Market Design for Surface Water , by Ferguson and Milgrom

 The potential market for surface water is a market in which any transfer of rights involves externalities affecting the water consumption of others.

Market Design for Surface Water  by Billy A. Ferguson & Paul Milgrom, NBER WORKING PAPER 32010, DOI 10.3386/w32010, December 2023

Abstract: Many proposed surface water transfers undergo a series of regulatory reviews designed to mitigate hydrological and economic externalities. While these reviews help limit externalities, they impose substantial transaction costs that also limit trade. To promote a well-functioning market for surface water in California, we describe how a new kind of water right and related regulatory practices can balance the trade-off between externalities and transaction costs, and how a Water Incentive Auction can incentivize a sufficient number of current rights holders to swap their old rights for the new ones. The Water Incentive Auction adapts lessons learned from the US government’s successful Broadcast Incentive Auction.

From the introduction:

"Why is there so little water trading in California despite the heterogeneous uses and huge price differences? The consensus among many economists studying water is that much of the problem lies in an archaic system of property rights, which was perhaps simple and clear enough to function well when California was first settled, but which is dysfunctional today. We will argue below that trading in traditional water rights creates externalities, so efficiency-enhancing changes in water allocations cannot be achieved by exhausting profitable bilateral trades. Rather, it requires a coordinated, multilateral effort. The next section on the Institutional Background provides a description of water rights and the externalities that can result from trade or from certain other decisions about uses. What is most novel in this paper comes after that: we analyze a mechanism that enacts a change in water rights that could lead to much more efficient trade.

Our analysis draws on lessons learned from the US Broadcast Incentive Auction in 2016-17, in which some rights to use radio spectrum for television broadcast were combined, converted, and subdivided into more flexible rights that were better suited for wireless broadband communications. This was accomplished using an auction procedure designed to provide an “incentive” for broadcasters to participate. As in that auction, participation in an analogous Water Rights Incentive Auction could be entirely voluntary, with current water users incentivized to participate because they could trade their existing rights for new, more flexible rights and possibly additional payments as determined by an auction. Just as the Broadcast Incentive Auction achieved its goals described in the National Broadband Plan even though many broadcasters chose not to sell their rights, a Water Incentive Auction could provide the substantial benefits of more flexible water rights even if many water users decline to participate. We describe some details of a possible Water Incentive Auctions in a later section of this paper."

The market for music rights--all Bob Dylan's songs

 The NY Times has the story:

Bob Dylan Sells His Songwriting Catalog in Blockbuster Deal--Universal Music purchased his entire songwriting catalog of more than 600 songs in what may be the biggest acquisition ever of a single act’s publishing rights.  By Ben Sisario

"The deal, which covers Dylan’s entire career, from his earliest tunes to his latest album, “Rough and Rowdy Ways,” was struck directly with Dylan, 79, who has long controlled the vast majority of his own songwriting copyrights.

"The price was not disclosed, but is estimated at more than $300 million.

...

"Music publishing is the side of the business that deals in the copyrights for songwriting and composition — the lyrics and melodies of songs, in their most fundamental form — which are distinct from those for a recording. Publishers and writers collect royalties and licensing fees any time their work is sold, streamed, broadcast on the radio or used in a movie or commercial. 

...

"Streaming has helped lift the entire music market — publishers in the United States collected $3.7 billion in 2019, according to the National Music Publishers’ Association — which has drawn new investors attracted to the steady and growing income generated by music rights.

"Dylan’s deal includes 100 percent of his rights for all the songs of his catalog, including both the income he receives as a songwriter and his control of each song’s copyright. In exchange for its payment to Dylan, Universal, a division of the French media conglomerate Vivendi, will collect all future income from the songs."

Cory Doctorow on copyright

Cory Doctorow in The Guardian: What do we want copyright to do?

"when we talk about copyright, we're not just talking about who pays how much to get access to which art, we're talking about a regulation that has the power to midwife, or strangle, enormous amounts of expressive speech."
...
"it's been more than a century since legal systems around the world took away songwriters' ability to control who performed their songs. This began with the first records, which were viewed as a form of theft by the composers of the day. You see, composers back then were in the sheet-music business: they used a copying device (the printing press) to generate a product that musicians could buy.

"When recording technology came along, musicians began to play the tunes on the sheet music they'd bought into microphones and release commercial recordings of their performances. The composers fumed that this was piracy of their music, but the performers said: "You sold us this sheet music – now you're telling us we're not allowed to play it? What did you think we were going to do with it?"

"The law's answer to this was a Solomonic divide-the-baby solution: performers were free to record any composition that had been published, but they had to pay a set rate for every recording they sold. This rate was paid to a collective rights society, and today, these societies thrive, collecting fees for all sorts of "performances" where musicians and composers get little or no say. For example, radio stations, shopping malls, and even hairdressers buy licences that allow them to play whatever music they can find. The music is sampled by more or less accurate means and dispersed to artists by more or less fair means."
...
"Rather than having the right to specify who may use your works, you merely get the right to get paid when the use takes place.

"Now, on hearing this, you might be thinking: "Good God, that's practically Stalinist! Why can't a poor creator have the right to choose who can use her works?" Well, the reason is that creators (and, notably, their industrial investors) are notoriously resistant to new media. The composers damned the record companies as pirates; the record labels damned the radio for its piracy; broadcasters vilified the cable companies for taking their signals; cable companies fought the VCR for its recording "theft." Big entertainment tried to kill FM radio, TV remote controls (which made it easy to switch away from adverts), jukeboxes, and so on, all the way back to the protestant reformation's fight over who got to read the Bible.

"Given that new media typically allow new creators to create new forms of material that is pleasing to new audiences, it's hard to justify giving the current lotto winners a veto over the next generation of disruptive technologies. Especially when the winners of today were the pirates of yesteryear. Turnabout is fair play."

Sustainable fisheries

Nowhere is the "tragedy of the commons" clearer than in ocean fisheries, which are difficult to regulate and maintain in a sustainable way. A recent article, Fish Shares and Sharing Fish describes the problem well. (From a market design perspective, one difficulty is that fishermen have large strategy sets, so changing the rules of the game often changes behavior in unanticipated ways.)

In national waters, regulations involve law enforcement, and the Washington Post has an illuminating story about a criminal investigation involving the sale of illegally large rockfish (striped bass), which the law requires must be thrown back so that the breeding pool should not be selected to consist of only small fish. Swimming in Intrigue in Backwoods of Md.: Four-Year Undercover Probe Led to Charges of Rockfish Trafficking.
Some quick quotes from that story:
"Cheating is an old vice around the Chesapeake, with watermen sneaking in extra bushels of oysters or undersized perch. "
"The fish -- a key predator and a beloved sport fish, also known as striped bass -- has rebounded from desperate lows in the 1980s, in part because of restrictions on fishing."
"Many of the fish were tagged as having been caught with hooks and lines, but the agents suspected they had actually been caught in a large net and should have been subject to different restrictions.
To prove it, they turned to a fish coroner. "

In October 2007 I hosted a conference at Harvard organized by Ecotrust on Market Design for Limited Access Programs in U.S. Fisheries. One consequence of that is that, together with some students and colleagues, I occasionally get to talk to Paul Parker of the Cape Cod Fisheries Trust, about contemporary market design problems in the Cape Cod scallop and ground fish fisheries. His concern is with how regulations on fishing may impact the composition of the fishing fleet; and how the makeup of the fleet (specifically the relationship between big factory ships and the small day boats that are the constituency of the Cape Cod Commercial Hook Fishermen's Association) will in turn impact the fish.

Market for ideas

Joshua Gans and Scott Stern sent me a fascinating market design paper called Is there a market for ideas?, which performs some admirable intellectual arbitrage. They seek to combine modern insights on the unusual properties of intellectual property with some of the recent conclusions from market design.

In particular, they take seriously my proposal here that many market failures have to do with a failure to make the market thick, to deal with congestion, or to make it safe to participate in the marketplace, together with the fact that some transactions are regarded as repugnant.

They argue that some of the properties of ideas themselves make it difficult to organize successful markets for ideas along conventional lines: e.g. "...a key property of ideas - the potential for expropriation - limits the potential for market thickness and lack of congestion identified by Roth."

Among the particular examples they discuss of market designs that try to solve these problems and make markets for ideas are the scientific incentive system ("Open Science"), open source efforts such as Wikipedia, and commercial projects such as Ocean Tomo (which runs auctions for IP assets), and Innocentive (which runs a marketplace in which companies can post Challenges in need of solutions).

Here's the abstract:
"This paper draws on recent work in market design to evaluate the conditions under which a market for ideas or technology (MfTs) will emerge and operate in an efficient way. While most research on MfT have focused primarily on bilateral exchanges, market design principles suggest that any single transaction takes place in the shadow or all other potential transactions. As highlighted by Roth (2007), effective market design must ensure four basic principles: market thickness, lack of congestion, market safety, and avoidance of “repugnance.” Taken together, these conditions ensure that participants in a market have opportunities to trade with a wide range of potential transactors (market thickness), that the market is rapid enough (relative to the speed of transactions) that market participants can feasibly turn down offers in order to seek better matches (lack of congestion), potential market participants have a high incentive to participate in the market and avoid strategic interaction which might undermine allocative efficiency and social welfare (market safety), and that market trade is not undermined by other social values which limit the ability to charge positive prices for a good (avoidance of repugnance). This paper provides a critical examination of these criteria for MfT. Our analysis suggests that microeconomic, strategic, and institutional factors likely inhibit the allocative efficiency of MfT in most circumstances. For example, Arrow’s disclosure problem suggests that the value of a given idea to any one buyer may be decreasing in the number of other potential buyers who have been able to evaluate the idea (due to information leakages in the valuation process). As a result, a key property of ideas - the potential for expropriation - limits the potential for market thickness and lack of congestion identified by Roth. At the same time, key institutional developments such as the development of formalized IP exchanges and increased attention on how to design the patent system to facilitate technology transfer suggest that effective market design may be possible for some innovation markets. Perhaps most intriguingly, our analysis suggests that markets for ideas are beset by the “repugnance” problem: from the perspective of market design, Open Science is an institution that places normative value on “free” disclosure and so undermines the ability of ideas producers to earn market-based returns for producing even very valuable “pure” knowledge. "

Property rights and real estate: Squatting in Britain

Markets allocate rights, but laws determine what those rights entail. Britain's real estate laws are unusual in giving owners only limited rights to their property when it is unoccupied. The Washington Post reports: Recession Revives Britain's Squatter Movement

"Squatting -- taking up residence in a vacant building -- has been a tradition in Britain since at least the 14th century, as well as a barometer of the times. It boomed after each of the 20th century's two world wars, when returning soldiers needed places to live, then picked up steam again in the radical 1960s.
Now, despite local governments' efforts to discourage it, squatting appears to be on the rise once more as a deep recession hits the country.
In Britain, trespassing is a civil offense, not a criminal one. Provided the squatters do not break a window or door to enter or otherwise damage the property, police are largely powerless to remove them.
Landlords must petition a court for an eviction order, and they can be prosecuted if they attempt to remove the intruders by force. " ...

""The owners are upset and distressed about this. They can't understand how the squatters can be permitted to break into their house and live there," said Andrew Jeffrey, a lawyer who represents the owners of the Mayfair house. "In nine out of 10 countries around the globe, this would not be tolerated, and the police would remove them immediately."
Nic Madge, a circuit court judge in London and a specialist in property law, said proposals in the 1970s to criminalize squatting were defeated in the face of "considerable political opposition."
"The standard British sign, 'Trespassers will be prosecuted,' is generally a legal fiction," Madge said. "

"Ron Bailey, an activist who started Britain's modern squatting movement in 1968 and has written books about squatting, said Britons have a history of sympathy for the practice that goes back hundreds of years. "We look at it as a social good," he said. "If it's a house left empty for a long time, I don't think people see anything wrong with it."

Bankruptcy

Contracts are shaped in part by the legal framework that determines what happens when contracts break down. The long time scholar of bankruptcy Michelle White has a timely new NBER working paper "Bankruptcy: Past Puzzles, Recent Reforms, and the Mortgage Crisis." (It is a revised version of her 2008 Presidential Address to the American Law and Economics Association.)

One arresting sentence:
"By the early 2000’s, more people were filing for bankruptcy each year than were graduating from college, getting divorced or being diagnosed with cancer."

British organ donation: opt in versus opt out

The Telegraph reports that A report into organ donation ordered by Gordon Brown will not recommend a system of presumed consent.

"The group ordered to look into the system as a possible solution to a shortage of donors is due to report at the start of next week. It will recommend that ministers work to increase the number of donors but is expected to favour a situation where donors still register to donate organs after their death.
The group is understood to have come under pressure from Muslim organisations to keep the opt-in system.
But senior government figures, including the Prime Minister and Liam Donaldson, the Chief Medical Officer, are understood to believe that presumed consent is the only way to solve the problem. "

The London Times also covers the story, with a different emphasis: Brown’s organ donor plan is rejected by scientists

"Mr Brown has argued previously that presumed consent, already used in Spain and other countries, could help to “close the aching gap between the potential benefits of transplant surgery in the UK and the limits imposed by our current system of consent”. ...
But the taskforce, an expert working group of healthcare professionals, lawyers and ethicists set up to look at ways to increase the number of organ donations, is understood to believe that an opt-out system would do little to boost the number of life-saving transplants. It is expected to say such a move would create practical problems for the NHS and risk a potential backlash among the public.
Last night a senior Whitehall source told The Times: “It’s fair to say this report is not helpful to the case for a change in the law to presumed consent.” "

Thaler and Sunstein will be disappointed too.

Update: Thaler emails me as follows
"Thaler and Sunstein will NOT be disappointed. We favor mandated choice for two reasons. First, presumed consent raises hackles. Second, it leads to more overrides by family since the donor's intentions may be only implicit.
Illinois has adopted this with zero fanfare. When you renew your license they just ask you "donor or not donor". Perfect."

Property rights

A lack of well defined property rights can hamper efficiency. A case in point: Christians Feud Over Church of Holy Sepulcher

"The Israeli government has long wanted to build a fire exit in the church, which regularly fills with thousands of pilgrims and has only one main door, but the plan is on hold because the sects cannot agree where the exit will be built. In another example, a ladder placed on a ledge over the entrance sometime in the 19th century has remained there ever since because of a dispute over who has the authority to take it down."