Matching Mechanisms for Refugee Resettlement By Delacrétaz, Kominers, and Teytelboym

Learning how better to resettle refugees is not going to go out of style anytime soon.  Here's a recent AER paper:

Matching Mechanisms for Refugee Resettlement By David Delacrétaz, Scott Duke Kominers, and Alexander Teytelboym, American Economic Review 2023, 113(10): 2689–2717 https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20210096

Abstract: "Current refugee resettlement processes account for neither the preferences of refugees nor the priorities of hosting communities. We introduce a new framework for matching with multidimensional knapsack constraints that captures the (possibly multidimensional) sizes of refugee families and the capacities of communities. We propose four refugee resettlement mechanisms and two solution concepts that can be used in refugee resettlement matching under various institutional and informational constraints. Our theoretical results and simulations using refugee resettlement data suggest that preference-based  matching mechanisms can improve match efficiency, respect priorities of communities, and incentivize refugees to report where they would prefer to settle."