Financial market design: the view from the Fed

Fed chairman Ben Bernanke, in a speech today (March 10) to the Council on Foreign Relations, after speaking of immediate steps to bail out financial institutions, talks about ways in which the financial markets might be redesigned in the longer term.

"At the same time that we are addressing such immediate challenges, it is not too soon for policymakers to begin thinking about the reforms to the financial architecture, broadly conceived, that could help prevent a similar crisis from developing in the future. We must have a strategy that regulates the financial system as a whole, in a holistic way, not just its individual components. In particular, strong and effective regulation and supervision of banking institutions, although necessary for reducing systemic risk, are not sufficient by themselves to achieve this aim.
Today, I would like to talk about four key elements of such a strategy. First, we must address the problem of financial institutions that are deemed too big--or perhaps too interconnected--to fail. Second, we must strengthen what I will call the financial infrastructure--the systems, rules, and conventions that govern trading, payment, clearing, and settlement in financial markets--to ensure that it will perform well under stress. Third, we should review regulatory policies and accounting rules to ensure that they do not induce excessive procyclicality--that is, do not overly magnify the ups and downs in the financial system and the economy. Finally, we should consider whether the creation of an authority specifically charged with monitoring and addressing systemic risks would help protect the system from financial crises like the one we are currently experiencing."

Regarding the financial infrastructure, he mentions among other things that
"To help alleviate counterparty credit concerns, regulators are also encouraging the development of well-regulated and prudently managed central clearing counterparties for OTC trades. Just last week, we approved the application for membership in the Federal Reserve System of ICE Trust, a trust company that proposes to operate as a central counterparty and clearinghouse for CDS transactions. "

On the subject of clearinghouses, he goes on to say
"The Federal Reserve and other authorities also are focusing on enhancing the resilience of the triparty repurchase agreement (repo) market, in which the primary dealers and other major banks and broker-dealers obtain very large amounts of secured financing from money market mutual funds and other short-term, risk-averse sources of funding.
...
it may be worthwhile considering the costs and benefits of a central clearing system for this market, given the magnitude of exposures generated and the vital importance of the market to both dealers and investors. "

His comments on "procyclicality" e.g. on making sure that regulation of capital reserves don't cause banks to cut back lending just when credit needs to be loosened, are also worth reading. His concluding paragraph is a sober look at market design contemplated (as it often must be) in advance of reliable scientific knowledge, but in light of recent experience:

"Financial crises will continue to occur, as they have around the world for literally hundreds of years. Even with the sorts of actions I have outlined here today, it is unrealistic to hope that financial crises can be entirely eliminated, especially while maintaining a dynamic and innovative financial system. Nonetheless, these steps should help make crises less frequent and less virulent, and so contribute to a better functioning national and global economy."

TARP II

Lucian Bebchuk, the eminent law-and-economics lawyer/economist best known for his work on corporate governance, has just distributed a paper, How To Make TARP II Work.

Here is the Abstract:
"Treasury Secretary Geithner announced a plan, which the Treasury is willing to finance with up to $1 trillion of public funds, to partner with private capital to buy banks' "troubled assets." The Treasury has not yet settled on the plan's design, and its announcement has encountered substantial skepticism as to whether an effective plan for a public-private partnership in buying troubled assets can be worked out. This paper argues that, yes, it can. The paper also analyzes how the plan should be designed to contribute most to restarting the market for troubled assets at the least cost to taxpayers.

"The government's plan should focus on establishing a significant number of competing funds that will be privately managed and dedicated to buying troubled assets - not on creating one, large public-private aggregator bank. Establishing competing funds, I show, is necessary both to securing a well-functioning market for troubled assets and to keeping costs to taxpayers at a minimum.

"Each new fund will be partly financed with private capital, with the rest coming (say, in the form of non-recourse debt financing) from the government's Investment Fund planned by the Treasury. One important element of the proposed design is a competitive process in which private managers seeking to establish a fund participating in the program will submit bids as to what fraction of the fund's capital will be funded privately. The government will set the fraction of each participating fund's capital that must be financed with private money at the highest level that, given the received bids, will still enable establishing new funds with aggregate capital equal to the program's target level. Overall, I show that the proposed design will leverage private capital to the fullest extent possible and will provide the most effective and least costly mechanism for restarting the market for troubled assets. "

Treasury abandons plans for reverse auction to purchase troubled assets

The Treasury announced today what had already become clear, which is that it has abandoned the initial plan to purchase troubled assets, in favor of buying equity in troubled companies: Remarks by Secretary Henry M. Paulson, Jr. on Financial Rescue Package and Economic Update

"As credit markets froze in mid-September, the Administration asked Congress for broad tools and flexibility to rescue the financial system. We asked for $700 billion to purchase troubled assets from financial institutions. At the time, we believed that would be the most effective means of getting credit flowing again.
During the two weeks that Congress considered the legislation, market conditions worsened considerably. It was clear to me by the time the bill was signed on October 3rd that we needed to act quickly and forcefully, and that purchasing troubled assets – our initial focus – would take time to implement and would not be sufficient given the severity of the problem. In consultation with the Federal Reserve, I determined that the most timely, effective step to improve credit market conditions was to strengthen bank balance sheets quickly through direct purchases of equity in banks. "

HT to Eric Budish (a market designer on the market)

Academic marketplace

Tough Times Strain Colleges Rich and Poor
"“Budget cuts mean that campuses won’t be able to fill faculty vacancies, that the student-faculty ratio rises, that students have lecturers instead of tenured professors,” said Mark G. Yudof, president of the California system. “Higher education is very labor intensive. We may be getting to the point where there will have to be some basic change in the model.” "

In the meantime, there's concern that the credit crisis will reduce the availability of student loans:
U.S. Buying More Loans to Students
"While students are still able to obtain federally backed loans, the credit crisis has hurt the lenders that provide them. Dozens have stopped offering the loans, blaming market conditions.
The initiative by the Education Department is intended to make it easier for these loan companies to obtain financing. In the 2009-10 academic year, the agency will purchase loans, as it has this year. The agency will also pledge to be the buyer of last resort for loans purchased by a private intermediary in an effort to foster investment in the student loan industry."

The Federal Reserve’s Term Auction Facility

As the credit crisis unfolded, the Fed prepared to auction funds to banks. Among other design features (such as how expressive a bidding language to allow) they thought about adverse selection: they wanted to reduce the signal value "stigma" of participation.

The Federal Reserve’s Term Auction Facility
July 2008 Volume 14, Number 5
Authors: Olivier Armantier, Sandra Krieger, and James McAndrews

Abstract: "As liquidity conditions in the term funding markets grew increasingly strained in late 2007, the Federal Reserve began making funds available directly to banks through a new tool, the Term Auction Facility (TAF). The TAF provides term funding on a collateralized basis, at interest rates and amounts set by auction. The facility is designed to improve liquidity by making it easier for sound institutions to borrow when the markets are not operating efficiently."

Auction Design: "Once the Federal Reserve concluded that an auction format was an effective funding alternative, it added features aimed at ensuring the most efficient distribution of funds to banks with a high demand. In particular, the Fed established a minimum rate at which bids could be submitted that was set in a comparable, competitive market (rather than a penalty rate, which is set at a premium to existing market rates).This market-based minimum bid rate was likely to encourage participation and reduce any stigma associated with receiving auctioned funds, since banks would not necessarily signal an abnormally high demand by bidding. The Federal Reserve also chose a uniform-price (or single-price) auction rather than a discriminatory (pay-your-bid) auction in part to spur participation further. By using the uniform-price structure common in Treasury auctions, the Fed reasoned that banks would be more comfortable with bidding. Finally, to allow for the widest allocation of funds, the central bank imposed a cap on the bid amount corresponding to 10 percent of the auction size.
The Fed also imposed two important rules. First, based on its experience with option auctions in 1999, it would allow each bidder to make two rate-amount offers. This rule represents the Fed’s resolution of the trade-off associated with multiple rate-amount offers: as the number of offers increases, the auction becomes more complex, but participants are able to make bids that are more representative of their demand. Second, the central bank would require TAF participants to pledge collateral beyond the amount necessary to secure credit in the new facility. This rule was imposed to ensure that bidders in the new facility could still borrow through the discount window’s primary credit facility to meet unexpected overnight funding needs."

Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 --market mechanisms

The bailout bill is pretty terse on the details of market design: here's the relevant section of H.R.1424, part b,SEC. 113. MINIMIZATION OF LONG-TERM COSTS AND MAXIMIZATION OF BENEFITS FOR TAXPAYERS

"(b) Use of Market Mechanisms- In making purchases under this Act , the Secretary shall--
(1) make such purchases at the lowest price that the Secretary determines to be consistent with the purposes of this Act ; and
(2) maximize the efficiency of the use of taxpayer resources by using market mechanisms, including auctions or reverse auctions, where appropriate.
(c) Direct Purchases- If the Secretary determines that use of a market mechanism under subsection (b) is not feasible or appropriate, and the purposes of the Act are best met through direct purchases from an individual financial institution, the Secretary shall pursue additional measures to ensure that prices paid for assets are reasonable and reflect the underlying value of the asset."

HT to Guhan Subramanian

Experiments in market design: financial bailout

NPR has followed up their earlier coverage of the Ausubel-Cramton reverse auction proposal with a brief story reporting on some experiments they are running with it: Can the Banks Cheat?

Hat tip to Steve Leider (an innovative experimenter and behavioral economist on the market this year:)

Market design that you can't refuse: Treasury switches to equity

The NY Times reports that the latest change of direction in the financial bailout was presented as an ultimatum by the Treasury to big banks: Drama Behind a $250 Billion Banking Deal

Market for economic advice (market failure)

This morning Peter Cramton and Larry Ausubel were on NPR talking about their reverse auction proposal, and The Chronicle of Higher Education writes about how little advice Congress got from economists on the financial rescue plans (i.e. not only how but what to buy, etc):
In Dismal Times, Economists Try to Shape Financial Debates (a permanent link for subscribers here)

Some quotes:
"Legislation drafted in haste and negotiated with recalcitrant partners is going to be bad legislation"

"Despite his frustrations with Congress, Mr. Galbraith says that he learned from watching his father for many years that it is important never to condescend to policy makers. “These are serious people, and you need to speak to them in a candid and serious way,” he says. “The question is not so much what economists need to say to policy makers, but what kind of policy education economists need in order to be able to intelligently understand the constraints that policy makers operate under.”
But one of the professors who joined Mr. Zingales in writing the anti-bailout petition takes a dimmer view of economists' efforts to speak directly into lawmakers' ears.
“The business of advice remains what it was,” says John H. Cochrane, a professor of finance at the University of Chicago. “You have to be willing become a sort of media person. You have to tailor your advice to what people want to hear, and then shade it a bit in the direction of common sense.” "

The credit crisis: anatomy of a market failure

The NY Times reports on 36 Hours of Alarm and Action as Crisis Spiraled.

"...But contagion was already spreading. The problem posed by the Lehman bankruptcy was not the losses suffered by hedge funds and other investors who traded stocks or bonds with the firms. As federal officials had predicted, that turned out to be manageable. (That was one reason the government did not step in to save the firm.)
The real problem was that a handful of hedge funds that used the firm’s London office to handle their trades had billions of dollars in balances frozen in the bankruptcy. "

Auction design for bailout by treasury--Ausubel and Cramton

Peter Cramton writes: Dear Al,
Here is the longer version of my paper with Larry Ausubel on possible details of a troubled asset reverse auction. It might even be a good topic for your market design class.
"A Troubled Asset Reverse Auction" (with Lawrence M. Ausubel), Working Paper, University of Maryland, September 2008. [Presentation]

A Troubled Asset Reverse Auction
Lawrence M. Ausubel and Peter Cramton
30 September 2008
Summary
The US Treasury has proposed purchasing $700 billion of troubled assets to restore liquidity and solve the current financial crisis, using market mechanisms such as reverse auctions where appropriate. This paper presents a high-level design for a troubled asset reverse auction and discusses the auction design issues. We assume that the key objectives of the auction are to:
· provide a quick and effective means to purchase troubled assets and increase liquidity;
· protect the taxpayer by yielding a price for assets related to their value; and
· offer a transparent rules-based process that minimizes discretion and favoritism.
We propose a two-part approach.
Part 1. Groups of related securities are purchased in simultaneous descending clock auctions. The auctions operate on a security-by-security basis to avoid adverse selection. To assure that the auction for each security is competitive, the demand for each security is capped at the total quantity offered by all but the largest three sellers. Demand bids from private buyers are also allowed. The simultaneous clock auctions protect the taxpayer by yielding a competitive price for each security and allow bidders to manage liquidity constraints and portfolio risk. The resulting price discovery also improves the liquidity of the securities that are not purchased in the auctions.
Part 2. Following Part 1, the remaining quantity is purchased in descending clock auctions in which many securities are pooled together. To minimize adverse selection, reference prices are calculated for each security from a model that includes all of the characteristics of each security including the market information revealed in the security-by-security auctions of Part 1. Bids in the pooled auctions are specified in terms of a percentage of the reference price for each security.
The two parts are complementary. Part 1 quickly adds liquidity and establishes competitive market prices for many securities. Additional assets are then purchased in Part 2, taking full advantage of the market information revealed in Part 1.
Clock auctions have been used successfully in the electricity and natural gas sectors for assets worth tens of billions of dollars over the last seven years. Related approaches have been used to auction emission allowances, radio spectrum, timber rights, and rough diamonds.
The approach is feasible even on an extremely tight timetable. The development of the reference price model and data will require the most time to complete, but fortunately this is not needed until Part 2. The auctions of Part 1 can begin in a matter of weeks.
We limit the scope of the paper to taking the legislation as given and providing an auction design within the requirements of the legislation.
The paper is organized as follows. We begin by explaining the adverse selection problem that arises when different securities are pooled together. Then we provide an overview of the two-part reverse auction plan. Next we develop details of Part 1, the security-by-security auctions. We then present the motivation for the simultaneous descending clock auction. Next we present further details of Part 2, the pooled auctions. Then we explore how stock warrants and senior debt can be usefully incorporated into the purchases of troubled assets. Next we discuss the feasibility of successful implementation on an expedited schedule. We conclude that the design achieves the key objectives and can be implemented with minimal risk in a short period of time.

Auction design for bailout by treasury

Peter Cramton and Larry Ausubul weigh in, in "Auction Design Critical for Rescue Plan" in The Economists' Voice

"An auction that determines a
real price for a given security needs to require
multiple holders of the security to compete
with one another. This can be achieved if the
Treasury purchases only some, not all, of any
given security."

"Thus, a better approach would be for the
Treasury to instead conduct a separate auction
for each security and limit itself to buying
perhaps 50% of the aggregate face value. Again,
the auction starts at a high price and works its
way down. If the security clears at 30 cents on
the dollar, this means that the holders value
it at 30 cents on the dollar. (If the value were
only 15 cents, then most holders would supply
100% of their securities to be purchased at 30
cents, and the price would be pushed lower.)
The auction then works as intended. The price
is reasonably close to value. The “winners” are
the bidders who value the asset the least and
value liquidity the most.
This auction has an important additional
benefit. The “losers” are not left high and dry.
By determining the market clearing price, the
auction increases liquidity for the remaining
50% of face value, as well as for related securities.
The auction has effectively aggregated market
information about the security’s value. This
price information is the essential ingredient
needed to restore the secondary market for
mortgage backed securities."

Repugnance and the financial bailout

There are lots of important market design issues being debated on-the-fly regarding the bailout of financial institutions. I am not surprised to see that repugnance seems to be playing a role. In President Bush's speech last night, for example:
“The American people are angry about executive compensation, and rightly so,” he said. “No one understands pay for failure.”

Design of the bailout

The demand for market designers:
"Paulson, while seeking maximum flexibility, said the Treasury is considering doing auctions one asset class at a time. He said the aim to bring “bright people” to work on the challenge of designing market mechanisms." (This sounds like a job for Paul Milgrom).

Hat tip to Eric Budish (who is on the market as a market designer this year).