Two sections of the October 2017 Feature Issue of the Economic Journal deal with market design. The second of these, on Designing Auctions, is apparent. The first, on The Confidence Crisis in Science is less obvious, until you think of the problem of how to conduct open science (peer review, replication, etc.) as a problem in market design. The first paper linked below lays out this point of view very clearly.
FEATURE: THE CONFIDENCE CRISIS IN SCIENCE
- You have free access to this contentThe Research Reproducibility Crisis and Economics of Science (pages F200–F208)
Zacharias Maniadis and Fabio TufanoVersion of Record online: 24 OCT 2017 | DOI: 10.1111/ecoj.12526 - You have free access to this contentTo Replicate or Not To Replicate? Exploring Reproducibility in Economics through the Lens of a Model and a Pilot Study (pages F209–F235)
Zacharias Maniadis, Fabio Tufano and John A. ListVersion of Record online: 24 OCT 2017 | DOI: 10.1111/ecoj.12527 - You have free access to this contentThe Power of Bias in Economics Research (pages F236–F265)
John P. A. Ioannidis, T. D. Stanley and Hristos DoucouliagosVersion of Record online: 24 OCT 2017 | DOI: 10.1111/ecoj.12461 - You have free access to this contentPersuasion Bias in Science: Can Economics Help? (pages F266–F304)
Alfredo Di Tillio, Marco Ottaviani and Peter Norman SørensenVersion of Record online: 24 OCT 2017 | DOI: 10.1111/ecoj.12515
FEATURE: DESIGNING AUCTIONS
- You have full text access to this contentThe German 4G Spectrum Auction: Design and Behaviour (pages F305–F324)
Peter Cramton and Axel OckenfelsVersion of Record online: 24 OCT 2017 | DOI: 10.1111/ecoj.12406 - You have full text access to this contentDetermining the Optimal Length of Regulatory Guarantee: A Length-of-contract Auction (pages F325–F333)
Thomas Greve and Michael G. PollittVersion of Record online: 24 OCT 2017 | DOI: 10.1111/ecoj.12405 - You have full text access to this contentA Practical Guide to the Combinatorial Clock Auction (pages F334–F350)
Lawrence M. Ausubel and Oleg BaranovVersion of Record online: 24 OCT 2017 | DOI: 10.1111/ecoj.12404 - You have full text access to this contentAuction Format and Auction Sequence in Multi-item Multi-unit Auctions: An Experimental Study (pages F351–F371)
Regina Betz, Ben Greiner, Sascha Schweitzer and Stefan SeifertVersion of Record online: 24 OCT 2017 | DOI: 10.1111/ecoj.12403 - You have full text access to this contentPro-competitive Rationing in Multi-unit Auctions (pages F372–F395)
Pär HolmbergVersion of Record online: 24 OCT 2017 | DOI: 10.1111/ecoj.12402
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