This workshop will be dedicated to advances in experimental economics combining laboratory and field-experimental methodologies with theoretical and psychological insights on decision-making, strategic interaction and policy. We would invite papers in lab experiments, field experiments and their combination that test theory, demonstrate the importance of psychological phenomena, and explore social and policy issues. In addition to senior faculty members, invited presenters will include junior faculty as well as graduate students.
In This Session
Thursday, August 12, 2021
Increasing the Demand for Workers with a Criminal Record
What Money Can Buy: How Market Exchange Promotes Values
Your Place in the World - Relative Income and Global Inequality
Break
Increasing the Demand for Workers with a Criminal Record
Why High Incentives Cause Repugnance: A Framed Field Experiment
Estimating Preferences for Competition from Convex Budget Sets
Corrections and Collaborations in Group Work
The Good Wife? Reputation Dynamics Within the Household and Women's Access to Resources
Break - Discussion
Friday, August 13, 2021
Eliciting Moral Preferences: Theory and Experiment
We examine to what extent a personís moral preferences can be inferred from observing their choices, for instance via experiments, and in particular, how one should interpret certain behaviors that appear deontologically motivated. Comparing the performance of the direct elicitation (DE) and multiple-price list (MPL) mechanisms, we characterize in each case how (social or self) image motives ináate the extent to which agents behave prosocially. More surprisingly, this signaling bias is shown to depend on the elicitation method, both per se and interacted with the level of visibility: it is greater under DE for low reputation concerns, and greater under MPL when they become high enough. We then test the modelís predictions in an experiment in which nearly 700 subjects choose between money for themselves and implementing a 350e donation that will, in expectation, save one human life. Interacting the elicitation method with the decisionís level of visibility and salience, we Önd the key crossing e§ect predicted by the model. We also show theoretically that certain ìKantianî postures, turning down all prices in the o§ered range, easily emerge under MPL when reputation becomes important enough.
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