Market Design Working Group Meeting, Fall 2023
Saturday, September 16, 2023
NBER Market Design Working Group Meeting, Fall 2023, Cambridge MA
Sunday, September 10, 2023
Nudges, shoves, regulations and designs: debate in Behavioral and Brain Sciences
Do "nudges" provide low cost solutions to big economic problems? Are they crowding out more effective, but harder or more expensive approaches?
The latest volume of Behavioral and Brain Sciences, Volume 46 - 2023, (a journal optimized to achieve impact factor, which counts references to previously published articles) contains 34 responses to the (previously published) target article*
- Nick Chater, George Loewenstein
- Published online 05 September 2022, e147
And here's a reply to all the commentary by the authors of the target article:
Where next for behavioral public policy?
- Nick Chater, George Loewenstein
- "Academic papers are rarely born out of personal struggles. Our target article was."
- ############
*Earlier post:
Thursday, June 16, 2022
Monday, July 24, 2023
Algorithms, Approximation, and Learning in Market and Mechanism Design" November 6-9, 2023 in Berkeley (register for funding)
Here's the announcement
Register for SLMath (MSRI) Workshop: "Algorithms, Approximation, and Learning in Market and Mechanism Design" November 6-9, 2023 in Berkeley, California, Simons Laufer Mathematical Sciences Institute (SLMath)
Priority Funding Application Deadline: August 31, 2023
Speakers:
Monday, November 6, 2023: Matching Markets without Money
- Jiehua Chen (Technische Universität Wien)
- Federico Echenique (University of California, Berkeley)
- David Manlove (University of Glasgow)
- Alvin E. Roth (Stanford University)
- Jaychandran Sethuraman (Columbia University)
Tuesday, November 7, 2023: Non-Convex Auction Markets
- Elizabeth Baldwin (Merton College, University of Oxford)
- Paul Milgrom (Stanford University)
- Shmuel Oren (University of California, Berkeley)
- Rakesh Vohra (University of Pennsylvania)
- Yinyu Ye (Stanford University)
(Attendee reception follows Tuesday's events)
Wednesday, November 8, 2023: Algorithmic Mechanism Design
- Dirk Bergemann (Yale University)
- Michal Feldman (Tel-Aviv University)
- Jason Hartline (Northwestern University)
- Roger Myerson (University of Illinois, Chicago)
- Sigal Oren (Ben Gurion University of the Negev)
Thursday, November 9, 2023: Learning in Games and Markets
- Michael Jordan (University of California)
- David Parkes (Harvard University)
- Lillian Ratliff (University of California, Berkeley)
- Tuomas Sandholm (Carnegie Mellon University)
- Eva Tardos (Cornell University)
Tuesday, July 4, 2023
Market shaping ideas sought at U. Chicago
The Market Shaping Accelerator at the University of Chicago is seeking to find innovative proposals: MSA Innovation Challenge 2023
"MSA’s inaugural Innovation Challenge 2023 will award up to $2,000,000 in total prizes for ideas that identify areas where a pull mechanism would help spur innovation in biosecurity, pandemic preparedness, and climate change, and for teams to design that incentive mechanism from ideation to contract signing.
...
"Pull mechanisms are policy tools that create incentives for private sector entities to invest in research and development (R&D) and bring solutions to market. Whereas “push” funding pays for inputs (e.g. research grants), “pull” funding pays for outputs and outcomes (i.e. prizes and milestone contracts). These mechanisms “pull” innovation by creating a demand for a specific product or service, which drives private sector investment and efforts towards developing and delivering that product or technological solution.
"One example of a pull mechanism is an Advance Market Commitment (AMC), which is a type of contract where a buyer, such as a government or philanthropic organization, commits to purchasing (or subsidizing) a product or service at a certain price and quantity once it becomes available. This commitment creates a market for the product or service, providing a financial incentive for innovators to invest in R&D and develop solutions to meet that demand.
"An AMC was used in the early 2000s in the case of developing a pneumococcal vaccine for the strain of the virus affecting children in low and middle income countries. Another current example is Frontier, led by Stripe, which is an AMC to accelerate carbon removal.
"In general, pull mechanisms are useful when we know we need an innovation, but we don’t who is best placed to develop it or how."
************
Earlier:
Friday, May 12, 2023
Thursday, June 22, 2023
Leo Hurwicz (1917-2008), biography
Here's a web site devoted to the biography of Leo Hurwicz, by his son Michael: Leonid Hurwicz: Intelligent Designer
Wednesday, June 14, 2023
Conference on Economic Design, University of Girona, June 15th-17th, 2023
Conference on Economic Design, University of Girona, June 15th-17th, 2023
Here is the program.
Plenary Sessions
June 15th, 19:00 Murat Sertel Lecture
Jordi Massó: On Strategy-proofness and the Salience of Single-peakedness in a Private Goods Allotment Problem
Chair: Salvador Barberà
June 16th, 17:00 Paul Kleindorfer Lecture
Alex Teytelboym: Duality in Market Design
Chair: Tommy Andersson
June 17th, 12:15 Leonid Hurwicz Lecture
Gabrielle Demange: Dual activities in a social network
Chair: Szilvia Pápai
June 15th, 16:00 Nedim Okan Young Scholar Prize
Zhuoqiong Chen: All-pay auctions with private signals about opponents’ values
Chair: Remzi Sanver
Introduction: Ayça Ebru Giritligil
Friday, May 12, 2023
Market Shaping at the University of Chicago: Promoting needed innovation
One of many exciting talks yesterday at the first day of the New Directions in Market Design conference was by U. Chicago's Rachel Glennerster who announced the new market design initiative at U. Chicago:
"Accelerating Innovation
"Threats to the global community — such as climate change and pandemics — demand urgent innovation and action at scale. But when commercial incentives for innovation trail behind the social value, market shaping instruments are required to credibly signal demand and spur and scale up innovation.
"The Market Shaping Accelerator aims to harness the momentum and interest in these tools generated from global successes in vaccine development to accelerate their adoption by governments, multilateral institutions, and philanthropies to solve the world’s most pressing challenges.
"Nobel Laureates, Leading Scholars and Innovators Advance the Use of Market Shaping Instruments to Address Global Challenges
"The Market Shaping Accelerator brings together the world’s leading market shaping experts. The team behind the Accelerator has contributed to both foundational research and prominent policy successes of market shaping mechanisms, including the Pneumococcal and Frontier Advanced Market Commitments (AMCs)."
Wednesday, May 10, 2023
New Directions in Market Design, NBER conference May 11-12, 2023 in Washington DC (and on YouTube)
I'm on my way to this conference, celebrating a quarter of a century of practical market design by economists.
New Directions in Market Design, NBER conference May 11-12, 2023 (US Eastern Time)
LOCATION Convene, 600 14th St NW in Washington, DC. and livestreamed on YouTube
ORGANIZERS Irene Y. Lo, Michael Ostrovsky, and Parag A. Pathak
NBER conferences are by invitation. All participants are expected to comply with the NBER's Conference Code of Conduct.
Supported by Schmidt Futures
Thursday, May 11
8:30 am Continental Breakfast
9:00 am Opening Talk: Alvin Roth, Stanford University and NBER ("Market Design and Maintenance")
9:30 am Break
9:45 am Electricity and Renewable Energy Market Design
Overview: Mar Reguant, Northwestern University and NBER
Viewpoint 1: Martin Bichler, Technical University of Munich
Viewpoint 2: Richard O’Neill, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
11:05 am Market Design for the Environment
Overview: Estelle Cantillon, ULB
Viewpoint 1: Rachel Glennerster, University of Chicago and NBER
Viewpoint 2: Nathan Keohane, Environmental Defense Fund
12:25 pm Lunch discussions
2:00 pm Market Design in Healthcare
Overview: Benjamin Handel, University of California at Berkeley and NBER
Viewpoint 1: Mark Miller, Arnold Ventures
Viewpoint 2: Fanyin Zheng, Columbia University
3:20 pm Market Design for Organ Transplantation
Overview: Tayfun Sonmez, Boston College
Viewpoint 1: Nikhil Agarwal, Massachusetts Institute of Technology and NBER
Viewpoint 2: Jennifer Erickson, Organize
4:40 pm Break
5:00 pm Market Design for Education
Overview: Parag Pathak, Massachusetts Institute of Technology and NBER
Viewpoint 1: Derek Neal, University of Chicago and NBER
Viewpoint 2: Irene Lo, Stanford University
6:20 pm Adjourn
6:45 pm Group Dinner - JW Marriott
Friday, May 12
8:00 am Continental Breakfast
8:30 am Market Design for Public Housing
Overview: Nathan Hendren, Harvard University and NBER
Viewpoint 1: Winnie van Dijk, Harvard University and NBER
Viewpoint 2: Mary Cunningham, Urban Institute
9:50 am Market Design in Transportation
Overview: Michael Ostrovsky, Stanford University and NBER
Viewpoint 1: David Shmoys, Cornell University
Viewpoint 2: Wai Yan Leong, Singapore Land Transport Authority
11:10 am Break
11:30 am Market Design in Financial Markets
Overview: Haoxiang Zhu, Massachusetts Institute of Technology and NBER
Viewpoint 1: Eric Budish, University of Chicago and NBER
Viewpoint 2: Scott Mixon, CFTC
12:50 pm
Lunch discussions
2:20 pm Market Design Tools in the Regulation of Online Marketplaces
Overview: Susan Athey, Stanford University and NBER
Viewpoint 1: Preston McAfee, Google
Viewpoint 2: Michael Schwarz, Microsoft
3:40 pm Artificial Intelligence and Market Design
Overview: Kevin Leyton-Brown, University of British Columbia
Viewpoint 1: Hal Varian, Google
Viewpoint 2: Nikhil Devanur, Amazon
5:00 pm Break
5:20 pm Closing Talk: Paul Milgrom, Stanford University
5:50 pm Adjourn
6:30 pm Group Dinner - JW Marriott