Fourth SIGecom Winter Meeting , Thursday, February 15, 2024

 I'll see some you Thursday, online, in Gather.town.

The Fourth Annual ACM SIGecom Winter Meeting will take place Thursday, February 15, 2024, at 11am–5pm Eastern time.  The workshop will take place on the Gather.town platform. 

"This year's topic is behavioral models. The meeting will feature two introductory talks and four research presentations that reflect an array of perspectives and active research directions. The event will also feature a fireside conversation with Noam Nisan and Al Roth."

Program

All times listed in US Eastern Time Zone (ET). All talks will take place in the auditorium unless otherwise noted.

11:10 - 1:00pm: Introductory Talks

11:10am - 12:00pm: John Kleinberg

12:00pm - 12:10pm: Break

12:10pm - 1:00pm: Ori Heffetz

1:00pm - 2:30pm: Social Break

1:15pm - 1:45pm: Student Fireside Chat with Noam Nisan and Al Roth

1:45pm - 2:30pm: SIGecom social events

2:30pm - 5:00pm: Spotlight talks

2:30pm - 3:00pm: Modibo Camara

3:00pm - 3:30pm: Ryan Oprea

3:30pm - 3:45pm: Break

3:45pm - 4:15pm: Gali Noti

4:15pm - 4:45pm: Nicole Immorlica

4:45pm - 5:00pm: Concluding Remarks

5:00pm - 6:00pm: Closing Reception

Organizers: Sigal Oren and Ran Shorrer

Celebrate Vince Crawford in Budapest at the CONFERENCE ON MECHANISM AND INSTITUTION DESIGN in July. (Call for papers...)

 Here's the announcement:

CONFERENCE ON MECHANISM AND INSTITUTION DESIGN

The 2024 Conference on Mechanism and Institution Design will take place in Budapest, Hungary, July 8-12, 2024, and be hosted by Corvinus University of Budapest. It will be an in-person meeting. This biannual conference is under the umbrella of the Society for the Promotion of Mechanism and Institution Design (SPMiD). The conference will also celebrate Vincent Crawford’s 75th birthday and his fundamental contributions to economic theory, game theory, and the Society.

The confirmed keynote speakers include:

• Paul Milgrom (Stanford University),
• Roger Myerson (University of Chicago),
• Al Roth (Stanford University), and
• Eva Tardos (Cornell University).

Call for papers

The theme of the conference is on mechanism and institution design, interpreted in a general sense. The conference welcomes papers in all areas of economics, finance, computer science, law, and politics, etc., which are related to mechanisms and institutions. The topics include but are not limited to game theory and foundations, auction design, mechanism design, market design, information design, market and equilibrium, assignments, contests, bargaining, matching, college admission, election schemes, political institutions, public good provision, algorithmic mechanism design, algorithmic game theory, computational social choice, engineering economics, nonlinear pricing, law and litigation, voting, sports, economic reform, regulation, taxation schemes, school choice, governance, corporate finance, cryptocurrency, financial institutions, capital structure, incentives in labor market, social choice, information and learning, decision theory, platform, network, etc. Papers can be theoretical, empirical, experimental, or historical. Young economists including senior PhD students are encouraged to submit their papers.

Matching Markets and Inequality, in Exeter in June: call for papers

 Here's the announcement and call for papers:

Matching Markets and Inequality Workshop, Department of Economics University of Exeter Business School June 20-21, 2024

Keynote speakers: Pierre-André Chiappori, Leeat Yariv, Christopher Neilson

Market design: some press accounts in Chile

 The recent market design workshop in Santiago was pretty thrilling, and I was asked to give some interviews and a public talk, which have now generated some press about market design.

Here's a post-talk story:

"Los mercados son artefactos humanos, son herramientas que construimos nosotros mismos para que nos ayuden" ["Markets are human artifacts, they are tools that we build ourselves to help us"]

Google translate does a good job, and the piece includes a video of my talk (starting at around minute 20:45 after a long wait between the start of live streaming and the actual start of the talk...). You can hear the talk in Spanish (only), the acute listener will notice that it's given in a woman's voice...)

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Another article also has some pictures of the audience, and as this was the last act of the market design workshop, readers of this blog may recognize some people in one of the photos.

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Some earlier stories were published after I was interviewed during the workshop also in Spanish, also accessible by G translate):

“An international collaboration in South America for kidney transplantation would be useful”

Alvin Roth and lack of equity in the Chilean economic system: “Attention should focus on alleviating and abolishing poverty”

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After the workshop we explored Chile's Atacama with some colleagues including Itai Ashlagi and Ravi Jagadeesan:

Market Design Workshop 18 - 20 December 2023 Santiago, Chile

 Market Design Workshop  18 - 20 December 2023  Santiago, Chile

Here is the list of participants, and the program. 

I'll be speaking on Monday and then again on Wednesday.

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Unrest and then Covid delayed this conference:

Tuesday, December 17, 2019

Market design workshop in Santiago, SUSPENDED

Politics can certainly get in the way of economics, even academic economics, as it turns out.  The organizers of a conference on matching and market design that I had planned to attend prudently decided  several weeks ago to postpone it, in light of the street demonstrations taking place in Chile.

 

 

 

Algorithms, Approximation, and Learning in Market and Mechanism Design at SLMath Berkeley this week--Thursday

 Thursday's program (last day)

 09:00 am - 09:45 am

Stability and Learning in Strategic Games

Eva Tardos, Cornell University

 09:45 am - 10:30 am

Statistical Contract Theory

Michael Jordan, University of California, Berkeley

 10:00 am - 10:30 am

Break

 11:00 am - 11:45 am

Learning Bayes-Nash Equilibria in Auctions and Contests

Martin Bichler, Technical University of Munich

 11:30 am - 11:45 am

Break

 11:45 am - 12:30 pm

Recent Advances in Computing Nash Equilibria in Markov Games

Ioannis Panageas, University of California, Irvine

 12:30 pm - 02:30 pm

Lunch

 02:30 pm - 03:15 pm

Learning in Games and Markets: Talk 5

Tuomas Sandholm, Carnegie Mellon University

 03:15 pm - 03:45 pm

Afternoon Tea

 03:45 pm - 05:00 pm

Learning in Games and Markets: Closing Panel

Algorithms, Approximation, and Learning in Market and Mechanism Design at SLMath Berkeley this week--Wednesday

 Wednesday's program

 09:00 am - 09:45 am

Dual Reduction and Elementary Games with Senders and Receivers

Roger Myerson, University of Chicago

 09:45 am - 10:30 am

Algorithmic Mechanism Design: Talk 5

Michal Feldman, Tel-Aviv University

 10:30 am - 11:00 am

Break

 11:00 am - 11:45 am

Simple Mechanisms for Non-linear Agents

Jason Hartline, Northwestern University

 11:45 am - 12:30 pm

Mechanism design for humans

Sigal Oren, Ben Gurion University of the Negev

 12:30 pm - 02:30 pm

Lunch

 02:30 pm - 03:15 pm

Cost Based Nonlinear Pricing

Dirk Bergemann, Yale University

 03:15 pm - 03:45 pm

Break

 03:45 pm - 05:00 pm

Algorithmic Mechanism Design: Closing Panel

Algorithms, Approximation, and Learning in Market and Mechanism Design at SLMath Berkeley this week--Tuesday

 Here's Tuesday's program

 09:00 am - 09:45 am

Walrasian Mechanisms for Non-Convex Economies and the Bound-Form First Welfare Theorem

Paul Milgrom, Stanford University

 09:45 am - 10:30 am

The Languages of Product-Mix Auctions

Elizabeth Baldwin, University of Oxford

 10:30 am - 11:00 am

Break

 11:00 am - 11:45 am

Workably Competitive Electricity Markets: Practice and Theory

Shmuel Oren, UC Berkeley

 11:45 am - 12:30 pm

(Near) Substitute Preferences and Equilibria with Indivisibilities

Rakesh Vohra, University of Pennsylvania

 12:30 pm - 02:30 pm

Poster Sessions and Lunch

 02:30 pm - 03:15 pm

Beyond Classical Fisher Markets: Nonconvexities and Online Allocations

Yinyu Ye, Stanford University

 03:15 pm - 03:45 pm

Afternoon Tea

 03:45 pm - 05:00 pm

Non-Convex Auction Markets: Closing Panel

 05:00 pm - 06:20 pm

Reception