An upside to dowries, by Natalie Bau, Gaurav Khanna, Corinne Low & Alessandra Voena

 Dowries (like bride prices*) are often criticized, but may have indirect effects that aren't so easy to see, as in this recent NBER paper:

Traditional Institutions in Modern Times: Dowries as Pensions When Sons Migrate by Natalie Bau, Gaurav Khanna, Corinne Low & Alessandra Voena  NBER WORKING PAPER 31176, DOI 10.3386/w31176

Abstract: This paper examines whether an important cultural institution in India - dowry - can enable male migration by increasing the liquidity available to young men after marriage. We hypothesize that one cost of migration is the disruption of traditional elderly support structures, where sons live near their parents and care for them in their old age. Dowry can attenuate this cost by providing sons and parents with a liquid transfer that eases constraints on income sharing. To test this hypothesis, we collect two novel datasets on property rights over dowry among migrants and among families of migrants. Net transfers of dowry to a man's parents are common but far from universal. Consistent with using dowry for income sharing, transfers occur more when sons migrate, especially when they work in higher-earning occupations. Nationally representative data confirms that migration rates are higher in areas with stronger historical dowry traditions. Finally, exploiting a large-scale highway construction program, we show that men from areas with stronger dowry traditions have a higher migration response to reduced migration costs. Despite its potentially adverse consequences, dowry may play a role in facilitating migration and therefore, economic development.

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*Recall this earlier paper:

Ashraf, Nava, Natalie Bau, Nathan Nunn, and Alessandra Voena. "Bride price and female education." Journal of Political Economy 128, no. 2 (2020): 591-641.

Mixed marriage bonus in Iraq

Iraq: $2, 000 for Shiite-Sunni Couples Who Marry

"Talib and his wife are among more than 1,700 newlywed couples who have accepted cash from a government program that encourages Sunnis and Shiites to tie the knot. The government has held 15 mass weddings for inter-sect couples from all over Iraq... While the Iraqi government doesn't track marriages bridging the two major Muslim sects, experts say mixed couples are on the rebound after a dramatic decline during the days of heavy violence. ...

"As security has improved, Iraqis are returning to their homes in mixed neighborhoods and spending more time at offices, universities and other places where they meet their future spouses, said Shiite cleric Sayyid Ahmed Hirz al-Yasiri in Baghdad's Shiite stronghold of Sadr City.
''There was a time when families were reluctant to consent to such marriages because of concerns created by certain conservative people from both sects,'' he said. ''That is over now and things are getting back to normal, like they were before the fall of Baghdad. "

Marriage market in Saudi Arabia: age of marriage

Many markets unravel, that is, transactions tend to become earlier and earlier. One example is marriage markets, in which betrothals can sometimes be very early indeed, particularly in polygenous cultures. The NY Times reports that Saudi Arabia's most senior cleric was quoted Wednesday as saying it is permissible for 10-year-old girls to marry .

"Al Sheikh's comments come at a time when Saudi human rights groups have been pushing the government to put an end to marriages involving the very young and to define a minimum age for marriage. ...
"On Sunday, the government-run Human Rights Commission condemned marriages of minor girls, saying such marriages are an ''inhumane violation'' and rob children of their rights.
The commission's statement followed a ruling by a court in Oneiza in central Saudi Arabia last month that dismissed a divorce petition by the mother of an eight-year-old girl whose father married her off to a man in his 50s....
"Activists say the girls are given away in return for hefty dowries or as a result of long-standing custom in which a father promises his infant daughters and sons to cousins out of a belief that marriage will protect them from illicit relationships."

Marriage market in Iran

The marriage market in Iran is not proceeding as planned, the Guardian reports: Premarital sex on rise as Iranians delay marriage, survey finds

"The survey also revealed that the average marrying age had risen to 40 for men and 35 for women, a blow to the government's goal of promoting marriage to shore up society's Islamic foundations."

The rise in age of marriage might be a result of religious barriers being raised to courtship between unmarried men and women. But there are other hypotheses to consider:

"Many blame economic circumstances for their failure to marry, citing high inflation, unemployment and a housing shortage along with cultural traditions that expect brides' families to provide dowries and husbands to commit themselves to mehrieh, an agreed cash gift."

"However, Hojatoleslam Ghasem Ebrahimipour, a sociologist, told Shabestan news agency that the trend was due to the availability of premarital sex, and feminism among educated women. "When a woman is educated and has an income, she does not want to accept masculine domination through marriage," he said."

Marriage market: dowries

The previous post got me thinking about dowries and their role in marriage markets: the paper I like best is "Why Dowries?" American Economic Review 93, no. 4 (September 2003): 1385-98, by Maristella Botticini and Aloysius Siow.

They argue that dowries make the most sense in agrarian societies in which daughters move to their husband's family upon marriage, while sons stay and invest in the family business. Thus parents who wish to support both sons and daughters give dowries to daughters and bequests (inheritances) to sons (instead of bequests to both, which would give sons less incentive to invest in running the family business...). As societies become less agrarian, and sons become less likely to remain in the family business, it becomes more efficient to treat sons and daughters more similarly and e.g. invest more in human capital by sending them both to college, etc...

Marriage market: Middle East

Head of Palestinian clan offers Iraqi shoe-throwing journalist a bride

"The head of a large West Bank family wants to reward the Iraqi journalist who lobbed his shoes at President George W. Bush by sending him a bride. 75-year-old Ahmad Salim Judeh says if journalist Muntadhar al-Zeidi is interested the family is willing to take one of its eligible daughters to Iraq along with her dowry. ... Al-Zeidi has become something of a folk hero since throwing his shoes at President Bush at a Sunday press conference."