Tuesday, October 31, 2017

Market Design in the Economic Journal: Designing science

Two sections of the October 2017 Feature Issue of the Economic Journal deal with market design.  The second of these, on Designing Auctions, is apparent.  The first, on The Confidence Crisis in Science is less obvious, until you think of the problem of how to conduct open science (peer review, replication, etc.) as a problem in market design.  The first paper linked below lays out this point of view very clearly.
  1. FEATURE: THE CONFIDENCE CRISIS IN SCIENCE

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      The Research Reproducibility Crisis and Economics of Science (pages F200–F208)
      Zacharias Maniadis and Fabio Tufano
      Version of Record online: 24 OCT 2017 | DOI: 10.1111/ecoj.12526
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      The Power of Bias in Economics Research (pages F236–F265)
      John P. A. Ioannidis, T. D. Stanley and Hristos Doucouliagos
      Version of Record online: 24 OCT 2017 | DOI: 10.1111/ecoj.12461
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      Persuasion Bias in Science: Can Economics Help? (pages F266–F304)
      Alfredo Di Tillio, Marco Ottaviani and Peter Norman Sørensen
      Version of Record online: 24 OCT 2017 | DOI: 10.1111/ecoj.12515

  2. FEATURE: DESIGNING AUCTIONS

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      The German 4G Spectrum Auction: Design and Behaviour (pages F305–F324)
      Peter Cramton and Axel Ockenfels
      Version of Record online: 24 OCT 2017 | DOI: 10.1111/ecoj.12406
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      Determining the Optimal Length of Regulatory Guarantee: A Length-of-contract Auction (pages F325–F333)
      Thomas Greve and Michael G. Pollitt
      Version of Record online: 24 OCT 2017 | DOI: 10.1111/ecoj.12405
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      A Practical Guide to the Combinatorial Clock Auction (pages F334–F350)
      Lawrence M. Ausubel and Oleg Baranov
      Version of Record online: 24 OCT 2017 | DOI: 10.1111/ecoj.12404
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      Auction Format and Auction Sequence in Multi-item Multi-unit Auctions: An Experimental Study (pages F351–F371)
      Regina Betz, Ben Greiner, Sascha Schweitzer and Stefan Seifert
      Version of Record online: 24 OCT 2017 | DOI: 10.1111/ecoj.12403
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      Pro-competitive Rationing in Multi-unit Auctions (pages F372–F395)
      Pär Holmberg
      Version of Record online: 24 OCT 2017 | DOI: 10.1111/ecoj.12402

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