Insurance for organ donors in Ireland: is it compensation?

Frank McCormick points out this interesting story from Ireland:

If you're donating an organ, you can now get insurance cover
The new Royal London Ireland offering has come in for criticism...

"Royal London Ireland has announced that it will now offer a "financial cushion" for policyholders who donate a kidney, bone marrow or portion of a lung or liver to another family member.

The first-of-its-kind "organ donor cover" has been introduced as part of the insurance provider's Specified Serious Illness (SSI) cover.

Under the newly-revamped policy offering, Royal London will pay a €2,500 one-off lump sum to living donors.

In the wake of the news, concerns have been raised that it amounts to "cash for organs" and is unsavoury and unethical.

Mark Murphy, chief executive of the Irish Kidney Association, has said:

"We don't need insurance companies offering these things, we have a compensation scheme... It's not necessary, it's not needed. They shouldn't be doing it, on the basis that it's not needed."

 Colette Houton, Royal London's underwriting and claims lead, commented:

"The supply of organ donations is an ongoing issue in this country, with an ever-increasing demand from those who are unfortunate enough to need organ transplantation.

"This shortage has led to more people receiving organs from living donors...

"It would be nice to think our pay-out could potentially help to offset the cost incurred as part of the admirable, altruistic acts that living donors are carrying out...

"Potential donors can face loss of earnings coupled with high medical bills and expenses and our goal is to alleviate these worries and concerns somewhat, by providing some financial aid to support them through surgery and recovery time.

"Living organ donation is an admirable, altruistic act and a lump sum can, at least, help to offset any costs the donor incurs following the operation and recovery involved."
*********

Here's a related press release from the Irish Brokers Association:
Royal London Launch Best-in-Class Serious Illness Cover

EC17: the ACM conference on Economics and Computation

EC is now a long-running computer science conference (underway right now at MIT). I think the initials initially stood for Electronic Commerce, but developments in both Econ and CS have let to the initial-conserving new name, Economics and Computation.

The program is a striking demonstration of the growing intersection between Ec and CS...among the papers that catch my eye are some on fairness, pricing, matching markets, and market design generally.

Here's the program with links to abstracts:

SESSION: Plenary session

Fair Algorithms for Machine Learning

• Michael Kearns

SESSION: 1a: Static Revenue Maximization 1

Dominant-Strategy versus Bayesian Multi-item Auctions: Maximum Revenue Determination and Comparison

• Andrew Chi-Chih Yao

Deferred-Acceptance Auctions for Multiple Levels of Service

• Vasilis Gkatzelis
 
• Evangelos Markakis
 
• Tim Roughgarden

The Optimal Mechanism for Selling to a Budget Constrained Buyer: The General Case

• Nikhil R. Devanur
 
• S. Matthew Weinberg

Optimal Multi-Unit Mechanisms with Private Demands

• Nikhil R. Devanur
 
• Nima Haghpanah
 
• Christos-Alexandros Psomas

SESSION: 1b: Peer Predictions

The Double Clinching Auction for Wagering

• Rupert Freeman
 
• David M. Pennock
 
• Jennifer Wortman Vaughan

Forecast Aggregation

• Itai Arieli
 
• Yakov Babichenko
 
• Rann Smorodinsky

Machine-Learning Aided Peer Prediction

• Yang Liu
 
• Yiling Chen

Peer Prediction with Heterogeneous Users

• Arpit Agarwal
 
• Debmalya Mandal
 
• David C. Parkes
 
• Nisarg Shah

SESSION: 2a: Matching 1

The Stochastic Matching Problem: Beating Half with a Non-Adaptive Algorithm

• Sepehr Assadi
 
• Sanjeev Khanna
 
• Yang Li

Facilitating the Search for Partners on Matching Platforms: Restricting Agent Actions

• Yash Kanoria
 
• Daniela Saban

Matching while Learning

• Ramesh Johari
 
• Vijay Kamble
 
• Yash Kanoria

Redesigning the Israeli Psychology Master's Match

• Avinatan Hassidim
 
• Assaf Romm
 
• Ran I. Shorrer

SESSION: 2b: Predictions and Queries

A "Quantal Regret" Method for Structural Econometrics in Repeated Games

• Noam Nisan
 
• Gali Noti

The Theory is Predictive, but is it Complete?: An Application to Human Perception of Randomness

• Jon Kleinberg
 
• Annie Liang
 
• Sendhil Mullainathan

Comparison-based Choices

• Jon Kleinberg
 
• Sendhil Mullainathan
 
• Johan Ugander

Combinatorial Auctions Do Need Modest Interaction

• Sepehr Assadi

SESSION: 3a: Dynamic Revenue Maximization 1

The Scope of Sequential Screening with Ex Post Participation Constraints

• Dirk Bergemann
 
• Francisco Castro
 
• Gabriel Weintraub

Dynamic Mechanisms with Martingale Utilities

• Santiago Balseiro
 
• Vahab Mirrokni
 
• Renato Paes Leme

Repeated Sales with Multiple Strategic Buyers

• Nicole Immorlica
 
• Brendan Lucier
 
• Emmanouil Pountourakis
 
• Samuel Taggart

Posted Price Mechanisms for a Random Stream of Customers

• José Correa
 
• Patricio Foncea
 
• Ruben Hoeksma
 
• Tim Oosterwijk
 
• Tjark Vredeveld

SESSION: 3b: Economic Equilibrium

Accounting for Strategic Response in an Agent-Based Model of Financial Regulation

• Frank Cheng
 
• Michael P. Wellman

Empirical Mechanism Design for Optimizing Clearing Interval in Frequent Call Markets

• Erik Brinkman
 
• Michael P. Wellman

Potential Function Minimizers of Combinatorial Congestion Games: Efficiency and Computation

• Pieter Kleer
 
• Guido Schäfer

Surge Pricing Solves the Wild Goose Chase

• Juan Camilo Castillo
 
• Dan Knoepfle
 
• Glen Weyl

SESSION: 4a: Matching 2

Stable Secretaries

• Yakov Babichenko
 
• Yuval Emek
 
• Michal Feldman
 
• Boaz Patt-Shamir
 
• Ron Peretz
 
• Rann Smorodinsky

Computing Equilibrium in Matching Markets

• Saeed Alaei
 
• Pooya Jalaly Khalilabadi
 
• Eva Tardos

Communication Requirements and Informative Signaling in Matching Markets

• Itai Ashlagi
 
• Mark Braverman
 
• Yash Kanoria
 
• Peng Shi

Complementary Inputs and the Existence of Stable Outcomes in Large Trading Networks

• Ravi Jagadeesan

SESSION: 4b: Voting

Making Right Decisions Based on Wrong Opinions

• Gerdus Benade
 
• Anson Kahng
 
• Ariel D. Procaccia

Voting in the Limelight

• Ronen Gradwohl

Metric Distortion of Social Choice Rules: Lower Bounds and Fairness Properties

• Ashish Goel
 
• Anilesh K. Krishnaswamy
 
• Kamesh Munagala

Of the People: Voting Is More Effective with Representative Candidates

• Yu Cheng
 
• Shaddin Dughmi
 
• David Kempe

SESSION: 5a: Static Revenue Maximization 2

A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for a Buyer with Complements: Abstract

• Alon Eden
 
• Michal Feldman
 
• Ophir Friedler
 
• Inbal Talgam-Cohen
 
• S. Matthew Weinberg

Price Doubling and Item Halving: Robust Revenue Guarantees for Item Pricing

• Elliot Anshelevich
 
• Shreyas Sekar

The Competition Complexity of Auctions: A Bulow-Klemperer Result for Multi-Dimensional Bidders

• Alon Eden
 
• Michal Feldman
 
• Ophir Friedler
 
• Inbal Talgam-Cohen
 
• S. Matthew Weinberg

Assortment Optimisation under a General Discrete Choice Model: A Tight Analysis of Revenue-Ordered Assortments

• Gerardo Berbeglia
 
• Gwenaël Joret

SESSION: 5b: Information Games

Optimal Signaling Mechanisms in Unobservable Queues with Strategic Customers

• David Lingenbrink
 
• Krishnamurthy Iyer

Information Sharing and Privacy in Networks

• Ronen Gradwohl

Algorithmic Persuasion with No Externalities

• Shaddin Dughmi
 
• Haifeng Xu

Fairness Incentives for Myopic Agents

• Sampath Kannan
 
• Michael Kearns
 
• Jamie Morgenstern
 
• Mallesh Pai
 
• Aaron Roth
 
• Rakesh Vohra
 
• Zhiwei Steven Wu

SESSION: Best Paper and Best Dissertation presentations

Combinatorial Cost Sharing

• Shahar Dobzinski
 
• Shahar Ovadia

SESSION: 6a: Scheduling

Makespan Minimization via Posted Prices

• Michal Feldman
 
• Amos Fiat
 
• Alan Roytman

Truth and Regret in Online Scheduling

• Shuchi Chawla
 
• Nikhil Devanur
 
• Janardhan Kulkarni
 
• Rad Niazadeh

Cost-Sharing Methods for Scheduling Games under Uncertainty

• Giorgos Christodoulou
 
• Vasilis Gkatzelis
 
• Alkmini Sgouritsa

SESSION: 6b: Fair Division 1

Convex Program Duality, Fisher Markets, and Nash Social Welfare

• Richard Cole
 
• Nikhil Devanur
 
• Vasilis Gkatzelis
 
• Kamal Jain
 
• Tung Mai
 
• Vijay V. Vazirani
 
• Sadra Yazdanbod

Controlled Dynamic Fair Division

• Eric Friedman
 
• Christos-Alexandros Psomas
 
• Shai Vardi

A Lower Bound for Equitable Cake Cutting

• Ariel D. Procaccia
 
• Junxing Wang

SESSION: 7a: Dynamic Revenue Maximization 2

Online Auctions and Multi-scale Online Learning

• Sebastien Bubeck
 
• Nikhil R. Devanur
 
• Zhiyi Huang
 
• Rad Niazadeh

Joint Pricing and Inventory Management with Strategic Customers

• Yiwei Chen
 
• Cong Shi

Pricing and Optimization in Shared Vehicle Systems: An Approximation Framework

• Siddhartha Banerjee
 
• Daniel Freund
 
• Thodoris Lykouris

Multidimensional Dynamic Pricing for Welfare Maximization

• Aaron Roth
 
• Aleksandrs Slivkins
 
• Jonathan Ullman
 
• Zhiwei Steven Wu

SESSION: 7b: Experiments

The Tragedy of your Upstairs Neighbors: Is the Negative Externality of Airbnb Internalized?

• Apostolos Filippas
 
• John Joseph Horton

Interacting User Generated Content Technologies: How Q&As Affect Ratings & Reviews

• Shrabastee Banerjee
 
• Chrysanthos Dellarocas
 
• Georgios Zervas

Learning in the Repeated Secretary Problem

• Daniel G. Goldstein
 
• R. Preston McAfee
 
• Siddharth Suri
 
• James R. Wright

Diffusion in Networks and the Unexpected Virtue of Burstiness

• Mohammad Akbarpour
 
• Matthew Jackson

SESSION: 8a: Mechanism Design -- General

Truthful Allocation Mechanisms Without Payments: Characterization and Implications on Fairness

• Georgios Amanatidis
 
• Georgios Birmpas
 
• George Christodoulou
 
• Evangelos Markakis

From Monetary to Non-Monetary Mechanism Design via Artificial Currencies

• Artur Gorokh
 
• Siddhartha Banerjee
 
• Krishnamurthy Iyer

Gibbard-Satterthwaite Success Stories and Obvious Strategyproofness

• Sophie Bade
 
• Yannai A. Gonczarowski

SESSION: 8b: Decision Making and Learning

Planning with Multiple Biases

• Jon Kleinberg
 
• Sigal Oren
 
• Manish Raghavan

Multidimensional Binary Search for Contextual Decision-Making

• Ilan Lobel
 
• Renato Paes Leme
 
• Adrian Vladu

Bifurcation Mechanism Design - from Optimal Flat Taxes to Improved Cancer Treatments

• Ger Yang
 
• Georgios Piliouras
 
• David Basanta

SESSION: 9a: Auctions -- Equilibrium

Approximating Gains from Trade in Two-sided Markets via Simple Mechanisms

• Johannes Brustle
 
• Yang Cai
 
• Fa Wu
 
• Mingfei Zhao

Approximately Efficient Two-Sided Combinatorial Auctions

• Riccardo Colini-Baldeschi
 
• Paul W. Goldberg
 
• Bart de Keijzer
 
• Stefano Leonardi
 
• Tim Roughgarden
 
• Stefano Turchetta

Learning in Repeated Auctions with Budgets: Regret Minimization and Equilibrium

• Santiago R. Balseiro
 
• Yonatan Gur

SESSION: 9b: Fair Division 2

Nash Social Welfare Approximation for Strategic Agents

• Simina Branzei
 
• Vasilis Gkatzelis
 
• Ruta Mehta

Fair Public Decision Making

• Vincent Conitzer
 
• Rupert Freeman
 
• Nisarg Shah

Approximation Algorithms for Maximin Fair Division

• Siddharth Barman
 
• Sanath Kumar Krishna Murthy

SESSION: Plenary session

Graphons: A Nonparametric Method to Model, Estimate, and Design Algorithms for Massive Networks

• Christian Borgs
 
• Jennifer Chayes

SESSION: 10a: Matching 3

Stability, Strategy-Proofness, and Cumulative Offer Mechanisms

• John William Hatfield
 
• Scott Duke Kominers
 
• Alexander Westkamp

Stable Matching with Proportionality Constraints

• Thanh Nguyen
 
• Rakesh Vohra

Making it Safe to Use Centralized Markets: Epsilon - Dominant Individual Rationality and Applications to Market Design

• Benjamin N. Roth
 
• Ran Shorrer

How (Not) to Allocate Affordable Housing

• Nick Arnosti
 
• Peng Shi

SESSION: 10b: Strategic Games

Simple Approximate Equilibria in Games with Many Players

• Itai Arieli
 
• Yakov Babichenko

Theoretical and Practical Advances on Smoothing for Extensive-Form Games

• Christian Kroer
 
• Kevin Waugh
 
• Fatma Kilinc-Karzan
 
• Tuomas Sandholm

A Network Game of Dynamic Traffic

• Zhigang Cao
 
• Bo Chen
 
• Xujin Chen
 
• Changjun Wang

A Polynomial Time Algorithm for Spatio-Temporal Security Games

• Soheil Behnezhad
 
• Mahsa Derakhshan
 
• MohammadTaghi Hajiaghayi
 
• Aleksandrs Slivkins

New papers on economic design: listing service

Alex Teytelboym writes:

Dear Al, 

I'm now editing the weekly NEP mailing list on economic design.

You can subscribe here: http://lists.repec.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/nep-des

I would be very grateful for a plug on your blog, and, of course, if you'd also subscribed and submitted your papers to repec.

Cheers, 

A.T.

Science publishing and (versus?) science

The Guardian has an interesting history of modern science publishing, focusing on the growth of Elsevier.

Is the staggeringly profitable business of scientific publishing bad for science?
It is an industry like no other, with profit margins to rival Google – and it was created by one of Britain’s most notorious tycoons: Robert Maxwell. By Stephen Buranyi

hard to excerpt, but worth reading whole...

Dr. Vanessa Grubbs on racial disparities in deceased kidney allocation

NPR has an interview with Dr Vanessa Grubbs, about her new book, on racial disparities in organ allocation, and on her experience as a living kidney donor and as a nephrologist:
'Interlaced Fingers' Traces Roots Of Racial Disparity In Kidney Transplants.

Ten years ago she published this article on the subject:
Good For Harvest, Bad For Planting

Overturning old convictions (for being gay) in Germany

Here's the story from the Guardian (in the "better late than never" category):
Germany to quash convictions of 50,000 gay men under Nazi-era law
Parliament votes through measure overturning conviction and offering compensation to the estimated 5,000 men still alive

"Germany’s parliament have voted to quash the convictions of 50,000 gay men sentenced for homosexuality under a Nazi-era law that remained in force after the second world war.

After decades of lobbying, victims and activists hailed a triumph in the struggle to clear the names of gay men who lived with a criminal record under article 175 of the penal code.

"An estimated 5,000 of those found guilty under the statute are still alive. The measure overwhelmingly passed the Bundestag lower house of parliament, where chancellor Angela Merkel’s coalition enjoys a large majority.

...

"Germany’s article 175 outlawed “sexual acts contrary to nature... be it between people of the male gender or between people and animals”. Sex between women was not explicitly illegal.

"Although it dated from 1871, it was rarely enforced until the Nazis came to power, and in 1935 they toughened the law to carry a sentence of 10 years of forced labour.

"More than 42,000 men were convicted during the Third Reich and sent to prison or concentration camps.

"In 2002, the government introduced a new law that overturned their convictions, but that move didn’t include those prosecuted after the second world war.

"The article was finally dropped from the penal code in East Germany in 1968. In West Germany, it reverted to the pre-Nazi era version in 1969 and was only fully repealed in 1994.

************

See my earlier posts on Turing's Law, named for Britain's 2003 posthumous pardon of Alan Turing.

London crossing signs and diversity in marriages

Walking from HM Treasury to LSE, a quarter turn around Trafalger Square shows that British traffic wardens have a relaxed view of modern marriage--here are two walk signs (or maybe go-ahead signs) that seem to celebrate both traditional and same-sex marriage.  (I was in a bit of a hurry so I didn't have time to circumnavigate the square and look for other variations on this theme...)

Could commercial surrogacy become legal in Denmark?

It doesn't sound like change in Danish surrogacy law is imminent, but it's under discussion. The Copenhagen Post has the story:

Still prohibited, is the tide slowly turning for commercial surrogacy?

Many Danes are using the internet to find a mother abroad

"There are many countries where surrogacy is illegal, and they are not all Catholic! Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Mexico, Sweden, Switzerland, Spain, Portugal and Bulgaria are among the many that prohibit all forms of surrogacy.

Others, such as the UK, Ireland, Denmark and Belgium, allow a form of surrogacy in which the surrogate mother is not paid, or only reimbursed for reasonable expenses. These countries prohibit full-on commercial surrogacy.Commercial surrogacy is legal in some US states and countries such as India, Russia and Ukraine.

...

"The situation in Denmark

Det Etiske Råd, the government’s ethical council, unanimously believes that commercial surrogacy is an ethical problem and a minority are against any form of surrogacy – either with or without payment. Legally-speaking, commercial surrogacy is forbidden under paragraph 31 of the Child Act (Børnelov).

Danish doctors must not assist in inseminating a surrogate mother with eggs from another women who, according to an agreement, will become the child’s social mother. It is also illegal for a third party to broker contact between a surrogate mother and a childless couple, so in practice it is almost impossible to find and use a surrogate mother in Denmark unless a friend or family member volunteers their services.  Danish law does allow a surrogate if she uses her own eggs and is willing to give up the child for adoption without being paid for it.

If a family travels abroad to one of the countries where surrogacy is legal, they may have a problem bringing the child back to Denmark. In the spring of 2014, the appeals tribunal, Ankestyrelsen, underlined that in Denmark the women who gives birth to a baby is regarded as its mother, so it can be difficult to obtain permission to bring another person’s child into the country.

A political dilemma
Danish politicians are divided on the issue as well. Kristeligt Dagblad reported on a debate in Parliament held in December 2013 about the use of surrogate mothers in which many parties expressed scepticism about the idea.

Özlem Cekic from Socialistisk Folkeparti said “personally, I feel that if really good friends asked me if I would be a surrogate, then I’d say yes. But if we have to examine the law, it is extremely important to look at the many dilemmas connected with surrogacy.”

“When money changes hands, there are also a lot of problems that could be equated with prostitution. We have to look at this without prejudice, but also investigate all the grey areas and dilemmas.”

Birgitte Josefsen (Venstre), another member of the committee reporting to Det Etiske Råd, had this to say: “Personally, I don’t support surrogacy. I’m very afraid that situations might occur in which a family-member won’t be able to refuse another family member who wants a child.”

Danske Folkeparti was also negative. Its health spokesperson, Liselott Blixt, said “on the face of it, it seems a noble gesture that a woman would carry another woman’s child out of altruism. But ethically, we at Danske Folkeparti don’t think it is something we should allow in Denmark. We don’t know what new problems it might cause.”

A beacon of hope?
However, in June 2016, DR Nyheder reported that Liberal Alliance wants to make surrogacy legal – the first party in Denmark to do so.

Despite the law, it seems as if an increasing number of childless Danish families are finding surrogate mothers abroad through the internet, using secret Facebook groups and false profiles.

“Liberal Alliance would like to make it possible for Danish citizens to find a surrogate mother here – rather than having to travel to the US,” said May-Britt Buch-Kattrup, the party’s health spokesperson.

In the US, there are thorough background checks on prospective surrogate mothers. “The screening model used in the US sounds very sensible and could form the basis for a similar law in Denmark,” added Buch-Kattrup.

But Karen Ellemenn, who was social minister at the time, came out plainly against the idea. “Basically, I don’t think that it is a human right to have a child. I believe we ought to continue to uphold the ban.”

The Danish church, however, was more conciliatory. A spokesman for the Bishop of Copenhagen said that the Folkekirke does not have an official view on the subject. However, he added that individual priests probably have their own ideas.

Who DAREs wins?
Mikkel Raahade is chairman of DARE Danmark, a lobby organisation that advocates for the legalisation of surrogate montherhood in Denmark.
DARE does not believe that it is the state’s business to interfere in these things. It should be looked at as an extension of the existing fertility treatments and available to all.”

“On top of that, the present legislation seems to open up to all the pitfalls that the opponents of surrogacy are afraid of. For example, that the mother might have regrets and be scarred for life from the experience, or that it is a sort of human trafficking.”

He went on to say that “in addition, the current view is that it is okay if a friend or family member is involved. Our experience has shown that this might not be true. We know of at least two cases where a mother has disappeared with the baby.”

There have also been cases that when the baby is born, the parents have refused to take it, thus leaving the mother stuck with the child.

Like Liberal Alliance, DARE thinks the best solution would be one where some form of screening takes place, like in Ukraine or the US.

In DARE’s view, having a child may not be a human right, but it makes sense that it is looked at in the context of fertility treatment in general.

Despite the best efforts of Liberal Alliance and DARE, it seems as if full legality for would-be parents is still some way off."

The article ends with this summary of the current situation:

"

Surrogacy in Denmark

"In Denmark it is illegal to pay another woman to bear your child

It is also illegal to initiate any form of contact with a potential surrogate

Infringements can result in fines or imprisonment for up to four months

In Denmark, the birth-mother is automatically regarded as the mother – even though a foreign surrogate has made a declaration giving up her right – and therefore parental custody will always belong to the birth mother

The biological mother – the one who has donated the egg and who will raise the child – can obtain parental custody through adoption"

Kidney transplant in June 1950

I'm accustomed to calling Murray's 1954 surgery the first successful kidney transplant, and indeed the first successful organ transplant.
(see my post  A transplant makes history--Joseph Murray’s 1954 kidney operation ushered in a new medical era.)

But there were earlier attempts, and there's room to disagree on what constitutes a success. Here's a recent anniversary article about an earlier kidney transplant, from a deceased donor (and also before immunosuppression--Murray's surgery involved a live donation from one identical twin to another...)

This Day In Science June 17, 1950 – First successful kidney transplant operation was performed

"On June 17th 1950 Dr. Richard Lawler performed the first successful kidney transplant. The recipient was Ruth Tucker, a 44-year-old woman who had polycystic kidney disease (PKD).
...
"A transplant was risky but the only real option for survival for Tucker, as dialysis was not yet widely available. The donor kidney was removed from a patient who had died of cirrhosis of the liver.

“Not the most ideal patient, but the best we could find,” said Dr. Lawler after the surgery. The transplant surgery was quick, and 45 minutes after removal of the kidney from the donor the operation was complete. Tucker was released from the hospital a month later.
"The kidney functioned for at least 53 days, but it was removed 10 months after the surgery as it had been rejected. This transplant was conducted well before the development of immunosuppressant drugs and tissue typing which would have helped prevent organ rejection.

"Ruth Tucker had PKD in both of her kidneys, leaving one non-functioning and the other functioning at 10%. The donor kidney gave her body the chance to resume normal kidney function, therefore when the donor kidney was removed, Ruth was able to live another 5 years with her one remaining kidney. She died in 1955 from coronary artery disease which was unrelated to PKD and her organ transplant.

"Dr. Richard Lawler never performed another transplant, saying that he “just wanted to get it started”.
***********

Here's some more detail on the website of the Little Hospital of Mary in Chicago, where the surgery was performed.

First Successful Organ Transplant, Little Company of Mary, 1950

"The surgery was extremely courageous, given that it was done without anti-infection drugs, tissue typing and other advances that are now standard. A Newsweek article a week after the surgery was headlined, “Borrowed from the Dead”. The article stated, “Successful transplants have been made of bones, skin, nerves, tendons and eye corneas. But up to last week, no vital human organ had ever been moved from one person to another. Then, in a daring surgical feat, Dr. Richard M. Lawler of the Little Company of Mary Hospital, Chicago, removed a diseased kidney from Mrs. Ruth Tucker…The patient was ‘willing to gamble rather than lie back and wait for death,’ Dr. Lawler said.” A month later, Tucker was released from the hospital, a medical miracle. She lived five years before dying from a coronary occlusion following pneumonia."

Ben Edelman calls out Uber

Ben has been following Uber for some time, and he's calling them out for their law-breaking business model:

Uber Can’t Be Fixed — It’s Time for Regulators to Shut It Down

June 21, 2017 - Permalink

From many passengers' perspective, Uber is a godsend — lower fares than taxis, clean vehicles, courteous drivers, easy electronic payments. Yet the company’s mounting scandals reveal something seriously amiss, culminating in last week’s stern report from former U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder.

Some people attribute the company’s missteps to the personal failings of founder-CEO Travis Kalanick. These have certainly contributed to the company’s problems, and his resignation is probably appropriate. Kalanick and other top executives signal by example what is and is not acceptable behavior, and they are clearly responsible for the company’s ethically and legally questionable decisions and practices.

But I suggest that the problem at Uber goes beyond a culture created by toxic leadership. The company’s cultural dysfunction, it seems to me, stems from the very nature of the company’s competitive advantage: Uber’s business model is predicated on lawbreaking. And having grown through intentional illegality, Uber can’t easily pivot toward following the rules.

Continued at hbr.org.