Antitrust, repugnance and expert testimony in NCAA case

My colleague Roger Noll gets top billing in this story about the courtroom plays being executed in a trial that touches on whether paying college athletes is repugnant: O'Bannon economist may be MVP

OAKLAND, Calif. -- The big names in the lawsuit against the NCAA are Ed O'Bannon, Oscar Robertson and Bill Russell, but the key to the plaintiffs' attempt to transform the NCAA is a 74-year-old economist named Roger Noll who has studied the sports industry for more than 40 years.

The tall and scholarly Stanford professor emeritus already has testified for nearly eight hours and will return for more on Wednesday before U.S. District Judge Claudia Wilken. Noll's job for the players is to convince Wilken that the NCAA's refusal to allow college athletes to sell their names, images and likenesses is a violation of American antitrust laws.

LIVE TWEETING THE TRIAL

ESPN reporter Tom Farrey (@TomFarrey) is tweeting from inside the federal courtroom in Oakland, Calif., alongside legal analyst Lester Munson.Follow the trial live here beginning at 11:30 a.m. (ET).

Relying on exhaustive research and extensive experience testifying in court as an expert witness in antitrust trials, Noll must be able to show that the NCAA is using its stranglehold over college sports to deprive current and former college athletes of their fair share of the money produced by sales of live broadcasts of games, rebroadcasts, video games and other merchandise.

Noll has already shown that the NCAA's restrictions that prevent athletes from selling their names, images and likenesses limit competition in recruiting high school stars (the colleges cannot offer payment to the athletes for use of their names and so forth). He also has shown that the restrictions "distort the industry" and push huge revenue from football and men's basketball into coaches' salaries and palatial facilities.

He also responded on Tuesday to the NCAA's claim that the restrictions on athletes enhance "competitive balance" among NCAA teams by showing, with a compelling chart, that there has never been competitive balance in major college sports and that a small number of schools dominate top 25 lists and national championships.

Noll's research for his testimony is impressive. In a chart that demonstrated the current level of competition for high school stars, he showed the outcomes of recruiting efforts in football and basketball for the five power conferences and Notre Dame. According to Noll's research, for example, the Irish succeeded in 11 out of 17 attempts in 2012 to recruit four- and five-star high school athletes.

During the pretrial stage of the O'Bannon litigation, Noll prepared 750 pages of reports and testified in a pretrial interrogation that went on for four days and filled more than 1,500 pages.

Noll is no stranger to the courtroom. He was the star witness for the NFL Players Association when the players used antitrust litigation to establish free agency. Noll's testimony in a federal court in Minneapolis in 1991 was the key to a verdict from a jury that the NFL's restrictions on player movement violated antitrust laws.

This is not his first time in Wilken's courtroom, either. He testified before Wilken for the winning side in an antitrust trial involving HIV drugs.

The NCAA is responding to Noll's expertise with a cross-examination that began Tuesday and with its own economists, including James Heckman, a Nobel Prize winner from the University of Chicago. The NCAA's principal witness against Noll will be Daniel Rubinfeld, a professor at New York University. Noll and the O'Bannon legal team have already started their attack on Rubinfeld, offering excerpts from a Rubinfeld textbook that admit that the NCAA is a cartel, the first step in any antitrust trial.

Rohit Singla, the NCAA attorney assigned to the cross-examination of Noll, did not make much progress on Tuesday, with Noll repeatedly suggesting that Singla's questions were "vague and based on facts that do not exist."

Singla and the NCAA insist that the players have no ownership of their names, images and likenesses that would permit them to bargain for a share of television broadcasts. All ownership, the NCAA says, resides with the schools, the conferences and itself.

If the NCAA is correct and the players have nothing to sell, it remains unknown why the NCAA would restrict the players from selling what they have no right to sell. It's a question that Noll may address as he continues his testimony on Wednesday.

O'Bannon, Robertson and Russell were highly successful in competition on the basketball court, but Noll's testimony on economic competition in a courtroom will determine the fate of the NCAA's current way of operation.

Payments to college athletes, no longer so repugnant

 The longstanding debate over whether college athletes must remain unpaid to preserve their 'amateur' status is starting to reach some conclusions.  Expect more to follow. 

The NY Times has the story:

Supreme Court Backs Payments to Student-Athletes in N.C.A.A. Case. The N.C.A.A. argued that the payments were a threat to amateurism and that barring them did not violate the antitrust laws.  By Adam Liptak and Alan Blinder

"The Supreme Court unanimously ruled on Monday that the N.C.A.A. cannot bar relatively modest payments to student-athletes in a decision that questioned the association’s monopoly power at a time when the business model of college sports is under increasing pressure.

"The decision concerned only payments and other benefits related to education, but its logic suggested that the court may be open to a frontal challenge to the N.C.A.A.’s ban on paying athletes for their participation in sports that bring billions of dollars in revenue to American colleges and universities. In a concurring opinion, Justice Brett M. Kavanaugh seemed to invite such a challenge.

“Nowhere else in America can businesses get away with agreeing not to pay their workers a fair market rate on the theory that their product is defined by not paying their workers a fair market rate,” Justice Kavanaugh wrote. “And under ordinary principles of antitrust law, it is not evident why college sports should be any different. The N.C.A.A. is not above the law.”

"In a statement on Monday, the N.C.A.A. said the ruling “reaffirms the N.C.A.A.’s authority to adopt reasonable rules and repeatedly notes that the N.C.A.A. remains free to articulate what are and are not truly educational benefits.”

"Next week, student-athletes in at least six states are poised to be allowed to make money through endorsements — not because of action by the N.C.A.A., but because of state officials who grew tired of the industry’s decades-long efforts to limit the rights of players.

...

"Less than two weeks before some of the new laws are scheduled to take effect in Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Mississippi, New Mexico and Texas and allow athletes to make endorsements and make money from their social media presences, the N.C.A.A. has not agreed to extend similar rights to players nationwide. And in a setback last week for the association, senior members of Congress said that they did not expect to strike a deal for a federal standard before July 1."

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Several months ago, SCOTUSblog gave a nice summary of the issues (HT: Kim Krawiec):

Amid March Madness, antitrust dispute over college athlete compensation comes to the court   By Amy Howe

"What differentiates college sports from professional sports, the NCAA stresses, is that college sports are played by amateurs – who, by definition, are not paid to play. Having amateurs in college sports, the NCAA adds, promotes competition by giving consumers a choice between college sports and professional sports; that choice is only possible, the NCAA explains, because of the agreement among the NCAA and its members on eligibility and compensation for college athletes.

...

"As far as the athletes are concerned, the court’s inquiry is a straightforward one that boils down to whether the NCAA’s restrictions, imposed in the name of amateurism, create enough benefits for competition to offset the harm that they create. Whether those restrictions are necessary to preserve amateurism, the athletes reiterate, is irrelevant.

...

"A brief by historians derides the concept of amateurism in elite college sports as a “myth that is neither necessary to the activity nor fair to the students who participate.” To the contrary, the scholars note, “top-tier college sports” have flourished even as “amateurism” in the athletes playing those sports has decreased. What’s more, the historians continue, the NCAA’s efforts to rely on amateurism as the basis to shield its eligibility rules from antitrust scrutiny is “profoundly unfair,” as those rules often led to coaches and schools making millions from poor students."

The NCAA cartel

The March 2018 issue of the Review of Industrial Organization is devoted to a Symposium: The NCAA Cartel

In the Introduction, Roger Blair begins by noting
"Becker (1987) once characterized the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) as a “cartel in Sheepskin clothing,” which seems to be an apt description. Under the organizing umbrella of the NCAA, the member institutions collusively exploit both monopolistic and monopsonistic power. "

Here's the table of contents

1. Symposium: The NCAA Cartel—Introduction

   Roger D. BlairPages 179-183
   
2. 

   OriginalPaper

   The National Collegiate Athletic Association Cartel: Why it Exists, How it Works, and What it Does

   Allen R. Sanderson, John J. SiegfriedPages 185-209
   
3. 

   OriginalPaper

   Athlete Pay and Competitive Balance in College Athletics

   Brian Mills, Jason WinfreePages 211-229
   
4. 

   OriginalPaper

   Modeling Competitive Imbalance and Self-Regulation in College Sports

   Rodney FortPages 231-251
   
5. 

   OriginalPaper

   Rent Sharing and the Compensation of Head Coaches in Power Five College Football

   Michael A. Leeds, Eva Marikova Leeds, Aaron HarrisPages 253-267
   
6. 

   OriginalPaper

   State of Play: How Do College Football Programs Compete for Student Athletes?

   Jill S. HarrisPages 269-281
   
7. 

   OriginalPaper

   Strategic Interaction in a Repeated Game: Evidence from NCAA Football Recruiting

   Brad R. Humphreys, Jane E. RuseskiPages 283-303
   
8. 

   OriginalPaper

   The Role of Broadcasting in National Collegiate Athletic Association Sports

   Allen R. Sanderson, John J. SiegfriedPages 305-321
   
9. 

   OriginalPaper

   The NCAA and the Rule of Reason

   Herbert HovenkampPages 323-335
   
10. 

    OriginalPaper

    Whither the NCAA: Reforming the System

    Andrew ZimbalistPages 337-350
    
11. 

    OriginalPaper

    The NCAA Cartel and Antitrust Policy

    Roger D. Blair, Wenche WangPages 351-368
    

The ban on paying college athletes is history

 The idea that paying college athletes is wrong has given way to the realities of the sports markets in which they perform.  For many years, college athletes were required to be unpaid amateurs, but that time has passed.

The WSJ has the story.

NCAA Agrees to Share Revenue With Athletes in Landmark $2.8 Billion Settlement. Breaking with more than a century of policy, the NCAA will pay billions in damages to former athletes and allow schools to pay athletes up to $20 million a year    By Laine Higgins  and Jared Diamond

"The National Collegiate Athletic Association and the five most prominent athletic conferences agreed to a $2.77 billion settlement of a class-action lawsuit on Thursday, ushering in a new era of college sports in which schools can pay athletes directly. 

"The move marks a dramatic shift for the NCAA, breaking with its century-old stance that college athletes are amateurs and therefore cannot share in any of the money they generate for their universities.

...

"It also marks the latest rule the NCAA has been forced to change amid an onslaught of legal challenges in recent years. 

"First, the NCAA allowed athletes to receive academic bonuses and profit from their name, image and likeness. Now, the biggest domino of all has fallen: For the first time ever, some players are going to be paid directly by their schools for playing their sports—a seismic shift that will completely reshape the business model for the top end of this billion-dollar industry. 

"The result is the creation of a system that will give Division I schools the ability to distribute roughly $20 million a year to their athletes, said people familiar with the matter. "

NCAA takes steps to allow college athletes to be compensated

Here's the NY Times:

N.C.A.A. Considers Loosening Rules for Athletes Seeking Outside Deals
The governing body for college sports appeared to soften its long-held stance that athletes should not profit from their fame. But it gave no details and said any rule changes required much more discussion.

"ATLANTA — The N.C.A.A. Board of Governors, under increasing pressure from legislatures around the country, voted Tuesday to pave the way for college athletes to profit off their fame, but the decision came with an elephant-size caveat: Any policy changes must maintain clear distinctions between amateur athletes and professional ones.

The vote was a surprising turn by the N.C.A.A., which for years has resisted calls for athletes to be compensated for the use of their names, images and likenesses. The board was responding to a report from a committee studying the issue and was expected to do little more than give the committee extra time to do its work.

The N.C.A.A. president, Mark Emmert, acknowledged that the passage of a bill in California that would permit sponsorships, the emergence of more than a dozen others like it nationwide and calls for change from prominent athletes like LeBron James had nudged his organization into action."
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See previous post:

Tuesday, October 1, 2019

College athletes can be paid for endorsements in California: an end to an American repugnance?

The market for college athletes

Putting the Amateur Myth to Rest by Allen L. Sack

"I agree with Brand that the term amateur is not a good fit for modern college sports, but it has definitely not outlived it usefulness for the NCAA. The myth of amateurism shields college sport from tax collectors and members of Congress, seeking unrelated business income taxes, and allows the NCAA to cap athletic subsidies at room, board, tuition and fees. The NCAA will probably play the “amateurism card” to fight a class action lawsuit filed this summer over its use of former athletes’ likenesses to sell licensed products.
So what can the NCAA do to end the pretense that big-time college athletes are amateurs, short of abandoning athletic scholarships or openly turning pro? The first step is to take Brand’s “off the cuff” suggestion seriously and drop the term amateur when referring to scholarship athletes.
The next step would be to adopt a model that continues the practice of awarding athletic scholarships to the nation’s most talented athletes, but eliminates conditions generally associated with employment. Borrowing a term from Myles Brand, I would call this the “collegiate model.”
Under current NCAA rules, athletes who fail to meet athletic expectations can lose their athletic scholarships, i.e., be “fired” at the end of the year, thus transforming athletic scholarships into contracts for hire. And because athletes are subject to their coaches’ control in return for payment of room, board, tuition and fees, they arguably meet common law definitions of employees. The collegiate model, on the other hand, would make satisfactory progress in the classroom the condition for renewing athletic scholarships. "

Further unraveling of basketball recruiting

Zhenyu Lai, a graduate student in Economics at Harvard, who is taking Market Design this semester, sent me the following email, which he gave me permission to reproduce below.

After last friday's class discussion on unravelling in markets, I came across this article about unravelling in NCAA basketball with a ton of good quotes and anecdotes.

What is particularly interesting is about the role played by agents. Increasingly, agents try to form relationships with potential NBA players early on in their college careers. And they're not just targeting the surefire stars, but gambling on marginal prospects.

Interesting excerpts:

1. Technological improvements aid unravelling markets. Agents are using facebook to make contact with players early.

2. Official rules are abused. Similar to the market example on clinical psychologists, looking at the NCAA rules for agent recruiting is very indicative of the unraveling problem. "Agents are free to contact players in high school or in college through social networking sites, on the phone or in person. As long as there is no written agreement or money exchanged, an agent or a representative of an agent can form a relationship with a player, his family and/or his handlers." An agent is quoted, "It's not breaking the rules. You're just building a relationship with a potential client down the road.". The columnist describes this as "the new normal in amateur basketball."

3. Coaches are in on it too. Much like the market for law clerks, agents (aka judges) develop relationship with coaches (aka law school deans) to ensure that they are making "a sound investment" on their prospect. However, coaches are getting ticked off. The "right way" to do this is apparently for the agents to approach the coach and the player's parents first, not to directly add the player on facebook, where the player may then bypass the coach completely.

4. Agent's argument for unravelling. "Domantay's argument for an agent's trying to make inroads in a profession dominated by an elite few is that if he were to wait until a college player's senior year, he becomes just another name on the list."

5. Argument that unraveling is bad. "If an agent contacts a kid directly, then there should be repercussions. Guys get in with kids and prey on the youthfulness and financial backgrounds and offer things to lock them in and set up a potential for blackmail: If I gave you this, then you owe me." Agents are using runners to form relationships with kids early and leveraging on family contacts and relationships. There is an aura of suspicion where high school kids are wary of who to trust.

6. Agent's motivation for promoting unraveling. "Whoever can control the kid can control the revenue stream -- [maybe] it's a kid going to college benefiting the college coach and leading to a better job. the player dictates the revenue. Everybody is trying to get in sooner and sooner however they can."

Interestingly, the columnist ends off with this quote which is filled with a tone of finality that unraveling is inevitable and an enduring legacy of capitalism,

"The pool of talent, with leagues all over the globe to fill and money to be made, means that anybody with potential is in play to be courted, and so too are their families, their friends, and their AAU and high school coaches. That's the new reality for college coaches. And there's no reason to think it will ever change back."


My thoughts on unraveling in college basketball:

1. High school students are usually at an impressionable age and easily influenced by people close to them, prompting this 'unraveling' process of agents trying to get close to them. While high school students might not be expected to make savvy long-term agent decisions, more needs to be done to make the agent seem like the "bad guy" for approaching the student early. No binding contract is allowed, and kids are empowered to change agents anytime. However, especially if the agent has some influence on a family member (or is a family member..), severing an agent relationship might be tricky. To discourage unraveling, there needs to be lower barriers to changing agents.

2. The NCAA doesn't have jurisdiction over agents (like in the case of federal judges), but some states do where a law states that there can be "significant damage resulting from the impermissible and often times illegal practices of some athlete agents. Violations of NCAA agent legislation impact the eligibility of student-athletes for further participation in NCAA competition". This law is passed in 38 states. However, this law affects the athletes and not the agents. One remedy would be for the NBA to revoke the right of agents to represent their clients if a recruiting violation is found. Agent's licenses could be subject to yearly review. Entry into the agent profession could be tightly regulated.

3. Perhaps NBA draftees could attend an "agent convention" where they could interview various representatives and have the right to choose from among them without any pressure. If it were a standard practice to be connected with legitimate agents only after you enter the NBA, players would then in no way be obliged to sign with an agent early even if they were to have already accepted illegal gifts.

Market for (seventh grade) basketball players

Got game in 7th grade? NCAA says you're a prospect

It looks like the NCAA plans to fight unraveling with unraveling:

"Giving in to the young-and-younger movement in college basketball recruiting, the NCAA has decreed that seventh-graders are now officially classified as prospects.
The organization voted Thursday to change the definition of a prospect from ninth grade to seventh grade — for men's basketball only — to nip a trend in which some college coaches were working at private, elite camps and clinics for seventh- and eighth-graders. The NCAA couldn't regulate those camps because those youngsters fell below the current cutoff."

HT Steve Leider

A union for college football players?

Here's the story from ESPN a little while ago:

For the first time in the history of college sports, athletes are asking to be represented by a labor union, taking formal steps on Tuesday to begin the process of being recognized as employees.

More from ESPN.com

Lester Munson writes that the Northwestern football players' attempt at unionization is likely to fail, but the impact could still be far-reaching. Story

Ramogi Huma, president of the National College Players Association, filed a petition in Chicago on behalf of football players at Northwestern University, submitting the form at the regional office of the National Labor Relations Board.

Backed by the United Steelworkers union, Huma also filed union cards signed by an undisclosed number of Northwestern players with the NLRB -- the federal statutory body that recognizes groups that seek collective bargaining rights.
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And here's the CBS coverage: Road ahead for college football players union isn't an easy one

The obstacles members of the Northwestern University Wildcats football team face on the road to forming a union are formidable.

First,  there are a myriad of legal questions that need to be answered, such as is there an employer/employee relationship that exists between the players and the Evanston, Ill. school that meets the criteria set by the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB).

Northwestern, not surprisingly, argues that such a relationship doesn't exist. Whether the players can make such a claim against the NCAA, which seems to be the focus of their wrath and also is opposed to their efforts, also is unclear. The players, though, do have the backing of the NFL Players Association, the union that represents their counterparts in the pros.

"Most of the grievances cited by the players concern the NCAA as a monopolistic cartel that wields unbalanced and unreasonable labor market power against the players in terms of compensation and scholarship limitations among other issues," writes Vanderbilt University Economist John Vrooman, a former college football player who studies the economics of sports, in an email. "The issue here is that the NCAA is clearly a cartel but it is not necessarily the employer."

The other obstacle facing the players affiliated with the National College Football Players Association is a practical one. Since members of the team graduate, creating a cohesive bargaining unit will be difficult if have to frequently recruit new members. That's one of the reasons why efforts to unionize teaching assistants on college campuses have faltered.
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Here's a report from the first days of hearings:

March 3, 2014

Are College Athletes Employees? Former Labor-Board Chairman Says Yes

Here's an earlier, related post:

College football is big business (who knew?)

Costs of unraveling: elementary school basketball players

One of the costs of "unraveling," in which transactions come to be made increasingly early, is that matches are made on the basis of very noisy information. I've posted earlier about the competition by colleges for basketball players (Market for (seventh grade) basketball players ), and a recent story highlights just how noisy those early signals can be: First Impressions Can Create Unrealistic Expectations for Recruits .

"Amid the clamor to find the next basketball wunderkind, the evaluation of sixth graders remains an uncertain pursuit. Francis, who runs the Hoop Scoop recruiting service, said the process involved much guesswork.
The players can stop improving, stop caring or stop growing." (emphasis added: the source of uncertainty is different in different markets:)

"In January, the N.C.A.A.lowered the school year a basketball player was considered a prospect from ninth grade to seventh grade.
Though the change seemed curious, it closed a loophole that had allowed college coaches to gain a recruiting edge by inviting middle school players to private camps. Those middle school prospects are now protected by the N.C.A.A. the same way as high school recruits.
For now, elementary school students are not included in this new rule. An associate commissioner of the Big East, Joseph D’Antonio, the chairman of the N.C.A.A.’s legislative council, hopes there is no need to change that.
“I think the seventh- and eighth-grade endpoint is a place to begin, because that’s where the problem has been identified,” D’Antonio said. “Whether or not we see bylaws in the future that lower the age even further is going to be driven by what the coaching involvement is.”"

HT Muriel Niederle

College athletes are now professionals

 For a long time the sports world tried to make a sharp distinction between amateur and professional athletes, especially in the Olympics and in college sports. The idea was that it was repugnant to pay amateurs, who just played for fun.  Like student athletes.

The last shreds of that posture are crumbling, after a long decline.

ESPN has the story:

Judge OK's $2.8B settlement, paving way for colleges to pay athletes by Dan Murphy

"Schools are now free to begin paying their athletes directly, marking the dawn of a new era in college sports brought about by a multibillion-dollar legal settlement that was formally approved Friday.

Judge Claudia Wilken approved the deal between the NCAA, its most powerful conferences and lawyers representing all Division I athletes. The House v. NCAA settlement ends three separate federal antitrust lawsuits, all of which claimed the NCAA was illegally limiting the earning power of college athletes."

Hockey: the NHL draft is different

Yesterday's post, with an update at the bottom...

Four Harvard Freshmen Selected in NHL Draft

"Months before they’ll put on a Harvard uniform for the first time, four incoming Crimson freshmen were chosen in Saturday’s National Hockey League draft.

With these four additions, there will be eight NHL draftees on Harvard’s roster going into the 2011-12 season.

"The structure of the NHL draft differs from that of the other three major American sports. Unlike in MLB, the NBA, and the NFL, players selected by NHL teams can continue to compete on the amateur level while remaining the protected picks of the team that originally selected them.

Baseball, football, and basketball prospects are forced to choose between signing a professional contract or retaining amateur status and NCAA eligibility shortly after the draft."
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Can someone fill us in  on why the NHL works this way? i.e. why do pro hockey draftees include students who are about to go to college?
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Update (Friday, July 29):

Jaron Cordero writes with some relevant detail:

"NFL draft: to be eligible players must be out of high school for at least three years.

NBA draft: you have to be 19 years old to be eligible.

--So a student can't enter either draft before entering college.

NHL and MLB: you can be "drafted" and still retain NCAA eligibility. In fact, there are plenty cases each year where a player fresh out of high school will get drafted by a major league baseball franchise, but instead choose to play college baseball.

The difference between the NHL and MLB is their respective collective bargaining agreements:

The MLB's requires a team to sign their drafted player in order to retain exclusive right of negotiation for his services. NCAA legislation states that an athlete's amateur status is forfeited if he/she signs a contract with a professional team.

On the other hand, the NHL's CBA allows teams to retain the exclusive right of negotiation of a drafted player until the summer after the athlete graduates from college. Thus, the athlete is not forced to sign any contract with a professional team; therefore he keeps his status as an amateur."

Thanks, Jaron.

So...now I'm puzzling over a new set of questions, e.g. why are the agreements so different? E.g. in MLB, they seem to think that playing in the minors is the way they want to develop players, in contrast to football, where players often develop in college. (Maybe because for football you have to see how big they are going to be when full grown?)  Is hockey somewhere in between?

Payment to college athletes: Name, Image and Likeness (NIL) Deals

 The recent changes in what college athletes can be paid for  (and in their ability to transfer freely between schools) has made it profitable for some football players who are eligible for the NFL draft to remain in school.  The NYT has the story:

How transfer, NIL rules thinned out NFL draft QB class: ‘It’s an anemic quarterback class’ by Kalyn Kahler

"the reason for the mid-to-late-round quarterback mass desertion has a lot to do with the growth of the transfer portal and name, image and likeness (NIL) deals.

"In April 2021, the NCAA changed its rules to allow transfers without sitting out a season. A little more than two months later, the NCAA announced its first-ever NIL policy, allowing college athletes to take deals with individual companies, like Bose, and sign deals with collectives affiliated with their schools.

"Collectives are generally made up of donor funds, and they offer contracts to athletes in return for services like autograph signings or event appearances. And in the second season of NIL, collectives are succeeding at incentivizing players at all positions to return to school, and most of all the most important position on the team.

“You’re not necessarily allowed to pay players to return. Like, that can’t be the reason,” said an executive for a collective affiliated with a West Coast university who, like others in this story, was granted anonymity in order to openly discuss details of the hush-hush world of NIL. “But you can talk about their potential when they come back, you’ll have significantly more NIL opportunities than maybe you had the prior year.

...

"You’re not exactly allowed to disclose what people are making,” said the West Coast collective executive. “It has not been laid out from the NCAA and a lot of schools on exactly what you can and can’t talk about. It’s very unclear in a lot of situations, so people naturally get uncomfortable because they don’t know the rules, especially coaches.”

"A veteran NFL agent who represented two draft-eligible Power 5 quarterbacks for their NIL deals said that one transferred to a new program this offseason with the understanding he would make a million-plus through that school’s collective. The agent said the other turned down an offer of more than a million in favor of a transfer to the best football situation, where he’s been promised an amount comparable to an NFL practice-squad salary (in the $200,000 range)."

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Related posts on (previously repugnant) payments to student athletes here.