Tuesday, January 12, 2016

Centennial lecture at U of Illinois College of Business (video of lecture and of an interview)

Here (and below) is the video of the public lecture I gave in October, and an accompanying interview, as part of the Centennial celebration at the University of Illinois College of Business, where I had my first academic job in 1974.



Monday, January 11, 2016

Matching: Theory and Applications, special issue dedicated to Marilda Sotomayor in honor of her 70th birthday

Here's the set of papers in honor of Marilda Sotomayor in the Journal of Dynamics and Games (JDG)
Volume 2,Number 3/4,     July/October 2015
1
Alberto Adrego Pinto and Michel Benaïm
 Abstract       Full Text      Related Articles
2
Danilo Coelho and David Pérez-Castrillo
 Abstract       References       Full Text      Related Articles
3
David Cantala and Juan Sebastián Pereyra
 Abstract       References       Full Text      Related Articles
4
A survey on assignment markets    Pages : 227 - 256
Marina Núñez and Carles Rafels
 Abstract       References       Full Text      Related Articles
5
Bettina Klaus and Frédéric Payot
 Abstract       References       Full Text      Related Articles
6
Eliana Pepa Risma
 Abstract       References       Full Text      Related Articles
7
Renato Soeiro,  Abdelrahim Mousa and Alberto A. Pinto
 Abstract       References       Full Text      Related Articles
8
Fuhito Kojima
 Abstract       References       Full Text      Related Articles
9
Alvin E. Roth
 Abstract       References       Full Text      Related Articles
10
Tone Arnold and Myrna Wooders
 Abstract       References       Full Text      Related Articles
11
William Thomson
 Abstract       References       Full Text      Related Articles

Sunday, January 10, 2016

Who Gets What and Why? Roth at Rotman (video snippet)

Here's  4 minutes (edited and patched together) of snippets from an event at the Rotman School at the University of Toronto, where I spoke about my book Who Gets What and Why, and was interviewed by Joshua Gans, who suggests that market designers might be more arrogant even than other economists. (This snippet also captures me talking about my friend and collaborator Elliott Peranson, whose firm National Matching Services is headquartered in Toronto...and about the Iron Law of Marriage:)

Saturday, January 9, 2016

Coming soon in German: Wer kriegt was - und warum? Bildung, Jobs und Partnerwahl: Wie Märkte funktionieren

The German translation of my book, Who Gets What -- and Why? is coming out in March.


 The subtitle of the book changes with each translation.  In the U.S. edition, the subtitle is The New Economics of Matchmaking and Market Design.

In the U.K. edition it is The Hidden World of Matchmaking and Market Design.
Google translate renders the German subtitle , Bildung, Jobs und Partnerwahl: Wie Märkte funktionieren, as "Education, Jobs and mate selection: Markets Work"

Friday, January 8, 2016

Baby booms and marriage squeezes

What is the consequence of a baby boom on marriage prospects, in societies in which husbands are customarily a few years older than their wives?  It's a 'marriage squeeze'. Here's a recent interesting article from Time, focusing on  marriages among observant Mormons and Jews (to others of the same religion, that is...), and, among Jews, the slightly different marriage patterns amongYeshivish Orthodox and Hasidic Jews (apparently Hasidic husbands and wives are often the same age).

What Two Religions Tell Us About the Modern Dating Crisis by Jon Birger
"The imbalance in the Orthodox marriage market boils down to a demographic quirk: The Orthodox community has an extremely high birth rate, and a high birth rate means there will be more 18-year-olds than 19-year-olds, more 19-year-olds than 20-year-olds, and so on and so on. Couple the increasing number of children born every year with the traditional age gap at marriage—the typical marriage age for Orthodox Jews is 19 for women and 22 for men, according to Michael Salamon, a psychologist who works with the Orthodox community and wrote a book on the Shidduch Crisis—and you wind up with a marriage market with more 19-year-old women than 22-year-old men.

"There is no U.S. Census data on religion. But Joshua Comenetz, chief of the Census Bureau’s Geographic Studies Branch, studied the demographics of Orthodox Jews back in his college professor days at University of Florida. Based on his academic research, Comenetz contended that each one-year age cohort in the Orthodox community has 4 percent more members than the one preceding it. What this means is that for every 100 22-year-old men in the Orthodox dating pool, there are 112 19-year-old women—12 percent more women than men."
...

"Both Yeshivish and Hasidic Jews are extremely pious and socially conservative. They live in tight-knit communities. They are known for having large families. And both groups use matchmakers to pair their young people for marriage.

"There is, however, one major cultural difference between the two groups: Hasidic men marry women their own age, whereas Yeshivish men typically marry women a three or four years their junior.

“In the Hasidic world, it would be very weird for a man to marry a woman two years younger than him,” said Alexander Rapaport, a Hasidic father of six and the executive director of Masbia, a kosher soup kitchen in Brooklyn. Both Rapaport and his wife were 36 when I interviewed him.

When I asked Rapaport about the Shidduch Crisis, he seemed perplexed. “I’ve heard of it,” he said, “but I’m not sure I understand what it’s all about.”

In fact, there is no Shidduch Crisis in the Hasidic community. “When I mention the term to Hasidim, they don’t know what I’m talking about,” said Samuel Heilman, a professor of sociology and Jewish studies at City University of New York and an expert on Hasidic Jews."
**************

Here's an earlier post on the shidduchim crisis:

When assortative matching on age can interfere with matching


and here's a link to an earlier article by Mr Birger:

Unequal Gender Ratios at Colleges Are Driving Hookup Culture



HT: Scott Kominers

Thursday, January 7, 2016

School Vouchers and Student Achievement: some sobering news from Abdulkadiroglu, Pathak, and Walters


School Vouchers and Student Achievement: First-Year Evidence from the Louisiana Scholarship Program

Atila AbdulkadirogluParag A. PathakChristopher R. Walters

NBER Working Paper No. 21839
Issued in December 2015
NBER Program(s):   ED   LS   PE 
We evaluate the Louisiana Scholarship Program (LSP), a prominent school voucher plan. The LSP provides public funds for disadvantaged students at low-performing Louisiana public schools to attend private schools of their choice. LSP vouchers are allocated by random lottery at schools with more eligible applicants than available seats. We estimate causal effects of voucher receipt by comparing outcomes for lottery winners and losers in the first year after the program expanded statewide. This comparison reveals that LSP participation substantially reduces academic achievement. Attendance at an LSP-eligible private school lowers math scores by 0.4 standard deviations and increases the likelihood of a failing score by 50 percent. Voucher effects for reading, science and social studies are also negative and large. The negative impacts of vouchers are consistent across income groups, geographic areas, and private school characteristics, and are larger for younger children. These effects are not explained by the quality of fallback public schools for LSP applicants: students lotteried out of the program attend public schools with scores below the Louisiana average. Survey data show that LSP-eligible private schools experience rapid enrollment declines prior to entering the program, indicating that the LSP may attract private schools struggling to maintain enrollment. These results suggest caution in the design of voucher systems aimed at expanding school choice for disadvantaged students.

Wednesday, January 6, 2016

Microeconomic Insights: a new website for economists

I've just added this new website to my newsfeed:
Microeconomic Insights: distilling research for public debate

Ariel Pakes writes:
"We are starting a new website entitled Microeconomic Insights.  We intend it to be a home for accessible summaries of high quality microeconomic research which informs the public about microeconomic issues relevant to the public debate.  Its goal is to bridge the gap between academic research and the public’s knowledge, thereby informing the public’s conversation on microeconomic issues. Microeconomic Insights’ intellectual content will be determined by an editorial board whose sole goal is to disseminate the insights from the very best research in microeconomics, irrespective of its political or ideological viewpoint.  ... The editors will work with the authors of the selected papers – forthcoming or recently published peer-reviewed journal articles – to write short 1,500-2,000 non-technical summaries of the key insights for a public policy audience.  The preparation of the final text of these articles will be done by a team of independent editors with extensive experience of writing for the public."

Compensation for kidney donors? The comments on the Washington Post discussion are now complete...

I've updated my earlier post

The Washington Post discusses compensation for organ donors 

to reflect the subsequent discussions, below. (See the original post for whole discussion, which now seems to be complete)

Taking the opposite point of view (but arguing that we should do more to reduce financial disincentives to donating, by paying for donor expenses): Francis Delmonico and Alexander Capron December 29, Our body parts shouldn’t be for sale
Scott Sumner's headline and sub-headline also speaks for itself:   We can save lives and cut costs with one change in policy. 
Will lab-grown kidneys fix our transplant waiting lists?: Benjamin Humphreys is optimistic that they will, eventually.
It’s time to treat organ donors with the respect they deserveJosh Morrison is a kidney donor and the executive director of WaitList Zero, a nonprofit devoted to representing living donors and supporting living donation.

Scott Carney disagrees, on practical grounds (he thinks that a legal US market would foster badly regulated overseas markets): If you’re willing to buy a kidney, you’re willing to exploit the poor: Legalizing the sale of kidneys in America would lead to a booming black market everywhere else.

Nancy Scheper-Hughes, who has spoken to many black market kidney sellers, thinks that legal markets couldn't funcion much differently: The market for human organs is destroying lives We don't have "spare" kidneys. They shouldn't be up for sale.

Tuesday, January 5, 2016

Some snapshots of the ASSA meetings

Some snapshots from the ASSA meetings







Monday, January 4, 2016

Matching and market design at the ASSA meetings

Here are some matching and market design sessions that caught my eye on today's program

Jan 04, 2016 8:00 am, Hilton Union Square, Union Square 20 
Econometric Society
Advances in Matching Theory (A1)
PresidingALESSANDRO PAVAN (Northwestern University)
Matching Design with Vertically- and Horizontally-Differentiated Preferences
ALESSANDRO PAVAN (Northwestern University)
[View Abstract]
Full Substitutability in Trading Networks
SCOTT DUKE KOMINERS (Harvard University)
[View Abstract]
Matching with Externalities
MAREK PYCIA (University of California-Los Angeles)
[View Abstract]
A Note on Stability in One-to-One, Multi-Period Matching Markets
MACIEJ KOTOWSKI (Harvard University)
[View Abstract]
Stability Concepts in Matching Under Distributional Constraints
FUHITO KOJIMA (Stanford University)
[View Abstract]

Jan 04, 2016 10:15 am, Hilton Union Square, Union Square 3 & 4 
Korea-America Economic Association

Market Design Approach to School Choice (C7, D4)
PresidingJINWOO KIM (Seoul National University)
Integrating Schools for Centralized Admissions
BUMIN YENMEZ (Carnegie Mellon University)
MEHMET EKMEKCI (Boston College)
[View Abstract] [Download Preview]
Promoting School Competition Through School Choice: A Market Design Approach
JOHN WILLIAM HATFIELD (McCombs School of Business, University of Texas at Austin)
FUHITO KOJIMA (Stanford University)
YUSUKE NARITA (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
[View Abstract]
Minimal Envy Efficient Assignment Mechanisms: The Design of New Orleans OneApp
ATILA ABDULKADIROGLU (Duke University)
YEON-KOO CHE (Columbia University)
PARAG A. PATHAK (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
ALVIN E. ROTH (Stanford University)
OLIVIER TERCIEUX (Paris School of Economics)
[View Abstract]
A Robust Redesign of High School Match
SAM ILMYOUNG HWANG (University of British Columbia)
[View Abstract]
Discussants:
YOUNGWOO KOH (Hanyang University)
JINWOO KIM (Seoul National University)
YINGHUA HE (Toulouse School of Economics)
SOOHYUNG LEE (University of Maryland)


Jan 05, 2016 8:00 am, Hilton Union Square, Franciscan D 
American Economic Association

Market Design for Student Placement: Econometrics and Empirical Evidence (I2, D4)
PresidingBERNARD SALANIE (Columbia University)
Demand Analysis Using Strategic Reports: An Application to a School Choice Mechanism
NIKHIL AGARWAL (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
PAULO SOMAINI (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
[View Abstract]
Structural Estimation of a Model of School Choices: The Boston Mechanism Versus Its Alternatives
CATERINA CALSAMIGLIA (Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona)
CHAO FU (University of Wisconsin-Madison)
MAIA GÜELL (University of Edinburgh, London School of Economics, CEPR, FEDEA, and IZA)
[View Abstract]
College Choice Allocation Mechanisms: Structural Estimates and Counterfactuals
CARVALHO JOSE RAIMUNDO (Universidade Federal do Ceará)
THIERRY MAGNAC (Toulouse School of Economics)
QIZHOU XIONG (Toulouse School of Economics)
[View Abstract]
Beyond Truth-Telling: Preference Estimation with Centralized School Choice
GABRIELLE FACK (Université Paris 1 and Paris School of Economics)
JULIEN GRENET (Paris School of Economics)
YINGHUA HE (Toulouse School of Economics)
[View Abstract] [Download Preview]
Discussants:
CHRISTOPHER A. NEILSON (Princeton University)
JEREMY FOX (University of Michigan)
ALFRED GALICHON (Sciences Po Paris)
BERNARD SALANIE (Columbia University)


Jan 05, 2016 8:00 am, Hilton Union Square, Union Square 16 
Econometric Society

Topics in Industrial Organization (A1)
PresidingJOHN LAZAREV (New York University)
Estimating Consumer Substitution Patterns and Welfare Loss Under Retail Stockouts
JUNICHI SUZUKI (University of Toronto)
[View Abstract]
Research Proximity and Productivity: Long-Term Evidence From Agriculture
ALEXANDER WHALLEY (University of California-Merced)
SHAWN KANTOR (Florida State University)
[View Abstract]
Input Allocation and Downstream Market Structure: The Unintended Consequences of Congestion Management in the Airline Industry
JOHN LAZAREV (New York University)
[View Abstract]
Experiments as a Bridge from Market Design Theory to Market Design Practice: Changing the Course Allocation Mechanism at Wharton
ERIC BUDISH (University of Chicago)
[View Abstract] [Download Preview]
Measuring the Bias of Technological Change
ULRICH DORASZELSKI (University of Pennsylvania)
[View Abstract] [Download Preview]