Usury and anti-semitism

From Ira Stoll's review of Capitalism and the Jews, by Jerry Z. Muller, Princeton University Press:

"The book by Mr. Muller, a professor of history at Catholic University, consists of a short introduction and four chapters. It's the first chapter, "The Long Shadow of Usury," that's the most enlightening.
"Usury was an important concept with a long shadow. It was significant because the condemnation of lending money at interest was based on the presumptive illegitimacy of all economic gain not derived from physical labor. That way of conceiving of economic activity led to a failure to recognize the role of knowledge and the evaluation of risk in economic life," he writes. "So closely was the reviled practice of usury identified with the Jews that St. Bernard of Clairvaux, the leader of the Cistercian Order, in the middle of the twelfth century referred to the taking of usury as 'Jewing'" says Mr. Muller."

B2B finance

Page 14 of a recent report by Morgan Stanley focuses on The Receivables Exchange, about which I have posted previously. (The Morgan Stanley report emphasizes: " This is not a research report and was not prepared by Morgan Stanley research department. It was prepared by Morgan Stanley sales, trading, banking and other non-research personnel. Past performance is not necessarily a guide to future performance.") Here it is.

The report has some recent performance statistics, and says "The Receivables Exchange, a private company, started trading on November 18, 2008 to bring private capital to the market for SME [small/medium enterprise] credit. Via The Receivables Exchange, an SME can auction its receivables to the highest bidder(s) for a substantial advance rate. The Receivables Exchange provides straight-through processing and acts as collateral agent and servicer, using an innovative approach to mitigate default risk."

Here are my previous posts about the Receivables Exchange, which strikes me as quite an interesting venture in disintermediation of credit. (Full disclosure; I'm on their advisory board.)

Klemperer's auction design for toxic assets

Over at voxeu.org, Paul Klemperer writes about Central bank liquidity and “toxic asset” auctions, which describes briefly his paper

Klemperer, Paul (2009). “The Product-Mix Auction: A New Auction Design for Differentiated Goods”.

In his Voxeu post he says "The product-mix auction yields better “matching” between suppliers and demanders, reduced market power, greater volume and liquidity, and therefore also improved efficiency, revenue, and quality of information than feasible alternatives. Its potential applications therefore extend well beyond the financial context."

Factoring

If you do a google search on "factoring," the first few organic results are on factoring numbers, but the ads are all about factoring receivables. Factors (in this sense of the word) are firms that lend cash to businesses, on the strength of their accounts receivable. It used to be (and still largely is) a relationship business; one factor would handle all of a firm's receivables.

The Street.Com has an article on the new face on the block, The Receivables Exchange , which is set up around the idea of letting firms borrow from individual investors on the strength of particular accounts receivable: Cash-Strapped Firms Sell Unpaid Accounts.

"Cash flow has become a leading concern for small firms as banks reduce credit lines, shorten maturities and raise rates, according to a May study by the Credit Research Foundation. Among the companies surveyed, 45% said the financial crisis was straining their access to working capital. Almost 70% reported a slowdown in customer payments, and 61% said their top priority was to boost cash flow by getting clients to pay what they owe faster.
The Receivables Exchange (TRE), which runs an online auction market for accounts receivable, is benefiting from these trends. More companies have been turning to the two-year-old firm to raise money as traditional credit sources dry up.
"We take the most liquid of the assets on the balance sheet that they can modify and allow those to trade on a transparent, standardized exchange," says Nicolas Perkin, president of the New Orleans-based company.
With TRE's online system, which one might describe as an eBay... for factoring, sellers post eligible receivables and set sale parameters, such as the duration of the auction, the minimum advance payment and the maximum fee they will pay.
Buyers, such as commercial banks and hedge funds, browse for accounts to bid on and post profiles indicating their preferences. Sellers can leave the auction open-ended or set a "buyout price" that allows a buyer to immediately snap up the accounts.

TRE has almost $20 billion of liquidity up for grabs. The average seller is looking to unload $65,000 of accounts receivable. The average auction lasts one day, with the shortest clocking in at less than a minute. The company has a 99% completion rate, with upwards of 85% selling at the buyout price. About 86% of users are repeat customers. "

I've written about TRE before, here and here.

Update: Steve Leider points me to this Marketplace Whiteboard video explaining Factoring, inspired by the recent troubles of CIT, a big factor.

House flipping fraud in Florida

I received the following email from Eric Budish, the Chicago market designer:

"I came across a neat investigative journalism feature on a form of mortgage fraud called “house flipping” .

The newspaper reviewed 19mm Florida real-estate transactions, and found that 50,000 involved appreciation of 30%+ in less than 90 days. They investigate one fraud circle in depth, and have features on the local police, lenders, etc.

What makes the fraud tick is that the buyer can finance at the new price. So if A legitimately buys a house for 100, then immediately sells it to his buddy B for say 150, B can get a mortgage against the 150 (especially if his buddy C is a real-estate appraiser). Even if B makes a small down payment on the 150, together A and B have extracted 50 minus downpayment minus fees in cash from the transaction. B never intends to repay the 150, and B’s mortgage lender is severely under collateralized.

The reason I think this is all so interesting is that the fraud is only possible because houses are idiosyncratic, but not too idiosyncratic. If houses were perfect substitutes, then A, B and C couldn’t trick the mortgage lender about house values (50,000 flips is a lot, and likely an underestimate, but still less than 1% of transactions). If houses were substantially more idiosyncratic, then banks would never have gotten in the habit of financing 90%+ of the purchase price in the first place: in the event of foreclosure they’d have to worry about whether the right types of buyers would be in the market. Put differently, the housing market is not too thick, but not too thin."

Credit markets, old and new: The Receivables Exchange

The WSJ reports CIT's Woes Prompt Surge In Activity At Receivables Exchange.

"The turmoil surrounding finance giant CIT Group Inc. (CIT) is driving a surge in new business for a New Orleans-based company that runs a market in receivables.
The Receivables Exchange, which lets small- and mid-sized companies auction their accounts receivable to buyers that include hedge funds and commercial banks, on Wednesday recorded its busiest day ever and is fielding a flood of calls from businesses searching for financing alternatives."

The Receivables Exchange is a new firm built a round the idea of disintermediating accounts receivable. Here's my earlier post.

Financial market design: the view from the Fed

Fed chairman Ben Bernanke, in a speech today (March 10) to the Council on Foreign Relations, after speaking of immediate steps to bail out financial institutions, talks about ways in which the financial markets might be redesigned in the longer term.

"At the same time that we are addressing such immediate challenges, it is not too soon for policymakers to begin thinking about the reforms to the financial architecture, broadly conceived, that could help prevent a similar crisis from developing in the future. We must have a strategy that regulates the financial system as a whole, in a holistic way, not just its individual components. In particular, strong and effective regulation and supervision of banking institutions, although necessary for reducing systemic risk, are not sufficient by themselves to achieve this aim.
Today, I would like to talk about four key elements of such a strategy. First, we must address the problem of financial institutions that are deemed too big--or perhaps too interconnected--to fail. Second, we must strengthen what I will call the financial infrastructure--the systems, rules, and conventions that govern trading, payment, clearing, and settlement in financial markets--to ensure that it will perform well under stress. Third, we should review regulatory policies and accounting rules to ensure that they do not induce excessive procyclicality--that is, do not overly magnify the ups and downs in the financial system and the economy. Finally, we should consider whether the creation of an authority specifically charged with monitoring and addressing systemic risks would help protect the system from financial crises like the one we are currently experiencing."

Regarding the financial infrastructure, he mentions among other things that
"To help alleviate counterparty credit concerns, regulators are also encouraging the development of well-regulated and prudently managed central clearing counterparties for OTC trades. Just last week, we approved the application for membership in the Federal Reserve System of ICE Trust, a trust company that proposes to operate as a central counterparty and clearinghouse for CDS transactions. "

On the subject of clearinghouses, he goes on to say
"The Federal Reserve and other authorities also are focusing on enhancing the resilience of the triparty repurchase agreement (repo) market, in which the primary dealers and other major banks and broker-dealers obtain very large amounts of secured financing from money market mutual funds and other short-term, risk-averse sources of funding.
...
it may be worthwhile considering the costs and benefits of a central clearing system for this market, given the magnitude of exposures generated and the vital importance of the market to both dealers and investors. "

His comments on "procyclicality" e.g. on making sure that regulation of capital reserves don't cause banks to cut back lending just when credit needs to be loosened, are also worth reading. His concluding paragraph is a sober look at market design contemplated (as it often must be) in advance of reliable scientific knowledge, but in light of recent experience:

"Financial crises will continue to occur, as they have around the world for literally hundreds of years. Even with the sorts of actions I have outlined here today, it is unrealistic to hope that financial crises can be entirely eliminated, especially while maintaining a dynamic and innovative financial system. Nonetheless, these steps should help make crises less frequent and less virulent, and so contribute to a better functioning national and global economy."

Credit: not repugnant anymore

What a difference a few centuries can make. When Shakespeare wrote The Merchant of Venice, lending money was a repugnant transaction.

When President Obama spoke to Congress Tuesday evening, he had this to say: "You see, the flow of credit is the lifeblood of our economy. The ability to get a loan is how you finance the purchase of everything from a home to a car to a college education, how stores stock their shelves, farms buy equipment, and businesses make payroll."

TARP II

Lucian Bebchuk, the eminent law-and-economics lawyer/economist best known for his work on corporate governance, has just distributed a paper, How To Make TARP II Work.

Here is the Abstract:
"Treasury Secretary Geithner announced a plan, which the Treasury is willing to finance with up to $1 trillion of public funds, to partner with private capital to buy banks' "troubled assets." The Treasury has not yet settled on the plan's design, and its announcement has encountered substantial skepticism as to whether an effective plan for a public-private partnership in buying troubled assets can be worked out. This paper argues that, yes, it can. The paper also analyzes how the plan should be designed to contribute most to restarting the market for troubled assets at the least cost to taxpayers.

"The government's plan should focus on establishing a significant number of competing funds that will be privately managed and dedicated to buying troubled assets - not on creating one, large public-private aggregator bank. Establishing competing funds, I show, is necessary both to securing a well-functioning market for troubled assets and to keeping costs to taxpayers at a minimum.

"Each new fund will be partly financed with private capital, with the rest coming (say, in the form of non-recourse debt financing) from the government's Investment Fund planned by the Treasury. One important element of the proposed design is a competitive process in which private managers seeking to establish a fund participating in the program will submit bids as to what fraction of the fund's capital will be funded privately. The government will set the fraction of each participating fund's capital that must be financed with private money at the highest level that, given the received bids, will still enable establishing new funds with aggregate capital equal to the program's target level. Overall, I show that the proposed design will leverage private capital to the fullest extent possible and will provide the most effective and least costly mechanism for restarting the market for troubled assets. "

Credit cards, data mining, incentives

Two recent stories point to the fact that banks, seeking to control their lending, are selectively suspending credit cards or cutting credit limits, based on data about individuals' credit card use. This introduces some interesting incentive problems, quite different from usual credit card decisions.

The NY Times story, American Express Kept a (Very) Watchful Eye on Charges , reports
"In some instances, if it didn’t like what it was seeing, the company has cut customer credit lines. It laid out this logic in letters that infuriated many of the cardholders who received them. “Other customers who have used their card at establishments where you recently shopped,” one of those letters said, “have a poor repayment history with American Express.”
"It sure sounded as if American Express had developed a blacklist of merchants patronized by troubled cardholders. But late this week, American Express told me that wasn’t the case. The company said it had also decided to stop using what it has called “spending patterns” as a criteria in its credit line reductions. "...

"American Express wouldn’t have been the first company to try cordoning off certain industries. Last year, CompuCredit, a subprime lender, got in trouble with the Federal Trade Commission for failing to disclose that it could reduce customers’ credit lines for using their cards at various establishments.
What was on CompuCredit’s no-go list? Marriage counselors, tire retreading and repair shops, bars and nightclubs, pool halls, pawnshops and massage parlors, among others. "

The Globe story, Lenders abruptly cut lines of credit, focuses on customers who have had their cards suspended.

"Many of the credit lines being taken away or reduced have not been used recently, according to people who track the business. Dennis Moroney of TowerGroup, a Needham research firm, called it the "kitchen drawer" syndrome because some consumers keep cards they don't need or don't use often. Card issuers are trying to rein in such accounts before they get tapped for emergencies in the slumping economy, Moroney said."...

"...if you have a card you haven't used in a while that you want to keep, ... "Buy something inexpensive and pay it off that month." "

TARP auction: Bank of England version

My hotel in Maastricht is housed in an old (renovated) church, and it now has excellent internet connections, so I can blog a bit more than I expected.

Paul Klemperer has written a paper on auction design for England's version of the Troubled Asset Recovery Program. It is called
A New Auction for Substitutes: Central Bank Liquidity Auctions, the U.S. TARP, and Variable Product-Mix Auctions.

It describes a sealed bid auction, required because of the speed and interdependence of markets for financial products:
"a multi-stage auction was ruled out because bidders who had entered the highest bids early on might change their minds about wanting to be winners before the auction closed, and because the financial markets might themselves be influenced by the evolution of the auction, which magnifies the difficulties of bidding and invites manipulation."

The credit crisis and market design

The WSJ, in its Real Time Economics Blog and in a related story in their January 2 issue, raises some questions about how discussion of financial market regulation has turned into a discussion of market design (although that's not exactly the way they put it). They recount the poor reception given to Raghuram G. Rajan's 2005 presentation at the Fed's Jackson Hole conference in honor of Alan Greenspan. Prof. Rajan noted that banks' increased exposure to the securities markets would make them less able to serve as a source of credit in a crisis, and his concerns were, the story reports, met with disdain by those assembled. The blog summarizes the attitude at the time:

"The episode suggests one reason that the crisis went unchecked: A dangerous all-or-nothing orthodoxy had come to dominate the policy debate, where one was either for free markets or against them. "

The point of the market design movement, of course, is that markets aren't either "free" or non-existent. A better description is that markets have rules, and some rules work better than others, and the goal of regulators and others who shape the rules should be to find rules that enable markets to work better.

However the WSJ blog also quotes Professor Rajan on the difficulties facing academics who wish to offer opinions on compex issues of public policy:
"“Most academics are really reluctant to take part in the public dialog, because the public dialog requires you to have an opinion about things you can’t really be sure about,” says Mr. Rajan. “They fear talking about things where everything is not neatly nailed in a model. They stay away and let the charlatans occupy the high ground.” "


(The story notes that calls for sensible regulation and market design were met with condescension before the credit crisis, a condescension that is being reevaluated now. So perhaps now is the chance I've been waiting for to note that an anagram for MARKET DESIGN is NEGATED SMIRK :-)

Pawn shops attracting wealthier customers

The WSJ has a story whose title and subtitle sum it up: People Pulling Up to Pawnshops Today Are Driving Cadillacs and BMWs : Well-to-Do Turn to Last-Resort Lenders; Putting Up Diamonds, Dumpsters as Collateral

Not only are the number of customers for loans increasing, so are the number of defaults:
"This year, the number of first-time pawnshop users is up 10%, according to Mr. Adelman of the pawnbroker trade group. Owners say the rate at which people are coming back to retrieve property and pay off loans has fallen about 10%. That leaves the store on the hook to sell the goods."

So pawn shops may be a place where a larger variety of goods than in the past will be recycled in the continuing credit crisis.

Markets for durables when credit is tight

Two stories in the NY Times reflect changes in markets for durable goods and for real estate in the context of tight credit: layaway plans and rent with option to buy, respectively.

The Last Temptation of Plastic reports on the revival of layaway plans, which used to be popular before credit cards. In a layaway purchase, you make installment payments before taking possession of your purchase (e.g. a big furniture purchase); it's a form of enforced savings that locks in a price and helps supply self control and commitment (to save for the purchase) where it might be lacking.

Rent Now, Buy Later reports on the growing number of offerings in the NYC real estate market. These transactions allow potential purchasers to delay purchase until they have a bigger downpayment (and until they see which way the market is going), and they give sellers some rental income in the meantime.

These are both signs of tough times...

Receivables exchange

The NY Times reports on a new online market in which companies can sell their receivables: An Online Market for Selling I.O.U.’s

"Businesses getting pinched by the credit squeeze can now tap a new source of cash — by selling the money owed to them by other companies.
A new online marketplace, the Receivables Exchange, was formally introduced on Monday after 18 months in development. It allows companies to sell their outstanding receivables at a discount to a panoply of financial institutions."

Truth in advertising: I'm on their advisory board.

Treasury abandons plans for reverse auction to purchase troubled assets

The Treasury announced today what had already become clear, which is that it has abandoned the initial plan to purchase troubled assets, in favor of buying equity in troubled companies: Remarks by Secretary Henry M. Paulson, Jr. on Financial Rescue Package and Economic Update

"As credit markets froze in mid-September, the Administration asked Congress for broad tools and flexibility to rescue the financial system. We asked for $700 billion to purchase troubled assets from financial institutions. At the time, we believed that would be the most effective means of getting credit flowing again.
During the two weeks that Congress considered the legislation, market conditions worsened considerably. It was clear to me by the time the bill was signed on October 3rd that we needed to act quickly and forcefully, and that purchasing troubled assets – our initial focus – would take time to implement and would not be sufficient given the severity of the problem. In consultation with the Federal Reserve, I determined that the most timely, effective step to improve credit market conditions was to strengthen bank balance sheets quickly through direct purchases of equity in banks. "

HT to Eric Budish (a market designer on the market)

Market for check cashing and payday loans

The NY Times has a nuanced article about the business and recent sale of a big check cashing chain: Check Cashers, Redeemed

"Selling to the poor is a tricky business. Poor people pay more for just about everything, from fresh groceries to banking; Prahalad, the economist, calls it the “poverty penalty.” They pay more for all kinds of reasons, but maybe most of all because mainstream firms decline to compete for their business. Nix has served customers that traditional financial institutions neglected, but he has also profited from that neglect. Whether he profited too much, charging poor communities what the market would bear — that’s a moral question as much as an economic one. And there’s no simple answer. "

The Federal Reserve’s Term Auction Facility

As the credit crisis unfolded, the Fed prepared to auction funds to banks. Among other design features (such as how expressive a bidding language to allow) they thought about adverse selection: they wanted to reduce the signal value "stigma" of participation.

The Federal Reserve’s Term Auction Facility
July 2008 Volume 14, Number 5
Authors: Olivier Armantier, Sandra Krieger, and James McAndrews

Abstract: "As liquidity conditions in the term funding markets grew increasingly strained in late 2007, the Federal Reserve began making funds available directly to banks through a new tool, the Term Auction Facility (TAF). The TAF provides term funding on a collateralized basis, at interest rates and amounts set by auction. The facility is designed to improve liquidity by making it easier for sound institutions to borrow when the markets are not operating efficiently."

Auction Design: "Once the Federal Reserve concluded that an auction format was an effective funding alternative, it added features aimed at ensuring the most efficient distribution of funds to banks with a high demand. In particular, the Fed established a minimum rate at which bids could be submitted that was set in a comparable, competitive market (rather than a penalty rate, which is set at a premium to existing market rates).This market-based minimum bid rate was likely to encourage participation and reduce any stigma associated with receiving auctioned funds, since banks would not necessarily signal an abnormally high demand by bidding. The Federal Reserve also chose a uniform-price (or single-price) auction rather than a discriminatory (pay-your-bid) auction in part to spur participation further. By using the uniform-price structure common in Treasury auctions, the Fed reasoned that banks would be more comfortable with bidding. Finally, to allow for the widest allocation of funds, the central bank imposed a cap on the bid amount corresponding to 10 percent of the auction size.
The Fed also imposed two important rules. First, based on its experience with option auctions in 1999, it would allow each bidder to make two rate-amount offers. This rule represents the Fed’s resolution of the trade-off associated with multiple rate-amount offers: as the number of offers increases, the auction becomes more complex, but participants are able to make bids that are more representative of their demand. Second, the central bank would require TAF participants to pledge collateral beyond the amount necessary to secure credit in the new facility. This rule was imposed to ensure that bidders in the new facility could still borrow through the discount window’s primary credit facility to meet unexpected overnight funding needs."

Credit Default Swaps: reducing counterparty risk

New York Fed Welcomes Further Industry Commitments on Over-the-Counter Derivatives

"The following areas constitute our central priorities for addressing both operational and market design concerns for OTC derivatives:
Institute a Central Counterparty (CCP) for Credit Default Swaps (CDS)...
Reduce Levels of Outstanding Trades via Portfolio Compression. Market participants continue to reduce the number of outstanding CDS trades through multilateral trade terminations (tear-ups)
Enhance Market Transparency.

HT to PrefBlog

Debt and fairness

Margaret Atwood points out that credit and debt are not only economically important but highly emotive, and that solutions to the credit crisis will also involve deeply held beliefs about fairness:
A Matter of Life and Debt

Not so many centuries ago, debt transactions were considered repugnant in many parts of the world (and are still so considered in parts of the Islamic world).