Monday, November 13, 2023

More on Realtor's contracts and practices, and the recent court decision

 Here are some further articles with some details about the recent court decision that real estate contracts are anticompetitive. Both are from the Washington Post:

Jury awards $1.8B in realty case that could shake up brokerage commissions. A Kansas City jury unanimously found that the National Association of Realtors and other organizations conspired to artificially inflate home sale commissions   By Julian Mark 

"The plaintiffs pointed to an NAR rule that required sellers to make a nonnegotiable commission offer before listing homes on the property database, the Multiple Listing Service, or MLS, which feeds widely used real estate sites including Zillow. That commission hovers around 5 to 6 percent of the sale price and is paid by the home seller to the sellers’ agent and the buyers’ agent. If sellers do not agree to the commission terms, they go virtually unseen in the market, Ketchmark said.

"The rule has stifled competition and has resulted in higher prices, the plaintiffs alleged. They argued that if the rule were not in place, buyers would pay commissions to their own agents while buyers’ agents would have to compete by offering lower rates. The lawsuit pointed to countries whose total real estate commissions average 1 to 3 percent, such as the United Kingdom, Singapore, the Netherlands, Australia and Belgium.

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Real estate industry trembles over commissions on home sales. After jurors recently found that there was a scheme to inflate commissions, experts say changes could shake up the business  By Julian Mark

"The judge overseeing the case has the power to issue an injunction that could break up the century-old “bundled” or “cooperative” commissions system, in which sellers’ and buyers’ agents split a commission that typically ranges between 5 and 6 percent of the home sale price. 

...

"The cooperative compensation structure was established in 1913, when National Association of Real Estate Exchanges, the precursor to NAR, said its member agents should share commissions with agents that produced buyers, according to a 2015 study by economists Panle Jia Barwick and Maisy Wong. The commissions rate hit 5 percent in 1940 and has remained virtually unchanged ever since, according to the study.

"Commissions work differently in countries such as the United Kingdom, where sellers pay typically less than 2 percent, and buyers pay their own agents, according to the study."

######

And here's the cited paper:

Barwick, Panle Jia, Parag A. Pathak, and Maisy Wong. 2017. "Conflicts of Interest and Steering in Residential Brokerage." American Economic Journal: Applied Economics9 (3): 191-222.

Abstract: This paper documents uniformity in real estate commission rates offered to buyers' agents using 653,475 residential listings in eastern Massachusetts from 1998–2011. Properties listed with lower commission rates experience less favorable transaction outcomes: they are 5 percent less likely to sell and take 12 percent longer to sell. These adverse outcomes reflect decreased willingness of buyers' agents to intermediate low commission properties (steering), rather than heterogeneous seller preferences or reduced effort of listing agents. Offices with large market shares purchase a disproportionately small fraction of low commission properties. The negative outcomes for low commissions provide empirical support for regulatory concerns over steering.

Sunday, November 12, 2023

Misunderstandings: False Beliefs in Communication by Georg Weizsäcker

 Georg Weizsäcker  has a new book, just out from Open Book Publishers. You can read online or download it for free, or purchase a printed copy.

Misunderstandings: False Beliefs in Communication, by Georg Weizsäcker 

"What do we expect when we say something to someone, and what do they expect when they hear it? When is a conversation successful? The book considers a wide set of two-person conversations, and a bit of game theory, to show how conversational statements and their interpretations are governed by beliefs. Thinking about beliefs is suitable for communication analysis because beliefs are well-defined and measurable, allowing to differentiate between successful understandings and their less successful counterparts: misunderstandings.

"The book describes the theoretical framework and empirical measurements of misunderstandings – written by an economist, but in simple words and using interdisciplinary concepts. The material will benefit students and researchers of behavioural economics and its neighbouring fields, and anyone interested in human language."



Among the endorsements:

"The most Zen part of economics has to do with how people form beliefs about the beliefs of others. Georg Weizsäcker is a Zen master at explaining the origins of misunderstandings, particularly those arising from false beliefs about the beliefs of others.

Prof. Alvin E. Roth, Stanford University"

Saturday, November 11, 2023

Graduate hotels, and campus humor

 I've been spending some time at Berkeley this quarter, and have twice stayed at the Graduate Hotel adjacent to the campus, Graduate Berkeley.  The Graduate chain  of hotels has a business model in which they purchase an old hotel (in Berkeley it was the Durant), and update it in various ways. (As far as I can tell, every room has a poster from the movie The Graduate.)  They also feel free to take swipes at neighboring universities: a restroom off the lobby of the Berkeley hotel  includes some Stanford signage.


I notice that a Graduate hotel has recently opened in Palo Alto, near Stanford.  I'll have to stop there for a drink sometime.

Friday, November 10, 2023

Kidney Exchange: Within and Across Borders (video lecture).

 Below is a video of my 40 minute talk at Berkeley on Monday, on Kidney Exchange: Within and Across Borders, at the final workshop on Mathematics and Computer Science of Market and Mechanism Design,  at the Simons Laufer Mathematical Sciences Institute (SLMath). (But we warned or reassured, this isn't a mathematical lecture...)


Here's another link to the video if you have trouble connecting:  https://www.slmath.org/workshops/1082/schedules/34227

Thursday, November 9, 2023

Algorithms, Approximation, and Learning in Market and Mechanism Design at SLMath Berkeley this week--Thursday

 Thursday's program (last day)

 09:00 am 09:45 am
Stability and Learning in Strategic Games
Eva Tardos, Cornell University
 09:45 am 10:30 am
Statistical Contract Theory
Michael Jordan, University of California, Berkeley
 10:00 am 10:30 am
Break
 11:00 am 11:45 am
Learning Bayes-Nash Equilibria in Auctions and Contests
Martin Bichler, Technical University of Munich
 11:30 am 11:45 am
Break
 11:45 am 12:30 pm
Recent Advances in Computing Nash Equilibria in Markov Games
Ioannis Panageas, University of California, Irvine
 12:30 pm 02:30 pm
Lunch
 02:30 pm 03:15 pm
Learning in Games and Markets: Talk 5
Tuomas Sandholm, Carnegie Mellon University
 03:15 pm 03:45 pm
Afternoon Tea
 03:45 pm 05:00 pm
Learning in Games and Markets: Closing Panel

Wednesday, November 8, 2023

Algorithms, Approximation, and Learning in Market and Mechanism Design at SLMath Berkeley this week--Wednesday

 Wednesday's program

 09:00 am 09:45 am
Dual Reduction and Elementary Games with Senders and Receivers
Roger Myerson, University of Chicago
 09:45 am 10:30 am
Algorithmic Mechanism Design: Talk 5
Michal Feldman, Tel-Aviv University
 10:30 am 11:00 am
Break
 11:00 am 11:45 am
Simple Mechanisms for Non-linear Agents
Jason Hartline, Northwestern University
 11:45 am 12:30 pm
Mechanism design for humans
Sigal Oren, Ben Gurion University of the Negev
 12:30 pm 02:30 pm
Lunch
 02:30 pm 03:15 pm
Cost Based Nonlinear Pricing
Dirk Bergemann, Yale University
 03:15 pm 03:45 pm
Break
 03:45 pm 05:00 pm
Algorithmic Mechanism Design: Closing Panel


Tuesday, November 7, 2023

Algorithms, Approximation, and Learning in Market and Mechanism Design at SLMath Berkeley this week--Tuesday

 Here's Tuesday's program

 09:00 am 09:45 am
Walrasian Mechanisms for Non-Convex Economies and the Bound-Form First Welfare Theorem
Paul Milgrom, Stanford University
 09:45 am 10:30 am
The Languages of Product-Mix Auctions
Elizabeth Baldwin, University of Oxford
 10:30 am 11:00 am
Break
 11:00 am 11:45 am
Workably Competitive Electricity Markets: Practice and Theory
Shmuel Oren, UC Berkeley
 11:45 am 12:30 pm
(Near) Substitute Preferences and Equilibria with Indivisibilities
Rakesh Vohra, University of Pennsylvania
 12:30 pm 02:30 pm
Poster Sessions and Lunch
 02:30 pm 03:15 pm
Beyond Classical Fisher Markets: Nonconvexities and Online Allocations
Yinyu Ye, Stanford University
 03:15 pm 03:45 pm
Afternoon Tea
 03:45 pm 05:00 pm
Non-Convex Auction Markets: Closing Panel
 05:00 pm 06:20 pm
Reception

Monday, November 6, 2023

Algorithms, Approximation, and Learning in Market and Mechanism Design at SLMath Berkeley this week--Monday

 

Nov
06
2023
Monday
 08:45 am 09:00 am
Welcome
 09:00 am 09:45 am
Kidney Exchange: Within and Across Borders
Alvin Roth, Stanford University
 09:45 am 10:30 am
Stable Matching as Transportation
Federico Echenique, University of California, Berkeley
 10:30 am 11:00 am
Break
 11:00 am 11:45 am
Couples can be Tractable: New Algorithms and Hardness Results for the Hospitals / Residents Problem with Couples
David Manlove, University of Glasgow
 11:45 am 12:30 pm
Advancing Stability in Matching Markets: Multi-Modal Preferences and Beyond
Jiehua Chen, Technische Universität Wien
 12:30 pm 02:30 pm
Poster Sessions and Lunch
 02:30 pm 03:15 pm
Old and New Results on Matching, Assignment, and Selection Problems
Jay Sethuraman, Columbia University
 03:15 pm 03:45 pm
Afternoon Tea
 03:45 pm 05:00 pm
Matching Markets without Money: Closing Panel