Friday, June 14, 2013

EC 13: ACM conference on Electronic Commerce, in Philadelphia, June 16-20 2013

EC 13, the 14th ACM conference on Electronic Commerce, will be held in Philadelphia, at Penn.

There will be workshops the 16th and 17th, and the conference proper will be the 18-20th. Some of the sessions that may be of particular interest to readers of this blog are Monday June 17 tutorials on market design by Utku Unver from 9-12:30 and by Tayfun Sonmez from 2-5:30, a session on kidney exchange on Wednesday June 19 (chaired by Aaron Roth) from 10:20-11:20, my talk on kidney exchange on Thursday June 20 from 9-10:00, and a session on Matching (chaired by Itai Ashlagi) from 11:40-12:40. There are also a bunch of sessions on mechanism design, with and without money.

 Here's the program (and here are the abstracts):

Tuesday, June 18, 2013
8:45 - 9:00 AM
Keynote Talk I
Chair: Eva Tardos
9:00 - 10:00 AM
Cascading Behavior in Social and Economic Networks
Jon Kleinberg
10:20 - 11:20 AM
Session 2a: Mechanism Design I
Chair: Costis Daskalakis
Prior-Independent Auctions for Risk-Averse Agents
Hu Fu, Jason Hartline and Darrell Hoy
Prior-free Auctions for Budgeted Agents
Nikhil R Devanur, Bach Ha and Jason Hartline
On the Ratio of Revenue to Welfare in Single-Parameter Mechanism Design
Robert Kleinberg and Yang Yuan
Session 2b: Prediction Markets
Chair: David Pennock
Cost Function Market Makers for Measurable Spaces, 
Yiling Chen, Michael Ruberry and Jennifer Wortman Vaughan
What You Jointly Know Determines How You Act --- Strategic Interactions in Prediction Markets
Xi Alice Gao, Jie Zhang and Yiling Chen
An Axiomatic Characterization of Adaptive-Liquidity Market Makers, 
Xiaolong Li and Jennifer Wortman Vaughan
11:20 - 11:40 AMBreak
11:40 - 12:40 AM
Session 3a: Multidimensional Mechanism Design
Chair: Michal Feldman
Multi-parameter Mechanisms with Implicit Payment Computation, 
Moshe Babaioff, Robert Kleinberg and Aleksandrs Slivkins
Optimal Auctions via the Multiplicative Weight Method
Anand Bhalgat, Sreenivas Gollapudi and Kamesh Munagala
The Menu-Size Complexity of Auctions
Sergiu Hart and Noam Nisan

Session 3b: Ad Auctions I
Chair: Sébastien Lahaie
Real-time Optimization of Personalized Assortments
Negin Golrezaei, Hamid Nazerzadeh and Paat Rusmevichientong
A Dynamic Axiomatic Approach to First-Price Auctions, 
Darrell Hoy, Kamal Jain and Chris Wilkens
Competition Among Asymmetric Sellers With Fixed Supply
Uriel Feige, Ron Lavi and Moshe Tennenholtz
12:40 - 2:00 PMLunch
2:10 - 3:30 PM
Session 4: Online Auctions
Chair: Ron Lavi 
Ranking and Tradeoffs in Sponsored Search Auctions
Ben Roberts, Dinan Gunawardena, Ian Kash and Peter Key
Whole-page Optimization and Submodular Welfare Maximization with Online Bidders
Nikhil R Devanur, Nitish Korula, Zhiyi Huang, Vahab Mirrokni and Qiqi Yan

Peaches, Lemons, and Cookies: Designing Auction Markets with Dispersed Information
Ittai Abraham, Susan Athey, Moshe Babaioff and Michael Grubb
Auctions for Online Display Advertising Exchanges: Approximations and Design
Santiago R. Balseiro, Omar Besbes and Gabriel Y. Weintraub
3:30 - 3:50 PMBreak
3:50 - 4:50 PM
Session 5a: Mechanism Design II
Chair: Jason Hartline
Cost-Recovering Bayesian Algorithmic Mechanism Design 
Hu Fu, Brendan Lucier, Balasubramanian Sivan and Vasilis Syrgkanis
Near-Optimal Multi-Unit Auctions with Ordered Bidders
Sayan Bhattacharya, Elias Koutsoupias, Janardhan ,Kulkarni Stefano Leonardi, Tim Roughgarden and Xiaoming Xu
Truthfulness and Stochastic Dominance with Monetary Transfers
Martin Hoefer, Thomas Kesselhei and Berthold Voecking
Session 5b: Price of Anarchy and Incentives
Chair: Nikhil R. Devanur
Risk Sensitivity of Price of Anarchy under Uncertainty
Georgios Piliouras, Evdokia Nikolova and Jeff S. Shamma
Improved Bounds on the Price of Stability in Network Cost Sharing Games
Euiwoong Lee and Katrina Ligett

Sincere and Sophisticated Players in the Envy-free Allocation Problem
Rodrigo Velez
4:55 - 6:15 PM
Session 6: Estimation and Forecasting
Chair: Michael Wellman
Primary-Market Auctions for Event Tickets: Eliminating the Rents of "Bob the Broker"
Eric Budish and Aditya Bhave
Measuring the Performance of Large-Scale Combinatorial Auctions: A Structural Estimation Approach
Sang Won Kim, Marcelo Olivares and Gabriel Weintraub
When Do Noisy Votes Reveal the Truth? 
Ioannis Caragiannis Ariel Procaccia and Nisarg Shah
A Combinatorial Prediction Market for the U.S. Elections
Miroslav Dudik, Sébastien Lahaie, David Pennock and David Rothschild
6:15 - 7:00 PMBusiness Meeting
7:00 - 8:30 PM

Poster Session
Wednesday, June 19, 2013
9:00 - 10:00 AM
Session 7: Mechanism Design III
Chair: Moshe Babaioff

Mechanism Design via Optimal Transport
Costis Daskalakis, Alan Deckelbaum and Christos Tzamos
Optimal and Near-Optimal Mechanism Design with Interdependent Values
Tim Roughgarden and Inbal Talgam-Cohen

Truthful Mechanisms for Agents that Value Privacy
Yiling Chen, Stephen Chong, Ian Kash, Tal Moran and Salil Vadhan
10:00 - 10:20 AM
10:20 - 11:20 AM
Session 8a: Mechanism Design IV
Chair: Robert Kleinberg
Differential Pricing with Inequity Aversion in Social Networks
Noga Alon, Yishay Mansour and Moshe Tennenholtz
Approximation in Mechanism Design with Interdependent Values
Yunan Li

Accounting for Price Dependencies in Simultaneous Sealed-Bid Auctions
Brandon Mayer, Eric Sodomka, Amy Greenwald and Michael Wellman

Session 8b: Kidney Exchange
Chair: Aaron Roth

Failure-Aware Kidney Exchange
John Dickerson, Ariel Procaccia and Tuomas Sandholm

Harnessing the Power of Two Crossmatches
Avrim Blum, Anupam Gupta, Ariel Procaccia and Ankit Sharma

Kidney Exchange in Dynamic Sparse Heterogenous PoolsItai Ashlagi, Patrick Jaillet and Vahideh Manshadi

11:20 - 11:40 AM
11:40 - 12:40 PM
Session 9a: Mechansim Design without Money I
Chair: Ariel Procaccia
Strategyproof Facility Location for Concave Cost Functions
Dimitris Fotakis and Christos Tzamos

Strategyproof Facility Location and the Least Squares Objective
Yoav Wilf and Michal Feldman

Loss Calibrated Methods for Bipartite Rationing
Herve Moulin and Jay Sethuraman

Session 9b: Public Goods and Networks
Chair: Arpita Ghosh
A Network Approach to Public Goods
Matt Elliott and Ben Golub

Empirical Agent Based Models of Cooperation in Public Goods GamesMichael Wunder, Siddharth Suri and Duncan Watts

Pricing Public Goods for Private Sale 
Michal Feldman, David Kempe, Brendan Lucier and Renato Paes Leme
12:40 - 2:00 PM
2:00 - 3:20 PM
Session 10a: Social Networks
Chair: Jeff MacKie Mason 
Complex Contagion and the Weakness of Long Ties in Social Networks: Revisited
Roozbeh Ebrahimi, Golnaz Ghasemiesfeh and Jie Gao

Selection and Influence in Cultural Dynamics
David Kempe, Jon Kleinberg, Sigal Oren and Aleksandrs Slivkins
Incentives, Gamification, and Game Theory: An Economic Approach to Badge Design
David Easley and Arpita Ghosh

A Markov Chain Approximation to Choice ModelingJose Blanchet, Guillermo Gallego and Vineet Goyal

Session 10b: Complexity and Learning
Chair: Yishay Mansour 
Best-Response Dynamics Out of Sync
Roee Engelberg, Alex Fabrikant, Michael Schapira and David Wajc

The Empirical Implications of Rank in Bimatrix Games
Siddharth Barman, Umang Bhaskar, Federico Echenique and Adam Wierman

Learning Equilibria of Games via Payoff QueriesRahul Savani, John Fearnley, Martin Gairing and Paul Goldberg
Super-Efficient Rational ProofsPablo Azar and Silvio Micali
3:20 - 3:50 PMBreak
3:50 - 4:50 PM
Session 11: Networks
Chair: Jon Kleinberg 
Selection Effects in Online Sharing: Consequences for Peer Adoption
Sean J Taylor, Eytan Bakshy and Sinan Aral

Bertrand Networks
Moshe Babaioff, Brendan Lucier and Noam Nisan

Potential Games are Necessary to Ensure Pure Nash Equilibria in Cost Sharing Games
Ragavendran Gopalakrishnan, Jason Marden and Adam Wierman
6:00 - 10:00 PM

Conference Dinner
Thursday, June 20, 2013
Keynote Talk II
Chair: Preston McAfee
9:00 -10:00 AM
Kidney Exchange: Where We’ve Been and Where We Can Go From Here Alvin E. Roth
10:00 -10:20 AMBreak
10:20 - 11:20 AM
Session 13: Mechanism Design without Money II
Chair: Mallesh Pai

Unbalanced Random Matching Markets
Itai Ashlagi, Yashodhan Kanoria and Jacob Leshno

Existence of Stable Matchings in Large Markets with Complementarities

Eduardo Azevedo and John Hatfield

Mechanism Design for Fair Division
Richard Cole, Vasilis Gkatzelis and Gagan Goel
11:20 - 11:40 AMBreak
11:40 - 12:40 AM
Session 14a: Ad Auctions II
Chair: Noam Nisan

Budget Smoothing for Internet Ad Auctions: A Game Theoretic Approach
Denis Charles, Deeparnab Chakrabarty, Max Chickering, Nikhil R Devanur and Lei Wang
Revenue Optimization in the Generalized Second-Price Auction
David Thompson and Kevin Leyton-Brown
Auctions with Unique Equilibria
Shuchi Chawla and Jason Hartline
Session 14b: Matching
Chair: Itai Ashlagi

Designing for Diversity in Matching

Scott D Kominers and Tayfun Sonmez

Two-Sided Matching with Partial Information
Baharak Rastegari, Anne Condon, Nicole Immorlica and Kevin Leyton-Brown

House Allocation with Indifferences: A Generalization and a Unified View
Daniela Saban and Jay Sethuraman
12:40 - 2:00 PMLunch
2:10 - 3:30 PM
Session 15a: Crowd Sourcing in networks
Chair: Jenn Wortman Vaughan

Sybil-proof Mechanisms in Query Incentive Networks
Wei Chen, Wang Yajun, Dongxiao Yu and Li Zhang
On Discrete Preferences and CoordinationFlavio Chierichetti, Jon Kleinberg and Sigal Oren

Incentivizing Participation in Online Forums for Education
Arpita Ghosh and Jon Kleinberg

Privacy and Coordination: Computing on Databases with Endogenous Participation
Arpita Ghosh and Katrina Ligett

Session 15b: Online experience
Chair: Siddharth Suri

Pick Your Poison: Pricing and Inventories at Unlicensed Online Pharmacies
Nektarios Leontiadis, Tyler Moore and Nicolas Christin
Down-to-the-Minute Effects of Super Bowl Advertising on Online Search Behavior
Randall A Lewis and David Reiley

Optimizing Password Composition Policies
Jeremiah M Blocki, Saranga Komanduri, Ariel Procaccia and Or Sheffet

Latency Arbitrage, Market Fragmentation, and Efficiency: A Two-Market Model
Elaine Wah and Michael Wellman
3:30 - 3:50 PMBreak
3:50 - 4:50 PM
Session 16: Information and Networks
Chair: Nicole Immorlica

Robust Incentives for Information Acquisition, 
Gabriel Carroll
Social Learning and Aggregate Network Uncertainty
Ilan Lobel and Evan Sadler

Implementing the "Wisdom of the Crowd"
Ilan Kremer, Yishay Mansour and Motty Perry

4:50 PMEnd

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