Will satellite companies sell C-Band spectrum by auction?

Auctionomics, the auction design company founded by my colleague Paul Milgrom, has been working with satellite broadcasters Intelsat (NYSE: I), SES (Euronext Paris: SESG), Eutelsat (Euronext Paris: ETL) and Telesat (the C- Band Alliance) to auction some of the rights to their C-Band spectrum.  Here's a press release

C-Band Alliance Filing on Proposed Commercial Auction Process

and here's a Bloomberg story:
Intelsat, SES Unveil Design for Private Sale of 5G Airwaves

It appears that the proposed auction is modeled on the FCC's incentive auction that repurposed some television broadcast spectrum licenses.  See my last year's post

Wednesday, June 13, 2018

The incentive auction (for radio spectrum) in three videos

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Update: the white paper, FUEL for 5G: Flexible Use and Efficient Licensing can be found here, preceded by a cover letter to the FCC.

Market design class at Harvard taught by Scott Kominers

If you are a Harvard student, check out Scott Kominer's Fall market design class.
Here's the course outline.

Market Design

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Economics 2099 -- Harvard University -- Fall 2018 

Description:

This course explores the theory and practice of market design. Key topics include auctions, labor market matching, school choice programs, online markets, organ exchange systems, financial market design, and matching with contracts. The first half of the course will introduce market design and its technology; subsequent weeks will discuss recent papers alongside their classical antecedents.

Information on Logistics, Requirements, and Readings:

See the course syllabus (posted August 29, 2018).

Enrollment Application:

https://tinyurl.com/2099app/.

Assignment Deadlines:

A short proposal summary/plan will be due on October 17, 2018. The final proposal will be due on December 10, 2018 (the last day of Reading Period).

Schedule:

Date	Topic	Guest(s)
September 4, 2018	Introduction/Overview
September 11, 2018	The Market Designer's Toolbox
September 18, 2018	Food Supply, Scrip Systems, and Pseudo-Markets	Erica Moszkowski
September 25, 2018	School Choice
October 2, 2018	Generalized Matching	Ravi Jagadeesan
October 9, 2018	Markets for Intellectual Property
October 16, 2018	Auction Theory	Shengwu Li
October 23, 2018	The US Spectrum Incentive Auction
October 30, 2018	Organ Allocation
November 6, 2018	Finance, Cryptocurrency, and Blockchain
November 13, 2018	Inequality and Urban Issues	Edward L. Glaeser
November 20, 2018	New Horizons	Zoë Cullen, Andrey Fradkin David Parkes, Utku Ünver, Kate Vredenburgh
November 27, 2018	Refugees, Immigration, and Economic Development	Benjamin Roth
December 4, 2018	Student Talks/Course Wrap

Internal Harvard Website:

https://canvas.harvard.edu/courses/43959/.

Office Hours Calendar:

https://2099-officehours.youcanbook.me/.

Best paper award to Mohammad Akbarpour and Shengwu Li for "Credible Mechanisms"

Good news from ec18 now going on at Cornell.

The Best Paper Award goes to "Credible Mechanisms" by Mohammad Akbarpour and Shengwu Li 

Here is the paper: Credible Mechanisms

Abstract: Consider an extensive-form mechanism, run by an auctioneer who communicates sequentially and privately with agents.  Suppose the auctioneer can deviate from the rules provided that no single agent detects the deviation.  A mechanism is credible if it is incentive-compatible for the auctioneer to follow the rules. We study the optimal auctions in which only winners pay, under symmetric independent private values.The  first-price  auction  is  the  unique  credible  static  mechanism.   The  ascending auction is the unique credible strategy-proof mechanism.

And here are their websites
Mohammad Akbarpour
Shengwu Li

Workshop on Mathematical Optimization in Market Design, June 18-19

Two market design conferences to be held at Cornell next week: Here's the program for the first one.

INFORMS Workshop Mathematical Optimization 

and Market Design 2018

June 18, 2018
8:00-8:30 am Registration and Breakfast

8:30-8:45 am 
Workshop Opening 
Martin Bichler, Bob Day

8:45-9:30 am  Talk (Chair: Martin Bichler)Solving Large Incomplete-Information Extensive-Form Games, and Beating the Top Human Professionals at Heads-Up No-Limit Texas Hold'em
Tuomas Sandholm, Carnegie Mellon University

9:30-9:45 am Coffee Break 

9:45-11:15 am Session (Chair: Bob Day)
Optimization and Pricing in Non-Convex Markets

Allocation Under Stochastic Demand: A Primal-Dual Approach
Sasa Pekec, Duke University

Competitive Equilibria in Combinatorial Exchanges with Financially Constrained Buyers
Stefan Waldherr, Technical University of Munich (with Martin Bichler)

Linear Prices in Combinatorial Auctions
Bob Day, University of Connecticut

11:15-11:30 am Coffee Break 

11:30-1:00 pm Session (Chair: Ben Lubin)
Iterative Combinatorial AuctionsAn Efficient Ascending Auction for Private Valuations
Oleg Baranov, University of Colorado

Adaptive-Price Combinatorial Auctions
Sebastien Lahaie, Google (with Ben Lubin, Boston University)

Machine Learning-Based Combinatorial Auctions
Ben Lubin, Boston University (with Sven Seuken and Gianluca Brero, Zurich University)
1:00-2:00 pm Lunch Break 

2:00-3:00 pm Session (Chair: Itai Ashlagi)
Matching with Constraints and Complex Preferences

Hidden Substitutes
Scott Kominers, Harvard Business School

Clearing Matching Markets Efficiently: Informative Signals and Match Recommendations
Itai Ashlagi, Stanford University
3:00-3:10 pm Break 

3:10-4:30 pm Panel DiscussionBeyond Strategyproofness
Panel Chair: Martin Bichler, Technical Univ. of Munich 
Panelists: Eric Budish, Univ. of Chicago; Peter Cramton, Cologne Univ.; Michal Feldman, Tel-Aviv Univ.

4:30-4:40 pm Coffee Break 

4:40-5:30 pm Talk (Chair: Ben Lubin)
Markets for Road Use: Eliminating Congestion through Scheduling, Routing, and Real-time Road Pricing,
Peter Cramton, Cologne University (with R. Richard Geddes and Axel Ockenfels)

6 pm Joint Reception with ACM EC at the Gates Hall

June 19, 2018

9:00-10:30 am ACM EC Opening Session and Keynote
  
10:30-12:00 noon Session (Chair: Thayer Morrill)
Market Models and Applications

Quantity Contingent Auctions and Allocation of Airport Slots 
Michael Ball, University of Maryland

Prophet Inequalities Made Easy: Stochastic Optimization by Pricing Non-Stochastic Inputs
Michal Feldman, Tel-Aviv University

Family Ties:  Incorporating Siblings into School Choice
Thayer Morrill, NCSU

12:00-12:10 pm Break

12:10-12:55 pm Talk (Chair: Thayer Morrill)Market Design and the FCC Incentive Auction
Larry Ausubel, University of Maryland  (with Christina Aperjis and Oleg Baranov)

The incentive auction (for radio spectrum) in three videos

These come from the Edelman competition:

Video 1: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GKWs5My86fw

Video 2: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TMAfacbPZ7Q

Video 3: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IeijpJ_6u_U

Earlier post:

Saturday, April 21, 2018

FCC receives Edelman award for incentive spectrum auction

Advancing wireless communication: FCC awarded the 2018 INFORMS Edelman Award, the leading award in analytics and operations research

FCC receives Edelman award for incentive spectrum auction

Advancing wireless communication: FCC awarded the 2018 INFORMS Edelman Award, the leading award in analytics and operations research

"The FCC conducted the world’s first two-sided “Incentive Auction” to meet the exploding demand for wireless services by reclaiming valuable low-band electromagnetic spectrum from TV broadcasters. By purchasing spectrum from TV broadcasters and reselling it to wireless providers, the auction repurposed 84 MHz of TV spectrum for mobile broadband, next-generation “5-G,” and other wireless uses, raised nearly $20 billion in revenue, and contributed over $7 billion to reduce the federal deficit. In addition, operations research enabled many TV stations to remain on their original channels, saving an estimated $200 million in relocation costs.  "
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I have written quite a number of posts focusing on the incentive auction, and on the dream team led by Paul Milgrom; here's one of the first:

Monday, April 21, 2014

The FCC's upcoming incentive auction, and I propose a new adjective (Milgromesque)

Market design and artificial intelligence (AI) by Milgrom and Tadelis

Two veteran market designers reflect on how AI is entering market design, building on their recent work on the incentive spectrum auction, and on identifying problematic online sellers from text analysis of post-transaction messaging:

How Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning Can Impact Market Design

Paul R. Milgrom, Steven Tadelis

NBER Working Paper No. 24282
Issued in February 2018
NBER Program(s):Industrial Organization, Productivity, Innovation, and Entrepreneurship 

In complex environments, it is challenging to learn enough about the underlying characteristics of transactions so as to design the best institutions to efficiently generate gains from trade. In recent years, Artificial Intelligence has emerged as an important tool that allows market designers to uncover important market fundamentals, and to better predict fluctuations that can cause friction in markets. This paper offers some recent examples of how Artificial Intelligence helps market designers improve the operations of markets, and outlines directions in which it will continue to shape and influence market design.

Here's an ungated version:
How Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning Can Impact Market Design
by Paul R. Milgrom  and Steve Tadelis

Congratulations to Paul Milgrom: 2017 CME Group-MSRI Prize

The award ceremony is today:  2017 CME Group-MSRI Prize

The 12th annual CME Group-MSRI Prize in Innovative Quantitative Applications will be awarded to PAUL MILGROM, Shirley and Leonard Ely professor of Humanities and Sciences in the Department of Economics and professor, by courtesy, at both the Department of Management Science and Engineering and the Graduate School of Business at Stanford University, at a luncheon in Chicago on February 12, 2018.

The CME Group-MSRI Prize is awarded to an individual or a group to recognize originality and innovation in the use of mathematical, statistical or computational methods for the study of the behavior of markets, and more broadly of economics.

About Paul Milgrom

Paul Milgrom's primary research is directed to designing auctions for multiple unique but related items. Along with Robert Wilson, he introduced the initial design for sales of radio spectrum licenses in the United States. He has designed new auctions for Internet advertising and for procuring complex services. Research on incentives and complexity are combined to create auctions that are simple and straightforward for bidders, yet which dramatically improve resource allocation compared to traditional auction designs.

After earning his PhD at the GSB, Milgrom taught at Northwestern University and Yale before returning to Stanford. He has made well-known contributions to many areas of economics, including auctions, incentive theory, industrial economics, economic history, economics of manufacturing, economics of organizations, and game theory. His book coauthored with John Roberts, Economics, Organization and Management, opened a new area to economic research.

He is a member of the National Academy of Sciences and the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, and winner of the 2008 Nemmers Prize in Economics and the 2012 BBVA Frontiers of Knowledge award.

About the event

Prior to the lunch and award presentation, a panel discussion on Frontiers of Research in Market Design will be held with the following panelists:

• Mohammad Akbarpour, Assistant Professor of Economics, Graduate School of Business, Stanford University
• Piotr Dworczak, Assistant Professor, Department of Economics, University of Chicago
• Shengwu Li, Junior Fellow of the Society of Fellows, Department of Economics, Harvard University
• Ellen Muir, Research Fellow, School of Mathematics & Statistics, The University of Melbourne

Luncheon remarks, an appreciation of the life and work of Paul Milgrom:

• Roger Myerson, Glen A. Lloyd Distinguished Service Professor of Economics at the University of Chicago

Paul Milgrom will present at talk on A Market Process to Reallocate Radio Spectrum.

2017 CME Group-MSRI Prize Selection Committee: David Eisenbud (chair), Director, Mathematical Sciences Research Institute Lars Peter Hansen, Homer J. Livingston Distinguished Service Professor in the Departments of Economics and Statistics at the University of Chicago. 2008 CME-MSRI Prize. 2013 Nobel Prize Winner Bengt Holmström, the Paul A. Samuelson Professor of Economics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and 2013 recipient of the CME-MSRI Prize. 2016 Nobel Prize Winner. R. Preston McAfee, Chief Economist & Corp VP, Microsoft Leo Melamed, Chairman Emeritus, CME Group Roger Myerson, Glen A. Lloyd Distinguished Service Professor of Economics, University of Chicago. 2007 Nobel Prize Winner Maureen O'Hara, Robert W. Purcell Professorship of Management; and Professor of Finance, SC Johnson College of Business, Cornell University Myron Scholes, Frank E. Buck Professor of Finance, Emeritus, Stanford Graduate School of Business Hugo Sonnenschein, Charles L. Hutchinson Distinguished Service Professor Emeritus, University of Chicago Jean Tirole, Scientific Director of Industrial Economics Institute (IDEI) and Member of the Toulouse School of Economics and 2010 recipient of the CME-MSRI Prize

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Here's an earlier announcement, of this prize and some others. Paul is deservedly a prize magnet, and this year he won three notable prizes.
Paul wins CME-MSRI Prize

Update:  and here's today's story from the CME
WHY PAUL MILGROM IS AN ECONOMIST YOU SHOULD KNOW

NBER Market Design Working Group Meeting tomorrow and Saturday

The market design meeting starting tomorrow in Boston includes two "New Directions" sessions, one on Transportation and Market Design and one on Development Economics and Market Design.

Here's the program: Market Design Working Group Meeting

Michael Ostrovsky and Parag A. Pathak, Organizers

October 20-21, 2017

NBER
Feldstein Conference Room, 2nd Floor
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA

Friday, October 20
9:00 am	Haluk Ergin, University of California at Berkeley Tayfun Sönmez, Boston College Utku Unver, Boston College Efficient and Incentive Compatible Liver Exchange
9:45 am	Nikhil Agarwal, Massachusetts Institute of Technology and NBER Itai Ashlagi, Stanford University Michael A. Rees, University of Toledo Medical Center Paulo J. Somaini, Stanford University and NBER Daniel C. Waldinger, Massachusetts Institute of Technology An Empirical Framework for Sequential Assignments: The Allocation of Deceased Donor Kidneys
10:30 am	Break
11:00 am	Eric Budish, University of Chicago and NBER Robin S. Lee, Harvard University and NBER Will the Market Fix the Market? A Theory of Stock Market Competition and Innovation
11:45 am	Albert "Pete" Kyle, University of Maryland Jeongmin Lee, Washington University in St. Louis Toward a Fully Continuous Exchange
12:30 pm	Lunch
2:00 pm	Paul Milgrom, Stanford University Ilya Segal, Stanford University Deferred-Acceptance Clock Auctions and Radio Spectrum Reallocation
2:45 pm	Lawrence Ausubel, University of Maryland Christina Aperjis, Power Auctions LLC Oleg V. Baranov, University of Colorado Boulder Market Design and the FCC Incentive Auction
3:30 pm	Ulrich Doraszelski, University of Pennsylvania and NBER Katja Seim, University of Pennsylvania and NBER Michael Sinkinson, Yale University and NBER Peichun Wang, University of Pennsylvania Ownership Concentration and Strategic Supply Reduction
4:15 pm	Break
	New Directions: Transportation and Market Design
4:30 pm	Michael Ostrovsky, Stanford University and NBER Michael Schwarz, Google Research To Be Announced
5:00 pm	Peter Cramton, University of Maryland Richard Geddes, Cornell University Axel Ockenfels, University of Cologne Markets for Road Use: Eliminating Congestion through Scheduling, Routing, and Real-Time Road Pricing
5:30 pm	Juan Camilo Castillo, Stanford University Dan Knoepfle, Uber Technologies Glen Weyl, Microsoft Research Surge Pricing Solves the Wild Goose Chase (slides)
6:00 pm	Adjourn
Saturday, October 21
8:15 am	Coach Bus leaves Royal Sonesta Hotel for NBER
8:30 am	Continental Breakfast
9:00 am	Parag A. Pathak, Massachusetts Institute of Technology and NBER Peng Shi, Massachusetts Institute of Technology How Well Do Structural Demand Models Work? Counterfactual Predictions in School Choice
9:45 am	Georgy Artemov, University of Melbourne Yeon-Koo Che, Columbia University Yinghua He, Rice University Strategic `Mistakes': Implications for Market Design Research
10:30 am	Break
11:00 am	Jacob D. Leshno, Columbia University Irene Y. Lo, Columbia University The Cutoff Structure of Top Trading Cycles in School Choice
11:45 am	Esen Onur, CFTC David Reiffen, CFTC Lynn Riggs, CFTC Haoxiang Zhu, Massachusetts Institute of Technology and NBER Mechanism Selection and Trade Formation on Swap Execution Facilities: Evidence from Index CDS
12:30 pm	Lunch
2:00 pm	Constantinos Daskalakis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Christos H. Papadimitriou, University of California at Berkeley Christos Tzamos, Microsoft Research Does Information Revelation Improve Revenue?
2:45 pm	Dirk Bergemann, Yale University Tibor Heumann, HEC - Montreal Stephen Morris, Princeton University Information and Market Power
3:30 pm	Break
	New Directions: Development Economics and Market Design
4:00 pm	Jean-François Houde, Cornell University and NBER Terence R. Johnson, University of Notre Dame Molly Lipscomb, University of Virginia Laura A. Schechter, University of Wisconsin, Madison Using Market Mechanisms to Increase the Take-up of Improved Sanitation in Senegal
4:30 pm	Reshmaan N. Hussam, Yale University Natalia Rigol, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Benjamin N. Roth, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Targeting High Ability Entrepreneurs Using Community Information: Mechanism Design in the Field
5:00 pm	Yusuke Narita, Yale University Experimental Design as Market Design: Billions of Dollars Worth of Treatment Assignments
5:30 pm	Adjourn

An Invitation to Market Design by Kominers, Teytelboym and Crawford

Scott, Alex and Vince have written an introduction to what I gather is a special issue of the Oxford Review of Economic Policy devoted to market design.  It is also a concise and easy to read introduction to the field, with some guesses about where we're going.

An Invitation to Market Design
Scott Duke Kominers, Alexander Teytelboym, Vincent P. Crawford
 September 4, 2017

Abstract: Market design seeks to translate economic theory and analysis into practical solutions to real-world problems. By redesigning both the rules that guide market transactions and the infrastructure that enables those transactions to take place, market designers can address a broad range of market failures. In this paper, we illustrate the process and power of market design through three examples: the design of medical residency matching programs; a scrip system to allocate food donations to food banks; and the recent “Incentive Auction” that reallocated wireless spectrum from television broadcasters to telecoms. Our lead examples show how effective market design can encourage participation, reduce gaming, and aggregate information, in order to improve liquidity, efficiency, and equity in markets. We also discuss a number of fruitful applications of market design in other areas of economic and public policy

Scott Kominers' Market design course at Harvard

http://scottkom.com/courses/Market-Design_2017-2018/index.html

Date	Topic	Guest(s)
September 5, 2017	Introduction/Overview
September 12, 2017	The Market Designer's Toolbox
September 19, 2017	Food Supply, Scrip Systems, and Pseudo-Markets
September 26, 2017	School Choice	Parag Pathak
October 3, 2017	Signaling in Matching Markets
October 10, 2017	Internet Markets	Ben Edelman, Andrey Fradkin
October 17, 2017	Auction Theory	Shengwu Li
October 24, 2017	The US Spectrum Incentive Auction
October 31, 2017	Organ Allocation	Carmen Wang
November 7, 2017	Refugees, Immigration, and Economic Development	Ilya Vidrin
November 14, 2017	Markets for Intellectual Property
November 21, 2017	New Horizons	Ravi Jagadeesan, David Parkes, Ben Roth, Utku Ünver
November 28, 2017	Student Talks/Course Wrap

Internal Harvard Website:

https://canvas.harvard.edu/courses/29888/.

Economics and computer science of a radio spectrum reallocation in the PNAS

A PNAS article on the recent incentive auction, by its design team.

Economics and computer science of a radio spectrum reallocation
Kevin Leyton-Brown, Paul Milgrom, and Ilya Segal
 Early Edition >  doi: 10.1073/pnas.1701997114

Abstract
The recent “incentive auction” of the US Federal Communications Commission was the first auction to reallocate radio frequencies between two different kinds of uses: from broadcast television to wireless Internet access. The design challenge was not just to choose market rules to govern a fixed set of potential trades but also, to determine the broadcasters’ property rights, the goods to be exchanged, the quantities to be traded, the computational procedures, and even some of the performance objectives. An essential and unusual challenge was to make the auction simple enough for human participants while still ensuring that the computations would be tractable and capable of delivering nearly efficient outcomes.

Conflict of interest statement: P.M. led the team of consultants on behalf of Auctionomics, which was responsible for advising the Federal Communications Commission on the design of the incentive auction. K.L.-B. and I.S. were the two other members of the Auctionomics consulting team.

Paul Milgrom on the history of spectrum auctions

How obscure science led to spectrum auctions that connected the world
BY PAUL MILGROM,  04/30/17 07:00 AM EDT

"The incentive auction I helped design is an innovation building on decades of economic theory research on auctions dating back to the Nobel-prize winning work of William Vickrey and to work by my own research advisor, Robert Wilson, in the 1960s with funding from the Atomic Energy Commission. What interest did this Cold War era agency have in theoretical auctions? Well, nothing, but they were highly interested in advancing the field of game theory – a then obscure branch of mathematics used in economics that aims to understand how individuals strategize and act in competitive situations.


Over more than 30 years, Wilson, I, and others continued to advance this seemingly esoteric field, until the FCC issued its first proposed rulemaking on developing a spectrum auction that referenced our work. Together with Preston McAfee, who had independently been developing similar ideas, we worked with the FCC to design the first spectrum auction in 1994. The simultaneous multiple round auction we invented has since been used for dozens of spectrum auctions here and around the world. Collectively, these have been called the greatest auction in history, delivering more than $60 billion for the federal government since the early 1990s and enabling the robust wireless communications we enjoy today.

In 2014, the three of us received a Golden Goose Award for our work in this obscure field of social science and its unexpected application to spectrum auctions. None of us envisioned such an auction when we began our study, we were driven by a curiosity in human behavior and markets, not data flying around the country. But the auctions we designed have nonetheless helped change the way we all communicate, consume media, and do our work.

The auction that closed last month was the first of its kind, both because it was two-sided, engaging both TV broadcasters as sellers and mobile operators as buyers, bidding in a single auction, and because the choices of which TV broadcast rights to buy and how to reassign continuing broadcasters needed to respect more than a million constraints to avoid interference among uses. Designing such a complex process brought together a new generation of researchers in both economic and computer science.

When the dust had settled, we were able to repurpose channels 38-51 from broadcast TV uses to free 70 megahertz of spectrum for the growing mobile broadband sector (plus 14 megahertz for wireless microphones). This will enable continuing innovation in broadband and bring better coverage to rural communities. The auction also raised nearly $20 billion in revenue, with more than $7 billion to federal coffers to be used for debt reduction.

Our work on auction design is just one example of how research that may sound obscure or even silly has often benefited society. The Golden Goose Award was founded five years ago to celebrate stories like ours, and it has recognized colleagues of mine like Al Roth whose studies of how to make perfect marriage matches now informs medical residency assignments and kidney exchanges, among many other researchers. In each case, a small investment of federal money returned huge benefits to our nation. And all led to outcomes the researchers never would have predicted when they started."

The FCC Spectrum Incentive Auction: conference at Duke

Here's a chance to hear about one of the most exciting auctions of modern times...

The FCC Spectrum Incentive Auction: Lessons for the Future

Friday, May 12, 2017, 8:30 a.m. - 1:30 p.m.
Duke University's "Duke in DC" offices
1201 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Suite 500 | Washington, DC 20004

The FCC is concluding the most complex auction in history, the culmination of a decade-long planning process for moving spectrum from broadcast to mobile broadband uses. On the morning of May 12, The Center for Innovation Policy at Duke Law will hold a half-day conference that will identify lessons from this auction for spectrum policy, government disposition of assets (whether of spectrum or other resources), and the future of innovation policy generally. The conference will be at Duke in DC, 1201 Pennsylvania Ave., NW, Suite 500, Washington, DC. The program is free and open to the public; due to limited space, registration is required (see the link below).

Speakers include: Lawrence Ausubel, Univ. of Maryland, Power Auctions; Jonathan Chaplin, New Street Research; Paul de Sa, Quadra Partners; Gary Epstein, FCC; Karla Hoffman, George Mason Univ.; Allan Ingraham, Economists Inc.; Edward Lazarus, Tribune Media; Michael Ostrovsky, Stanford Graduate School of Business; Preston Padden, Boulder Thinking; Charla Rath, Verizon; Dorothy Robyn, former Commissioner at GSA; Gregory Rosston, Stanford Univ.; David Salant, Auction Technologies; Steve Sharkey, T-Mobile; and Ilya Segal, Stanford Univ.

PRELIMINARY AGENDA

8:30 AM	Introduction
8:35 AM	Auction Design
9:45 AM	Auction Implementation
11:15 AM	Auction Participation and Future Directions
12:30 PM	Adjourn