Economic design in Budapest, June 2019 (submissions are open now)

Paper submissions are now invited for the

2019 Conference on Economic Design: Budapest, Hungary, June 12-14, 2019

The Scope:

The conference welcomes paper submissions from many different fields such as economics, business, finance, politics, computer science, operations research, law, history relevant to mechanism or institution design in a broad sense, regardless of whether contributions are theoretical, empirical, experimental, historical or practical. Subjects include but are not limited to auctions, matching, school choice, college admission, organ exchange, decentralised markets, random market mechanisms, voting, social choice, taxation, tax reform, coalition formation, price formation, ranking and scoring, measurements of power and influence, contest, fair division, contract, bargaining, negotiation, market design implementation, pricing on electricity, pricing on public utilities, pricing on cloud computing services, online allocation mechanisms, online auctions, market design experiments, public goods experiments, behavioural mechanism design, information and incentive, digital sport market for labour, market design in transportation sector, institution and organisation, health care, health policy, health insurance, pension scheme, fiscal policy, monetary policy, growth and development, performance evaluation, arbitration, patent design, governance, refugee assignment, robust mechanism design, matching in dynamic environments, rationality and irrationality in market design, etc.

The Keynote Speakers are:

Leonid-Hurwicz Lecture: Philippe Jehiel (Paris School of Economics)

Murat Sertel Lecture: Bhaskar Dutta (University of Warwick)

Paul Kleindorfer Lecture: Bumin Yenmez (Boston College)

Important Dates:

Paper Submission Opens: 19-Nov-2018

Paper Submission Deadline: 18-Feb-2019