Philippe van Baßhuysen has an article now online in the journal Philosophy of the Social Sciences, focusing on market design, and taking as his main example the design of the labor clearinghouse for American doctors, the National Resident Matching Program. (He also includes some remarks about spectrum auctions.) He comments a bit on the gap between how some parts of the philosophy of science literature think about market design, and how market designers thing about it, and his article brings some of the latter thought to the attention of philosophers.
How to Build an Institution, by Philippe van Basshuysen
Philosophy of the Social Sciences. November 2020. doi:10.1177/0048393120971545.
"Abstract: How should institutions be designed that “work” in bringing about desirable social outcomes? I study a case of successful institutional design—the redesign of the National Resident Matching Program—and argue that economists assume three roles when designing an institution, each of which complements the other two: first, the designer combines positive and normative modeling to formalize policy goals and to design possible mechanisms for bringing them about. Second, the engineer refines the design by conducting experiments and computational analyses. Third, the plumber implements the design in the real world and mends it as needed."
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