Matching and Market Design talks at the SAET in Brisbane June 30 - July 3

I woke up in Auckland NZ this morning (Saturday already) on my way to Brisbane, and I'll be speaking about kidney exchange tomorrow (Sunday). There are a number of papers on matching and market design on the program, including these.


Market Design I (Sunday July 1,  11:00-13:00, Bldg 7 Rm 237)
Ning Chen
Room 234, Building 7
1. Ties Matter: Improving E ciency in Class Registration by Introducing
Ties
Ning Chen Nanyang Technological University
(ningc@ntu.edu.sg)
2. A Necessary and Su cient Condition for Stable Matching Rules to be
Strategy-Proof
Takashi Akahoshi Waseda University
(akahoshi@suou.waseda.jp)
3. Strategyproof Matching with Minimum Quotas
Peter Troyan Stanford University
(petetroyan@gmail.com)
Daniel Fragiadakis Stanford University
Atsushi Iwasaki Kyushu University
Suguru Ueda Kyushu University
Makota Yokoo Kyushu University
4. Experimentation in Democrcay
Vit alijs A. Butenko Center of Economic Research at ETH
Zurich (vbutenko@ethz.ch)
Hans Gersbach Center of Economic Research at ETH
Zurich



Market Design II  (Monday July 2, 8:30-11:30)
Tayfun Sonmez
Room 348, Building 63
1. College Admission Problem with Clear-In Ranks
Georgy Artemov University of Melbourne
(georgy@gmail.com)
2. Stability and Competitive Equilibrium in Trading Networks
Alexandru Nichifor University of St. Andrews
(alexandru.nichifor@gmail.com)
John William Hat eld Stanford University
Scott Duke Kominers University of Chicago
Michael Ostrovsky Stanford University
Alexander Westkamp University of Bonn
3. Matching with (Branch-of-Choice) Contracts at United States Military
Academy
Tayfun Sonmez Boston College
(tayfun.sonmez@bc.edu)
Tobias B. Switzer United States Air Force
4. Platform Markets and Matching with Contracts
Juan Fung University of Illinois at
Urbana-Champaign
(fung5@illinois.edu)
Chia-Ling Hsu University of Illinois at
Urbana-Champaign


Matching, Group Formation, and Evolutionary Games (Monday, July 2, 13:30-15:30)
Takako Fujiwara-Greve
Room 139, Building 8
1. Understanding Stable Matchings: A Non-Cooperative Approach
Yosuke Yasuda GRIPS (yyasuda@grips.ac.jp)
Michihiro Kandori University of Tokyo
Fuhito Kojima Stanford University
2. Group Formation and Heterogeneity in Collective Action Games
Toshimasa Maruta Nihon University
(maruta.toshimasa@nihon-u.ac.jp)
Akira Okada Hitotsubashi University
3. Perfect Foresight Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games
Kenichi Amaya Kagawa University
(amaya@ec.kagawa-u.ac.jp)
4. Behavioral Diversity in Voluntarily Separable Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma
Takako Fujiwara-Greve Keio University
(takakofg@econ.keio.ac.jp)
Masashiro Okuno-Fujiwara Ryutu Keizai University and University
of Tokyo