Sunday, November 18, 2018

Congratulations to Fuhito Kojima, on the Enjoji Jiro Memorial Prize

My colleague Fuhito Kojima has a lot to be congratulated on lately, and today comes another cause for congratulations.  He shares the 5th Enjoji Jiro Memorial Prize by the Japan Center for Economic Research. The prize recognizes 'young and mid-level economists under 45 years of age who have made achievements in the field of economic theory, and have a promising future.'

Here's the story from today's Nikkei Shimbun Morning Paper:

第5回「円城寺次郎記念賞」 小島・渡辺両氏に

2018/11/18付
日本経済新聞 朝刊

"The 5th "Jiroji Jiro Memorial Award" To Mr. Kojima and Mr. Watanabe"

Congratulations, Fuhito!

**********
I used Google translate to translate the headline, but for the following paragraph it had trouble with a word that I gather in this context means "between junior and senior in age/career," which came out as saying that Fuhito is a "young and medium-sized economist ." (The description of the prize above comes from an English language report on the 2009 prize...)

The resident match can be confusing, in PNAS by Alex Rees-Jones and Samuel Skowronek

Here's a recent paper in PNAS, |
An experimental investigation of preference misrepresentation in the residency match
Alex Rees-Jones and Samuel Skowronek
www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.1803212115

"The development and deployment of matching procedures that incentivize truthful preference reporting is considered one of the major successes of market design research. In this study, we test the degree to which these procedures succeed in eliminating preference misrepresentation. We administered an online experiment to 1,714 medical students immediately after their participation in the medical residency match—a leading field application of strategy-proof market design. When placed in an analogous, incentivized matching task, we find that 23% of participants misrepresent their preferences. We explore the factors that predict preference misrepresentation, including cognitive ability, strategic positioning, overconfidence, expectations, advice, and trust. We discuss the implications of this behavior for the design of allocation mechanisms and the social welfare in markets that use them

Saturday, November 17, 2018

Black markets for marijuana in Canada, where marijuana is now legal

Here are some accounts of the bumpy road to a thick legal market for marijuana:

From the NY Times, on how stores continue to sell not yet legalized products still available on the black market:
Vancouver, Canada’s Marijuana Capital, Struggles to Tame the Black Market

From the Guardian, on the shortage of legal product in face of strong demand:
Weed woes: Canada struggles to meet huge demand for legal cannabis
Numerous stores dealing with empty shelves and disgruntled customers, with fears many consumers will turn to black market

“Now that we can’t supply them, they’re still going to find it,” [a legal supplier with empty shelves] said. “There’s no shortage of weed in Labrador City. Just the legal stuff.”

Friday, November 16, 2018

Xenotransplants: the (evergreen) promise of transplantable organs from pigs

Wouldn't it be great if the shortage of transplantable organs could be fixed by figuring out how to grow them in farm animals? (Yes, that would raise a bunch of issues of its own, but so does meat eating...)

The NY Times has the story of how that might be closer than it has been in the past:
20 AMERICANS DIE EACH DAY WAITING FOR ORGANS. CAN PIGS SAVE THEM?
THANKS TO GENETICALLY ENGINEERED PIGS, THE DONOR-ORGAN SHORTAGE COULD SOON BE A THING OF THE PAST.


It includes lots of promising news, and this observation:
“The joke about xenotransplantation is that it’s always just around the corner, and it always will be,” says Parsia Vagefi, the chief of surgical transplantation at the University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center in Dallas. “But recent progress has been so remarkable that for first time it feels like we’re on the verge of a definitive solution to the organ crisis.”
*************

And of course, note that many more than 20 Americans die each day due to a shortage of organs:

Wednesday, November 14, 2018

Thursday, November 15, 2018

The law and economics of market design: conference in Mannheim November 15-16

The program is here, but for some reason I can't copy it.
Kim Krawiec and Peter Cramton will be giving keynote addresses.

Market design seems like a natural for a conference on law and economics...

Wednesday, November 14, 2018

The Terrible Toll of the Kidney Shortage, by McCormick, Held and Chertow

An editorial in the Journal of the American Society of Nephrology counts the high human costs of the kidney shortage in terms not only of deaths among those on the waiting list for a deceased donor transplant, but also among the other three-fourths of kidney failure patients who are not added to the waiting list but who would medically benefit from a transplant.

The Terrible Toll of the Kidney Shortage,
by Frank McCormick, Philip J. Held, and Glenn M. Chertow

"to see the full extent of the harm done by the kidney shortage and the potential benefit from ending it, let us assume that 50% of those who are diagnosed with ESRD could medically benefit from a transplant. (This assumption is consistent with the findings of Schold et al. 5 that, if all of the patients on dialysis who have a life expectancy of >5 years were placed on the kidney waiting list, the number on the list would almost double.) Thus, half of the 126,000 patients who are currently diagnosed with ESRD each year—63,000 patients—might medically benefit from a transplant. However,if only 20,000 patients per year receive a transplant, the remaining 43,000 would join the growing toll of those who die prematurely because of the kidney shortage. To put this in perspective, this is the same death toll as from 85 fully loaded 747s crashing each year.




*************

See my earlier post on earlier, defining work on the costs of the organ shortage:

Saturday, October 17, 2015

Tuesday, November 13, 2018

Welfare of sophisticated versus naive players revisited, by Babaioff, Gonczarowski, and Romm

Here's a new paper with a nuanced view of how well sophisticated players may do in a non-strategy-proof mechanism:

Playing on a level field: Sincere and sophisticated players in the Boston mechanism with a coarse priority structure
Moshe Babaioff, Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Assaf Romm∗
October 15, 2018

Abstract: Who gains and who loses from a manipulable school choice mechanism? We examine this question with a focus on the outcomes for sincere and sophisticated students,and present results concerning their absolute and relative gains under the manipulable Boston Mechanism (BM) as compared with the strategy-proof Deferred Acceptance (DA). The absolute gain of a student of a certain type is the difference between her expected utility under (an equilibrium of) BM and her utility under (the dominant strategy quilibrium of) DA. Holding everything else constant, one type of a player has relative gain with respect to another type if her absolute gain is higher. Prior theoretical works presented inconclusive results regarding the absolute gains of both types of students, and predicted (or assumed) positive relative gains for sophisticated types compared to sincere types. The empirical evidence is also mixed, with different markets exhibiting very different behaviors. We extend the previous results and explain the inconsistent empirical findings using a large random market approach. We provide robust and generic results of the “anything goes” variety for markets with a coarse priority structure. That is, in such markets there are many sincere and sophisticated students who prefer BM to DA (positive absolute gain), and vice versa (negative absolute gain). Furthermore, some populations may even get a relative gain from being sincere (and being perceived as such). We conclude by studying market forces that can influence the choice between the two mechanisms.

Monday, November 12, 2018

MIT School choice summit: Nov. 13

A big group of academics and practitioners involved in school choice will gather in Cambridge to take stock of what we have learned, and still hope to learn, about school choice.

MIT SCHOOL ACCESS AND QUALITY SUMMIT 2018

"November 13, 2018 | Cambridge, MA
The MIT School Access and Quality Summit will focus on school enrollment strategies that can increase access and generate data to improve portfolio planning and the measurement of school effectiveness. Researchers will present new findings on the impact of policy interventions, and policymakers will share their experiences with implementation. Through these conversations, we hope to spark long-term partnerships between researchers and practitioners, and prompt continuous interaction between rigorous research and policy design, implementation, and evaluation."

Tuesday, November 13

9:00 AM  Welcome and Introduction
Ian Waitz, Vice Chancellor for Undergraduate and Graduate Education, MIT

9:15 AM  Leveraging Enrollment Mechanisms to Evaluate Impact
Joshua Angrist, Director, School Effectiveness and Inequality Initiative
Parag Pathak, Director, School Effectiveness and Inequality Initiative

9:45 AM  Simplifying Enrollment in Chicago: A First Look at the Adoption of GoCPS
Lisa Barrow, Senior Economist, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
Tony T. Howard, III, Executive Director of Enrollment and Education Policy, Chicago Public Schools

10:45 AM  Break

11:00 AM  Keynote
Richard Carranza, Chancellor, of New York City Department of Education

11:30 Taking Stock of School Choice Reforms
Neil Dorosin, Executive Director, Institute for Innovation in Public School Choice

12:00 PM  Working Lunch

Case Consultancies
Introduction by Carrie Conaway, Chief Research and Strategy Officer, Massachusetts Department of Elementary and Secondary Education

1:30 PM  Improving School Quality in Camden
Paymon Rouhanifard, Former Superintendent, Camden City School District

2:00 PM Evidence on the Determinants and Consequences of School Choice from Washington DC
Steven Glazerman, Senior Policy Fellow, Mathematica Policy Research
Dallas Dotter, Researcher, Mathematica Policy Research
Claudia Luján, Deputy Chief, Strategic School Planning and Enrollment, District of Columbia Public Schools

3:00 PM  Break

3:15 PM  Leveling the Playing Field for High School Admissions in New York City
Sarah Cohodes, Assistant Professor of Education and Public Policy, Columbia University
Nadiya Chadha, Director of High School Admissions Research and Policy, New York City Department of Education

4:15 PM  Developing a National Research Agenda for Access and Choice
Douglas Harris, Director, The National Center for Research on Education Access and Choice

***********
Update: here's a Nov. 20 news report from MIT following the conference:
Exploring school choice
MIT School Access and Quality Summit brings policymakers, educators, and researchers together to examine strategies and ways to measure effectiveness.

Sunday, November 11, 2018

Repugnance watch: Greyhound racing banned (even) in Florida

Florida had an active greyhound racing industry, now banned by referendum:
Here's the story from the Orlando Sentinal:
How vote to end Florida greyhound racing won and what comes next

"After years of failing to push greyhound racing reform through the Florida Legislature, animal-welfare advocates took their mission directly to the state’s voters this week — scoring such a decisive victory that proponents say it signals the eventual end of the sport across the country.

“A 69-percent vote in Florida — a state with a still-conservative electorate — shows that this is now unstoppable,” said Carey Theil, executive director of GREY2K USA, the main force behind the Yes on 13 campaign to support the racing ban. “It sends a message not only to the remaining dog tracks in the nation but all around the world that dogs are members of our families and we will not tolerate industries that harm them.
...
"Florida’s 11 active dog tracks will have until Jan. 1, 2021, to phase out their live greyhound racing. They’ll still be able to race horses, if their tracks can accommodate the event, and they’ll still be able to have wagering on simulcast races from other tracks, including from dog tracks in the five remaining states where the practice is still active and legal."
*******

A NY Times article begins by considering the problem of rehoming the racing dogs who will be retired, but includes an interesting feature of the industry that has kept dog racing active in Florida:

Thousands of Greyhounds May Need Homes as Florida Bans Racing

"Florida’s tracks remained in part because of state laws that require them to continue racing in order to keep their lucrative gambling operations. In Florida, only existing “parimutuel” facilities like dog tracks and horse tracks could obtain licenses to operate card rooms and slots."

Saturday, November 10, 2018

Obvious manipulations by Pete Troyan and Thayer Morrill

Here's a paper motivated by the fact that (obviously:) there are going to be many more mechanisms that aren't obviously manipulable than there are mechanisms that are obviously strategy proof, or even strategy proof...

Obvious Manipulations
Peter Troyan, Thayer Morrill∗ (*in random order)
October 3, 2018

Abstract: A mechanism is strategy-proof if agents can never profitably manipulate, in any state of the world; however, not all non-strategy-proof
mechanisms are equally easy to manipulate - some are more “obviously”
manipulable than others. We propose a formal definition of an obvious
manipulation and argue that it may be advantageous for designers to
tolerate some manipulations, so long as they are non-obvious. By doing
so, improvements can be achieved on other key dimensions, such as
efficiency and fairness, without significantly compromising incentives.
We classify common non-strategy-proof mechanisms as either obviously
manipulable (OM) or not obviously manipulable (NOM), and show that
this distinction is both tractable and in-line with empirical realities
regarding the success of manipulable mechanisms in practical market
design settings

"Intuitively, a manipulation ...is classified as “obvious” if it either makes
the agent strictly better off in the worst case ...or it makes the agent strictly better off in the best case..."

Friday, November 9, 2018

Marijuana scores some gains in the voting booth

The NY Times has the story:
Marijuana Embraced in Michigan, Utah and Missouri, but Rejected in North Dakota

"Marijuana initiatives appeared on ballots in four states in the midterm elections. In Michigan and North Dakota, initiatives gave voters the opportunity to legalize marijuana for recreational use. In Missouri and Utah, voters chose whether to allow people who are sick to use the drug for medical reasons."

See my earlier post:

Friday, October 6, 2017

Thursday, November 8, 2018

Arrow lecture at Columbia University this evening


The 11th Annual Kenneth J. Arrow Lecture | Market Design in Large Worlds: The Example of Kidney Exchange
Thursday, November 8, 2018
6:00 pm - 7:30 pm
International Affairs Building, 420 W. 118 St., New York, NY 10027 1501


Please join us for the 11th Annual Kenneth J. Arrow Lecture delivered by Alvin Roth, the 2012 Nobel Laureate in Economic Sciences and Craig and Susan McCaw Professor of Economics at Stanford University, on "Market Design in Large Worlds: The Example of Kidney Exchange."
Discussants: Parag Pathak, Jane Berkowitz Carlton and Dennis William Carlton Professor of Microeconomics at MIT
Joseph E. Stiglitz, 2001 Nobel Laureate in Economic Sciences and University Professor at Columbia University Description:

Abstract: "Marketplaces are often small parts of large markets, and so potential marketplace participants may have large strategy sets, that include actions taken outside of the marketplace. And markets require social support, so the behavior of people who do not intend to participate in the market may nevertheless be important for market design. This lecture will illustrate these points with some examples, drawing most heavily on the experience of kidney exchange."

About the Kenneth J. Arrow Lecture Series: Kenneth J. Arrow’s work has shaped the course of economics for the past sixty years so deeply that, in a sense, every modern economist is his student. His ideas, style of research, and breadth of vision have been a model for generations of the boldest, most creative, and most inventive economists. His work has yielded such seminal theorems as general equilibrium, social choice, and endogenous growth, proving that simple ideas have a profound impact. The Kenneth J. Arrow Lecture Series highlights economists, from Nobel laureates to groundbreaking younger scholars, whose work builds on Arrow’s scholarship as well as his innovative spirit. The books in the series are an expansion of the lectures that are held in Arrow's honor at Columbia University.

Wednesday, November 7, 2018

Kidney exchange needs to be conducted at scale, in Vox

Nikhil Agarwal, Itai Ashlagi, Eduardo Azevedo, Clayton Featherstone,  and Omer Karaduman summarize their recent paper in Vox..eu:

Market failure in kidney exchange
03 November 2018

National kidney exchange platforms significantly boost the number of life-saving kidney transplants by finding complicated exchange arrangements that are not possible within any single hospital. This column examines US data and finds that the majority of kidney exchanges continue to be performed within hospitals, suggesting a fragmented market that comes at a large efficiency cost. National platforms may need to be redesigned to encourage full participation, with reimbursement reform.

Tuesday, November 6, 2018

Discussion of marijuana in the U.K.--a police chief looks ahead

Now that medical marijuana is legal, can legal recreational use be far behind?  The Guardian has the story.
Former Met police chief urges rethink on cannabis
Bernard Hogan-Howe says there is clear evidence to warrant review of prohibition

"He said: “We already know from the evidence around the world that where people use it for medicinal purposes, it slides into recreational. Surely it’s better that we get ready for that potential change.”

"His intervention follows the legalisation of recreational cannabis in Canada last week, its decriminalisation in Uruguay, Portugal and in several US states, and the relaxation of cannabis laws in the UK to allow the prescription of cannabis-based medicines from next month.
...
"Hogan-Howe joins a growing list of prominent figures who have cast doubt on the coherence of the UK’s approach to enforcing laws that are often ignored with impunity, given that a number of police forces have publicly said they would not prosecute perpetrators of low-level cannabis offences."

Monday, November 5, 2018

The case for compensating Australian plasma donors, by Bob Slonim

Here's Bob Slonim, explaining the current situation in Australia, of unpaid Australian plasma donors, and big imports of plasma products from countries in which donors are paid:

How Australia can fix the market for plasma and save millions

"The National Blood Authority’s 2016-2017 annual report indicates Australian imports of immunoglobulin, a plasma component, provide 44% of domestic demand. This costs A$120 million while the remaining 56% comes from domestic supply costing A$413 million.

"This implies the domestic supply of immunoglobulin costs over three times more per unit than what is imported, despite domestic donors not being compensated."

Sunday, November 4, 2018

Waze carpool--launched nationwide

At the NBER market design conference, Michael Schwarz spoke of market design with his practioner hat on (he's Microsoft's chief economist, and former chief scientist at Waze when he worked for Google). He points out the importance of reducing transaction costs, because "enormous [potential] markets may consist of tiny transactions."

Speaking of which, he points out that Waze carpool went live throughout the U.S. last month.

Here's a story: Waze launches carpool service across the U.S.

"Carpooling isn’t just a smart way to cut down on weekly expenditures. It’s also good for the planet: Sharing a car with coworkers, friends, or neighbors keeps 1,600 pounds of greenhouse gas out of the air each year. And if 100 people were to take advantage of a carpool every day, it’d eliminate 1,320 pounds of carbon monoxide and a whopping 2,376,000 pounds of carbon dioxide.

That’s one of the reasons Google-owned navigation platform Waze hopes to lower the barrier to entry. Starting today, it’s launching Waze Carpool, a ridesharing platform it hopes will one day eliminate traffic congestion — and by extension pollution — across the U.S. in all 50 states. The rollout follows successful pilot tests in Israel, California, Texas, Washington, Massachusetts, Illinois, and Nevada."

Saturday, November 3, 2018

Some Portuguese press on kidney exchange and market design

When I was in Lisbon I gave two talks, and some interviews.  Here's a nice story written after both my talks:
O que tem a economia a ver com transplantes de rins? Tudo [What Does The Economy Have To Do With Kidney Transplants? Everything.]
by SÓNIA M. LOURENÇO (whose sister once took my experimental economics class at Harvard)



Here's a story that followed the first talk, which was part of an honorary degree ceremony.
A ciência económica ao serviço do amor, saúde e felicidade
by Sandra Maximiano
[G translate: Economic science at the service of love, health and happiness]
Here's a video and some photos of the whole event...


And I gave a tv interview in which the interviewer wished to ignore my pre-interview insistence to talk about game theory and market design and the conference in Portugal as opposed to the recession and recovery, and Italy...(but we reached a sort of compromise...)*

Nobel da Economia em entrevista à TVI critica populismos e alerta para mais migração
Alvin Roth referiu ainda que o fenómeno do aquecimento global vai aumentar a migração.
[G translate: Nobel la Economía in interview with TVI criticizes populism and alert for more migration
Alvin Roth also noted that the phenomenon of global warming will increase migration.]
*************

Friday, November 2, 2018

Private equity job offers to young investment bankers unravel earlier this year, while investment banks try to stem their own unraveling

Two stories from the WSJ about unraveling, at different parts of the financial industry.

1. The WSJ has publishes this year's unraveling story earlier than last year's...

No Experience? No Problem. Private Equity Lures Newbie Bankers With $300,000 Offers.
Annual recruitment drive starts earlier this year as firms try to get a jump on preferred candidates

"An industrywide scramble is under way this week to hire young investment bankers.

"The instigator was Thoma Bravo LLC, which extended its first job offers this past weekend, according to people familiar with the matter. Word spread quickly to rivals, and by Monday interviews were under way at nearly every big firm, including Blackstone Group LP, Apollo Global Management LLC, Carlyle Group LP and TPG.

"Welcome to private equity’s annual recruitment, the frenzied window of interviews and fast-expiring job offers that firms use to fill their junior ranks. The candidates graduated college as recently as last spring and landed at Wall Street investment-banking desks just weeks ago.

"Those lucky enough to get offers will finish their two-year bank analyst programs and start at private-equity firms in the summer of 2020...
...
"Recruiting used to take place during the summer, once applicants had at least a year of experience under their belts. But it has crept earlier as firms try to get a jump on preferred candidates. In 2014, interviews began in February. Last year, recruiting started before Christmas. Applicants describe a frantic period of interviews and “exploding” offers that can expire in 24 hours or less.
**********

2. The investment banks also hire very early in students' college careers, and here's a story about an attempt to resist that urge (good luck with that):

 Goldman, JPMorgan Hit Pause on Intern Recruiting ‘Madness’
A push in recent years to move up application deadlines isn’t bringing in the kinds of candidates the banks need

"Two Wall Street investment banks are easing up in the race to hire their most junior employees.

"Goldman Sachs Group Inc.  and JPMorgan Chase & Co. won’t interview or extend summer internship offers to college sophomores this year and will go back to recruiting students in the fall of their junior year, executives said.

"It is a nod to a softer Wall Street, eager to cast off its sweatbox image to compete with perk-happy Silicon Valley. It is also an acknowledgment that a push in recent years to move up application deadlines isn’t bringing in the kinds of candidates banks need as they try to diversify their overwhelmingly white and male ranks.

“We were contributing to an environment that pressured students to choose rather than to explore,” said Dane Holmes, Goldman’s top human-resources executive. “I want people who want to be at Goldman Sachs, not people who felt they had to say yes to an offer.”

Thursday, November 1, 2018

Harvard admissions on trial--dualing economist expert witnesses, interesting details

The Chronicle of Higher Ed has the story:
Dueling Economists: Rival Analyses of Harvard’s Admissions Process Emerge at Trial
There are many strands to this story (and it seems to be ungated), but here I'll just note a few interesting admissions stats.

"Of the 37,000 applicants for admission to the Class of 2019, for instance, 8,200 had perfect grade-point averages, and more than 2,700 had perfect scores on the verbal section of the SAT. But Harvard had only about 1,700 spots to offer. Even if the university wished to consider only grades and test scores, it would be hard-pressed to select a freshman class using those variables alone.
...
"The two economists’ analyses vary in several ways. Perhaps most significant, their respective models include different kinds of applicants. Arcidiacono excludes recruited athletes, the children of alumni, the children of Harvard faculty and staff members, and students on a special list that includes children of donors.

"Card includes them. Though the total number of students who fit those descriptions represents a small fraction of the applicant pool (5 percent), they account for a large proportion of accepted students (29 percent).

Wednesday, October 31, 2018

EconTrack: The AEA's Job Market Information Board

The AEA has launched a job market information board, which will collect information about the progress of interviews and flyouts for (I imagine) jobs that advertise in the JOE.

Here it is:  EconTrack: The AEA's Job Market Information Board, and the headings for the information they hope to track as the job market develops are these:

Institution, Job Title, Fields, Application Deadline, Interviewing at ASSA?, Interview Invitations Issued, Campus Visits Issued, List of Campus Invitees...

Tuesday, October 30, 2018

The (hot) job market for "Digitization Economists"

HBS interviews Mike Luca on the market for new economists (and his recent paper with Susan Athey):
Hunting for a Hot Job in High Tech? Try 'Digitization Economist'

"Some 50 tech companies “have been snapping up economists at a remarkable scale,” says Michael Luca, the Lee J. Styslinger III Associate Professor of Business Administration at Harvard Business School. “All of the big Bay Area tech companies have teams of economists, and lots of the smaller companies are starting to hire handfuls of them.” The list includes Google, Microsoft, Airbnb, Uber, Facebook, and numerous smaller companies.

"Tech companies are turning to sharp economic minds to provide their unique lens on business problems like advertising auctions and market design. The accelerating phenomenon has given rise to a new field within economics called the economics of digitization. Research from the field is quickly finding its way into practice, directly through the work of PhD economists, and in the classroom, as HBS and other business schools add more tech-germane courses to their MBA offerings."

Monday, October 29, 2018

Market design and development economics at Harvard

There's a two day conference at Harvard, called
Development Economics and Market Design 

Organizers: Scott Kominers, Natalia Rigol, Ben Roth, Alexander Teytelboym

 Program:
OCTOBER 28, 2018
9:00 to 9:15  Opening Remarks
9:15 to 10:15  Ride Sharing
Abhijit Banerjee MIT
Discussants
Elizabeth Mishkin Harvard University
10:15 to 10:30  Break
10:30 to 11:30  Credit/Targeting
Dilip Mookherjee Boston University
Sujata Visaria Hong Kong University of Science and Technology
11:30 to 11:45  Break
11:45 to 12:45 Fisheries
Jonathan Colmer University of Virginia
Discussants
Daniel Marszalec University of Tokyo
12:45 to 1:45 Lunch
1:45 to 2:45 Localized Markets/Information
Terence Johnson University of Notre Dame
Discussants
Vivek Bhattacharya Northwestern University
2:45 to 3:00 Break
3:00 to 4:00 Mobile Money
Tavneet Suri MIT
Discussants
Ran Shorrer Penn State University
4:00 to 4:15 Break
4:15 to 5:15 Development Medicine
Michael Kremer Harvard University
Christopher Snyder Dartmouth College
Discussants
Scott Kominers Harvard Business School
5:15 to 5:30 Open Discussion & Day 1 Closing Remarks

OCTOBER 29, 2018
9:00 to 10:00 Deforestation
Seema Jayachandran Northwestern University
Discussants
Alexander Teytelboym Department of Economics, University of Oxford
10:00 to 10:15 Break
10:15 to 11:15 Advice to Farmers
Shawn Cole Harvard University
Discussants
Shengwu Li Harvard University
11:15 to 11:30 Break
11:30 to 12:30 Labor Markets
Simon Quinn University of Oxford
Discussants
Eva Meyersson Milgrom Stanford University
12:30 to 1:30 Lunch
1:30 to 2:30 Coffee Commodity Markets
Ashok Rai Williams College
2:30 to 3:00
Discussion & Closing Remarks

Sunday, October 28, 2018

Repugnance watch: Blasphemy no longer unconstitutional in Ireland, as of yesterday

Here's the story in The Guardian:
Ireland votes to oust ‘medieval’ blasphemy law
Decision is latest in ‘quiet revolution’ of seismic social and political changes in the country

"Campaigners in Ireland celebrated the end of a “medieval” ban on blasphemy on Saturday, after voters overwhelmingly supported a referendum to remove the offence from the constitution.

"Almost 65% of voters supported the move – a total of 951,650 people – with just over 35% (515,808) in favour of retaining it, on a turnout of just over 43%.
...
"The government had already laid out legislation to remove the offence of blasphemy from the constitution and all relevant laws, should the referendum be passed.

"It has been more than 150 years since anyone was prosecuted for blasphemy in Ireland, but the country had passed a blasphemy law in 2009, making it the only western democracy to bring in new legislation in the 21st century."

Saturday, October 27, 2018

University of Virginia celebrates Charlie Holt

Thomas Jefferson would be proud:



"During the ceremony in the John Paul Jones Arena, held in conjunction with Family Weekend, UVA President Jim Ryan presented two Thomas Jefferson Awards – one for excellence in scholarship, to Charles A. Holt, A. Willis Robertson Professor of Political Economy in the Department of Economics and professor of public policy in the Frank Batten School of Leadership and Public Policy; and one for service to Richard M. Carpenter, patient care services manager at the UVA Medical Center. The awards are the highest given by UVA to a member of the University community."

Incentives can save lives (Washington Post op-ed with Congressman Cartwright)

The Washington Post published this week an opinion piece I coauthored with Congressman Matt Cartwright of Pennsylvania, in support of the new legislation he has proposed, H.R.6448 - Organ Donation Clarification Act of 2018.

Our piece ran under the headline
Student loan forgiveness and other incentives could save lives. Here’s how.
By Matt Cartwright and Al Roth
October 25
Matt Cartwright, a Democrat, represents Pennsylvania’s 17th District in the House. Al Roth, a professor at Stanford University, won the 2012 Nobel Prize in economics.

Here's the text as in ran in the paper:

"Every day 20 Americans will die waiting for an organ transplant, 13 of them waiting for a kidney. Hundreds of thousands will undergo painful and debilitating dialysis treatments to extend their lives in the hope that a kidney will eventually become available.
We are quickly marching in the wrong direction. As of mid-October,95,000 people remain on the kidney waiting list. Each year, approximately 17,000 patients are lucky enough to receive a transplant; however, 35,000 new patients are added annually to the national waitlist.
The average wait time for a new kidney is approaching five years , unless you have a family member or friend who can serve as your donor. During this time, your activity will be limited due to your fragile condition, and your schedule will be dictated by four-hour dialysis sessions several times a week. Because of this, 77 percent of dialysis patients are unemployed and reliant on social services.
The pain, suffering and death are overwhelming. And so is the cost: roughly 7 percent of the Medicare budget. Dialysis, on its own, costs Medicare more than $87,000 per patient per year. A kidney transplant, on the other hand, pays for itself in less than two years and saves an average of more than $745,000 in medical costs over a 10-year period, with 75 percent of those savings going to the taxpayers. If the supply of transplant kidneys could be increased to meet the demand, taxpayers would save more than $12 billion per year in medical costs.
Solving the organ and kidney waiting list issue is a true win-win: changing the lives of those suffering from kidney failure while relieving a significant burden on the American taxpayer.
Innovations in science and health-care management have undoubtedly increased donations. Last decade, groundbreaking registries and matching programs were created to allow incompatible patient-donor pairs to join a pool of other patients and donors so that each patient received a compatible kidney. The kidney-exchange model has saved thousands of lives and helped earn one of the co-authors of this article a Nobel Prize in economics.
The kidney wait list is now one and a half times the size it was in 2004, when the New England Program for Kidney Exchange began. This is partly because medical progress extending the lives of those on dialysis has failed to address the fundamental issue of organ failure. Meanwhile, innovation in our approach to transplantation has not kept pace with dramatic increases in the demand for kidneys. We are clearly in need of a new approach. Effective legislation can help solve the problem.
The Organ Donation Clarification Act, introduced by the other co-author of this article, proposes a new and innovative path toward increasing both deceased and living organ donation. The bill clarifies the definition of a “valuable consideration” — cash payments for donation, which are currently prohibited for organ donors — to eliminate misunderstandings and delays in reimbursement for valid donation-related expenses, which have hampered living organ donation. This bill also allows government-run, ethics-board-approved pilot programs to test the effectiveness of providing noncash incentives to promote organ donation.
What might such pilot programs look like? Perhaps a living donor might receive health insurance, forgiveness of student loans, a donation to a charity of choice, a contribution to retirement savings. The family of a deceased donor might get funeral benefits.
We do not know exactly what the effects of incentives would be on organ donation, which is exactly why these pilot programs are necessary. Would they help? What incentives would be most effective? What are the unforeseen circumstances? Let’s allow the scientific community to experiment, test creative solutions and see what might solve this crisis.
Public opinion firmly supports compensating organ donors. The pilot programs under the bill would ensure the noncash incentives would not come from the organ recipient and that organs would be distributed fairly, in the same manner they are now. With those parameters, more than 80 percent of people in a recent national academic study of nearly 3,000 voiced their support for a successful program of compensating organ donors.
There are many factors to consider when tackling the issue of organ donation. We must preserve dignity, avoid exploitation and be careful about incentives. We must ensure that the poor and desperate are not treated unfairly.
We can do this right, and these pilot programs will help us get answers to fix the organ shortage that costs us 20 American lives every day. We can save lives, end suffering and save billions in the process. The time to act is now."
**************

The bill is is designed to make healthcare more accessable. And it is pro-science as a way for finding out how to do this.  It is likely that it will meet with some opposition ... but it's good to know that we have representatives like Mr. Cartwright who keep trying.

Friday, October 26, 2018

Computational advances for hard matching problems

Computational complexity theory focuses on worst case examples to identify hard problems, but the good news is that the instances that arise in practice of the (potentially) hard problems identified in this way can often be solved pretty efficiently. Here are some new techniques for doing that, from Scottish researchers:

Mathematical models for stable matching problems with ties and incomplete lists
by Maxence Delorme, Sergio Garcia, Jacek Gondzio, Joerg Kalcsics, David Manlove, and William Pettersson

Abstract: We present new integer linear programming (ILP) models for N P-hard optimisation problems in instances of the Stable Marriage problem with Ties and Incomplete lists (SMTI) and its many-to-one generalisation, the Hospitals / Residents problem with Ties (HRT). These models can be used to efficiently solve these optimisation problems when applied to (i) instances derived from real-world applications, and (ii) larger instances that are randomly generated. In the case of SMTI, we consider instances arising from the pairing of children with adoptive families, where preferences are obtained from a quality measure of each possible pairing of child to family. In this case we seek a maximum weight stable matching. We present new algorithms for preprocessing instances of SMTI with ties on both sides, as well as new ILP models. Algorithms based on existing state-of-the-art models only solve 6 of our 22 real-world instances within an hour per instance, and our new models solve all 22 instances within a mean runtime of 60 seconds. For HRT, we consider instances derived from the problem of assigning junior doctors to foundation posts in Scottish hospitals. Here we seek a maximum size stable matching. We show how to extend our models for SMTI to the HRT case. For the real instances, we reduce the mean runtime from an average of 144 seconds when using state-of-the-art methods, to 3 seconds when using our new ILP based algorithms. We also show that our models outperform considerably state-of-the-art models on larger randomly-generated instances of SMTI and HRT

Thursday, October 25, 2018

Building kidney exchange in Europe

Here's a report, in the journal Transplantation (the full published paper is available at the link at bottom):

Building Kidney Exchange Programmes in Europe – An Overview of Exchange Practice and Activities
Biró, Péter1; Haase-Kromwijk, Bernadette2; Andersson, Tommy3; Ásgeirsson, Eyjólfur Ingi4; Baltesová, Tatiana5; Boletis, Ioannis6; Bolotinha, Catarina7; Bond, Gregor8; Böhmig, Georg8; Burnapp, Lisa9; Cechlárová, Katarína10; Di Ciaccio, Paola11; Fronek, Jiri12; Hadaya, Karine13; Hemke, Aline2; Jacquelinet, Christian14; Johnson, Rachel9; Kieszek, Rafal15; Kuypers, Dirk16; Leishman, Ruthanne17; Macher, Marie-Alice14; Manlove, David18; Menoudakou, Georgia19; Salonen, Mikko20; Smeulders, Bart21; Sparacino, Vito11; Spieksma, Frits16; de la Oliva Valentín Muñoz, María22; Wilson, Nic23; vd Klundert, Joris24 on behalf of the ENCKEP COST Action

Transplantation: September 21, 2018 - Volume Online First

Update: here's the published reference and link:
Biró, P., Haase-Kromwijk, B., Andersson, T., Ásgeirsson, E. I., Baltesová, T., Boletis, I., ... & van der Klundert, J. (2019). Building kidney exchange programmes in Europe—an overview of exchange practice and activities. Transplantation, 103(7), 1514.

Wednesday, October 24, 2018

Game Theory and Applications in Lisbon, October 25-27, 2018

The Lisbon Meetings in Game Theory and Applications #10. The Anniversary Edition​. October 25-27, 2018

The program is here.

I'll be speaking at noon on Friday, with a working title of
Game theory in a large world:  Market design, and the example of kidney exchange

The announcement says:
"The UECE Lisbon Meetings in Game Theory and Applications are an annual event that brings together leading scholars doing theoretical or applied research in the field of game theory.

The first edition of the conference took place in 2009 and throughout the years it has become a reference event in the field, attracting renowned academics from all over the world.

In the tenth edition of the Lisbon Meetings, we are pleased to announce four keynote lectures  by

Prof. Itzhak Gilboa (HEC, Paris-Saclay, and Tel-Aviv University)
Prof. Itay Goldstein (University of Pennsylvania)
Prof. Alvin E. Roth (Stanford University)
Prof. Larry Samuelson (Yale University)

Prof. Gilboa will present the annual lecture in honor of the preeminent game theorist Jean-François Mertens

The organizing Committee

Filomena Garcia (Indiana University, ISEG/UECE)
Luca David Opromolla (Banco de Portugal, UECE)
Joana Pais (ISEG, UECE)
Joana Resende (CE-FUP, University of Porto)"


I also plan to give a short talk at a ceremony this evening,  about markets and market design along the lines of my book Who Gets What and Why (which was translated into Portugese as Como Funcionam Os Mercados }.


Here's a news story:
Teoria dos Jogos revoluciona ciência, economia e vida em sociedade
Prémio Nobel Alvin E. Roth cruza Teoria dos Jogos e transplante de rins

Tuesday, October 23, 2018

Ethics and Welfare Conference at Penn, Oct 26-7

This conference will be the third in a series. The first was funded by the Becker-Friedman Institute at the University of Chicago in 2014, and the second was at the Harvard Business School.  Videos and papers from the previous conferences can be found at https://bfi.uchicago.edu/events/normative-ethics-and-welfare-economics and https://www.hbs.edu/faculty/conferences/2016-newe/Pages/schedule.aspx

"This conference is divided into seven main sessions, each devoted to a different normative question. In each session, both economic and philosophical perspectives will be presented, and ample time will be provided for audience discussion. The conference will close with a distinguished panel of economists and philosophers, who will discuss the themes raised by the conference."

Here's the program:

Friday, October 26, 2018
8:15-8:45      Breakfast

8:45-9:00      Opening Remarks

Benjamin Lockwood, University of Pennsylvania
Itai Sher, University of Massachusetts Amherst
9:00-10:30      Session 1: Ethics and Economics of Climate Change

Dale Jamieson, New York University
Christian Traeger, University of Oslo
Discussant: Arthur Van Benthem, University of Pennsylvania
10:30-11:00      Break

11:00-12:30      Session 2: Normative Uncertainty and Normative Diversity

Stefan Riedener, University of Zurich (Paper)
Itai Sher, University of Massachusetts Amherst (Paper)
Discussant: Christian Tarsney, University of Groningen
12:30-2:00      Lunch

2:00-3:30      Session 3: Preferences for Redistribution and Moral Psychology

Raymond Fisman, Boston University (Paper)
Fiery Cushman, Harvard University (Paper)
Discussant: Geoffrey Goodwin, University of Pennsylvania
3:30-4:00      Break

4:00-5:30      Session 4: Poverty, Inequality, and Health

Martin Ravallion, Georgetown University (Paper)
Jennifer Prah Ruger, University of Pennsylvania (Paper)
Discussant: Mark Pauly, University of Pennsylvania
5:30-6:30      Break

6:30-9:00      Conference Dinner (for speakers and discussants)

Saturday, October 27, 2018.
8:30-9:00      Breakfast

9:00-10:30      Session 5: Behavioral Welfare Economics and Paternalism

Benjamin Lockwood, University of Pennsylvania (Paper)
Erik Angner, Stockholm University
Discussant: Douglas Mackay, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
10:30-11:00      Break

11:00-12:30      Session 6: Algorithms, Data and the Public Good

Rakesh Vohra, University of Pennsylvania (Paper)
Helen Nissenbaum, Cornell University
Discussant: Daniel Singer, University of Pennsylvania
12:30-1:30      Lunch

1:30-3:00      Session 7: Happiness and Social Welfare

Kristen Cooper, Gordon College
Dan Haybron, Saint Louis University (Paper)
Discussant: Alex Rees-Jones, University of Pennsylvania
3:00-3:30      Break

3:30-5:00      Closing Panel

Ruth Chang, Rutgers University
Joel Sobel, University of California, San Diego
John Broome, University of Oxford
Steven Sheffrin, Tulane University
Moderator: Amy Sepinwall, University of Pennsylvania

Monday, October 22, 2018

Axel Ockenfels on Economic Engineering: Public Lecture in NYC tomorrow, Oct 23

Axel Ockenfels will be speaking in New York City tomorrow...

A LEIBNIZ LECTURE:
ECONOMIC ENGINEERING OF HUMAN COOPERATION AND COMPETITION

"What do climate change, shortage of organ donors, and traffic congestion have in common? They can all be addressed with behavioral economics. Join us for a lecture by Leibniz Prize recipient Professor Axel Ockenfels.

"Many economic and societal challenges can only be addressed with a change in human behavior. Market design can offer solutions because market rules affect our behavior in predictable ways. Traffic jams, for example, cost time, money and impact our health, while recent advances in technology would allow for the design of new markets for road use that promote cooperation and prevent congestion. Climate change is fundamentally a problem of insufficient cooperation that can be addressed if recognized as such and acted on accordingly in international climate negotiations.

"In his lecture, Professor Ockenfels will show how market rules can be engineered to promote cooperation and trust even in large communities and to encourage competition in small markets. Professor Ockenfels’ focus will be on human behavior in markets, which responds to market rules, but rarely in a fully rational way. He will show how market design can take on real-world challenges."

October 23 2018 | 06:30 PM until 08:00 PM

German House, 871 United Nations Plaza, New York, NY 10017,
Organizer: German Center for Research and Innovation (DWIH NY)

Market design to reduce inequality

The closing talk at the NBER market design conference was delivered by Scott Kominers, on the general theme that we may not care for fully competitive markets (and might prefer some use of price controls and rationing) for markets involving e.g. sellers who are relatively poor compared to buyers, since competition can exacerbate wealth inequality:

Redistribution through Markets
Piotr Dworczak, Scott Duke Kominers, Mohammad Akbarpour


Abstract: When macroeconomic tools fail to respond to wealth inequality optimally, regulators can still seek to mitigate inequality within individual markets. A social planner with distributional preferences might distort allocative efficiency to achieve a more desirable split of surplus, for example, by setting higher prices when sellers are poor -- effectively, using the market as a redistributive tool.

In this paper, we seek to understand how to design goods markets optimally in the presence of inequality. Using a mechanism design approach, we uncover the constrained Pareto frontier by identifying the optimal trade-off between allocative efficiency and redistribution in a setting where the second welfare theorem fails because of private information and participation constraints. We find that competitive equilibrium allocation is not always optimal. Instead, when there is substantial inequality across sides of the market, the optimal design uses a tax-like mechanism, introducing a wedge between the buyer and seller prices, and redistributing the resulting surplus to the poorer side of the market via lump-sum payments. When there is significant within-side inequality, meanwhile, it may be optimal to impose price controls even though doing so induces rationing.


Sunday, October 21, 2018

Matching with complex constraints

At the NBER market design conference yesterday, Fuhito Kojima spoke about his paper with Yuchiro Kamada on matching with 'upper bound' constraints of the kind that occur in matching children to day care in Japan.

Here's the paper:

FAIR MATCHING UNDER CONSTRAINTS: THEORY AND
APPLICATIONS by YUICHIRO KAMADA AND FUHITO KOJIMA

Abstract. This paper studies a general model of matching with constraints. Observing that a stable matching typically does not exist, we focus on feasible, individually rational, and fair matchings. We characterize such matchings by fixed points of a certain function. Building on this result, we characterize the class of constraints on individual schools under which there exists a student-optimal fair matching (SOFM), the matching that is the most preferred by every student among those satisfying the three desirable properties. We study the numerical relevance of our theory using data on governmentorganized
daycare allocation.

Saturday, October 20, 2018

Centralized Admissions for Engineering Colleges in India

Yesterday I had the opportunity to hear Yash Kanoria discuss the implementation and operation of a centralized college admissions system for engineering colleges in India.  It replaces a semi-centralized process that left some seats unfilled (when IIT and non-IIT seats were allocated to the same people).

There are some novel constraints that have to be satisfied, some of which can theoretically present intractable problems, but in practice they don't.

An appendix on history and background is a quick education in Indian education.

Below is a link to the paper, which seems to be a fine example of market design as economic engineering, which solved some important problems and has now operated successfully for several years. There are also problems (e.g. concerning vacancies in non-IITs) left to solve...:

Centralized Admissions for Engineering Colleges in India
by Surender Baswana, Partha Pratim Chakrabarti, Sharat Chandran, Yashodhan Kanoria, Utkarsh Patange

Abstract We designed and implemented a new joint seat allocation process for undergraduate admissions to over 500 programs spread across 80 technical universities in India, including the prestigious Indian Institutes of Technology (IITs). Our process is based on the well known Deferred Acceptance algorithm, but complex affirmative action seat reservations led us to make a number of algorithmic innovations, including (i) a carefully constructed heuristic for incorporating non-nested common quotas that span multiple programs, (ii) a method to utilize unfilled reserved seats with no modifications to the core software, and (iii) a robust approach to reduce variability in the number of reserved category candidates admitted, while retaining fairness. Our new seat allocation process went live in 2015, and based on its success, including significant and provable reduction in vacancies, it has remained in successful use since, with continuing improvements.