Friday, February 18, 2022

The Economic Theory Conference in Memory and Honor of Hugo Sonnenschein, April 29-30, U. Chicago

 In April, a memorial conference honoring Hugo Sonnenschein:

The Economic Theory Conference in Memory and Honor of Hugo Sonnenschein

Date: Friday, April 29 to Saturday, April 30

Friday, April 29, 2022
8:00 am - 8:45 am
Continental Breakfast and Registration
8:45 am - 9:00 am
Introductory Remarks
Session 1
9:00 am - 9:45 am
General Equilibrium with Climate Change
9:45 am - 10:30 am
Market Design and Walrasian Equilibrium
10:30 am - 11:00 am
Break
Session 2
11:00 am - 11:45 am
Predicting Choice from Information Costs
11:45 am - 12:30 pm
Investment Incentives in Near-Optimal Mechanisms
12:30 pm - 2:00 pm
Lunch

With remarks by Dilip Abreu, New Yok University; Pierre-Andre Chiappori, Columbia University; Vijay Krishna, Pennsylvania State University; andJohn Roberts, Stanford University

 

Session 3
2:00 pm - 2:45 pm
2:45 pm - 3:30 pm
On the Structure of Informationally Robust Optimal Auctions
3:30 pm - 4:00 pm
Break
Session 4
4:00 pm - 4:45 pm
A Minskyite Model of Financial Crises
4:45 pm - 5:30 pm
5:30 pm
Conference Dinner

With remarks by Salvador Barberà, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona; Matthew O. Jackson, Stanford University; David M. Kreps, Stanford University; and Robert Wilson, Stanford University

Location: City View Room, 10th Floor Rubenstein Forum

Saturday, April 30, 2022
8:00 am - 9:00 am
Continental Breakfast
Session 1
9:00 am - 9:45 am
Interactions Across Multiple Games: Implications for Cooperation, Corruption, and the Design of Teams and Organizations
9:45 am - 10:30 am
Efficiency in Random Resource Allocation and Social Choice
10:30 am - 11:00 am
Break
Session 2
11:00 am - 11:45 am
11:45 am - 12:30 pm
Bargaining with Exclusionary Commitments
**************

Thursday, July 15, 2021

Thursday, February 17, 2022

Mathematics and Computer Science of Market and Mechanism Design at MSRI Berkeley in Fall of 2023

 Here's an early announcement of a program at Berkeley's Mathematical Sciences Research Institute (MSRI). MSRI loves company, so if you have a sabbatical coming up and are interested in market design, this is worth looking into.

Mathematics and Computer Science of Market and Mechanism Design

August 21, 2023 to December 20, 2023

Organizers

Michal Feldman (Tel-Aviv University), Nicole Immorlica (Microsoft Research), LEAD Scott Kominers (Harvard University), Shengwu Li (Harvard University), Paul Milgrom (Stanford University), Alvin Roth (Stanford University), Tim Roughgarden (Stanford University), Eva Tardos (Cornell University)

Description

In recent years, economists and computer scientists have collaborated with mathematicians, operations research experts, and practitioners to improve the design and operations of real-world marketplaces. Such work relies on robust feedback between theory and practice, inspiring new mathematics closely linked – and directly applicable – to market and mechanism design questions. This cross-disciplinary program seeks to expand the domains in which existing market design solutions can be applied; address foundational questions regarding our ways of developing and evaluating mechanisms; and build useful analytic frameworks for applying theory to practical marketplace design. 

Wednesday, February 16, 2022

The Art Mart

 Art galleries are (among other things) middlemen, intermediating between artists and buyers of art, who may range from passionate consumers to institutional investors. (There are of course also passionate consumers who are also investors in an asset class that, like real estate, you can enjoy while it appreciates.)  

Of course, the galleries' incentives may not always be perfectly aligned with those of creators and consumers.  Galleries play a big role in helping bring young artists to market, and matching them to consumers and investors.  But as artists become more well known, other opportunities present themselves.

Here's a story from the WSJ about tensions involving sales by galleries versus sales by auction.

Why Artwork Flipping Can Incur the Wrath of Dealers. Dealers want to control the artists’ narrative and pricing, but investors want to leave it to the market  By Daniel Grant

"Chicago gallery owner Rhona Hoffman has three or four collectors she won’t sell to again.

“They broke the rule,” says the contemporary art dealer.

"That commandment to collectors: If you later decide to sell your artwork, consign it back to the gallery—do not put it up at auction.

"When buyers ignore this rule and auction off recently purchased pieces, it’s called flipping."

**********

Here's an older story, from Artsy, about the British artist/entrepreneur Damien Hirst, who has a long history of ambivalence about the role of galleries in the design of the market for art.

How Damien Hirst’s $200 Million Auction Became a Symbol of Pre-Recession Decadence by Nate Freeman

"On September 15, 2008, Sotheby’s was set to auction off 223 brand new works by Damien Hirst, including top-flight examples of his whole animals in formaldehyde, medicine cabinets, and spin paintings. It was an unprecedented incursion by an auction house into the primary market, and an unabashedly flashy sale accompanied by a global marketing tour with stops in Kiev, Aspen, and New Delhi.

...

"The Hirst auction, which the artist had dubbed “Beautiful Inside My Head Forever,” exceeded all expectations, grossing $200.75 million over the course of two sales in the span of 24 hours and becoming the most expensive single-artist auction ever. The 56 lots at the evening sale went 97% sold, and the two lots that did not find buyers during the auction were sold before the night was over. Over a third of the buyers had never bought contemporary art before. On the cusp of a global recession, Hirst walked away with $172 million.

...

"Taking work directly to market through an auction house would siphon millions of dollars from Hirst’s powerful dealers, Jay Jopling and Larry Gagosian. Hirst’s set up was typical of any in-demand artist at the time: He made work, and his dealers decided where to place it. Ordinarily, it is frowned upon when a vetted collector flips a work at auction. But Damien embraced that very act of betrayal and decided to pre-flip his own works to whoever could pay, with the support of Dunphy, whom he trusted more than his two dealers.

“Frank has my best interests at heart,” Hirst told The Economist in a story published before the sale. “Dealers say they do, but they don’t.”

Tuesday, February 15, 2022

The market for ballet dancers, by Olivia Hartzell

 Here's a post about the market for ballet dancers, by Olivia Hartzell, an econ Ph.D. student at Harvard whose previous profession was ballet. She writes in Dance Magazine that the market for dancers isn't as thick as it might be, because there aren't uniform times at which companies hire, and efficient matches are hard to predict. She proposes a centralized clearinghouse, but anticipates some obstacles to adoption and implementation.

The Ballet Job Market Needs a Market (Re)Design  by Olivia Hartzell

"The ballet job market is what an economist would refer to as a “matching market”—you cannot simply choose where to go, but you must also be chosen. What makes the ballet market peculiar is that, unlike most professional athletic markets, directors have vastly different preferences for dancers and they mostly do not (and cannot) compete for hires with salaries. Rather, dancers are first and foremost committed to finding their best artistic fits and are often willing to work for less than their worth.

This phenomenon would not be quite as problematic if dancers and directors were nonetheless matched efficiently. Unfortunately, there are two major failures that plague the current system.

First, although many, but not all, major ballet companies in the U.S. operate under the dancers’ union AGMA, there is virtually no regulation in terms of hiring. Deadlines to hold auditions, renew or cancel contracts are company-specific and are not standardized industry-wide. This is problematic because when streams of dancers are released into the audition market at different times, both companies and dancers can end up with undesirable results.

...

"In other settings, centralized clearinghouses have been enormously effective in eliminating similar market failures. Specifically, what I have in mind is a variant that I’ve designed of the well-known top trading cycles algorithm. It would work something like this: After all company departures have been announced and auditions held, dancers and directors would simply submit their preferences to a centralized algorithm that would quickly determine final assignments based on those preferences. 

...

"Of course, centralized clearinghouses are most effective when the majority of the market agrees to partake in them. While leaders may fear that this would require them to relinquish some control, they would only make offers to the dancers who they would under the best possible scenario, and the gains they would achieve by thickening and coordinating the market would far outweigh any perceived losses.

"As new leaders begin to take the reins at companies around the globe, time will tell whether they will be brave enough to challenge the status quo and reshape the marketplace in a way that truly works for both dancers and directors."

HT: Scott Kominers

*************

The market for ballet dancers is tough in other ways as well, e.g. it's the rare dancer who finds her way to graduate school later. Many professional dancers never go to college. See e.g. (also in Dance Magazine)

What Directors Really Think of Ballet Dancers Going To College by Sarah Wroth

"In the ballet world, the phrase “going to college” is sometimes regarded as the musings of a dancer who’s not really serious about their craft. Although schools like Juilliard and Bennington College have made degrees acceptable for modern dancers for decades, the competitive ballet world (which often follows a philosophy of “the younger the better”) tends to discourage higher education."

***************

And this, from a story about a dancer with an unusually long and storied career who was able to make a post ballet career in contemporary dance:

When Ballet Is Your Life, What Does Life After Ballet Look Like? Wendy Whelan only ever wanted to dance. But what happens when you can't dance anymore?  by Chloe Angyal

 "Career paths out of ballet are notoriously narrow. Dancers usually skip college, and even the end of high school, to devote themselves to dancing in their late teens and early 20s, which means that when they retire from dancing, they’re out in the job market without an entry-level degree. Some dancers go on to teach or coach, and some to choreograph, though the latter path is often even less stable, predictable or lucrative than being a dancer. Some go into ballet-adjacent work, like dance photography. Some will be picked to run companies; Pacific Northwest Ballet, Miami City Ballet, Washington Ballet and Pennsylvania Ballet are all run by alumni of the New York City Ballet or American Ballet Theater. But there are only so many ballet companies to run, and turnover at the top can be infrequent."

Monday, February 14, 2022

Building capacity in science

 Here's a post from Nature about some of the projects highlighted by the recent Einstein Foundation awards for promoting quality in research


Science Should Value Building Research Capacity

T
The Source
Written by Patrick S. Forscher and Moreen Terer

Science values outstanding, already-completed scientific achievements and the people who make them. This priority is illustrated in the profusion of scientific awards, such the Nobel Prize, Fields Medal, and Breakthrough Prize, that reward these accomplishments. However, science places less emphasis on efforts to promote quality within the research ecosystem itself. Nor does science typically recognize the critical capacity-building activities that are necessary to create the robust scientific ecosystems necessary to produce high quality research in the first place.


On November 21, 2021, the Einstein Foundation broke with this trend by issuing a series of awards for efforts to promote quality within the research ecosystem itself. Even more unusually, one of its award categories, the Early Career category, recognized not past achievements but rather outstanding proposed projects that showed special promise in promoting future quality. Four projects were shortlisted for this €100,000 award.

The projects that were shortlisted for the Early Career award shared something in common that may be unexpected: they are unusually focused on building a strong scientific community, especially in groups and settings that science has neglected. Take the first author’s (Patrick Forscher’s) project, for example. This project aimed to grow behavioral science in Africa by building a website, called “Lab in a Box”, to make it easy to set up a new behavioral lab in Africa, enhancing an existing database of measures with existing measures that are adapted to African languages and contexts, and stocking that database with newly translated and adapted measures. These activities are feasible due to Patrick’s position at a research center, the Busara Center for Behavioral Economics, that is both headquartered in Africa and dedicated to advancing behavioral science in the Global South. As Africa currently produces 2% of all research output (Kasprowicz et al., 2020), capacity-building activities such as the ones proposed are critical if behavioral science is to establish a robust presence in Africa.

***********

Capacity building is important in medicine as well as in science.  Here's a paper on global chains of kidney exchange, that would contribute to building surgical capacity around the world.

Global kidney chains, by Afshin Nikzad, Mohammad Akbarpour, Michael A. Rees, Alvin E. Roth, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences Sep 2021, 118 (36) e2106652118; DOI: 10.1073/pnas.2106652118

Sunday, February 13, 2022

The future pandemic that has already started making an appearance

I never expected the Covid pandemic: I was expecting a different one, coming not from a virus but from an antibiotic-resistant bacteria.  That one is still in our future, but here's an article that indicates that there are many bacterial candidates that could start something big, and taken together they are already starting to loom on the horizon.

In the Lancet (Available online 19 January 2022, In Press, Corrected Proof):

Global burden of bacterial antimicrobial resistance in 2019: a systematic analysis  By the  Antimicrobial Resistance Collaborators 

"Background: Antimicrobial resistance (AMR) poses a major threat to human health around the world. Previous publications have estimated the effect of AMR on incidence, deaths, hospital length of stay, and health-care costs for specific pathogen–drug combinations in select locations. To our knowledge, this study presents the most comprehensive estimates of AMR burden to date.

...

"Findings: On the basis of our predictive statistical models, there were an estimated 4·95 million (3·62–6·57) deaths associated with bacterial AMR in 2019, including 1·27 million (95% UI 0·911–1·71) deaths attributable to bacterial AMR. At the regional level, we estimated the all-age death rate attributable to resistance to be highest in western sub-Saharan Africa, at 27·3 deaths per 100 000 (20·9–35·3), and lowest in Australasia, at 6·5 deaths (4·3–9·4) per 100 000. Lower respiratory infections accounted for more than 1·5 million deaths associated with resistance in 2019, making it the most burdensome infectious syndrome. The six leading pathogens for deaths associated with resistance (Escherichia coli, followed by Staphylococcus aureus, Klebsiella pneumoniae, Streptococcus pneumoniae, Acinetobacter baumannii, and Pseudomonas aeruginosa) were responsible for 929 000 (660 000–1 270 000) deaths attributable to AMR and 3·57 million (2·62–4·78) deaths associated with AMR in 2019. One pathogen–drug combination, meticillin-resistant S aureus, caused more than 100 000 deaths attributable to AMR in 2019, while six more each caused 50 000–100 000 deaths: multidrug-resistant excluding extensively drug-resistant tuberculosis, third-generation cephalosporin-resistant E coli, carbapenem-resistant A baumannii, fluoroquinolone-resistant E coli, carbapenem-resistant K pneumoniae, and third-generation cephalosporin-resistant K pneumoniae.

"Interpretation: To our knowledge, this study provides the first comprehensive assessment of the global burden of AMR, as well as an evaluation of the availability of data. AMR is a leading cause of death around the world, with the highest burdens in low-resource settings. Understanding the burden of AMR and the leading pathogen–drug combinations contributing to it is crucial to making informed and location-specific policy decisions, particularly about infection prevention and control programmes, access to essential antibiotics, and research and development of new vaccines and antibiotics. There are serious data gaps in many low-income settings, emphasising the need to expand microbiology laboratory capacity and data collection systems to improve our understanding of this important human health threat."

***********

Earlier:

Wednesday, July 15, 2020

Saturday, February 12, 2022

First kidney exchange in Brazil

 A first kidney exchange in Brazil, at Universidade de São Paulo, Hospital das Clínicas da Faculdade de Medicina, São Paulo, SP, Brasil, is briefly reported in the Brazilian Journal of Nephrology?

Pioneering Experience of First Kidney Paired Donation in Brazil by David José de Barros Machado, William Carlos Nahas, Elias David Neto, Braz. J. Nephrol. • 02 Feb 2022 • https://doi.org/10.1590/2175-8239-JBN-2021-0259

"The supply of kidneys from deceased and living donors in Brazil cannot meet the growing annual demand for transplants1. ABO incompatibility (ABOi) or positive complement-dependent cytotoxicity (CDC) crossmatch between the candidate recipient and the prospective donor is a major obstacle to living donor kidney transplant, and consequently many recipients remain on the waiting list for years.

"Since 2011, we have started the discussion and preparation for the implementation of a local KPD program at the Hospital das Clínicas - FMUSP. We discussed the topic internally with our Bioethics Commission, Medical Ethics Commission, Organ and Tissue Transplant Commission, and Clinical Board. In Brazil, Law No. 9,434 regulates the removal of organs, tissues, and parts of the human body for transplant purposes, without contemplating the activity of paired donation. Therefore, we proposed and obtained ethical approval (CAAE 83469418400000068) for a research project to assess the effectiveness of transplantation in patients with ABOi living donor or positive CDC/flow cytometry crossmatch by donor exchange. At the end of the medical, psychological, social, and immunological evaluation of the pairs and after the consent terms were signed, approval was obtained from the Ethics Committee that evaluates transplants with unrelated donors to perform the paired donation. Subsequently, we also obtained the approvals of the Public Prosecutor’s Office, the judicial approval and that of the General Coordination of the National Transplant System - Ministry of Health, for the first transplant with KPD in Brazil.

"On March 10, 2020, the 38-year-old recipient (recipient 1) with chronic glomerulonephritis, undergoing dialysis treatment, on a deceased transplant waiting list for 8 years and with the previous exclusion of 7 living donors, including his wife (donor 1), because of ABOi, received the kidney of the 45-year-old donor of the second pair. The second recipient, 57 years old, with chronic glomerulonephritis, undergoing dialysis treatment, on a deceased transplant waiting list for 1.9 years, and with exclusion of his only donor, wife (donor 2) because of ABOi, received the kidney from the 39-year-old donor of the first pair (donor 1). Pair anonymity was assured until the time of admission, as was reciprocal compatibility between the pairs and simultaneous surgery in 4 operating rooms, which allowed donors to withdraw consent at any time before anesthesia. After 12 months, recipients had adequate kidney function and their donors were doing well.

"Efforts to increase organ supply have a significant source of potential donors in the paired donation programs. Today, all countries that are world leaders in transplantation are practicing and developing this modality in an attempt to reach more and more recipients because of its excellent results"

************

Earlier: 

Sunday, December 26, 2021

Friday, February 11, 2022

A Lloyd Shapley tribute, by his niece Deborah Shapley

 Lloyd's niece, Deborah Shapley, is a Washington DC based science writer and activist.  She is developing a website of material about her grandfather (Lloyd's father) Harlow Shapley.

In connection with that, she's published a website about Lloyd, that talks about his life and his work:

Lloyd Shapley - Nobelist

"Lloyd Shapley received the Nobel prize from King Carl XVI Gustaf of Sweden at the annual grand ceremony in December 2012. Among the Nobelists my uncle Lloyd was the tallest. At age 89, he was the oldest. Though wobbly he was dignified and humorous. He also differed from the others by his convention-defying hair - which resembled the mathematical algorithm for which he won science’s highest honor.

"At the time I posted about our family’s glorious days in Stockholm. Now that my writing focuses on high achievement in science, including that of the Shapleys,  I dug a bit into the story of my talkative, funny, floppy-haired uncle."

Thursday, February 10, 2022

Access and transparency in transplantation at the TTS 2022 meeting in September

 Covid-permitting, I'll be flying to Buenos Aires in September to participate in person in the 2022 international meeting of The Transplantation Society (TTS), with a focus on access and transparency in transplantation.






 Monday, September 12, 2022 – 09:40 to 11:10

Transplantation in a moving world; migrants, refugees & organ trafficking
Dominique Martin, Australia
Steps towards increasing deceased donation worldwide
Beatriz Dominguez-Gil, Spain
How can we optimize local economics to achieve self-sufficiency and ethical transplantation in an unequal global economy
Alvin E. Roth, United States

Wednesday, February 9, 2022

Stability in Matching Markets with Complex Constraints by H. Nguyen, T. Nguyen, and A. Teytelboym

 Here's a paper motivated in part by the issues that arise in matching refugee families to localities in which to settle (once they have been granted asylum in a particular country).  It's also a good example of the way that operations research methods are playing an increasing role in market design.

Hai Nguyen, Thành Nguyen, Alexander Teytelboym (2021) Stability in Matching Markets with Complex Constraints. Management Science 67(12):7438-7454. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2020.3869

Abstract. "We develop a model of many-to-one matching markets in which agents with multiunit demand aim to maximize a cardinal linear objective subject to multidimensional knapsack constraints. The choice functions of agents with multiunit demand are therefore not substitutable. As a result, pairwise stable matchings may not exist and even when they do, may be highly inefficient. We provide an algorithm that finds a group-stable matching that approximately satisfies all the multidimensional knapsack constraints. The novel ingredient in our algorithm is a combination of matching with contracts and Scarf’s Lemma. We show that the degree of the constraint violation under our algorithm is proportional to the sparsity of the constraint matrix. The algorithm, therefore, provides practical constraint violation bounds for applications in contexts, such as refugee resettlement, day care allocation, and college admissions with diversity requirements. Simulations using refugee resettlement data show that our approach produces outcomes that are not only more stable, but also more efficient than the outcomes of the Deferred Acceptance algorithm. Moreover, simulations suggest that in practice, constraint violations under our algorithm would be even smaller than the theoretical bounds."


"Around 50,000 refugees are resettled to the United States every year. Nine American resettlement agencies coordinate networks of dozens of local communities (which we refer to as localities) that support refugees during their first few years in the United States. Localities are allowed to admit different numbers of refugees and offer different services (e.g., language support, support for large families, support for single parents, etc.) that may or may not match the needs of the refugees (Ahani et al. 2021, Delacrétaz et al. 2019). In order to secure government approval to conduct resettlement, resettlement agencies must aim to maximize the number of refugees who are employed within 90 days of arrival. Some resettlement agencies have begun using integer optimization and machine learning in order to improve refugee outcomes (Bansak et al. 2018, Ahani et al. 2021); however, as far as we know, refugees’preferences over localities are presently not collected anywhere in the world.

...

Our algorithm is a novel combination of Scarf’s Lemma and a rounding procedure. We build on the approach of Nguyen and Vohra (2018); however, we make a number of substantial extensions and modifications. The novelty of our approach is the way we apply Scarf’s Lemma to capture group stability. To use Scarf’s Lemma for stable matching problems, one needs to create a constraint matrix Q, where each column corresponds to a possible blocking coalition. Hitherto, two methods to construct such a matrix have been proposed: first, with columns corresponding to all possible blocking coalitions (Scarf 1967); second, with columns corresponding to small blocking coalitions (a hospital and a doctor or a doctor couple and two hospitals) (see Nguyen and Vohra 2018). Although the method of Nguyen and Vohra only obtains matchings that are immune to deviations by small coalitions, Scarf’s method can, in principle, capture group stability. However, the disadvantage of Scarf’s method is that the resulting constraint matrix is not sparse, which prevents us from guaranteeing small error bounds in the rounding procedure.

"Our main structural contribution is a new way of combining ideas from matching with contracts with Scarf’s method in order to create an appropriate constraint matrix. A contract specifies both agents in the match as well as a “price” for one of the dimensions of the knapsack constraints. Our method allows us to get the best of both methods: the sparsity of our constraint matrix does not change, but the prices specified in the contracts still allow us to capture group stability via pairwise stability."

***********

Earlier:

Sunday, October 19, 2014

Tuesday, February 8, 2022

Is applying to college too hard?

 While there are concerns that electronic application services like the common app have led to an explosion of applications, there are also concerns in the opposite direction, that applying to college remains a barrier particularly to students who don't automatically think of college as an option.

Here's a story from the Chronicle of Higher Ed about an initiative to ease the application process.

Rethinking the Act of Applying to College. A tedious process that puts the onus on students may need an overhaul.  By Eric Hoover

"On Thursday, the Coalition for College, a membership group of 162 institutions with a shared online application, announced a plan to ease the challenge of applying. As part of a new partnership, the organization will embed its application process into Scoir, an online college-advising platform used by students at more than 2,000 high schools nationwide.

"Instead of creating a Coalition application and typing information into a separate website, students with a Scoir account will soon be able to apply to any Coalition college by transmitting an admission form prepopulated with information — demographic data, grades, test scores, and so on — that would already reside under the same virtual roof.

...

"The more complex the application process, the less equitable it becomes."

"That was a key line from a report published in January by the National Association for College Admission Counseling and the National Association of Student Financial Aid Administrators. The report, which imagined what the college-application process would look like if racial equity were the main objective, included findings and recommendations drawn from interviews with a panel of admissions and financial-aid experts, as well as students."

Monday, February 7, 2022

Market design at the Econometric Society summer school in Dynamic Structural Econometrics

 Here's an announcement that came by email from the Econometric Society (which reflects the continued evolution of market design):

ECONOMETRIC SOCIETY SUMMER SCHOOL in DYNAMIC STRUCTURAL ECONOMETRICS

Theme: Market Design

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

August 15–20, 2022

APPLY AT http://dseconf.org

DEADLINE: FRIDAY APRIL 1

We are pleased to announce the next event in the sequence of Econometric Society summer schools in Dynamic Structural Econometrics.

The primary focus of DSE summer schools is to provide early-stage PhD students with the tools to carry out research in the rapidly developing area of empirical market design with a strong emphasis on closely integrating economic and econometric theory in empirical work. The school covers the theoretical and methodological foundations in market design, the state-of-the-art methods for estimating models that are fundamental in this literature and providing an overview of open questions. We will use a variety of empirical applications to illustrate how these tools and methods are combined to address important applied questions.

The 2022 Econometric Society DSE summer school consists of 4 days of lectures held in conjunction with the Dynamic Structural Econometrics Conference 2022 (August 19-20). The conference brings together top junior and senior researchers from the field to discuss recent advances in theoretical and applied work. The summer school and the conference are hosted by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Lecturers of the summer school and invited conference speakers include:

Nikhil Agarwal (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)

Fedor Iskhakov (Australian National University)

Irene Lo (Stanford University)

Victoria Marone (University of Texas at Austin)

Robert A. Miller (Carnegie Mellon University)

Whitney Newey (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)

Ariel Pakes (Harvard University)

Parag Pathak (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)

John Rust (Georgetown University)

Bertel Schjerning (University of Copenhagen)

Paulo Somaini (Stanford Graduate School of Business)

Daniel Waldinger (New York University)

Interested students and presenters are invited to submit their applications via the website http://dseconf.org. Application deadline is April 1, 2022.

Sunday, February 6, 2022

Interview on market design (in Polish)

I was interviewed by Sebastian Stodolak about market design and repugnance, in the Polish journal https://www.dziennik.pl/tagi/alvin-e-roth. Aside from being in Polish, it's behind a paywall. 

But here's an excerpt on which Google Translate works moderately well (without however giving you the feeling that the original discussion was in English...):

Prohibited activities. They repel, they don't disappear (Zakazane dziaÅ‚alnoÅ›ci. OdpychajÄ…, nie znikajÄ…)

"DGP: You design markets. What does that even mean? 

Alvin E. Roth: It's nothing new. People have always designed markets. They must already have been doing this in order to be able to trade stone tools over long distances. For example, they had to agree on the terms of this trade.

And that was designing?

In some sense. Without the design of appropriate rules, banking, auction systems or exchanges that were created during transactions carried out in an informal atmosphere in coffee shops in London or New York would not have been born.

It's just that most of the time people were doing fine without economists, and suddenly you show up with your friends and you even get a Noble for it!

It took a long time for economists to recognize the importance of design. For a long time they thought about markets in a very abstract way, aggregates, they talked about supply, about demand. This was the case until game theorists such as William Vickrey and the recent Nobel Prize winners Paul Milgrom and Bob Wilson appeared in economics. It was only when we started to look more closely at the rules on which the market game takes place that we saw that markets are project-based and how these projects define their functioning.