Preference signaling in the Political Science job market

 There is now signaling in the Political Science job market:  They allow job candidates to send up to three signals: here's the APSA's page with frequently asked questions about signaling.

Aside from the procedures APSA members should use, their site offers some general comments about signaling. Some excerpts:

What is the history of signaling as applied to specialized labor markets like that for political science PhDs?

 The American Economics Association (AEA) Ad Hoc Committee on the Job Market, including Roth, applied his research to the economics PhDs job market over 15 years ago. Since the 1970s, the job market for economists has been organized around the AEA and related associations’ annual meeting (called the Allied Social Sciences Associations, or the “ASSA”) in January and since 2006, economists have utilized signaling for job interviews that take place at the ASSA. For those who don’t secure a position there, a job “scramble” that is more public takes place later in the spring. These events act as clearinghouses to clear congestion resulting from candidates applying for almost all positions due to their need to secure a position, and also prevents “unraveling,” where employers make offers earlier and earlier each year to get the best possible candidate they can.[1] The AEA Ad Hoc Committee on the Job Market offers detailed advice on signaling for (economics) PhDs going on the job market here.

Why would the political science job market benefit from signaling?

The number of political science job postings per PhD on the job market has decreased considerably since 2011, when there were two job openings for each candidate as it recovered from the Great Recession.[1] After the COVID pandemic, the higher education job market seems to be showing signs that it is recovering more slowly, and political science is no exception to this trend. The behavior of the higher education job markets runs counter to the general labor market trend in the US where jobs are currently outnumbering jobseekers.[2]  Currently there are almost two candidates per job opening on APSA eJobs.[3] The political science job market is also congested in 2023. In the last few years, candidates have reported applying for upwards of 25-50, more than 51, or more than 100 positions in a job market cycle, making the possibilities for matches endless.[4]

After the job market at APSA’s Annual Meeting in September, the job market for political science PhDs is decentralized and thin, lacking a centralizing timeframe, location, or deadline, with the only way for candidates to let employers know they are interested is to contact the hiring committee or send in an application for the position. Jobs are being posted earlier each year to secure the best candidates by utilizing the APSA Annual Meeting as a job market clearinghouse. For the remainder of the academic year, those participating in the job market lack any kind of intentionally designed mechanism to structure their path to a job placement before the next academic year..[5] For all these reasons: a surplus of jobseekers, market congestion (applying to all jobs), market unraveling (earlier and earlier offers), the political science job market would benefit from being approached with the market design tools that have been shown to alleviate these inefficiencies.

Citations

How will signaling benefit candidates and employers at APSA Annual Meeting/ Interview Services?

 Due to job market congestion, the job market centralized around the APSA Annual Meeting/ Interview Services would benefit from a mechanism for candidates and employers to be able to decipher meaningful interest more easily from candidates for positions, and to allow institutions to view candidates more equally across characteristics outside of institutional prestige, rank, or publication records. Due to the large number of candidates relative to jobs, we believe signaling can increase the number of matches facilitated, decrease the number of applications both written and submitted by candidates and reviewed by hiring committees, and decrease the stress of all participants in the market. We have created a pilot program to beta test how signaling will work for employers and candidates utilizing Interview Services at the Annual Meeting.