Econometric Society Summer School in Dynamic Structural Econometrics: Market Design

Market design isn't just about game theory these days:

Econometric Society Summer School in Dynamic Structural Econometrics: Market Design, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, August 15-20, 2022

Lecturers of the summer school and invited conference speakers include:

Nikhil Agarwal, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Irene Lo, Stanford University

Victoria Marone, University of Texas at Austin

Robert A. Miller, Carnegie Mellon University

Whitney Newey, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Advisory board: 

Ariel Pakes, Harvard University

Parag Pathak, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Paulo Somaini, Stanford Graduate School of Business

Daniel Waldinger, New York University

2022 organizers: 

Nikhil Agarwal, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Whitney Newey, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Update on those Four Harvard students on the economics job market this year (2012-13)

Back in November I blogged about Nikhil Agarwal, Stephanie Hurder, Scott Kominers, and  Johanna Mollerstrom   who were on the market, as well as Alex Peysakhovich who decided early to take a postdoc at Yale.

Well, they all got jobs.

Nikhil Agarwal will go to the Economics department at MIT.

Stephanie Hurder will go to the Economics department at Michigan.

Scott Kominers will return to Harvard as a junior fellow.

Johanna Mollerstrom will go to the Economics department at George Mason.

Congratulations to all!

The ASSA / AEA meetings, preliminary program

This year's ASSA preliminary program is now online:  https://www.aeaweb.org/conference/2018/preliminary 
The AEA sessions were organized by President Elect Olivier Blanchard (and his program committee).  David Laibson will give the Ely lecture.

Here are two sessions that caught my eye from just the first page (of 11).

Thursday, Jan. 4, 2018   5:30 PM - 7:00 PM
 Marriott Philadelphia Downtown, Grand Ballroom Salon H
 Econometric Society Presidential Address

Drew Fudenberg, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 

Inner Workings of Organ Markets and Organ Allocation

Paper Session

• Chair: Eric Budish, University of Chicago

The Inner Workings of Kidney Exchange Markets

Nikhil Agarwal

,

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Itai Ashlagi

,

Stanford University

Eduardo Azevedo

,

University of Pennsylvania

Clayton Featherstone

,

University of Pennsylvania

Omer Karaduman

,

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Abstract

The market for kidney exchange was created to address the shortage of kidneys for donations. The market allows patients with a willing but incompatible live donor to swap donors, so that they can perform transplants, and has grown to about 800 transplants per year. This paper uses detailed administrative data to describe the functioning of this market. The most striking finding is that the market is fragmented into dozens of small platforms instead of working in a single large platform, with most transactions happening in platforms that operate within a single transplant center. This may lead to substantial inefficiency if there are increasing returns to scale to matching patients in a large, thick market.

A Regulated Market for Kidneys

Mohammad Akbarpour

,

Stanford University

Abstract

The persistent shortage of kidneys for transplantation is a global problem for end-stage renal disease (ESRD) patients. Many countries have tried to address this issue by increasing deceased donation, by introducing kidney exchange programs, and by optimizing the allocation algorithms. Despite such efforts, the problem of shortage is growing in most countries, with more than 100,000 people waiting for a kidney transplant only in the U.S. Iran is the only country in the world that has introduced a different program of living unrelated renal donation, which includes two kinds of monetary compensation of donors: a "gift for altruism" from the government to donors, as well as an additional compensation from the patients themselves. We will discuss the impacts of this program on waiting times, organ shortage, and its equilibrium effects on other kinds of live donation.

Strategic Behavior in the Kidney Waitlist

Nikhil Agarwal

,

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Itai Ashlagi

,

Stanford University

Paulo J. Somaini

,

Stanford University

Abstract

A transplant can improve a patient's life while saving several hundred thousands of dollars of healthcare expenditures. Organs from deceased donors, like many other common pool resources (e.g. public housing, child-care slots, publicly funded long-term care), are rationed via a waitlist. The efficiency and equity properties of design choices such as penalties for refusing offers or object-type specific lists are not well understood and depend on agent preferences. This paper establishes an empirical framework for analyzing the trade-offs involved in waitlist design and applies it to study the allocation of deceased donor kidneys. We model the decision to accept an offer from a waiting list as an optimal stopping problem and use it to estimate the value of accepting various kidneys. Our estimated values for various kidneys is highly correlated with predicted patient outcomes as measured by life-years from transplantation (LYFT). While some types of donors are preferable for all patients (e.g. young donors), there is substantial heterogeneity in willingness to wait for good donors and also substantial match-specific heterogeneity in values (due to biological similarity). We find that the high willingness to wait for good donors without considering the effects of these decisions on others results in agents being too selective relative to socially optimal. This suggests that mild penalties for refusal (e.g. loss in priority) may improve efficiency. Similarly, the heterogeneity in willingness to wait for young, healthy donors suggests that separate queues by donor quality may increase efficiency by inducing sorting without significantly hurting assignments based on match-specific payoffs.

Discussant(s)

Utku Unver, Boston College

Glen Weyl, Microsoft Research

Benjamin R. Handel, University of California-Berkeley

The 1% Steps for Health Care Reform Project (including kidney exchange)

 The goal of the 1% Steps for Health Care Reform Project is to shift the way we think about health care spending in the US and offer a roadmap to policy makers of tangible steps we as a country can take to lower the cost of health care in the US. We want to leverage leading scholars’ work to identify discrete problems in the US health system and offer evidence-based steps for reform. We will continually update the project with new proposals that are based on the latest academic research.

Here is their full list of Policy Briefs.

Here's one on kidney exchange:

Expanding Kidney Exchange

Authors: Nikhil Agarwal, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Itai Ashlagi, Stanford University; Michael Rees, The University of Toledo Medical Center; Alvin Roth, Stanford University

Here's one paragraph:

"Policy Proposal: This brief discusses three specific proposals for expanding kidney exchange. First, policy makers should eliminate financial disincentives for participating in kidney exchange platforms by including medical and administrative costs specific to kidney exchange in reimbursements from the Medicare program. Second, policy makers should direct the federal contractor UNOS (United Network for Organ Sharing) to allow kidney exchange chains to be initiated by deceased donors. Third, Medicare should pay for the costs of a global kidney exchange that allows exchanges involving patients in different nations."

And here's some discussion by Nikhil Agarwal with Zack Cooper:

A landmark market design paper, on school choice in NYC, by Abdulkadiroglu, Agarwal, and Pathak

When market design was young, it was a game played by game theorists.  As it matured, and we wanted market designs be adopted, implemented, and maintained, it became a kind of economic engineering. But for market design to become a fully mature part of economics, not only must designs move into practice, and be monitored and maintained, they must also be evaluated.*

So I find myself thinking again about this paper from the December AER that I already blogged about:

Abdulkadiroglu, Atila, Nikhil Agarwal, and Parag A. Pathak, “The WelfareEffects of Coordinated Assignment: Evidence from the New York City High SchoolMatch,”American Economic Review, 107(12), December 2017, 3635–3689.

I think of it as the third of three papers: the first two were about the engineering aspects of the NYC high school match, the first school choice design of its kind:

Abdulkadiroglu, Atila , Parag A. Pathak, and Alvin E. Roth, "The New York City High School Match," American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, 95,2, May, 2005, 364-367.

and

Abdulkadiroglu, Atila , Parag A. Pathak, and Alvin E. Roth, "Strategy-proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the NYC High School Match,'' American Economic Review, 99, 5, Dec. 2009, pp1954-1978. 

Now, in this third paper, two of the original designers (Abdulkadiroglu and Pathak) together with one of the new generation of market design investigators  (Agarwal) evaluate the impact on students of the current centralized school choice system (it uses a deferred acceptance algorithm) in comparison to the decentralized ("uncoordinated") system it replaced.  

The new system produces a stable matching, which good evidence suggests is helpful in keeping the system healthy in the long term in a school system like NYC, in which the school principals are also strategic players.  But aside from being long lasting, how good is the system for students?

Using the (ordinal) rank order lists submitted by students in the new system, the paper measures welfare by estimating a cardinal random  utility model, with (cardinal) tradeoffs among school attributes being measured in terms of the additional distance a student is willing to travel to be at a more preferred school.

The uncoordinated system suffered from congestion, with many students having to be placed administratively in a school for which they had expressed no preference.  They find that these schools were by and large significantly less desirable.

They find that the new system improves welfare over the old by 80% of the gains that could be achieved by a utility-maximizing allocation made independent of other constraints. They further find that changes in the algorithm (e.g. choosing a different stable matching, among the multiple that arise from random tie-breaking) would have very little effect on welfare.

The biggest difference is that under the old system, only about half the students were placed in the "main round" (now occupied by the deferred acceptance algorithm), whereas in the new system this number immediately climbed to over 80% (with some additional subsequent gains). So students who used to be administratively assigned are now largely assigned instead to a school over which they have expressed a preference. That turns out to be very good for them.

Market design is coming of age...
###########

* Of course, not all steps in the market design process have to be accomplished by the same individuals, but in this case that's an extra plus.  And of course other  school choice markets have been investigated by these and other investigators, but in most cases those markets were not designed by economists, so that's another extra bonus here too, especially since features of the design (which encourage truthful reporting of preferences) add to the ability to estimate welfare gains. 

Tuneups for kidney exchange by Agarwal, Aslahi, Azevedo, Featherstone and Karaduman

From the May 2018, first issue of the AEA (not R) Papers and Proceedings:
What Matters for the Productivity of Kidney Exchange?
Nikhil Agarwal
Itai Ashlagi
Eduardo Azevedo
Clayton Featherstone
Ömer Karaduman

Download Full Text PDF 

Abstract

Kidney exchange platforms serve patients who need a kidney transplant and who have a willing, but incompatible, donor. These platforms match patients and donors to produce transplants. This paper documents operational details of the three largest platforms in the United States. It then uses the framework developed in Agarwal et al. (2017) to examine how practical details influence platform productivity. The results show that reducing frictions in accepting proposed matches, frequent matching, and encouraging altruistic donors are important ways in which a platform can increase its productivity.

The welfare effects of centralized school choice in NYC, by Abdulkadiroglu, Agarwal and Pathak in the AER

The Abdulkadiroglu, Agarwal and Pathak paper on the effects of school choice in NYC has now come out in the December 2017 AER ( 107(12): 3635–3689).

They find substantial welfare effects in moving from NYC's old decentralized high school choice system (in which individual schools made uncoordinated acceptance decisions, so some students received multiple offers while others got none) to the stable matching system (using the deferred acceptance algorithm with single tie-breaking) now used. They don't find big gains from trying to reach a student optimal stable matching by revising the tie-breaking decisions.

The Welfare Effects of Coordinated Assignment:Evidence from the New York City High School Match
By Atila Abdulkadiroglu, Nikhil Agarwal, and Parag A. Pathak

"Coordinated  single-offer  school  assignment  systems  are  a  popular  education  reform.  We  show  that  uncoordinated  offers  in  NYC’s  school  assignment  mechanism  generated  mismatches.  One-third  of  applicants were unassigned after the main round and later administratively placed at less desirable schools. We evaluate the effects of the new coordinated mechanism based on deferred acceptance using estimated student preferences. The new mechanism achieves 80 per-cent of the possible gains from a no-choice neighborhood extreme to a utilitarian benchmark. Coordinating offers dominates the effects of further algorithm modifications. Students most likely to be previously administratively  assigned  experienced  the  largest  gains  in  welfare  and subsequent achievement."


Here's the ungated working paper

Topics in Market Design: Econ 287/365: Winter quarter, Itai Ashlagi

Itai Ashlagi will be teaching Econ 287 this quarter, on topics in market design.  It's highly recommended.

He writes that the syllabus below is very tentative, and will depend in part on how many of the enrolled students took Econ 285 (Ostrovsky and Roth) in the Fall (back in 2023:-)

Topics in Market Design 2024, Itai Ashlagi

Market design is a field that links the rules of the of the marketplace to understand frictions, externalities and more generally economic outcomes. The course will provide theoretical foundations on assignment and matching mechanisms as well as mechanism design. There will be emphasis on theories at the intersection of economics, CS and operations as well as applications that arise in labor markets, organ allocation, platforms.

The class will further expose students to timely market design challenges and will we will host a few guest lectures. The class offers an opportunity to begin a research project. Students will reading critique papers, present papers and write a final paper.

Lectures: Monday 10:30am-1:20pm Shriram 052

Course requirements: (i) reading and writing critiques about papers, (ii), presenting papers in class, and (iii) a term paper.

Instructor: Itai Ashlagi. iashlagi@stanford.edu

Some potential papers for presenting:

Equity and Efficiency in Dynamic Matching: Extreme Waitlist Policies, Nikzad and Strack.

Eliminating Waste in Cadaveric Organ Allocation, Shi and Yin

Pick-an-object mechanisms, Bo and Hakimov

Monopoly without a monopolist, Huberman, Leshno and Moallemi

The College Portfolio Problem, Ali and Shorrer

Equal Pay for Similar Work, Passaro, Kojima, and Pakzad-Hurson

Auctions with Withdrawal Rights: A Foundation for Uniform Price, Haberman and Jagadessan.

Optimal matchmaking strategy in two-sided marketplaces, Shi

Practical algorithms and experimentally validated incentives for equilibrium-based fair division (ACEEI),

Budish, Gao, Othman, Rubinstein

Congestion pricing, carpooling, and commuter welfare, Ostrovsky and Schwarz

Artificial intelligence and auction design, Banchio and Skrzypacz

Selling to a no-regret buyer, Braverman et al.

Dynamic matching in overloaded waiting lists, Leshno

The regulation of queue size by levying tolls, Naor

Optimal search for the best alternative, Weitzman

Whether or not to open Pandora’s box, Doval

Descending price optimally coordinates search, Kleinberg, Waggoner, Weyl

Market Failure in Kidney Exchange? Nikhil Agarwal, Itai Ashlagi, Eduardo Azevedo, Clayton Featherstone and Omer Karaduman

Choice Screen Auctions, Michael Ostrovsky

Incentive Compatibility of Large Centralized Matching Markets, Lee

Tentative schedule:

Week 1: Two-sided matching, stability and large markets.

Week 2: One-sided matching, duality, optimization and constraints.

Week 3: Multi-item auctions, auction design, revenue equivalence, optimal auctions, interdependent

valuations.

Week 4: Congestion, dynamic matching.

Week 5: Waitlists, search and learning.

Week 6: Foundations of mechanism design.

Week 7: Robustness in implementation

Weeks 8-10: Projects

We will host several guest lectures. Presentations of papers will take place throughout the course.

Background references

1. List of (mostly applied) papers are given in a separate document.

2. Books

Roth, Alvin E.and Marilda A. Oliveira Sotomayor, Two-sided matching: A study in game-theoretic modeling and analysis. No. 18. Cambridge University Press, 1992.

Vijay Krishna, Auction Theory, 2010.

Tilman Borgers, An Introduction to Mechanism Design by Tilman Borgers.

Milgrom, Paul, Putting Auction Theory to Work, 2004.

3. Papers

(a) Introduction

Roth, Alvin E. The Economist as Engineer: Game Theory, Experimentation, and Computation as Tools for Design Economics. Econometrica, 70(4), 2002. 1341-1378.

Klemperer, Paul, What Really Matters in Auction Design?, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 16(1): 169-189, 2002.

Weitzman, Martin, Is the Price System or Rationing More Effective in Getting a Commodity to Those Who Need it Most?, The Bell Journal of Economics, 8, 517-524, 1977.

(b) Stable matching and assignment

Gale, David and Lloyd Shapley, College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage, American Mathematical Monthly, 69: 9-15,1962.

Roth and Sotomayor, Chapters 2-5.

Hylland, Aanund, and Richard Zeckhauser. The efficient allocation of individuals to positions, The Journal of Political Economy, 293-314,1979.

Roth, Alvin E., The Evolution of the Labor Market for Medical Interns and Residents: A Case Study in Game Theory. Journal of Political Economy, 92: 991-1016, 1984.

Kojimam, Fuhito and Parag A. Pathak. Incentives and stability in large two-sided matching markets. American Economic Review, 99:608-627, 2009

Abdulkadiroglu, Atila and Tayfun Sonmez. School choice: A mechanism design approach. American Economic Review, 93:729-747, 2003.

Abdulkadiroglu, Atila , Parag A. Pathak, and Alvin E. Roth. The New York City high school match. American Economic Review, 95:364-367, 2005.

Ashlagi, Itai, Yash Kanoria, and Jacob D. Leshno. Unbalanced random matching markets: The stark effect of competition, Journal of Political Economy,

Ashlagi, Itai and Peng Shi. Optimal allocation without money: An engineering approach. Management Science, 2015.

Peng Shi and Nick Arnosti. Design of Lotteries and Waitlists for Affordable Housing Allocation, Management Science, 2019.

Peng Shi, Assortment Planning in School Choice, 2019.

Ashlagi, Itai, and Afshin Nikzad. What matters in tie-breaking rules? how competition guides design, 2015.

(c) Auctions and revenue equivalence

Myerson, Roger Auction Design, Mathematics of Operations Research, 1981.

Milgrom, Paul. Putting Auction Theory to Work. Chapter 2-3.

W. Vickrey, Counterspeculation, auctions, and competitive sealed tenders, The Journal of Finance, 16(1) 8–37, 1961.

R. Myerson, Optimal auction design, Mathematics of Operations research, 1981.

J. Bulow and J. Roberts, The simple economics of optimal auctions, Journal of Political Economy, 1989.

J. Bulow and P. Klemperer, Auctions vs negotiations, American Economic Review, 1996.

P.R. McAfee and J. McMillan, Auctions and bidding, Journal of Economic Literature 1987.

P. Milgrom and R. Weber, A theory of auctions and competitive bidding, Econometrica, 1982.

Roth, A. E. and A. Ockenfels, Late-Minute Bidding and the Rules for Ending Second-Price Auctions: Evidence from eBay and Amazon.” American Economic Review, 92(4): 1093-1103, 2002.

(d) Mechanism design

Vickrey, William (1961): Counterspeculation, Auctions and Competitive Sealed Tenders. Journal of Finance, 16(1): 8-37.

Ausubel, Larry and Paul Milgrom, The Lovely but Lonely Vickrey Auction. in Cramton et. al Combinatorial Auctions, 2005.

J.C. Rochet, A necessary and sufficient condition for rationalizability in a quasi-linear context”, 1987.

K. Roberts, The characterization of implementable choice rules”, 1979.

F. Gul and E. Stacchetti, Walrasian equilibrium with gross substitutes, Journal of Economic Theory, 1999.

I. Ashlagi, M. Braverman, A,. Hassidim and D. Monderer, Monotonicity and implementability, Econometrica, 2011.

(e) Dynamic mechanism design and dynamic pricing

G. Gallego and G. Van Ryzin, Optimal dynamic pricing of inventories with stochastic demand over finite horizons. Management science, 40(8), 999-1020, 1994.

S. Board and A. Skrzypacz, Revenue management with forward-looking buyers, Unpublished manuscript, Stanford University,2010.

A. Gershkov, B. Moldovanu, P. Strack, Revenue Maximizing Mechanisms with Strategic Customers and Unknown, Markovian Demand

D. Bergemann and J. Valimaki, The dynamic pivot mechanism, Econometrica, 2010.

A. Gershkov and B. Moldovanu, Dynamic Revenue Maximization with Heterogeneous Objects: A Mechanism Design Approach, 168-198, 2009.

F. Gul, H. Sonnenschein, R. Wilson, Foundations of dynamic monopoly and the Coase conjecture, J. of Economic Theory, 1986.

D. Besanko and W. L. Whinston, Optimal price skimming by a monopolist facing rational consumers, Management Science, 1990.

(f) Dynamic matching

Itai Ashlagi and Alvin E. Roth. New challenges in multihospital kidney exchange. American Economic Review, 102:354-359, 2012

Nikhil Agarwal, Itai Ashlagi, Eduardo Azevedo, Clayton Featherston and Omer Karaduman. Market Failure in Kidney Exchange, 2018.

Anderson, R., Ashlagi, I., Gamarnik, D. and Kanoria, Efficient Dynamic Barter Exchange, Operations Research, 2015.

Mohammad Akbarpour, Shengwu Li, and Shayan Oveis Gharan. Dynamic matching market design. JPE, 2019.

Baccara, Mariagiovanna, SangMok Lee, and Leeat Yariv, Optimal dynamic matching, 2015.

Jacob Leshno, Dynamic Matching in Overloaded Waiting Lists, 2017.

Some ASSA sessions I would go to if I could, and some I'll certainly attend

I'm going to be a busy boy at the AEA/ASSA meetings, since as president of the AEA I'll preside over many champagne receptions and a few other things.  But the conference looks like fun. Here are just a few of the sessions that particularly caught my eye, even though I have conflicts with some of them...

Econometric Society Presidential Address

Session/Event

 Thursday, Jan. 4, 2018   5:30 PM - 7:00 PM

 Marriott Philadelphia Downtown, Liberty Ballroom

Hosted By: ECONOMETRIC SOCIETY

Econometric Society Presidential Address
Drew Fudenberg, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Speaker(s)

Drew Fudenberg

,

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Topic: Learning, Experimentation, and Equilibrium Refinements

************

Economic Applications of Machine Learning

Paper Session

 Friday, Jan. 5, 2018   8:00 AM - 10:00 AM

 Marriott Philadelphia Downtown, Liberty Ballroom Salon A

Hosted By: AMERICAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION

• Chair: Daniel Björkegren, Brown University

A Large Scale Model of Travel Time and User Choice Behavior

Susan Athey

,

Stanford University

Robert Donnelly

,

Stanford University

•  View Abstract

Behavior Revealed in Mobile Phone Usage Predicts Loan Repayment

Daniel Björkegren

,

Brown University

Darrell Grissen

,

Entrepreneurial Finance Lab

•  View Abstract

Estimating Poverty and Wealth From Mobile Phone Data

Joshua Blumenstock

,

University of California-Berkeley

Gabriel Cadamuro

,

University of Washington

Robert On

,

University of California-Berkeley

•  View Abstract

Forecasting Economic Activity With Yelp Data

Edward Glaeser

,

Harvard University

Hyunjin Kim

,

Harvard Business School

Michael Luca

,

Harvard Business School

•  View Abstract

Discussant(s)

Michael Luca

,

Harvard Business School

Marshall Burke

,

Stanford University

Greg Lewis

,

Microsoft Research

Shane Greenstein

,

Harvard Business School

************

Like Everybody Else: Experimental Economics of Conformity, Image, and Identity

Paper Session

 Friday, Jan. 5, 2018   2:30 PM - 4:30 PM

 Marriott Philadelphia Downtown, Meeting Room 305

Hosted By: ECONOMIC SCIENCE ASSOCIATION

• Chair: James Andreoni, University of California-San Diego

Identity and Impact in Public Goods Contributions: A Field Experiment on Wikipedia

Yan Chen

,

University of Michigan

Rosta Farzan

,

University of Pittsburgh

Robert Kraut

,

Carnegie Mellon University

Iman YeckehZarre

,

University of Michigan

Ark Fangzhou Zhang

,

University of Michigan

•  View Abstract

Status Goods: Experimental Evidence From Platinum Credit Cards

Leonardo Bursztyn

,

University of Chicago and NBER

Bruno Ferman

,

Getulio Vargas Foundation

Stefano Fiorin

,

University of California-San Diego

Martin Kanz

,

World Bank

Gautam Rao

,

Harvard University and NBER

•  View Abstract
 
•  Download Preview (PDF, 402.50 KB)

Preference Endogeneity and Conformity

Douglas Bernheim

,

Stanford University

Christine Exley

,

Harvard Business School

•  View Abstract

The Conformity Trap: Adaptation and Stagnation of Social Norms in a Changing World

James Andreoni

,

University of California-San Diego

Nikos Nikiforakis

,

New York University Abu Dhabi

Simon Siegenthaler

,

University of Texas-Dallas

•  View Abstract

Discussant(s)

Alain Cohn

,

University of Michigan

Desmond Ang

,

University of California-San Diego

Florian Ederer

,

Yale University

Ariel Rubinstein

,

New York University

*********

Large Matching Markets

Saturday, Jan. 6, 2018   8:00 AM - 10:00 AM

 Marriott Philadelphia Downtown, Meeting Room 406

Hosted By: ECONOMETRIC SOCIETY

• Chair: SangMok Lee, University of Pennsylvania

Stable Matching in Large Economies​

Yeon-Koo Che

,

Columbia University

Jinwoo Kim

,

Seoul National University

Fuhito Kojima

,

Stanford University

•  View Abstract
 
•  Download Preview (PDF, 1.06 MB)

The Cutoff Structure of Top Trading Cycles in School Choice

Jacob D. Leshno

,

Columbia University

Irene Lo

,

Columbia University

•  View Abstract

Need Versus Merit: The Large Core of College Admissions Markets

Avinatan Hassidim

,

Bar-Ilan University

Assaf Romm

,

Hebrew University of Jerusalem

Ran I. Shorrer

,

Pennsylvania State University

•  View Abstract
 
•  Download Preview (PDF, 401.95 KB)

Top Trading Cycles in Two-Sided Matching Markets: An Irrelevance of Priorities in Large Matching Markets

Yeon-Koo Che

,

Columbia University

Olivier Tercieux

,

Paris School of Economics

•  View Abstract

Discussant(s)

Eduardo Azevedo

,

University of Pennsylvania

Utku Unver

,

Boston College

Scott Duke Kominers

,

Harvard University

Atila Abdulkadiroglu

,

Duke University

*************

Inner Workings of Organ Markets and Organ Allocation

Paper Session

 Saturday, Jan. 6, 2018   2:30 PM - 4:30 PM

 Pennsylvania Convention Center, 201-C

Hosted By: AMERICAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION

• Chair: Eric Budish, University of Chicago

The Inner Workings of Kidney Exchange Markets

Nikhil Agarwal

,

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Itai Ashlagi

,

Stanford University

Eduardo Azevedo

,

University of Pennsylvania

Clayton Featherstone

,

University of Pennsylvania

Omer Karaduman

,

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

•  View Abstract

A Regulated Market for Kidneys

Mohammad Akbarpour

,

Stanford University

•  View Abstract

Strategic Behavior in the Kidney Waitlist

Nikhil Agarwal

,

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Itai Ashlagi

,

Stanford University

Paulo J. Somaini

,

Stanford University

•  View Abstract

Discussant(s)

Utku Unver

,

Boston College

Glen Weyl

,

Microsoft Research

Benjamin R. Handel

,

University of California-Berkeley

******

Here are some sessions I'm looking forward to attending ex officio:

AEA/AFA Joint Luncheon - Fee Event

 Friday, Jan. 5, 2018   12:30 PM - 2:15 PM

 Marriott Philadelphia Downtown, Grand Ballroom Salon G & H

Hosted By: AMERICAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION & AMERICAN FINANCE ASSOCIATION

• Chair: David Scharfstein, Harvard Business School

Presiding: David Scharfstein, Harvard Business School
Speaker: Raghuram Rajan, University of Chicago

Speaker(s)

Raghuram Rajan

,

University of Chicago

Topic: Liquidity and Leverage

************

AEA Richard T. Ely Lecture

Session/Event

 Friday, Jan. 5, 2018   4:45 PM - 5:45 PM

 Marriott Philadelphia Downtown, Grand Ballroom Salon G & H

Hosted By: American Economic Association

Speaker: David Laibson, Harvard University
*************




AEA Nobel Laureate Luncheon-Fee Event
Session/Event
 Saturday, Jan. 6, 2018   12:30 PM - 2:15 PM
 Marriott Philadelphia Downtown, Grand Ballroom Salon G & H
Hosted By: AMERICAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION
• Chair: Olivier Blanchard, Peterson Institute for International Economics
Nobel Laureate Luncheon Honoring the 2016 Nobel Laureates in Economics: Oliver Hart, Harvard University and Bengt R. Holmstrom, Massachusetts Institute of Technology--Fee Event--
Presiding: Olivier Blanchard, Peterson Institute for International Economics--
Speakers: Daron Acemoglu, Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Luigi Zingales, University of Chicago
**********

AEA Awards Ceremony and Presidential Address

Session/Event

 Saturday, Jan. 6, 2018   4:30 PM - 5:45 PM

 Marriott Philadelphia Downtown, Grand Ballroom Salon G & H

Hosted By: AMERICAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION

• Chair: Olivier Blanchard, Peterson Institute for International Economics

Awards Ceremony & Presidential Address
Presiding: Olivier Blanchard, Peterson Institute for International Economics
Speaker: Alvin E. Roth, Stanford University
Topic: Markets and Marketplaces
****************

New Insights on Classic Questions in Matching Theory

Paper Session

 Sunday, Jan. 7, 2018   10:15 AM - 12:15 PM

 Marriott Philadelphia Downtown, Liberty Ballroom Salon A

Hosted By: AMERICAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION

• Chair: Alvin E. Roth, Stanford University

The Lattice of Envy-free Matchings

Qingyun Wu

,


Stanford University

Alvin E. Roth

,


Stanford University

•  View Abstract
 
•  Download Preview (PDF, 297.93 KB)
•  Download PowerPoint (PDF, 208.47 KB)

Deferred Acceptance with Compensation Chains

Piotr Dworczak

,


Stanford University

•  View Abstract

Virtual Demand and Stable Mechanisms

Jan Christoph Schlegel

,


University of Lausanne

•  View Abstract

Lone Wolves in Competitive Equilibria

Ravi Jagadeesan

,


Harvard University

Scott Duke Kominers

,


Harvard University

Ross Rheingans-Yoo

,


Harvard University

•  View Abstract

Discussant(s)

Alexander Teytelboym

,


University of Oxford