Dynamic Games, Contracts, and Markets at Stanford SITE, July 21-23

STANFORD INSTITUTE FOR THEORETICAL ECONOMICS (SITE)
Session 3: Dynamic Games, Contracts, and Markets

Monday, July 21, 2014

8:30 am to 9:00 am

Check-in and Breakfast

9:00 am to 9:45 am

Dynamic Trading: Price Inertia, Front-Running and Relationship Banking

Presented by: Yuliy Sannikov, Princeton University

Co-Authors: Andy Skrzypacz, Stanford University

9:45 am to 10:00 am

Coffee Break

10:00 am to 10:45 am

Dynamic Ex Post Equilibrium, Welfare, and Optimal Trading Frequency in Double Auctions

Presented by: Songzi Du, Simon Fraser University; Haoxiang Zhu, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

10:45 am to 11:00 am

Coffee Break

11:00 am to 11:45 am

TBA

Presented by: Zhiguo He, University of Chicago

11:45 am to 1:30 pm

Lunchtime Discussion

1:30 pm to 2:15 pm

Labor Union Members Play an OLG Repeated Game

Presented by: Michihiro Kandori, University of Tokyo; Shinya Obayashi, Tohoku University

2:15 pm to 2:30 pm

Coffee Break

2:30 pm to 3:15 pm

Perfect Versus Imperfect Monitoring in Repeated Games

Presented by: Takuo Sugaya, Stanford University; Alexander Wolitzky, Stanford University

3:15 pm to 3:30 pm

Coffee Break

3:30 pm to 4:15 pm

Reputation Without Commitment

Presented by: Jonathan Weinstein, Northwestern University; Muhamet Yildiz, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

6:00 pm to 8:30 pm

Dinner

Tuesday, July 22, 2014

8:30 am to 9:00 am

Check-in and Breakfast

9:00 am to 9:45 am

The Value of a Reputation Under Imperfect Monitoring

Presented by: Martin Cripps, University College London; Eduardo Faingold, Yale University

9:45 am to 10:00 am

Coffee Break

10:00 am to 10:45 am

A Reputational Theory of Firm Dynamics

Presented by: Simon Board, University of California, Los Angeles; Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn, University of California, Los Angeles

10:45 am to 11:00 am

Coffee Break

11:00 am to 11:45 am

Managerial Attention and Worker Engagement

Presented by: Marina Halac, Columbia Business School; Andrea Prat, Columbia University

11:45 am to 1:30 pm

Lunchtime Discussion

1:30 pm to 2:15 pm

Beeps

Presented by: Jeff Ely, Northwestern University

2:15 pm to 2:30 pm

Coffee Break

2:30 pm to 3:15 pm

Dynamic Delegation of Experimentation

Presented by: Yingni Guo, Northwestern University

3:15 pm to 3:30 pm

Coffee Break

3:30 pm to 4:15 pm

Optimal Design of Internal Disclosure

Presented by: Dmitry Orlov, Stanford University

6:00 pm to 8:30 pm

Dinner

Wednesday, July 23, 2014

8:30 am to 9:00 am

Check-in and Breakfast

9:00 am to 9:45 am

Auctions with Limited Commitment

Presented by: Konrad Mierendorff, University of Zurich

Co-Authors: Qingmin Liu, Columbia University; Xianwen Shi, University of Toronto

9:45 am to 10:00 am

Coffee Break

10:00 am to 10:45 am

Dynamic Eliciting Unobservable Information

Presented by: Nicolas Lambert, Stanford University

Co-Authors: Christopher Chambers, University of California, San Diego

10:45 am to 11:00 am

Coffee Break

11:00 am to 11:45 am

Making Collusion Hard: Asymmetric Information as a Counter-Corruption Measure

Presented by: Sylvain Chassang, Princeton University; Juan Ortner, Boston University

11:45 am to 1:30 pm

Lunchtime Discussion

1:30 pm to 2:15 pm

Efficient Firm Dynamics in a Frictional Labor Market

Presented by: Leo Kaas, University of Konstanz

Co-Authors: Philipp Kircher, University of Edinburgh

2:15 pm to 2:30 pm

Coffee Break

2:30 pm to 3:15 pm

Optimal Financial Regulation and the Concentration of Aggregate Risk

Presented by: Sebastian Di Tella, Stanford University

3:15 pm to 3:30 pm

Coffee Break

3:30 pm to 4:15 pm

Dynamic Markets for Lemons: Performance, Liquidity, and Policy Intervention

Presented by: Diego Moreno, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid; John Wooders, University of Technology Sydney