Massachusetts Institute of Technology and NBER

12:20 pm Lunch - Vidalakis Courtyard

Session 7. Auctions and Mechanism Design

This session: 25 minutes presenter, 5 minutes Q&A.

1:30 pm Screening with Persuasion by Dirk Bergemann, Yale University, , Tibor Heumann, PUC Chile, Stephen Morris, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Auctions with Frictions by Stephan Lauermann, University of Bonn, Asher Wolinsky, Northwestern University

Pure-Strategy Equilibrium in the Generalized First-Price Auction, by Michael Ostrovsky, Stanford University and NBER, Andrzej Skrzypacz, Stanford University

Managing inter-district school choice, by Yuchiro Kamada and Fuhito Kojima

 Here's a paper that considers inter-district school choice, motivated by Tokyo day care centers.  I think  a similar problem arises in the EU in allocating foreign study opportunities for college students.

 Ekkyo Matching: How To Connect Separate Matching Markets For Welfare Improvement  By Yuichiro Kamada And Fuhito Kojima

Abstract. "We consider a school-choice matching model that allows for inter-district transfer of students, with the “balancedness” constraint: each student and school belongs to a region, and a matching is said to be balanced if, for each region, the outflow of students from that region to other regions is equal to the inflow of students from the latter to the former. Using a directed bipartite graph defined on students and schools, we characterize the set of Pareto efficient matchings among those that are individually rational, balanced and fair. We also provide a polynomial-time algorithm to compute such matchings. The outcome of this algorithm weakly improves student welfare upon the one induced when each region independently organizes a standard matching mechanism"

" In Japan ... allocation of slots at accredited daycares are conducted by individual municipal governments and, with few exceptions, a child can only attend a daycare in the municipality of their residence. The City of Tokyo, for example, is divided into 23 small municipalities ... and each conducts a matching independently. Due to the small sizes of the regions, many families would find inter-district admissions—which is called the ekkyo admission ... to be a viable option. Moreover, as a large metropolitan area, many people cross a city boundary to commute, making it potentially more convenient to put their children to a daycare center close to their workplace"

School choice consulting in New York City

 It is a truth universally acknowledged that any stressful process in which affluent people participate must be in need of a consulting industry.

New York City's school choice processes are no exception:

The School-Admissions Whisperer Joyce Szuflita can assuage Brooklyn’s most anxious parents.  By Caitlin Moscatello

"For the better part of two decades, Szuflita has demystified the process of public-school admissions for some of Brooklyn’s most overwhelmed, optimization-prone parents. ... Prekindergarten and elementary admission are largely based on where you live. But the game gets significantly more byzantine come middle school and more complex yet for high school, with its tier of “screened” institutions that have traditionally required students to test in, audition, or undergo other high-stress assessments. The process of getting into certain schools — and don’t kid yourself, everybody wants in — has long been a brutal one. Until it got slightly easier. And then brutal again. Or maybe some middle level of brutal? This is why parents need Szuflita.

...

"On September 29, schools chancellor David C. Banks abruptly announced that some of the city’s most prestigious middle and high schools would move away from an open lottery system and increase their use of merit-based admissions. The approach prioritizes students with an A average — children Banks calls “hardworking,” a loaded description in a city with one of the greatest wealth disparities in the country — and reverses the previous mayor’s strategy, which aimed to usher more lower-income students into New York’s top schools.

...

“The pendulum is swinging back a little bit,” Szuflita says of the Banks announcement, insisting that the changes are not as sweeping as they might seem. “The algorithm is still exactly the same.” Contrary to how some have read the news, the old lottery is still partially in use. The random number (a hexadecimal, actually) that each student is assigned works as a tiebreaker to get into screened high schools and can sometimes be a major factor when families submit their ranked choices of preferred schools.

"Clients often panic about their lottery numbers and want to change the ranking of their list, which Szuflita doesn’t recommend for anyone except those with exceptionally high or low numbers. Trying to outsmart the process, she says, is pure “magical thinking.” She’s constantly telling parents to trust the fairness of the city’s sorting algorithm, whose authors literally won the Nobel Prize, and rank in true preference order. (Or, as she tends to put it in emails: “RANK IN TRUE PREFERENCE ORDER!!!!!!!”) Despite this, clients sometimes persist, asking, How do we work the algorithm to our advantage? How do we strategize ranking our list? “That’s when I yell at people in the nicest way,” she says, because they don’t know what they’re talking about and they’re cutting into her time. “Like, ‘No, shut up. Shut up and listen to me. You’re not going to get everything you need to know.’” But most of her consults take two hours, she says, and don’t involve a lot of back-and-forth. “They tell me about their children and then what follows is usually a rapid-fire, two-hour information dump from me. There is not a lot of airing of concerns, because I already anticipate their concerns.” The download is intensely specific, tailored to each family and covering individual schools, principals, teachers, and facility upgrades few people are aware of. She verifies rumors (or sets the record straight) and knows things you can’t find on the internet."

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Related recent post:

Sunday, October 2, 2022

Return to previous school assignment policies (in some respects) under New York City's new mayor

My Morse Lecture at INFORMS 2022, tomorrow

 Tomorrow, Wednesday October19, from 8-9am Eastern time, I'll be giving the Morse Lecture at the INFORMS 2022 annual meeting in Indianapolis

Market Design: The Dialog Between Simple Abstract Models and Practical Implementation

I’ll review some of the elegantly simple models that underlie the initial designs for matching processes like the medical residency Match, school choice and kidney exchange, and the modifications, complications and  computations that were needed to get new designs adopted, implemented and maintained over the years.

You can read about the occasion of this lecture, my Philip McCord Morse Lectureship Award here.

Choosing between public and private schools: vouchers in Arizona

There's a fight over public versus private school funding in Arizona. Here's the background:

Arizona OKs Biggest US School Voucher Plan, Faces Challenge. Republican Gov. Doug Ducey has signed a massive expansion of Arizona’s private school voucher system.  AP, July 7, 2022

"Republican Gov. Doug Ducey on Thursday signed a massive expansion of the state’s private school voucher system, even as he faced a promised effort by public school advocates to block the bill and ask voters to erase it during November’s election.

"The expansion Ducey signed will let every parent in Arizona take public money now sent to the K-12 public school system and use it to pay for their children’s private school tuition or other education costs.

...

"Ducey has championed “school choice” during his eight years in office. He signed a universal voucher expansion in 2017 with enrollment caps that was referred to the ballot by a grassroots group called Save Our Schools Arizona.

"Voters soundly rejected the expansion by a 2-to-1 vote in the 2018 election, but advocates of what are formally called “Empowerment Scholarship Accounts” pushed ahead with new expansions anyway. The universal voucher bill passed with only support from majority Republican lawmakers in the legislative session that ended early on June 25."

**********

And Salon brings us up to date:

Arizona's school privatization battle heats up: Will the voters get to decide?  Republicans' massive school voucher plan may yet be defeated (again) — but the challenge is stiffer this time By KATHRYN JOYCE, SEPTEMBER 20

"A fight over the future of the most sweeping school voucher program in the country has heated up in Arizona over the last few weeks, as public school advocates race to gather enough signatures to trigger a ballot referendum aimed at overturning a voucher law recently passed by the state's Republican-dominated legislature. The referendum campaign, which faces a crucial deadline this Friday, has drawn intense opposition from Arizona conservatives. This has included funding for multiple anti-referendum websites, roadside protests starring Republican legislators and, over the last two weeks, conflicts between activists both on social media and in the streets. 

...

"Under the new law, any Arizona parent who opts their children out of public school will receive a debit card with an average balance of just under $7,000, which they can use to spend on almost any educational needs they choose, from private school tuition to homeschooling expenses to buying computers to hiring private teachers for "microschools." Public education advocates immediately warned that such a huge transfer of public funds to private hands could be the death knell for public schools, which would likely have to make untenable cuts to teaching staff and school programs.

...

"From the inception of Arizona's ESAs, critics have charged that they're little more than a workaround to funnel public tax dollars to private schools. The idea was born after a court found in 2009 that two earlier Arizona school voucher programs were unconstitutional, violating the state's prohibition on using public money for private education. In 2011, under the guidance of the Goldwater Institute, a conservative think tank, the state launched an ingenious alternative: sending state funds directly to parents, who spend the money as they see fit. The ESA option then became a nationwide model, copied in numerous other states and increasingly seen by conservative education reform activists as "the purest form of school choice." 

HT: Bertan Turhan

Market design workshop at Iowa State University

 I'll give a public talk this evening to open a market design workshop tomorrow and Saturday:

Two-day Workshop: September 23-24, 2022, Heady Hall 360A, Iowa State University

Organizers: Ran Shorrer, Bumin Yenmez, Bertan Turhan  

Program: MARKET DESIGN WORKSHOP PROGRAM

Day 1: Friday, September 23, 2022 (Heady Hall 368A)

SESSION 1

8:00-8:40 Rakesh Vohra (w/ Thanh Nguyen)

“(Near) Substitute Preferences and Equilibria with Indivisibilities”

8:40-9:20 Federico Echenique (w/ Sumit Goel and SangMok Lee)

“Stable Allocations in Discrete Economies”

9:20-10:00 Marzena Rostek

“Decentralized-Market Design”

Chair: Tarun Sabarwal

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BREAK: 10:00-10:30

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SESSION 2

10:30-11:10 Karam Kang (w/ Giulia Brancaccio)

“Search Frictions and Product Design in the Municipal Bond Market”

11:10-11:50 Mariana Lavarde

“Distance to Schools and Equal Access in School Choice Systems”

11:50-12:30 Atila Abdulkadiroğlu (w/ Aram Grigoryan)

“Priority-based Assignment with Reserves and Quotas”

Chair: David Cooper

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LUNCH: 12:30-1:40 (Heady 360)

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SESSION 3

1:40-2:20 Bumin Yenmez (w/ Isa Hafalir and Fuhito Kojima)

“Design on Matroids: Diversity vs Meritocracy”

2:20-3:00 Orhan Aygün (w/ Bertan Turhan)

“Affirmative Action in India: Restricted Strategy Space, Complex Constraints, and

Direct Mechanism Design”

3:00-3:40 Nick Arnosti

“Explainable Affirmative Action”

Chair: Atila Abdulkadiroğlu

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BREAK: 3:40-4:10

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SESSION 4

4:10-4:50 Eric Budish

“The Economic Limits of Bitcoin and Anonymous, Decentralized Trust on the Blockchain”

4:50-5:30 Eduardo Azevedo (w/ David Mao, Jose Montiel Olea, and Amilcar Velez)

“A/B Testing with Gaussian Priors”

5:30-6:10 Ran Shorrer (w/ Yannai Gonczarowski and Scott Kominers)

“To Infinity and Beyond: Scaling Economic Theories via Logical Compactness”

Chair: Al Roth

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Day 2: Saturday, September 24, 2022

SESSION 5

8:00-8:40 Thayer Morrill (w/ Peter Troyan)

“Desirable Rankings: A New Method for Ranking Outcomes of a Competitive Process”

8:40-9:20 Lars Ehlers (w/ Christian Basteck)

“Strategy Proof and Envy-Free Random Assignment”

9:20-10:00 Itai Ashlagi (w/ Jacob Leshno, Pengyu Qian, and Amin Saberi)

“Price Discovery in Waiting Lists: A Connection to Stochastic Gradient Descent”

Chair: Rakesh Vohra

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BREAK: 10:00-10:30

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SESSION 6

10:30-11:10 Josue Ortega (w/ Thilo Klein)

“Improving Efficiency and Equality in School Choice”

11:10-11:50 Aram Grigoryan

“Transparency in Allocation Problems”

11:50-12:30 Inácio Bó (w/ Rustam Hakimov)

“Pick-an-Object Mechanisms”

Chair: Federico Echenique

Crowdsourcing organ transplant ethics

 In Slate, an upbeat article about the ethical issues associated with deceased organ allocation and (before that) access to dialysis, and the benefits and difficulties with crowdsourcing the solutions.  

The Kidney Transplant Algorithm’s Surprising Lessons for Ethical A.I.  A more democratic approach to A.I. is messy, but it can work.  BY DAVID G. ROBINSON

This article is adapted from Voices in the Code: A Story About People, Their Values, and the Algorithm They Made, out Sept. 8 from Russell Sage Foundation Press.

" in the world of organ transplants, surgeons and data scientists have an unusual habit of being brutally honest about the human lives behind their work—of inviting others into the impossible choices their field confronts. For better and worse, the organ transplant system is itself a real-life laboratory of more inclusive, accountable techniques for building and using A.I.—approaches that are now being proposed in U.S. and EU legislation that could cover courtrooms, hiring, housing, and many other sensitive domains.

...

"Where did this culture of moral humility—one that’s now shaping the design of a high-stakes A.I. system—come from?

"Collaborative decision-making about hard ethical choices in kidney medicine began before the digital revolution. It began before there were many kidney transplants. "

After the development of dialysis there were..."just a handful of dialysis machines, ...Whom to save? Scribner and his team were inundated with pleas from dying patients and their doctors.

"Faced with this quandary, Scribner and his colleagues chose to do something extraordinary: They shared their moral burden with the Seattle community they served. Rather than pretending that their technical expertise gave them special moral standing, they chose to be morally modest, and to widen the circle. The doctors still decided who was medically eligible for dialysis. But then, they established a second committee, a group of seven laypeople chosen by the local medical society, who would make the non-medical decision of how to allocate the few available slots among the many eligible patients. The committee members were given some basic education about kidney medicine, but weren’t told how to make their moral choices.

“They Decide Who Lives, Who Dies” was the headline of a 1962 Life magazine article about this new group. Its members, who were anonymous, were photographed in shadow. A clerical collar can be seen on one. The lone woman of the group, a homemaker, clasps a pair of reading glasses in her folded hands. The article reported that the committee’s approach was based on “acceptance of the principle that all segments of society, not just the medical fraternity, should share the burden of choice as to which patients to treat and which ones to let die.”

"The Life story described some biases that played out on the committee—they favored male breadwinners who had children to support—and it triggered widespread revulsion. A pair of scholars wrote that the committee was judging people “in accordance with its own middle-class suburban value system: scouts, Sunday school, Red Cross. This rules out creative nonconformists … the Pacific Northwest is no place for a Henry David Thoreau with bad kidneys.” The original Life story never mentioned race, but later reporting suggested the committee had been biased in favor of white applicants. The committee only ran for a few years. Other dialysis facilities used different rationing strategies—including first-come, first-served—and in 1972 Congress passed an extraordinary law to provide dialysis at public expense through Medicare to all patients who needed it. That proved to be a humane, if extremely costly, escape route from the rationing problem that Scribner once faced.

"Along with all its faults, I think the Seattle committee also gave us much to admire. It was profoundly, even uncomfortably, honest about the hard choices at the center of kidney medicine. It refused to pretend that such choices were—or ever could be—entirely technical. And it tried, albeit clumsily, to democratize the values inside a complex, high-tech system. The Seattle physicians and their lay colleagues were rationing a scarce supply of dialysis treatments. But even after Congress provided dialysis for everyone, the shortage of transplantable kidneys was destined to spark similar questions, ones we still face today."

HT: Tom Riley

MATCH-UP 2022, August 24-26, 2022, TU Vienna, Vienna, Austria

 MATCH-UP 2022, August 24-26, 2022, TU Vienna, Vienna, Austria

registration for the workshop is only possible until August 16, 23:59 CET: https://www.eventbrite.at/e/match-up-2022-the-6th-workshop-on-preferences-under-matching-registration-368493533077

Here's the program:

24.08. Wednesday

13:30–14:15		Registration
14:15–14:30		Opening remarks
14:30–14:55	Estelle Cantillon, Li Chen and Juan Pereyra	Respecting priorities versus respecting preferences in school choice: When is there a trade-off?
14:55–15:20	Lars Ehlers	Student-Optimal Interdistrict School Choice: District-Based versus School-Based Admissions
15:20–15:45	Bnaya Dreyfuss, Ofer Glicksohn, Ori Heffetz and Assaf Romm	Incorporating Reference-Dependence Considerations in Deferred Acceptance
15:45–16:15		Coffee break
16:30–16:55	Xuan Zhang and Yuri Faenza	Affinely representable lattices, stable matchings, and choice functions
16:55–17:20	Kemal Yildiz and Ahmet Alkan	Modular stable matching mechanisms
17:20–17:45	Peter Biro and Gergely Csáji	Strong core and Pareto-optimal solutions for the multiple partners matching problem under lexicographic preferences
17:30–19:30		Poster session

25.08. Thursday

9:00–9:25	Niclas Boehmer, Klaus Heeger and Stanisław Szufa	A Map of Diverse Synthetic Stable Roommates Instances
9:25–9:50	Klaus Heeger and Ágnes Cseh	Popular matchings with weighted voters
9:50–10:15	Inbal Rozenzweig, Reshef Meir and Nicholas Mattei	Mitigating Skewed Bidding for Conference Paper Matching
10:15–10:40	Sai Srivatsa Ravindranath, Zhe Feng, Shira Li, Jonathan Ma, Scott Kominers and David Parkes	Deep Learning for Two-Sided Matching
10:40–11:10		Coffee break
11:10–11:35	Yannai Gonczarowski, Ori Heffetz and Clayton Thomas	Self-Explanatory Strategyproof Mechanisms
11:35–12:00	Assaf Romm, Alvin Roth and Ran Shorrer	Stability vs. No Justified Envy
12:00–12:25	Rupert Freeman, Geoffrey Pritchard and Mark Wilson	Order Symmetry: A New Fairness Criterion for Assignment Mechanisms
12:25–14:00		Lunch break
14:00–15:00	Keynote: Vijay Vazirani Note: Different from the other talks, will be held in Hörsaal 1 (lecture hall 1).	Online Bipartite Matching and Adwords
15:00–15:25	Danny Blom, Bart Smeulders and Frits Spieksma	Rejection-proof Kidney Exchange Mechanisms
15:25–15:50	Peter Biro, Flip Klijn, Xenia Klimentova and Ana Viana	Shapley-Scarf Housing Markets: Respecting Improvement, Integer Programming, and Kidney Exchange
15:50–16:30		Coffee break
16:15–16:40	Josue Ortega and Thilo Klein	Improving Efficiency and Equality in School Choice
16:40–17:05	Ran Shorrer and Sandor Sovago	Dominated Choices in a Strategically Simple College
17:05–17:30	Daniel Kornbluth and Alexey Kushnir	Undergraduate Course Allocation through Pseudo-Markets
17:30–18:00		Group photo in front of the main university building (Karslplatz)
18:30–22:00		Bus ride to and dinner at Heuriger

26.08. Friday

9:00–10:00	Keynote: Sophie Bade Held in Hörsaal 8 (lecture hall 8).	TBA
10:00–10:25	Nick Arnosti, Carlos Bonet and Jay Sethuraman	A Systematic Approach to Selection Problems
10:25–10:50	Di Feng, Bettina Klaus and Flip Klijn	A Characterization of the Coordinate-Wise Top-Trading-Cycles Mechanism for Multiple-Type Housing Markets
10:50–11:20		Coffee break
11:20–11:45	Haris Aziz and Zhaohong Sun	Multi-Rank Smart Reserves
12:45–12:10	Jean-Jacques Herings and Yu Zhou	Equilibria in Matching Markets with Soft and Hard Liquidity Constraints
12:10–13:45		Lunch break
13:45–14:10	Karolina Vocke	Anonymity and stability in large many-to-many markets
14:10–14:35	Kristóf Bérczi, Erika Renáta Bérczi-Kovács and Evelin Szögi	A dual approach for dynamic pricing in multi-demand markets
14:35–15:00	Georgy Artemov, Yeon-Koo Che and Yinghua He	Stable Matching with Mistaken Agents
15:00–15:25	Federico Bobbio, Margarida Carvalho, Andrea Lodi, Ignacio Rios and Alfredo Torrico	Capacity Planning in Stable Matching: An Application to School Choice
15:25–16:00		Coffee break
16:00–16:25	Haris Aziz, Anton Baychkov and Peter Biro	Cutoff stability under distributional constraints with an application to summer internship matching
16:25–16:50	Kenzo Imamura and Yasushi Kawase	Efficient matching under general constraints
16:50–17:15	Zheng Chen, Bo Li, Mingming Li and Guochuan Zhang	Fair Graphical Resource Allocation with Matching-Induced Utilities
17:15–17:40	Bo Li, Fangxiao Wang and Yu Zhou	Maximin Share Fair Allocation of Indivisible Chores: Beyond Additive Valuations
17:40		Closing remarks