Talent management in the Marine Corps--lateral entry?

"Talent management" is making inroads in the armed forces.  One anomaly of military service is that almost all of its personnel enter the business at around age 18: there is almost no lateral entry.  But some skills, such as those related to cyber warfare, can also be cultivated in the private sector.  Think how hard it would be to run a tech company if you could only recruit your people right out of high school or college. 

Defense One has the story:

Marines See Early Successes in Retention Push—and Ways to Do Better. Meanwhile, the commandant wants to bring skilled people into the Corps at advanced ranks.

"Monday’s update highlights Berger’s dissatisfaction with the Corps’ progress toward what’s called “lateral entry”—enabling recruits with critical skills to come in at a rank that reflects their experience. The commandant wants the lateral-entry system to focus first on reservists and Marines who have left the service. This could help fill cyber jobs and others in which the Corps competes with the civilian sector, Glynn said.   

 ...

The service is still working on bringing to life its Talent Management Engagement Portal, which the update calls “a must-pay bill.” It is meant to improve career assignment selections with a transparent “marketplace” for Marines, units, and assignment managers, according to Glynn."

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Here's the Marine Corps' report Talent Management 2030 from November 2021

"CREATING A PATH TO LATERAL ENTRY

"Our current enlisted recruiting model is optimized for ecruiting teenagers, and for officers, those in their early twenties. (It was not always this way: During theInterwar Period, potential enlisted recruits had to be over 21 and required a character reference from an employer, teacher, coach, or religious leader). While we will always seek to attract young Americans to our ranks, we do not have an effective vehicle for finding, recruiting, and onboarding talented Americans who already possess critical skills. In other words, there is currently only one way to join the Marine Corps – at the bottom. 

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"The rapid rise in importance of the cyber domain, for instance, has challenged us to find creative ways to quickly build critical skills at mid-career and senior levels. Unless we find a means to quickly infuse expertise into the force – at the right ranks – I am concerned that advances in artificial intelligence and robotics, among other fields where the speed of technological change is exponential, will force us into a reactive posture. We should have an open door for exceptionally talented Americans who wish to join the Marine Corps, allowing them to laterally enter at a rank appropriate to their education, experience, and ability."

And, somewhat separately

"CREATING A TALENT MARKETPLACE

"Taking advantage of the initial lessons learned by the Army, Navy, and Air Force, we are developing a web-based “talent marketplace,” where units post job information about available billets, Marines apply for those positions virtually, and monitors serve as overall managers and arbiters. While much in the way of mechanics remains to be determined, I am committed to creating a process that places increased responsibility in the hands of unit commanders and individual Marines, employs cutting edge technology, and preserves a vital role for headquarters. Initially, our talent marketplace will be for officers, and eventually senior enlisted, while we assess options for changes to the junior enlisted assignments process."

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Earlier:

Wednesday, November 10, 2021

The labor market that is the United States Marine Corps

Tuesday, December 1, 2020

The labor market that is the military: a report from the National Academies of Science, Engineering, and Medicine

(Mis)Matching airmen to bases

 The Military Times has this story, suggesting that the Air Force still has lots of room to improve it's internal matching procedures:

Air Force to end preferred basing for enlisted as it changes how airmen find new jobs.  By Rachel S. Cohen

"The Air Force this month will suspend its 4-year-old “base of preference” program for airmen who are on at least their second enlistment contract, saying it fails to send most applicants to the installations they want.

"Stopping the initiative at the end of May can also offer the service more flexibility to move airmen around as military staffing needs dictate.

The change affects “career airmen,” or those who have reenlisted at least once. They previously needed to spend at least four years in their jobs before leaving for a preferred base.

...

"That success rate would have been way higher if we actually had a resource where your standard airman could easily see what bases had openings/low manning, without having to have your [senior enlisted leader] ask your [career field manager] (who probably gets pinged about that at least once a week from people all over the world),” Reddit user JustHangInThere wrote April 28."

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Here's a post from 2020 about a NAS report that offered some suggestions on how to improve Air Force matching of personnel to bases and jobs:

Tuesday, December 1, 2020

The labor market that is the military: a report from the National Academies of Science, Engineering, and Medicine

HT: Cherie Shauvin

Redesigning the US Army's Branching Process, by Kyle Greenberg, Parag A. Pathak & Tayfun Sönmez,

 Here's a new NBER working paper that marks a significant step forward in matching soldiers to positions.

Mechanism Design meets Priority Design: Redesigning the US Army's Branching Process by Kyle Greenberg, Parag A. Pathak & Tayfun Sönmez, NBER WORKING PAPER 28911 DOI 10.3386/w28911,  June 2021

Army cadets obtain occupations through a centralized process. Three objectives – increasing retention, aligning talent, and enhancing trust – have guided reforms to this process since 2006. West Point’s mechanism for the Class of 2020 exacerbated challenges implementing Army policy aims. We formulate these desiderata as axioms and study their implications theoretically and with administrative data. We show that the Army’s objectives not only determine an allocation mechanism, but also a specific priority policy, a uniqueness result that integrates mechanism and priority design. These results led to a re-design of the mechanism, now adopted at both West Point and ROTC.

One of the unusual features of this paper is that the first author is both an economist and an Army officer, working in West Point's Office of Economic and Manpower Analysis:

"MAJ Greenberg is an Assistant Professor of Economics in the Department of Social Sciences and is OEMA’s Director of Long-Term Research. His primary areas of research are labor economics and public finance, with a focus on veteran employment, disability compensation, and military labor markets. Currently a Major in the U.S. Army, Kyle served tours in Iraq and Germany prior to teaching at the United States Military Academy. He earned a BS in Mathematics from the United States Military Academy in 2005 and a Ph.D. in Economics from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 2015."

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Here's a related earlier post, in which Major Greenberg discusses some of the design issues still facing the Army's assignment systems.

Monday, December 7, 2020

Officer assignment in the U.S. Army

Officer assignment in the U.S. Army

In a recent post I discussed the NAS report on the military labor force, focusing on the new Talent Marketplaces, and some of the difficulties they are facing in the Air Force, and (more briefly) in the Army.  

The Modern War Institute at West Point has a related article, published last month, on the implementation of these labor market clearinghouses in the Army, by Major Kyle Greenberg, Lieutenant Colonel Mark Crow  and Colonel Carl Wojtaszek. (They all have Ph.D.s in economics, and are associated with the Army's Office of Economic and Manpower Analysis (OEMA).)

Winning In The Marketplace: How Officers And Units Can Get The Most Out Of The Army Talent Alignment Process 

by Kyle Greenberg, Mark Crow and Carl Wojtaszek 

"Not too many years ago, if the Army had wanted you to have an opinion about your next assignment, it would have issued you one with your duffel bag. The same had been true for units, as well. Leaders at every level largely left it to the Army to fill their formations with individuals based not on talent, but on having the right rank, branch, and availability date. In 2019, this changed when the Army introduced a market into its assignment system.

...

"Officers can greatly influence their chances of receiving the jobs they prefer in the market. Most importantly, moving officers should build their resumes in AIM 2.0. If officers are the engine of the marketplace, then the information they share on their AIM 2.0 resumes is the fuel that keeps it humming along smoothly. Complete and informative resumes allow units to better identify officers with backgrounds or experiences that are a particularly good fit for a specific job or type of work. Surprisingly, though, only 60 percent of officers in last fall’s marketplace took the time to describe their talents within the AIM 2.0 resumes. Choosing not to do so is a missed opportunity as officers with resumes benefited significantly, receiving 40 percent more #1 votes from units than officers without detailed resumes.

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"moving officers should interview with units they are interested in joining. In a survey given to all units at the end of last year’s marketplace, 35 percent said that interviews were the most important factor in determining how to rank officers in the market. Even though AIM 2.0 is online, the marketplace is designed to facilitate person-to-person interaction, albeit predominately via phone or video conference. Moving officers who reach out to unit POCs and schedule interviews early in the marketplace have better chances of finding the jobs they want than officers who wait for units to contact them.

"A third way an officer can maximize the benefit of ATAP is to submit truthful preferences to the assignment market. While this is not immediately obvious, it becomes clearer once an officer understands how they are paired to jobs after the marketplace closes. The Army uses a deferred acceptance algorithm to match officers to jobs. While that might sound complicated, it is a relatively straightforward process—but one that works best when officers and units submit truthful preferences. ... "officers cannot achieve a better outcome by misreporting their actual preferences, or “gaming the system.” In fact, officers often hurt themselves when they do this. The design is intentional and allows officers to list “reach assignments” without penalty. So, go ahead and reach for that dream job knowing your chances of success in the market will not be diminished. (You can learn more about deferred acceptance algorithms at here or here.)

"There is substantial evidence that officers did not understand this point in the 2019 market. Post-marketplace surveys revealed that 31 percent of officers admitted that they did not place their true first preference #1 in the marketplace. Furthermore, roughly 75 percent admitted that at least some of their preferences were not truthful.

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"Just like officers benefit if they truthfully preference as many jobs as possible, units benefit by ranking as many officers as possible. Units that rank all of the officers they are interested in will do better than units that only consider officers who rank their jobs #1. 

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"A second suggestion for units is to put your best foot forward and professionalize your hiring processes. Many officers in last year’s market found little more than boilerplate job descriptions and had difficultly contacting units and scheduling interviews.

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"Finally, there are several changes the Army should implement to make the marketplace more effective for both officers and units. First, the Army should better educate the force on how officers pair to units. 

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"Second, the Army should limit the number of “signals” officers can send to units to indicate their interest. During last year’s marketplace, officers adjusted their preferences multiple times to signal interest to different units at different times. This resulted in an unlimited number of signals for officers to use and generated substantial problems. It also frustrated many units who could no longer be certain which officers were genuinely interested in them and which officers were likely to change their preferences immediately after a phone call or interview.

"The Army should give every officer a specific number of “market coins” to be sent to units of their choosing independent of their preference list. This would help units learn which officers are interested in their jobs without requiring officers to repeatedly change their preferences. The method of using signals to quickly identify interested participants has a proven record of making other matching markets more efficient.

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In an email, Major Greenberg elaborates:

"The Army determines officer assignments through the Army Talent Alignment Process, which is implemented through an online portal known as the Assignment Interactive Module, Version 2.0. Within AIM2, officers can rank jobs they are eligible for and units can rank officers who are eligible for their unit’s jobs. Units are not able to observe an officer’s exact preference for their jobs, but they are able to observe if an officer ranked one of their jobs among the officer’s top 10% of all possible choices.  Likewise, officers cannot observe the exact rankings units give them, but they are notified if a unit ranked them at all. Officers and units are free to interact and adjust their preferences at all times while the marketplace is open. The marketplace closes at a pre-announced time, at which time both officer and unit preferences “lock.” After the marketplace closes, officers are matched to jobs according to a deferred acceptance algorithm (this is still a relatively new phenomenon, as the Army just started testing the DAA last year).

"One of the problems we are noticing is that a large number of officers are not being truthful with their preferences. It appears that units will frequently press officers to rank one of their jobs as their number one choice, and will often make their ranking for officers conditional on the officer’s ranking for one of the unit’s jobs. Army officers can always respond to these requests with cheap talk, but most dislike doing this: maybe because integrity is critical to our profession, or maybe because officers feel there is a reasonable chance they will one day have to work with the unit representative who is interviewing them.  To make the marketplace more safe for officers, OEMA advocates for removing all signals that are a function of officer preferences, but replacing them with a limited number of signals that officers can send to units, completely separate from preferences."

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Here's my earlier post:

Tuesday, December 1, 2020

The labor market that is the military: a report from the National Academies of Science, Engineering, and Medicine   

"To summarize, the Talent Marketplace has to also become an information marketplace that allows position owners and Airmen to make appropriate information available to each other in order to develop informed, accurate preferences."