The signaling mechanism run by the American Economic Association closes on Monday at midnight (but signalers must register by Sunday). Economists may use it to send up to two signals of interest to potential employers. The mechanism is described here, together with some advice for candidates and departments.
My advice to candidates: read the advice, talk to your advisor, think about where to send your signals, but don't stress out about it; signals are just one small factor in your overall campaign. Good luck to all.
Saturday, November 29, 2008
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7 comments:
Does the AEA have any plans to publish anything about the usefulness of the signals in the near future?
The AEA plans to conduct some post-signaling surveys this year. If enough people answer them, maybe we'll learn something.
Aren't you worried that these signals might become observable to other schools, just as the actual applications and interviews are (de facto)? If so, wouldn't it be a problem?
Copied from the econ job rumors board:
I think the informational content in NOT receiving a signal is so small as to be zero, but the informational content in receiving a signal is not zero, but also not clearly positive... I think the dominant strategy is not to send any, unless you really truly credibly would go to an otherwise undesirable school.
But given the signals are scarce, I wonder this otherwise cheap talk can indeed be credible. Professor Roth, are you aware of any paper studying scare costless messages?
Shameless plug: I've made a lengthy post analyzing the mechanism, and particularly criticizing the AEA's advice to candidates not to send signals to top schools, here.
The economics job market is one of the the most important focus of attention in this area !
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