Showing posts with label seminar. Show all posts
Showing posts with label seminar. Show all posts

Thursday, May 19, 2022

Frontiers of Economic Design (FED): Ellen Muir and I speak tomorrow (Friday) on Zoom

 We hope to start off this new seminar with a bang (9am Pacific time, noon on the East Coast, 18:00 in middle Europe...)

To hear us you have to register to get a link

Here's the seminar site:

Frontiers of Economic Design (FED)

"The goal of this seminar series is to bring young researchers in economic design and related areas together, to promote their work, and also to disseminate cutting-edge research. Each meeting will feature two presentations: one from an established researcher and one from a graduate student or post-doc. "


 

Sunday, April 24, 2022

Frontiers of Economic Design (FED)--new online seminar series

Bumin Yenmez and Lars Ehlers announce a new seminar series:

Yenmez writes:

"Lars Ehlers and I are organizing a new online economic-design seminar series. The seminar will (1) meet bi-weekly, (2) have one established researcher and one postdoc or graduate student present at each meeting (45 minutes each), and (3) meet mostly on Fridays noon-1:45pm (EST). We would like to make the seminar especially attractive to young researchers and make it friendly.

 The first webinar will be on May 20. Al Roth (Stanford) and Ellen Victoria Muir (Stanford) will present at the first meeting. The second webinar will be on June 3. Aytek Erdil (Cambridge) and Aram Grigoryan (Duke) will present at the second meeting.

 The website for the webinar is: www.frontiersofeconomicdesign.com. Please register on the website if you would like to receive further communication from us including a Zoom link for meetings. You can also email to frontiersofeconomicdesign@gmail.com."


Here's the website:

Frontiers of Economic Design (FED)

"The goal of this seminar series is to bring young researchers in economic design and related areas together, to promote their work, and also to disseminate cutting-edge research. Each meeting will feature two presentations: one from an established researcher and one from a graduate student or post-doc. 

The first webinar is on May 20, 2022 between 12:00-1:45pm EST (9:00-10:45pm PST). We have two inaugural speakers:

Alvin Roth on "Controversial markets and the political economy of market design"

Ellen Victoria Muir on "Wage dispersion, minimum wages and involuntary unemployment: A mechanism design perspective" (joint with Simon Loertscher)"

Thursday, June 24, 2021

Health Applications Society Online Seminar Series (Inaugural seminar Friday June 25, on Kidney Exchange)

A new seminar series is being organized by the Health Applications Society of INFORMS.  I'll be giving the inaugural seminar tomorrow, June 25.

Here's the general announcement:

Health Applications Society Online Seminar Series

"Welcome to the HAS Online Seminar Series! This seminar series welcomes a broad range of healthcare modeling research topics such as healthcare operations, medical decision making, health policy, and health analytics. 

Please join our Google Group or subscribe to our Mailing List to receive the latest announcement on the upcoming seminars!

When: 1-2 pm ET (10-11 am PT) on 4th Friday of each month

Where: Zoom Webinar (Register Now!)   

Speaker: Dr. Alvin E. Roth, Stanford University

Seminar Title: Kidney Exchange: An Operations Perspective

Date and Time: June 25 (Friday), 2021, 1-2 pm ET (10-11 am PT)

Abstract: Many patients in need of a kidney transplant have a willing but incompatible (or poorly matched) living donor. Kidney exchange programs arrange exchanges among such patient-donor pairs, in cycles and chains of exchange, so each patient receives a compatible kidney. Kidney exchange has become a standard form of transplantation in the United States and a few other countries, in large part because of continued attention to the operational details that arose as obstacles were overcome and new obstacles became relevant. We review some of the key operational issues in the design of successful kidney exchange programs. Kidney exchange has yet to reach its full potential, and the paper further describes some open questions that we hope will continue to attract attention from researchers interested in the operational aspects of dynamic exchange.

Bio: Al Roth is the Craig and Susan McCaw Professor of Economics at Stanford, and the George Gund Professor Emeritus of Economics and Business Administration at Harvard. He and Lloyd Shapley shared the 2012 Nobel memorial prize in Economics "for the theory of stable allocations and the practice of market design.”  He received a Ph.D. in Operations Research from Stanford University in 1974.

Seminar Organizers and Advisory Board: This seminar series is organized by Sanjay Mehrotra (Northwestern University)Sait Tunc (Virginia Tech)Qiushi Chen (Pennsylvania State University).

The advisory board includes Ebru Bish (University of Alabama)Stephen Chick (INSEAD), and Mark Van Oyen (University of Michigan).

Special thanks to INFORMS Healthcare Application Society and all board members for their enormous support!"

Monday, September 21, 2020

Auctions and Market Design Friday Seminar Series, organized by INFORMS (starting Oct 2)

 The auctions and market design section of INFORMS (the Operations Research and Management Science organization) is initiating a new seminar series,  every other week on Fridays, starting Oct 2.  I'll start the series off with a talk on contemporary kidney exchange, and there are talks scheduled through December, see below.

Auctions and Market Design Online Seminar Series

About the Seminar

The aim of this interdisciplinary seminar is to discuss pioneering and impactful work in the broad area of market design. Theoretical, computational, and experimental work as well as field studies will be featured. A wide range of applications, ranging from online advertising and labor markets to networks and platforms, will be presented. The seminar features research talks and expository talks to highlight trends in the field.

Organization

The seminar is organized by Ozan Candogan (Chicago Booth)Vahideh Manshadi (Yale), and Fanyin Zheng (Columbia).

The seminar will be bi-weekly on Fridays at 1-2 pm ET (10-11 am PT).

Email List

If this seminar interests you and you would like to be notified of upcoming speakers, you can join our email list.

Schedule

October 02 - Alvin Roth (Stanford University)

Title: Kidney Exchange: an Operations Perspective


October 16 - John Birge (University of Chicago)

Title: Increasing Efficiency in Electricity Market Auctions



October 30 - Jon Kleinberg (Cornell University)

November 13 - Winners of the Michael H. Rothkopf Junior Researcher Paper Prize

December 04 - Asuman Ozdaglar (MIT)

December 18 - Matthew Jackson (Stanford University)

Monday, June 29, 2020

New seminar series on Marketplace Algorithms and Design.

Yash Kanoria writes to alert me to their new seminar series:


Gagan Goel, Daniela Saban, and Yash Kanoria (with help from Judy Gan) are organizing a seminar on Marketplace Algorithms and Design.

We will start with an "Ask me anything" session with Preston McAfee on Tuesday June 30th, 11am-12pm PT. Thereafter, on Thursdays, 11am - 12pm PT we have:
· July 9: Navdeep Sahni, "Search Advertising and Information Discovery: Are Consumers Averse to Sponsored Messages?"
· July 23: Ramesh Johari, "Experimental Design in Two-Sided Platforms: An Analysis of Bias"
· July 30: Sera Linardi, "Worker-Firm Relational Contracts at the Time of Shutdowns: Experimental Evidence"
Zoom info: https://zoom.us/j/97125802655  password: please request it by filling this form
Simultaneous Youtube live stream channel
Time: 11 am to noon Pacific Time

Saturday, April 11, 2020

Market design seminars on Zoom, Monday afternoons in Paris

For those of you missing your local market design seminars, here's a convenient substitute, Monday afternoons if you're in Europe, or before breakfast if you're in California... (The first one was this past Thursday.)

Virtual MD Seminar Series
The Virtual Market Design Seminar is an open online alternative to seminars cancelled due to the COVID-19. Seminars will cover all fields from market design. Talks usually take place bi-weekly on Monday at 4:00-5:00pm (Paris UTC) on Zoom. Please check the schedule below, different days and times are possible.
Registration
If you would like to participate and to stay up to date about upcoming presentations, please join our mailing list. You will receive the Zoom link for each talk. 

Upcoming Presentations
Thursday, April 9, 2:00pm (Paris UTC).
Maarten Janssen (University of Vienna): "Regulating Product Communication". (with S. Roy). [slides]
Monday, April 20, 4:00pm (Paris UTC).
Scott Duke Kominers (Harvard Business School): "Redistribution through Markets" (with P. Dworczak and M. Akbarpour).
Monday, May 4, 4:00pm (Paris UTC).
Renato Gomes (Toulouse School of Economics): "Regulating Platform Fees under Price Parity" (with A. Mantovani).
Monday, May 18, 4:00pm (Paris UTC).
Benny Moldovanu (University of Bonn):"tba".

Organizers
Olivier Bos (Paris II), Nicolas Fugger (Cologne), Vitali Gretschko (ZEW), Helene Mass (Bonn), Marion Ott (ZEW), Martin Pollrich (Bonn), Nora Szech (KIT).

Friday, November 15, 2019

Controversial markets: Seminar at Pitt

I'll be speaking at Pitt today, in the experimental/behavioral seminar:

Controversial Markets

11:30 a.m. to 1 p.m., 4940 Posvar Hall
Sponsor: Experimental/Behavioral Seminar

Thursday, June 20, 2019

Seminar at Bocconi

I'll speak today, about Controversial Markets, at IGIER at Bocconi...

IGIER Seminar Series

June 20, 2019 - 12:30 to 13:45
room N02 - Velodromo
Alvin Roth (Stanford University)

Monday, June 17, 2019

Matching markets and market design at the University of Campania, Luigi Vanvitelli

I'll be speaking today on matching markets and market design at the
Università degli studi della Campania Luigi Vanvitelli

Here's the announcement: Premio Nobel alla Vanvitelli, in cattedra c'è Alvin Roth,
and here's another.

"Alvin Roth - Premio Nobel per l'economia 2012 - all'Università Vanvitelli con una conferenza dal titolo "Matching markets and market design".

"L'evento, organizzato dal Dipartimento di Scienze politiche dell'Ateneo, si terrà il 17 giugno presso l'Aula Magna del Centro residenziale e studi della SNA, Corso Trieste a Caserta alle ore 10.30. Economista statunitense già noto per i suoi fondamentali contributi nella teoria dei giochi e dell'economia sperimentale, attualmente è Professore di Economia, presso il Dipartimento di Economia della Stanford University ed è Professore Emerito di Economia e Business Administration presso la Harvard University.


"Roth è leader mondiale nelle aree di ricerca della teoria dei giochi, economia sperimentale e market design, in particolare del disegno dei matching markets.
Il problema del combinare diversi giocatori (agenti) nel miglior modo possibile, è un problema economico molto rilevante. Lloyd Shapley (che ha condiviso il Nobel con Alvin Roth) ha studiato i diversi metodi di matching teoricamente e, a partire dagli anni ’80, Alvin Roth ha usato i risultati teorici di Shapley per spiegare come funziona una certa tipologia di mercati (i matching markets). Attraverso studi empirici ed esperimenti economici, Alvin Roth ha dimostrato che la stabilità è una caratteristica essenziale per ottenere un metodo di matching di successo. Roth ha sviluppato algoritmi per combinare medici con ospedali, studenti con scuole, donatori di organi con pazienti. Nel 2000, nell’ospedale di Rhode Island avvenne il primo scambio di reni negli Stati Uniti e la teoria sviluppata da Alvin Roth sui cicli di scambio sembrò avere un ottimo potenziale per questo tipo di applicazione. Roth e i suoi collaboratori hanno disegnato un algoritmo per lo scambio di reni sia tra pazienti e donatori diretti, sia per integrare questo tipo di scambio con donatori non diretti (come donatori deceduti o altri donatori non diretti ancora in vita). "

Wednesday, July 5, 2017

Eduardo Azevedo on "Market failure in kidney exchange" at Penn today

If I were at Penn today I'd attend this seminar by Eduardo Azevedo:


Wed, July 5, 12:00pm – 1:30pm
G65 JMHH
AEW Seminars for Business Economics and Public Policy
Eduardo Azevedo "Market Failure in Kidney Exchange" joint w/ Clayton Featherstone, Nikhil Agarwal, Itai Ashlagi, Omer Karaduman ABSTRACT: The market for kidney exchange was created to address the shortage of kidneys for transplantation. The participants in kidney exchange markets are patients who want to receive a kidney transplant, and have a willing but incompatible live donor. These patients register in kidney exchange platforms, where they perform donor swaps with other patients. This market has grown to about 800 transplants per year. We show that this market is fragmented. Transactions take place in dozens of platforms, which are mostly very small, as opposed to in a few large platforms. This fragmentation leads to a deadweight loss of at least 200 transplants per year, because the size of most existing platforms is far below the efficient scale necessary for efficiently matching patients. The fragmentation is due to classic market failures, and simple alternative mechanisms can considerably increase efficiency.

Monday, March 27, 2017

Columbia U. Economic Theory Workshop today: Stable matching in centralized and decentralized markets

I'll speak at Columbia today, partly on a paper with Qingyun Wu, and partly on the larger question of why stable matching mechanisms seem to be very important for centralized clearinghouses, but may provide less insight into how decentralized markets resolve themselves.

"Stable matching in centralized and decentralized markets"


MAR
27
Monday
Al Roth (Stanford) 
2:30 - 3:45  |  INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS BUILDING 1101





Monday, May 6, 2013

UCLA honors Lloyd Shapley, but closes CASSEL

On Thursday I gave a department seminar at UCLA's department of Economics, and was glad to see this poster of Lloyd Shapley around campus, and a display in his honor in the library.

Lloyd Shapley


In the same visit, I was sorry to hear that UCLA's big experimental economics lab CASSEL, the California Social Science Experimental Laboratory, is scheduled to be closed down...:(

Monday, October 17, 2011

I speak about kidney exchange at Harvard Medical School

As the seminar announcement makes clear, part of the attraction (at least to third year students) is the free food:)



John Warren Surgical Society at Harvard Medical School
presents

Alvin E. Roth, Ph.D
 George Gund Professor of Economics and Business Administration in the Department of Economics 
at Harvard University and in the Harvard Business School.
for a discussion of
"Market Design, Kidney Exchange, and Repugnance"


 Monday, October 17th
 12:30 pm, TMEC 250

Food will be served.
Al Roth's research, teaching, and consulting interests are in game theory, experimental economics, and market design. The best known market he has designed (or, in this case, redesigned) is the National Resident Matching Program, which matches approximately twenty thousand doctors a year with their residency program at American hospitals. He has recently been involved in the reorganization of the market for Gastroenterology fellows, which started using a clearinghouse in 2006 for positions beginning in 2007. Other markets he has helped design include the high school matching system used in New York City to match approximately ninety thousand students to high schools each year, starting with students entering high school in the Fall of 2004; The matching system used in Boston Public Schools, adopted for students starting school in September 2006; And the New England Program for Kidney Exchange, for incompatible patient-donor pairs. He is the chair of the American Economic Association's Ad Hoc Committee on the Job Market, which has designed a number of recent changes in the market for new Ph.D. economists. He is a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and the Econometric Society, and has been a Guggenheim and Sloan fellow. He received his Ph.D at Stanford University, and came to Harvard from the University of Pittsburgh, where he was the Andrew Mellon Professor of Economics.

High Yield Information:  
First years:  Al Roth is awesome.  You get to ask him questions.  Also attendees will get early access to joining the HMS Transplant Pager Program where you will likely be able to observe the a paired kidney donation first hand.  
Second years: Relive great memories of last year while we talk about kidneys, residency, policy, and ethics.
Third Years: There will be free food.
Fourth Years: Al Roth designed the National Resident Matching Program. I'm sure he'd be happy to answer a reasonable number of questions.  
We look forward to seeing you there!

Monday, October 3, 2011

Kessler-Roth at the Health Law Policy and Bioethics Workshop today

At 5pm today Judd Kessler and I will be speaking at Harvard Law School at this seminar*, on this paper**...

It's open to the public, Hauser Hall Room 105.

*Petrie Flom Center Health Law Policy Workshop

**Kessler, Judd B. and Alvin E. Roth, '' Organ Allocation Policy and the Decision to Donate,'' American Economic Review, forthcoming.

Thursday, May 13, 2010

Market design seminar tomorrow (Friday May 13 2010)

If you're not on Peter Coles' distribution list, here's the announcement.

Hello Market Design Community:

The speakers in Friday’s HBS Market Design Workshop (the last of the semester!) are

** IAN KASH, "An Auction Design for Sharing Wireless Spectrum," Harvard Center for Research on Computation and Society

** SCOTT KOMINERS, "Concordance Among Holdouts" [with E. G. Weyl], Harvard Business Economics

We’ll meet tomorrow, Friday May 14, from 3-5PM in HBS Baker Library Room 102. The workshop features an informal format for presenting early-stage work, and is intended to encourage the Boston area market design community to meet and interact. Sushi will be provided.

Thanks, and we look forward to seeing you.

Peter Coles / Ben Edelman / Al Roth