Market design conference at Columbia

COLUMBIA MARKET DESIGN CONFERENCE
Friday, April 13, 2018 - Saturday, April 14, 2018

April 13, 2018

8:00-8:25 Breakfast & Registration

8:25-8:30 Introduction by Yeon-Koo Che (Columbia University)

Session 1:

Chair: Guillaume Haeringer (Baruch College)

8:30-9:30  Yusuke Narita (Yale University), “Regression Discontinuity Design Meets Market Design”

9:30-10:30 Yinghua He (Rice University), “A Pigouvian Approach to Congestion in Matching Markets,” (joint with Thierry Magnac).

10:30-10:45 Coffee Break

Session 2:

Chair: Jay Sethuraman (Columbia University)

10:45-11:45 Ran Shorrer (Penn State University), “Need vs. Merit: The Large Core of College Admissions Markets,” (joint with Avinatan Hassidim, Assaf Romm).

11:45-12:45 Olivier Tercieux (Paris School of Economics),  “Top Trading Cycles in Prioritized Matching: An Irrelevance of Priorities in Large Markets,” (joint with Yeon-Koo Che).

12:45-1:45 Lunch

Session 3:

Chair: José Montiel Olea (Columbia University)

1:45-2:45 Mohammad Akbarpour (Stanford University), “Credible Mechanisms,” (joint with Shengwu Li).

2:45-3:45 Nicole Immorlica (Microsoft Research),  “Optimal Data Acquisition for Statistical Estimation,” (joint with Yiling Chen, Brendan Lucier, Vasilis Syrgkanis, Juba Ziani).

3:45-4:00 Coffee Break

Session 4:

Chair: Yash Kanoria (Columbia University)

4:00-5:00 Alfred Galichon (New York University), “A Model of Decentralized Matching without Transfers,” (joint with Yu-Wei Hsieh).

5:00-6:00 Josh Mollner (Northwestern University), “Lottery Equilibrium,” (joint with Glen Weyl).

6:30 Dinner (off campus)

April 14, 2018

8:00-8:30 Breakfast & Registration

Session 1: 

Chair: Xiaosheng Mu (Harvard University)

8:30-9:30 Juan Carlos Carbajal (University of New South Wales), “Selling Mechanisms for a Financially Constrained Buyer,” (joint with Ahuva Mu’alem).

9:30-10:30 Ben Brooks (University of Chicago) “Optimal Auction Design with Common Values: An Informationally Robust Approach,” (joint with Songzi Du).

10:30-10:45 Coffee Break

Session 2:

Chair: Qingmin Liu (Columbia University)

10:45-11:45 Philipp Strack (Berkeley),  “A Theory of Auctions with Endogenous Valuations,” (joint with Alex Gershkov, Benny Moldovanu).

11:45-12:45 Jacob Leshno (Columbia University),  “Monopoly without a Monopolist: An Economic Analysis of the Bitcoin Payment System,” (joint with Gur Huberman, Ciamac C. Moallemi).