Computational and Experimental Economics Summer School June 11-16, 2023, Barcelona

 Rosemarie Nagel sends me the following announcement:

We invite graduate students and young faculty to the
2nd Computational and Experimental Economics Summer School
June 11-16, 2023, BESLAB, UPF, Barcelona, Spain

The goal of the summer school is to develop a foundation for using computational models
and simulations to complement and/or explain results from human subject experiments.
In particular, throughout the curriculum, students will learn how to implement a variety of agent-based models
that have successfully captured regularities observed in the experimental and field data.
They will participate in experiments and develop an original project in groups of 3-4 participants.

In addition, the summer school will include a two-day workshop on computational and experimental economics (June 14-15)
with presentations by leading researchers who are interested in experimental and computational economics.

The deadline for applications is March 31, 2023.

You can find how to participate here:

Organizers
Herbert Dawid (Bielefeld University)
John Ledyard (Caltech)
Rosemarie Nagel (ICREA-UPF, and BSE)

Yaroslav Rosokha  (Purdue University)

Guest lecturers

Mikhail Anufriev (University of Technology Sydney)
Cars Hommes (University of Amsterdam and Bank of Canada)
Annie Liang (Northwestern. University)
Valentyn Panchenko (University of New South Wales)

 

Marketplace Design: summer school at Paris School of Economics in June

Olivier Tercieux forwarded this announcement:

THE DESIGN OF MARKET PLACES - Recent development in matching theory and empirical methods of matching  June 22 to June 26, 2020

"Allocation procedures have recently become a new and exciting field of economic research, with a wide range of applications. Since the seminal work by Gale and Shapley (1962) and Shapley and Shubik (1971), matching theory has developed and matured to a point where matching theorists could guide designs of medical match and other entry-level labor markets, school choice, course allocation and organ donation, among others. This course will introduce you to the frontier of research, including theoretical developments, applications, and empirical analysis"

The professors are:
•       Olivier Tercieux, Two-sided matching theory and application to school choice
•       Atila Abdulkadiroglu, Empirics of school choice
•       Alfred Galichon, Matching theory with transfers: optimal transport and economic applications

Dynamic Games: 26th Jerusalem Summer School in Economic Theory (deadline April 27)

Theory and experiments in Jerusalem this summer...

26th Jerusalem School in Economic Theory

Dynamic Games

Event date: Jun 24 - Jul 3, 2015

Organizers:

Eric Maskin, Director (Harvard University)
Elchanan Ben-Porath, Codirector (The Hebrew University)
Drew Fudenberg (Harvard University)



In many economic, social, and political settings, participants interact strategically not just once but over time.


When raising its import tariffs today, for example, a country will try to anticipate the reactions of its trading partners tomorrow. And an oligopolistic firm can learn from its rivals’ past pricing behavior so as to gauge what prices they are likely to set now.


The Summer School will emphasize theoretical aspects of dynamic games, but will also include work on experiments.


List of speakers:
Robert Aumann (The Hebrew University)
Martin Cripps (University College London)
Guillaume Fréchette (New York University)
Drew Fudenberg (Harvard University)
Sergiu Hart (The Hebrew University)
Johannes Hörner (Yale University)
Navin Kartik (Columbia University)
George Mailath (University of Pennsylvania)
Eric Maskin (Harvard University)
Abraham Neyman (The Hebrew University)
Larry Samuelson (Yale University)
Alistair Wilson (University of Pittsburgh)

• Application Form

Deadline for applications: April 27

Recap of the 25th Jerusalem School in Economic Theory- Matching and Market Design

The 25th Jerusalem School in Economic Theory- Matching and Market Design was, in my humble opinion, a great success. If you click on the link above you can see videos of all 20 lectures.  (There's even a "play all" button, which I presume (I haven't tried it) would launch 30 hours of lectures that you could binge-watch.)

Over a hundred students attended the lectures, given by ten speakers over nine days (plus a day off). Many visitors attended at least some of the lectures, led by Ken Arrow who attended them all. Eyal Winter was celebrated as he finished 15 years as director of the summer school, and prepared to hand the reins to Elchanan Ben-Porath.

Topics covered ranged from elegant abstract theory to fully implemented practical designs, from matching markets to auctions and financial markets, and from designs implemented two decades ago to designs successfully implemented this year.

The quality of the students, and of the new generation of market designers who lectured, makes me very optimistic about the future of market design as "the source of practical advice, solidly grounded in well tested theory, on designing the institutions through which we interact with one another."

QED

25th Jerusalem School in Economic Theory :Matching and Market Design, June 23-July 2

I'm off to Jerusalem for the 25th Jerusalem School in Economic Theory. This year the topic is Matching and Market Design

Event date: Jun 23 - Jul 2 ,2014 

Organizers:

Scott Duke Kominers (Harvard University)
Eric Maskin, Director (Harvard University)
Alvin Roth (Stanford University)
Eyal Winter, Codirector (The Hebrew University)


Models of matching---in which agents are paired with one another to undertake transactions---have played an important role in contemporary economic theory. Matching algorithms have proven valuable in many real-life applications, including the assignment of students to schools, medical residents to hospitals, and organ donors to recipients. Matching theory has also helped illuminate thorny problems such as inequality and unemployment. The summer school will place greatest emphasis on design issues, but will touch on other aspects of matching as well.

LIST OF SPEAKERS
NAME	AFFILIATION
Atila Abdulkadiroglu	Duke University
Itai Ashlagi	MIT
Eric Budish	Universty of Chicago
Scott Duke Kominers	Harvard University
Jacob D. Leshno	Columbia University
Eric S. Maskin	Harvard University
Paul R. Milgrom	Stanford University
Elliott Peranson	National Matching Services, Inc
Assaf Romm	Harvard University
Alvin E. Roth	Stanford University

PROGRAM 
Monday, June 23
8:30-9:30 REGISTRATION IN IIAS LOBBY
9:30-11:00 Eric Maskin (Harvard University)
 Introduction to Matching and Allocation Problems (I)
11:00-11:30 Coffee break
11:30-13:00 Scott Duke Kominers (Harvard University)
 Introduction to Matching and Allocation Problems (II)
13:00-14:30 Lunch break
14:30-16:00 Alvin E. Roth (Stanford University)
 The Design of the National Resident Matching Program

16:00 Reception

Tuesday, June 24
9:30- 11:00 Itai Ashlagi (MIT)
 Unbalanced Random Matching Markets: Competition and Complementarities
11:00-11:30 Coffee break
11:30-13:00 Elliott Peranson (National Matching Services, Inc.)
 Issues in Real-World Matching Market Design
13:00-14:30 Lunch break
14:30-16:00 Eric Maskin (Harvard University)
 Assortative Matching and Inequality

Wednesday, June 25
9:30-11:00 Paul R. Milgrom (Stanford University)
 Matching with Contracts
11:00-11:30 Coffee break
11:30-13:00 Scott Duke Kominers (Harvard University)
 Substitutability in Generalized Matching
13:00-14:30 Lunch break
14:30 TOUR OF JERUSALEM

Thursday, June 26
9:30-11:00 Paul R. Milgrom (Stanford University)
 Deferred Acceptance Heuristic Auctions
11:00-11:30 Coffee break

11:30-13:00 Paul R. Milgrom (Stanford University)
 Auctions for Internet Advertising
13:00-14:30 Lunch break
14:30 FIRST STUDENT POSTER SESSION

Friday, June 27
9:30-11:00 Alvin E. Roth (Stanford University)
 Kidney Exchange
11:00-11:30 Coffee break
11:30-13:00 Itai Ashlagi (MIT)
 Current Challenges in Kidney Exchange

Saturday, June 28
TOUR OF MASADA

Sunday, June 29
9:30-11:00 Eric Budish (University of Chicago)
 Combinatorial Assignment
11:00-11:30 Coffee break
11:30-13:00 Eric Budish (University of Chicago)
 Financial Market Design

Monday, June 30
9:30-11:00 Atila Abdulkadiroglu (Duke University)
Theory of School Choice
11:00-11:30 Coffee break

11:30-13:00 Atila Abdulkadiroglu (Duke University)
 Empirics of School Choice
13:00-14:30 Lunch break
17:00-18:30 ARROW LECTURE
19:00 Dinner (invited speakers only)

Tuesday, July 1
9:30-11:00 Jacob D. Leshno (Columbia University)
 Dynamic Matching in Overloaded Systems
11:00-11:30 Coffee break
11:30-13:00 Assaf Romm (Harvard University)
 Efficient Assignment and the Israeli Medical Match
13:00-14:30 Lunch break
18:30 Concert at the Jerusalem Music Center and dinner at the Terasa Restaurant

Wednesday, July 2
9:30-11:00 Jacob D. Leshno (Columbia University)
 Large-Market Matching

Here's the poster .
************
Updates:

Eric Maskin giving the opening lecture

Spring School in Behavioral Econ at UCSD in March

Uri Gneezy writes to announce the

Spring School in Behavioral Economics

March 15 to March 21, 2013, San Diego

The Choice Lab at the Norwegian School of Economics (NHH) and the Rady School of Management at UC San Diego will host a spring school in behavioral economics. The goal of this spring school is to introduce graduate students to new and exciting research in the field. This is a great opportunity for graduate students to expand their behavioral skills and learn what behavioral economics research is about. Topics include social preferences, (psychological) games, incentives, charitable giving and behavioral interventions.

The Summer School is comprised of a series of 10 half day lectures. The lectures will be delivered by Jim Andreoni, Alexander Cappelen, Martin Dufwenberg, Armin Falk, Uri Gneezy, Theo Offerman, Bertil Tungodden, Lise Vesterlund and Angelino Viceisza. A strong emphasis is given to informal interactions, and students will also be given the opportunity to present their work.

We will cover participants’ costs during the workshop, including housing and most meals. Unfortunately, we do not have funds to cover travel costs. About twenty five participants will be invited.

To apply, please send your curriculum vitae and a short (up to 1000 words) statement of research interest, all in one pdf file to rady.spring.school@gmail.com. We will also need a letter of recommendation to be sent to the same email address. The deadline for applications is Monday, December 31, 2012.

Alexander, Bertil and Uri

Uri Gneezy | The Epstein/Atkinson Chair in Behavioral Economics
Rady School of Management, UC san Diego | 9500 Gilman Drive #0553 La Jolla CA 92093, USA
Tel: 858-534-4312 | Fax: 858-534-0745 | http://management.ucsd.edu/faculty/directory/gneezy/

Summer school in algorithmic economics at CMU in August

The announcement is here.
Important dates

• April 15, 2012: Application deadline
• May 6, 2012: Notification of selection
• August 6-10, 2012: Summer school 

Confirmed speakers:

• Itai Ashlagi, MIT (Sloan)
• Avrim Blum, Carnegie Mellon (CS)
• Vincent Conitzer, Duke (CS & economics)
• Constantinos Daskalakis, MIT (EECS)
• Jason Hartline, Northwestern (EECS)
• Herve Moulin, Rice (economics)
• Eva Tardos, Cornell (CS)
• Rakesh Vohra, Northwestern (Kellogg)
• Leeat Yariv, Caltech (economics) 

Market design in Trento

13^th Trento Summer School

Intensive course in Market Design: Theory and Pragmatics

 

Co-Directors:

Dan Friedman, Economics Department, Santa Cruz University CA

David Parkes, School of Engineering and Applied Sciences, Harvard University

Download poster

Download brochure

 
Guest lecturers: Tuomas Sandholm, School of Computer Science, Carnegie Mellon University, Peter Cramton, Economics Department, University of Maryland, Paul J. Healy, Economics Department, Ohio State University, S. N. Muthu Muthukrishnan, Computer Science Department, Rutgers University, Estelle Cantillon, ECARES, Université Libre de Bruxelles

For the last several centuries, markets have spread spontaneously and have organized an increasing share of human activity. Globalization and information technologies accelerated the process in the early 21st century and, at the same time, opened unprecedented new opportunities for deliberate design.
Market design has much to learn from success stories like Amazon and eBay, online advertising, labour markets for medical interns and residents, wireless spectrum auction design, expressive auctions for sourcing, and mobile phone banking in the developing world. Market designers can also learn from disasters such as the California energy market of May 2000 through September 2001 and the credit-default swap market freeze in September 2008.
Market design is a multi-disciplinary problem with relevant expertise coming from economic theory, computer science, and operations research. Advances are made with the right combination of theory and pragmatics, with theoretical ideals balanced against requirements for computational and informational efficiency, as well as simplicity and robustness.

The 2012 Trento Summer School faculty will bring together experts from many fields:

• artificial intelligence and multi-agent systems
• experimental economics
• mechanism design theory
• prediction markets
• theoretical computer science

They will provide an integrated series of lectures on topics such as

• two-sided platforms
• matching markets
• double auction markets
• virtual economies
• combinatorial auctions

Students participating in this Summer School will gain an up-to-date overview of the relevant theory, current evidence on what sorts of market formats work well under various conditions, and pragmatic issues that arise when theoretical paradigms meet real-world challenges.
In addition to overview lectures in the mornings, the school will feature intensive seminar-style discussions in the afternoons of participants’ research.
The Trento Summer Schools are intended for advanced graduate students and post-doctoral scholars in economics, computer science and operations research. People interested in participating in the Summer School are encouraged to apply by submitting a curriculum vitae, a two-page essay describing their interest in Market Design, a course transcript from their PhD program, including advanced examinations passed, two letters of recommendation, and statements about their current or projected research, along with relevant research papers, if any.

Applications are due by Saturday, 17 march 2012. Persons interested in participating in the Summer School should follow the application procedure.

Admissions decisions will be announced by 10 April 2012. All applicants will be informed by e-mail about the results.

The sessions will be held at Hotel Villa Madruzzo, Trento, Italy. All participants are required to stay for the entire duration of the event. Food and accommodation will be covered by the School (except for meals during the weekend) and participants will have to cover travel expenses.

Please direct logistical questions to the Summer School secretary (ccschool@economia.unitn.it).

This is the 13^th of a series of intensive courses to be offered by the Cognitive and Experimental Economics Laboratory (CEEL) with the financial support of John S. Latsis Public Benefit Foundation, an Athens-based Foundation supporting public benefit activities in Greece and abroad: www.latsis-foundation.org.

Previous courses were offered in Computable Economics (2000, Director K. Vela Velupillai), Experimental Economics (2001, Director Daniel Friedman), Adaptive Economic Processes (2002, Director Peter Howitt), Behavioral Economics (2003, Directors Daniel Friedman and David Laibson), Institutional Economics (2004, Director Richard N. Langlois), Evolutionary Economic Dynamics (2005,Directors Ken Binmore and Larry Samuelson), Agent-Based Computational Economics (2006, Directors Leigh Tesfatsion and Robert Axtell), Agent-Based Finance (2007, Directors Cars Hommes and Thomas Lux), Financial Instability and Crises (2008, Directors Domenico Delli Gatti and Mauro Gallegati), Networks and Innovation (2009, Directors John Padgett, Lee Fleming and Massimo Riccaboni), Macroeconomics and Financial Crises (2010, Directors Peter Howitt, Daniel Heymann and Axel Leijonhufvud) and Evolution of Social Preferences (2011, Directors Dan Friedman and Luigi Mittone)

 

 

Program Directors: Axel Leijonhufvud, UCLA and University of Trento and Enrico Zaninotto, University of Trento Co-Directors of the School: Dan Friedman, Economics Department, Santa Cruz University CA David Parkes, School of Engineering and Applied Sciences, Harvard University Guest Lecturers: Tuomas Sandholm, School of Computer Science, Carnegie Mellon University, Peter Cramton, Economics Department, University of Maryland, Paul J. Healy, Economics Department, Ohio State University, S. N. Muthu Muthukrishnan, Computer Science Department, Rutgers University, Estelle Cantillon, ECARES, Université Libre de Bruxelles Laboratory Director: Luigi Mittone, University of Trento Lab Technical Assistant: Marco Tecilla, University of Trento Summer School Secretary: ccschool@economia.unitn.it The course is offered by the Cognitive and Experimental Economics Laboratory CEEL of the University of Trento with the financial support of John S. Latsis Public Benefit Foundation, an Athens-based Foundation supporting public benefit activities in Greece and abroad: www.latsis-foundation.org.