We still know too little about interviewing as a part of matching markets, but here's a paper (that has been around for a while but is now published) that takes an interesting approach.
RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
By:Lee, RS (Lee, Robin S.); Schwarz, M (Schwarz, Michael)
Volume: 48
Issue: 3
Pages: 835-855
DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12193
Abstract
We introduce the interview assignment problem, which generalizes classic one-to-one matching models by introducing a stage of costly information acquisition. Firms learn preferences over workers via costly interviews. Even if all firms and workers conduct the same number of interviews, realized unemployment depends also on the extent to which agents share common interviewing partners. We introduce the concept of overlap that captures this notion and prove that unemployment is minimized with perfect overlap: that is, if two firms interview any common worker, they interview the exact same set of workers.
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