To continue yesterday's discussion about the Market for ideas, academic journals present an interesting set of institutions. The Chronicle of Higher Ed reports on the open access journal movement: Physicists Set Plan in Motion to Change Publishing System (and, permanently, here for subscribers). The story concerns SCOAP3 - Sponsoring Consortium for Open Access Publishing in Particle Physics, which seeks to set up a non-profit organization that will fund cooperating journals.
"Here's the pitch. Libraries would stop paying for subscriptions to journals in high-energy physics. Instead, each library or government agency would pay a set amount every year to the new nonprofit group. Each journal publisher would then apply for a portion of that money, submitting a bid spelling out how much it would cost them to review, edit, and publish their articles that year (building in some profit as well). To win a bid, the journals would commit to publishing their articles free online for anyone to see."
"Several factors make high-energy physics an ideal field for this experiment. For one thing, it is a relatively small and tight-knit research area, where almost all major papers appear in just six journals. "
There are clearly obstacles in the path of this plan. But Arxiv, the physics/math working paper archive now hosted at Cornell, seems to have had somewhat more success than the similar effort in Economics at WUSTL, pioneered by Bob Parks, so it will bear watching.
(On the subject of working papers in economics, RePEc and SSRN have filled some of that space in economics, and there are a growing number of open access journals, among them Theoretical Economics.) See also Ted Bergstrom's Journal Pricing Page for a discussion of other proposals for redesigning the market for scientific publishing.
Showing posts with label public goods. Show all posts
Showing posts with label public goods. Show all posts
Friday, January 30, 2009
Sunday, December 28, 2008
Eminent domain
A story in the NY Times has a striking photo of a private home in Seattle located in a niche in a large commercial building. The large building had to be built around the small one after developers were unable to convince the owner to sell them the last piece of land they needed to build a conventional, rectangular building.
Governments, unlike private developers, have the right of eminent domain, which allows them to compel landowners to sell their land for public purposes. The idea is that some public projects, like highways, would be difficult or impossible to complete if each plot of land on the proposed route would have to be acquired on the private market before a road could be built. Eminent domain is meant to solve the coordination problem involved in assembling a large landholding (since there are seldom large, road-shaped plots of land vacant where new roads would be useful in populated places). It is also meant in part to solve the "holdup problem" associated with the fact that, once a large tract of property has been assembled, the missing pieces have very high marginal value, so that the last properties needed for a large project would become especially difficult or costly to acquire.
Governments can use eminent domain for private projects that they take to be in the public interest, e.g. not just highways, but privately owned railroads also. Recently the State of New York agreed to use eminent domain to acquire the last plots of land for Columbia University to expand its campus north of its current Manhattan location, on land that Columbia had mostly assembled over years of private acquisition.
Harvard acquired land in the Allston neighborhood of Boston in the 1990's, without eminent domain, by buying lots secretly, through a third party, as they became available. The thought was that the last lots would have become very expensive if it became known that Harvard was purchasing land for a large project.
Update: Steve Leider urges me to include the recent expansion of eminent domain authority to include more strictly private projects. He writes:
"You probably ought to mention the Kelo decision (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kelo_v._City_of_New_London ) which substantially expanded what counts as "for a public purpose" in terms of using eminent domain for a private project - basically increased tax revenue counts. The decision is very controversial, since it basically allows ED for just about anything, and many are worried that developers will try to wield influence with lawmakers to get ED invoked. There was lots of discussion at the time on law blogs like volokh.com (here are some of their recent posts on the subject http://volokh.com/posts/chain_1201469127.shtml )"
Governments, unlike private developers, have the right of eminent domain, which allows them to compel landowners to sell their land for public purposes. The idea is that some public projects, like highways, would be difficult or impossible to complete if each plot of land on the proposed route would have to be acquired on the private market before a road could be built. Eminent domain is meant to solve the coordination problem involved in assembling a large landholding (since there are seldom large, road-shaped plots of land vacant where new roads would be useful in populated places). It is also meant in part to solve the "holdup problem" associated with the fact that, once a large tract of property has been assembled, the missing pieces have very high marginal value, so that the last properties needed for a large project would become especially difficult or costly to acquire.
Governments can use eminent domain for private projects that they take to be in the public interest, e.g. not just highways, but privately owned railroads also. Recently the State of New York agreed to use eminent domain to acquire the last plots of land for Columbia University to expand its campus north of its current Manhattan location, on land that Columbia had mostly assembled over years of private acquisition.
Harvard acquired land in the Allston neighborhood of Boston in the 1990's, without eminent domain, by buying lots secretly, through a third party, as they became available. The thought was that the last lots would have become very expensive if it became known that Harvard was purchasing land for a large project.
Update: Steve Leider urges me to include the recent expansion of eminent domain authority to include more strictly private projects. He writes:
"You probably ought to mention the Kelo decision (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kelo_v._City_of_New_London ) which substantially expanded what counts as "for a public purpose" in terms of using eminent domain for a private project - basically increased tax revenue counts. The decision is very controversial, since it basically allows ED for just about anything, and many are worried that developers will try to wield influence with lawmakers to get ED invoked. There was lots of discussion at the time on law blogs like volokh.com (here are some of their recent posts on the subject http://volokh.com/posts/chain_1201469127.shtml )"
Thursday, December 25, 2008
Charity at a price
Nicholas Kristof's NY Times column on Christmas day, The Sin In Doing Good Deeds, begins with the question about repugnant transactions:
"If a businessman rakes in a hefty profit while doing good works, is that charity or greed? Do we applaud or hiss? "
He writes, of a book by Dan Palotta on the subject:
"Mr. Pallotta’s frustration is intertwined with his own history as the inventor of fund-raisers like AIDSRides and Breast Cancer 3-Days — events that, he says, netted $305 million over nine years for unrestricted use by charities. In the aid world, that’s a breathtaking sum.
But Mr. Pallotta’s company wasn’t a charity, but rather a for-profit company that created charitable events. Critics railed at his $394,500 salary — low for a corporate chief executive, but stratospheric in the aid world — and at the millions of dollars spent on advertising and marketing and other expenses.
“Shame on Pallotta,” declared one critic at the time, accusing him of “greed and unabashed profiteering.” In the aftermath of a wave of criticism, his company collapsed. "
Kristof later touches tangentially on a lively debate among development economists:
"There are lots of saintly aid workers in Rwanda, including the heroic Dr. Paul Farmer of Partners in Health, and they do extraordinary work. But sometimes, so do the suits. Isaac Durojaiye, a Nigerian businessman, is an example of the way the line is beginning to blur between businesses and charities. He runs a for-profit franchise business that provides fee-for-use public toilets in Nigeria. When he started, there was one public toilet in Nigeria for every 200,000 people, but by charging, he has been able to provide basic sanitation to far more people than any aid group. "
Aside from debating the merits of non-profit versus profit making organizations in fostering development, development economists have become interested in the question of whether it might further the goals of charity to charge a small price for some goods (water purifiers, or mosquito nets), rather than giving them away for free. Aside from the issue of how such supplies are financed, the question has been raised about whether charging for such goods might better put them in the hands of those who would actually use them, or even might make people more likely to use them.
Two randomized trial field experiments have reached different conclusions on this subject, in two countries, for two different goods.
The first of these, by my colleague Nava Ashraf, and James Berry, and Jesse M. Shapiro is "Can Higher Prices Stimulate Product Use? Evidence from a Field Experiment in Zambia."
They find that, for a home water purification product, in Zambia "...higher prices screen out those who use the product less," i.e. that when a price is charged, more of the product ends up being actually used.
The second paper, which uses the Ashraf et al. experimental design to study the distribution of insecticide-treated mosquito nets in Kenya, is
"Free Distribution Or Cost-Sharing? Evidence From A Randomized Malaria Prevention Experiment" by Jessica Cohen and Pascaline Dupas. They conclude
"... our results suggest that in some settings free distribution might be as
cost-effective as cost-sharing, if not more."
"If a businessman rakes in a hefty profit while doing good works, is that charity or greed? Do we applaud or hiss? "
He writes, of a book by Dan Palotta on the subject:
"Mr. Pallotta’s frustration is intertwined with his own history as the inventor of fund-raisers like AIDSRides and Breast Cancer 3-Days — events that, he says, netted $305 million over nine years for unrestricted use by charities. In the aid world, that’s a breathtaking sum.
But Mr. Pallotta’s company wasn’t a charity, but rather a for-profit company that created charitable events. Critics railed at his $394,500 salary — low for a corporate chief executive, but stratospheric in the aid world — and at the millions of dollars spent on advertising and marketing and other expenses.
“Shame on Pallotta,” declared one critic at the time, accusing him of “greed and unabashed profiteering.” In the aftermath of a wave of criticism, his company collapsed. "
Kristof later touches tangentially on a lively debate among development economists:
"There are lots of saintly aid workers in Rwanda, including the heroic Dr. Paul Farmer of Partners in Health, and they do extraordinary work. But sometimes, so do the suits. Isaac Durojaiye, a Nigerian businessman, is an example of the way the line is beginning to blur between businesses and charities. He runs a for-profit franchise business that provides fee-for-use public toilets in Nigeria. When he started, there was one public toilet in Nigeria for every 200,000 people, but by charging, he has been able to provide basic sanitation to far more people than any aid group. "
Aside from debating the merits of non-profit versus profit making organizations in fostering development, development economists have become interested in the question of whether it might further the goals of charity to charge a small price for some goods (water purifiers, or mosquito nets), rather than giving them away for free. Aside from the issue of how such supplies are financed, the question has been raised about whether charging for such goods might better put them in the hands of those who would actually use them, or even might make people more likely to use them.
Two randomized trial field experiments have reached different conclusions on this subject, in two countries, for two different goods.
The first of these, by my colleague Nava Ashraf, and James Berry, and Jesse M. Shapiro is "Can Higher Prices Stimulate Product Use? Evidence from a Field Experiment in Zambia."
They find that, for a home water purification product, in Zambia "...higher prices screen out those who use the product less," i.e. that when a price is charged, more of the product ends up being actually used.
The second paper, which uses the Ashraf et al. experimental design to study the distribution of insecticide-treated mosquito nets in Kenya, is
"Free Distribution Or Cost-Sharing? Evidence From A Randomized Malaria Prevention Experiment" by Jessica Cohen and Pascaline Dupas. They conclude
"... our results suggest that in some settings free distribution might be as
cost-effective as cost-sharing, if not more."
Tuesday, December 23, 2008
Lifesharers: organ donation as a club good rather than a public good
My earlier post today drew a comment from the executive director of an organization, LifeSharers, with an interesting approach to promoting deceased organ donation. In economist-speak, they want to increase organ donation by changing it from a public good to a club good.
Deceased organ donation is a public good in the sense that everyone is better off in expectation if everyone else is willing to donate their organs when they die, but no one receives any direct benefit from donating his organs after death (and there must be perceived costs to donation, since not everyone is a donor).
Economists often worry about how to provide public goods (which is one reason for the invention of taxes: the fellow who mows the lawn in a public park is likely a city employee, but there's no problem in getting people to maintain their own, private lawns...)
In between public and private goods are "club goods," like a park or country club that is funded by members, and is only open to members and their guests. The idea of LifeSharers is that organ donation can be a club good: members indicate that they are willing to donate their organs, giving first preference to other members.
The LifeSharers site has references to some of the many articles that discuss this or similar ideas favorably in the context of organ donation. (I can't put my finger offhand on an unfavorable reference, but I recall seeing some arguments in the medical ethics literature that question whether you should always be happy giving preference to a club member in favor of a non club member, when there might also be many other features that distinguish them...)
As a practical matter, there are obviously obstacles to making a voluntary club good out of a public good that only benefits a member with very low probability. The LifeSharers FAQ includes the following:
Q. How many LifeSharers members have died and donated organs?
A. We have not yet had a member die in circumstances that would have permitted recovery of his or her organs.
Whatever your views on the market design issues, the holidays are a good time (when families are gathered) to let yours know that you would like to be an organ donor, so that they will be able to act on your wishes if it comes to that.
Deceased organ donation is a public good in the sense that everyone is better off in expectation if everyone else is willing to donate their organs when they die, but no one receives any direct benefit from donating his organs after death (and there must be perceived costs to donation, since not everyone is a donor).
Economists often worry about how to provide public goods (which is one reason for the invention of taxes: the fellow who mows the lawn in a public park is likely a city employee, but there's no problem in getting people to maintain their own, private lawns...)
In between public and private goods are "club goods," like a park or country club that is funded by members, and is only open to members and their guests. The idea of LifeSharers is that organ donation can be a club good: members indicate that they are willing to donate their organs, giving first preference to other members.
The LifeSharers site has references to some of the many articles that discuss this or similar ideas favorably in the context of organ donation. (I can't put my finger offhand on an unfavorable reference, but I recall seeing some arguments in the medical ethics literature that question whether you should always be happy giving preference to a club member in favor of a non club member, when there might also be many other features that distinguish them...)
As a practical matter, there are obviously obstacles to making a voluntary club good out of a public good that only benefits a member with very low probability. The LifeSharers FAQ includes the following:
Q. How many LifeSharers members have died and donated organs?
A. We have not yet had a member die in circumstances that would have permitted recovery of his or her organs.
Whatever your views on the market design issues, the holidays are a good time (when families are gathered) to let yours know that you would like to be an organ donor, so that they will be able to act on your wishes if it comes to that.
Monday, November 3, 2008
The market for science
The "republic of science" is the original open source public good, and its origins are traced to Renaissance patronage of science and math, in Paul David's essay in Capitalism and Society, The Historical Origins of 'Open Science': An Essay on Patronage, Reputation and Common Agency Contracting in the Scientific Revolution
The essay is accompanied by a comment by Ken Arrow, who summarizes the issue as follows:
" Scientific activity, like any other, requires resources, in the first instance: human resources usually with considerable alternative value, but also material
resources of an increasingly expensive nature. The typical dissemination of scientific information does not, in general, yield any income; indeed, publication itself is costly and was more so before the invention of printing.
"David concentrates in this paper on the development of scientific activity from the 15th to the 17th centuries, a period clearly of the greatest importance in setting the tone and style of the modern Scientific Revolution. His thesis, amply documented, is that the prestige to patrons, generally rulers, was an important motive for the support of science. They were not unaware of the practical usefulness of scientific discovery in technological development, but the sheer display value was an additional and powerful motive. To achieve this prestige, though, it was necessary to evaluate the qualities of the scientists to be supported. Especially in the case of mathematics, this was beyond the capacity of the rulers or their ministers. An open diffusion of science, then, was needed to permit critical evaluation, as well, indeed, as to display the prestige-granting science. Hence, the gradual emergence of the apparatus and value-system of science: publications, the opportunity for comment and criticism, and, eventually, the emergence of publicly supported academies, such as the Royal Society in England and the Académie des Sciences in France, and of periodicals for the diffusion of ideas."
The essay is accompanied by a comment by Ken Arrow, who summarizes the issue as follows:
" Scientific activity, like any other, requires resources, in the first instance: human resources usually with considerable alternative value, but also material
resources of an increasingly expensive nature. The typical dissemination of scientific information does not, in general, yield any income; indeed, publication itself is costly and was more so before the invention of printing.
"David concentrates in this paper on the development of scientific activity from the 15th to the 17th centuries, a period clearly of the greatest importance in setting the tone and style of the modern Scientific Revolution. His thesis, amply documented, is that the prestige to patrons, generally rulers, was an important motive for the support of science. They were not unaware of the practical usefulness of scientific discovery in technological development, but the sheer display value was an additional and powerful motive. To achieve this prestige, though, it was necessary to evaluate the qualities of the scientists to be supported. Especially in the case of mathematics, this was beyond the capacity of the rulers or their ministers. An open diffusion of science, then, was needed to permit critical evaluation, as well, indeed, as to display the prestige-granting science. Hence, the gradual emergence of the apparatus and value-system of science: publications, the opportunity for comment and criticism, and, eventually, the emergence of publicly supported academies, such as the Royal Society in England and the Académie des Sciences in France, and of periodicals for the diffusion of ideas."
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