Designing centralized marketplaces that work gracefully with pre-existing decentralized ones, in Management Science, by Benjamin Roth and Ran Shorrer

 In Management Science (online ahead of print):

Making Marketplaces Safe: Dominant Individual Rationality and Applications to Market Design

 Benjamin N. Roth , Ran I. Shorrer 

Published Online:8 Dec 2020 https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2020.3643

Abstract: Often market designers cannot force agents to join a marketplace rather than using pre-existing institutions. We propose a new desideratum for marketplace design that guarantees the safety of participation: dominant individual rationality (DIR). A marketplace is DIR if every pre-existing strategy is weakly dominated by some strategy within the marketplace. We study applications to the design of labor markets and the sharing economy. We also provide a general construction to achieve approximate DIR across a wide range of marketplace designs.

Introduction: "Many marketplaces operate in a broader economic environment, and often participants cannot be forced to use a marketplace rather than the pre-existing institutions it was meant to displace. For instance, although most hospitals and residents use the clearinghouse known as the National Residency Matching Program (NRMP) to coordinate job offers, there is no legal barrier that prevents members of either side of the market from finding matches outside of the clearinghouse.1 In school choice, charter schools sometimes opt not to participate in clearinghouses, instead recruiting students in a decentralized manner. In the private sector, marketplaces that comprise the gig and sharing economies demonstrate the primacy of attracting participants who have many outside alternatives. In each of these settings marketplaces are actively engaging with the challenge of recruitment. In other words, these are marketplaces in which participation is not always safe.

...

"A designer may introduce a mediator (alternatively referred to as a marketplace), to which players may delegate their decision rights (i.e., participate in the marketplace). The mediator comprises a message space and a mapping from messages to outcomes (strategy profiles for the delegators). Players who delegate their decision rights select a message to send to the mediator, who then acts on their behalf according to the outcome mapping, as a function of the whole set of messages it receives. The mediator is voluntary in the sense that players may choose one of their original (outside) actions instead of sending it a message. And the mediator is restricted to condition the actions of participants only on the messages of other participants and not on the outside actions of nonparticipants.

"This framework highlights the endogeneity of the individual rationality constraint with respect to both the set of players who sign away their decision rights and the actions they take. We show by example that mediators that satisfy attractive criteria such as incentive compatibility and efficiency assuming that everyone participates may no longer do so in equilibria with partial participation. This motivates the search for mediators that can guarantee the safety of participation. In Section 3 we present our key desideratum: dominant individual rationality (DIR)."

Job market technology is diffusing slowly through the armed forces

Here's a story from the Army Times, about trying to incorporate enlisted soldiers' preferences into their job assignments. (I hope to have something more to say about this in the future.)

Enlisted job marketplace launches this summer for select soldiers
 by Kyle Rempfer

"Armor, intelligence and some quartermaster troops will test a new assignment market system that launches this summer and is scheduled to go service-wide in January 2021, according to an Army news service release.

The Assignment Satisfaction Key-Enlisted Marketplace pilot program will launch in June, but was already tested by a smaller group of armor branch noncommissioned officers last year.

"The enlisted program matches up roughly with a similar officer marketplace already in use. The Army’s talent management initiatives began with the officer corps, because the population is much smaller and easier to run trials on than the enlisted force, according to Sgt. Maj. Wardell Jefferson, the Army G-1’s senior enlisted soldier.

...

"The pilot program could provide enlisted troops more choice in their careers than the current assignment system, which forces troops to choose six basing options — three in the United States and three overseas, Jefferson explained during a Facebook Town Hall on Monday.

The new system is expected to allow soldiers to rank order more assignment preferences. Army leaders have said that the marketplace will stabilize enlisted soldiers’ careers by weighing their preferences more in the assignment process and ensuring good soldiers are retained rather than lost to the civilian sector..

I join the NRMP board of directors

In the 1990's I worked closely with the NRMP on the resident match, and since then I've been following it from a distance.  Now I'll join their Board.  I imagine that during my term there may be an opportunity to look at how the overall system of applications, interviews and matching have co-evolved and adapted to each other.

Here's the NRMP press release:

 NRMP Board Of Directors Welcomes Outstanding Cohort Of New Members
Nobel Prize Recipient Dr. Alvin E. Roth Among Talented Slate of Elected Individuals
Washington, D.C., June 22, 2020 –

At its June meeting, the National Resident Matching Program® (NRMP®) Board of Directors elected five individuals for terms that begin July 1, 2020. The NRMP’s 19-member Board includes medical school deans, institutional officials, clinical program directors, resident/fellow physicians, medical students, and one public member. The appointment of Dr. Alvin E. Roth, the 2012 co-recipient of the Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel, highlights the quality of the slate of new members.

“The individuals recently elected to the NRMP Board of Directors will bring an impressive mix of professional experiences and fresh perspectives to the governance of the organization,” said NRMP Board Chair Dr. Steven J. Scheinman. “They were selected from a deep pool of accomplished applicants, and we look forward to working with them on an array of initiatives.”

The term for directors is four years, with a maximum of two terms. The term for resident/fellow and student directors is two years. Listed alphabetically, the new members include:

Ricardo J. Boccardo Bello, M.D., General Surgery resident at the University of Massachusetts Medical School. A graduate of the Universidad Central de Venezuela in Caracas, he earned a Master of Public Health from the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine and completed his PGY-1 General Surgery residency and postdoctoral research fellowship in Microsurgery Outcomes at Johns Hopkins University. While at Johns Hopkins, he received the Core Surgery Clerkship Outstanding Junior Resident Teaching Award.

Sydney Miller, Michigan State University College of Osteopathic Medicine student. Elected President of her class, Ms. Miller serves alongside faculty leaders as a member of the Dean’s Executive Board, which deliberates the college’s undergraduate and graduate medical education programs and other strategic initiatives. She earned her undergraduate degree in Human Biology at Michigan State University. Her interests include increasing awareness and appreciation of osteopathic medicine.

Alvin E. Roth, Ph.D., Senior Fellow at the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research and a Professor, by courtesy, for the school of Management Science and Engineering. He is also the George Gund Professor of Economics and Business Administration Emeritus at Harvard University. Dr. Roth’s academic expertise is in game theory, experimental economics, and market design, and he was co-recipient of the 2012 Nobel Prize in Economics for work which focused in part on the NRMP’s matching algorithm. He earned a doctoral degree in Operations Research from Stanford University.

Morgan Swanson, M.D./Ph.D. student at the University of Iowa Carver College of Medicine and College of Public Health. She has served with the Association of American Medical Colleges’ Organization of Student Representatives (OSR), most recently as one of 12 students selected to its Administrative Board. Ms. Swanson graduated from Iowa State University and serves as a member of the Editorial Board of the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report.

Christopher B. Traner, M.D., recent graduate of Neurology residency at Yale-New Haven Hospital and incoming Epilepsy/Neurophysiology fellow at Yale. He received the Yale Neurology Department’s Lewis Levy Award, presented to the PGY-2 resident who best exemplifies clinical excellence. He advised undergraduates as a Kaplan MCAT Advantage Plus Mentor while attending the University of Toledo College of Medicine. As a resident at Yale, Dr. Traner was a member of his program’s Interview Committee.

The newly elected Board members replace those whose terms conclude on June 30: Dr. Zaid Almarzooq, Cardiology fellow, Brigham and Women’s Hospital; Dr. Jessica Fried, chief resident, Diagnostic Radiology, Hospital of the University of Pennsylvania; Dr. Eriny Hanna, 2020 graduate of Vanderbilt University School of Medicine transitioning to an Emergency Medicine residency at Vanderbilt; Father Daniel Morrissey, O.P.; and Dr. Thomas Wickham, 2020 graduate of the University of New England College of Osteopathic Medicine transitioning to a Family Medicine residency at UMass Memorial Medical Center.

About NRMP
The National Resident Matching Program® (NRMP®) is a private, non-profit organization established in 1952 at the request of medical students to provide an orderly and fair mechanism for matching the preferences of applicants for U.S. residency positions with the preferences of residency program directors. In addition to the annual Main Residency Match® for almost 44,000 registrants, the NRMP conducts Fellowship Matches for more than 60 subspecialties through its Specialties Matching Service® (SMS®).

Tools to allocate medical supplies in a crisis: Cramton, Ockenfels, Roth and Wilson in Nature

Publishing a commentary in Nature is a dizzying process for anyone accustomed to the stately dance of publishing in Economics.  It's fast (in this case the commentary below appeared one month after submission), and the editors play an active role.

Borrow crisis tactics to get COVID-19 supplies to where they are needed
Emergency procedures that keep electricity running and food banks stocked can also keep health workers in protective equipment.
Peter Cramton, Axel Ockenfels, Alvin E. Roth and Robert B. Wilson
Nature 582, 334-336, 11 JUNE 2020 doi: 10.1038/d41586-020-01750-6

We began thinking about what market designers know about addressing shortages in an emergency.  We considered the experience in electricity markets and food banks as potentially relevant.
Here are some of our early notes:

• Selling to the highest bidder isn’t always acceptable in an emergency (repugnance)
• But prices matter, because they help generate new supply and reduce excessive  precautionary demand
• And prices can do some of their work even if just in specialized accounting money, so that we’re not just sending supplies to the wealthiest institutions
• Coordination is needed; centralized clearinghouses can help.
• It would have been useful to have had a sufficiently centralized clearinghouse operating as an ordinary market exchange in normal times, that could go into emergency mode when required (so that new suppliers and demanders would have had an address to go to to take part in newly formed supply chains...)
• Our experience in this regard now (after wave 1 of COVID-19) should inform how we think about these markets in the near future (wave 2, next winter, etc.) and the further future (future pandemic diseases...)
• In some respects Germany may be better poised to take steps towards a centralized clearinghouse than we are in the decentralized U.S., especially given our current political disarray. (But Germany has politics of its own...)
• It will be worthwhile to think more about the design of markets that are robust against emergencies –  so they can transition gracefully from normal to emergency states, and back.

Clearinghouses are hard to organize in a hurry: volunteer medical workers in NYC

Many healthcare workers are willing and able to come to New York to help with the shortages that Covid-19 has created there.  But existing staffing marketplaces seem to be the avenue by which many of them are in fact matched.

The NY Times has the story:

Volunteers Rushed to Help New York Hospitals. They Found a Bottleneck.
When New York called for volunteers to help fight the coronavirus, 90,000 people responded. The hard part? Getting them into hospitals.

"Ms. Strickland, a former pediatric intensive care unit nurse in High Point, N.C., spent hours trying to submit her volunteer application online, and then emailed city and state representatives. She never heard back.

"Frustrated, she reached out directly to Mount Sinai Queens hospital in New York City. A manager told her to use a private recruiting agency, which the hospital had used for years to bring in temporary staff.

"Within two days, Ms. Strickland, 47, received her assignment. She started this week in the hospital’s emergency department, making about $3,800 a week for three 12-hour shifts instead of doing it for free, as she had initially wanted.
...
"As of Wednesday, more than 90,000 retired and active health care workers had signed up online to volunteer at the epicenter of the pandemic, including 25,000 from outside New York, the governor’s office said.
...
"New York City hospitals have only deployed 908 volunteers as of Wednesday, according to city health officials.

"The urgent need for medical personnel is colliding head-on with the immovable bureaucracy of hospital regulations
...
"State officials said the volunteer portal, which was built from scratch, was initially overwhelmed by the response, but has since connected about 10,000 volunteers to hospitals in New York State within two weeks.
...
"The challenge of screening so many medical workers has opened an opportunity for the dozens of established private agencies that place temporary nurses and doctors at hospitals nationwide
...
"The staffing agencies, an $18 billion industry, say that unlike the state, they already have the technology and infrastructure in place to quickly check credentials for health professionals. In normal times, hospitals hire them to fill short-term staffing needs, such as during a regular flu season.

“As great as it is that the state is trying to help, it’s a very complex process to staff a clinician,” said Alexi Nazem, chief executive of Nomad Health, a health recruiting agency based in New York. “There are dozens of documents to verify. Our company has spent years building those systems.”
...
"New York City’s public hospitals had used private recruiters to bring in about 3,600 new medical workers as of late last week and were seeking to hire 3,600 more, according to the mayor and a city spokesman.

"One of those recruiting agencies, NuWest Group, began contracting with the city less than two weeks ago. Since then, the agency has secured hundreds of nurses and respiratory therapists for city hospitals, with some positions paying more than $10,000 a week, a spokeswoman for the agency said.

"Agencies, who negotiate the rates with hospitals, say that without the high pay, there would not be enough qualified clinicians willing to take jobs at the front lines
...
"Hospital staff members say they are grateful for any reinforcements, but some residents and nurses have expressed frustration over the pay disparities."

Are there too many interviews for medical residencies and fellowships? Should there be an interview Match?

A recent article in JAMA considers the question in the title of this post:

September 21, 2018
Matching for Fellowship Interviews
Marc L. Melcher, MD, PhD; Itai Ashlagi, PhD; Irene Wapnir, MD

"Most surgical training programs interview many candidates because the consequences of not matching harms the reputation of the program and affects the work force of their services.5 Surveys of pediatric surgery program directors in 2011, 2012, and 2014 revealed that they interviewed a median of 24 to 30 candidates per year. However, the median rank at which the programs matched was less than 4, and programs never matched beyond their 12th choice, suggesting that they did not need to interview as many residents as they did.
...
"instituting an interview match may be one approach to help improve the interview selection process by reducing the large numbers of unfruitful and costly fellowship interviews. For example, Ashlagi et al7 found in a theoretical matching model that when candidates and programs each have highly heterogeneous preferences, limiting the number of interviews improved the efficiency of the matching process. Thus, fellowship interview matches represent an opportunity to reduce the excessive number of interviews and optimize the selection of applicants.

"A practical strategy that may achieve this goal is an interview match that precedes the existing match. After applications are submitted, candidates and programs submit rank lists that could be used to fill limited interview slots. Mechanisms that enable applicants and training programs to signal interest in each other have been proposed.4,7 By ranking candidates and programs highly, both essentially are respectively signaling their strong preference for each other.4 Therefore, fewer interviews might be sufficient for candidates and programs to identify mutually desirable matches and reduce the number and costs of interviews. If the program and candidate interview slots remain unfilled, a secondary match could be performed to fill unmatched interview slots.
...
"n conclusion, a well-designed interview match may help reduce excessive costly interviews while more efficiently pairing candidates and programs, so that both achieve as many highly ranked choices as possible. This strategy could be applied broadly to matching programs in other medical specialties and may be attractive at earlier career stages such as residency interviews."
************

And here's a related news story on the Stanford Medical School site:

The current fellowship interview process is cumbersome — Stanford researchers have a better idea

"In their fourth and fifth years, surgical residents are busy: They're caring for patients, assisting junior trainees and fulfilling their own training requirements. And that's not all: About 75 percent of these residents are scrambling to squeeze in interviews for fellowships across the country, often packing in between 6 and 15 interviews to ensure they secure a spot, Stanford transplant surgeon Marc Melcher, MD, PhD, told me.

"Fellowship program directors, including Stanford surgeon Irene Wapnir, MD, who directs the breast surgical fellowship, are similarly harried. To fill typically one position, the directors can interview 20 or more doctors to find a quality candidate whose interests match their program.

"The process is also expensive and time-consuming. When experienced residents leave, their coworkers need to cover for them, and the residents must pay their own way to travel to interviews, Melcher said.

...

"Melcher and Wapnir reached out to their Stanford Engineering colleague Itai Ashlagi, PhD, who specializes in the design and analysis of marketplaces, such as matching kidney donors with recipients.  Together with Alvin Roth, PhD, a Stanford economist, they're proposing a new fellowship interview matching system. Their concept appears in JAMA.

"The researchers propose two key changes. First, applicants and programs would signal their preferences for each other — before making travel arrangements and setting aside days of valuable physician time. In addition, the number of interviews for each fellowship program would be capped, as would the number of interviews for each candidate, Melcher said."

Why aren't clearinghouses used in college admissions?

I recently had an email from  Professor Deepak Hegde, at NYU's Stern School who asked me a question that led to the following exchange (edited for brevity and reproduced with his permission):

"Why are admission decisions in a broader set of settings (e.g., Phd applicants-programs, MBA applicants-to-business schools and so on)  not cleared through matching programs as is done with medical schools and residency applicants (or in some cases public schools matching)?   Are there a general set of conditions that one could develop to understand the contexts in which the matching algorithm that have helped advance could be implemented effectively?"

I replied as follows:

"I certainly don’t have a complete answer, but one obvious piece is that setting up a centralized clearinghouse for a whole market involves getting a lot of parties to coordinate and cooperate.  So I would guess that MBA admissions have a better chance of getting organized than, say Ph.D. admissions, since MBA programs are more alike one another than are Ph.D. programs (e.g. in Physics and Philosophy, or Chemistry and Chinese).

"And since wide scale cooperation is hard, I think it mostly happens in market in which people are very dis-satisfied with the existing system, and not just somewhat irritated.

"Is it your sense that MBA admissions is in a crisis of some sort?"

His reply: "In my assessment ... MBA admissions is not facing such a crisis, yet."

So...I think the MBA Match isn't something we'll hear about in the near future.

Clearinghouses for IOU's in the 13th through 18th centuries: by Borner and Hatfield

Here's a market design/economic history paper about early financial clearinghouses, forthcoming in the Journal of Political Economy:

The Design of Debt Clearing Markets: Clearinghouse Mechanisms in Pre-Industrial Europe
Lars Borner, and John William Hatfield

Abstract
We examine the evolution of the decentralized clearinghouse mechanisms that were
in use throughout Europe from the 13th century to the 18th century; in particular,
we explore the clearing of non- or limited-tradable debts like bills of exchange. We
construct a theoretical model of these clearinghouse mechanisms and show that the
specific decentralized multilateral clearing algorithms known as rescontre, skontrieren
or virement des parties, used by merchants in this period, were efficient in specific historical
contexts. Our analysis contributes to the understanding of both the emergence
and evolution of these mechanisms during late medieval and early modern fairs and
their robustness during the 17th and 18th centuries.

The Fellowship Matches in Orthopedic Surgery

The Journal of Bone and Joint surgery has a new article on the experience of the fellowship matches in orthopedic surgery, many of which started after a study of the (then unraveled) match process in the 2008 article,
Harner, Christopher D., Anil S. Ranawat, Muriel Niederle, Alvin E. Roth, Peter J. Stern, Shepard R. Hurwitz, William Levine, G. Paul DeRosa, Serena S. Hu, "Current State of Fellowship Hiring: Is a universal match necessary? Is it possible?," Journal of Bone and Joint Surgery, 90, 2008,1375-1384.


The new report, by Lisa K. Cannada, MD, Scott J. Luhmann, MD, Serena S. Hu, MD, and Robert H. Quinn, MD is
The Fellowship Match Process: The History and a Report of the Current Experience, 2015-01-01Z, Volume 97, Issue 1, Pages e3(1)-e3(7), The Journal of Bone and Joint Surgery.

It's gated, so here are some relevant paragraphs:

"Beginning in 2007, there was substantial movement from the American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons (AAOS) and the American Orthopaedic Association (AOA) to promote a coordinated match process for orthopaedic fellowships. It is estimated that at least 90% of all orthopaedic surgery residents participate in a year of fellowship training 1 . The results of a survey at the 2007 AOA Symposium on Fellowships found that 79% of attendees believed that the current process was unacceptable and 87% believed that the process was unfair to residents 2 . The situation of those disciplines that were not in an organized match process was compared with problems often seen in a decentralized labor market 2 . A survey of residents indicated that 80% of residents were in favor of an organized match for fellowship and wanted a later date in their fourth postgraduate year for the decisions 2 .
...
"There have been previous attempts at a formalized match process for fellowship positions. However, the process for most subspecialties unraveled over time. The failure of the match process in the past was due to a variety of reasons: fewer applicants than positions, interviews in the third postgraduate year, early offering of positions, and the lack of a regulated process with a central agency for applications with deadlines 

The Orthopaedic Hand Surgery Fellowship Match is administered by the National Resident Matching Program (NRMP) and has been so since 1990.

The American Shoulder and Elbow Surgeons (ASES) made arrangements to administer their own match, which they have done since 2005.

The Sports Match was run through the NRMP until 2005. Sports rejoined the formal match process in 2008, using the San Francisco Match (SF Match).

The Adult Reconstruction Match joined SF Match in 2009, and the match is now run with the same applications and timeline as the Tumor Match. There has been no formal match in place for tumor fellowships in the past.

The Pediatric Orthopaedic Society of North America (POSNA) had a previous match that had failed, in part, because of noncompliance by the fellowship programs and directors. POSNA ran another match from 2008 to 2009 and joined SF Match in 2010.

The Spine Match involves cooperation among multiple societies: the North American Spine Society, the Cervical Spine Research Society, and the Scoliosis Research Society. They joined SF Match in 2009.

The American Orthopaedic Foot & Ankle Society was the pioneer in the new match process, initially beginning in 2006 through the NRMP. Subsequently, the American Orthopaedic Foot & Ankle Society joined SF Match in 2007.

The Orthopaedic Trauma Association (OTA) had a match program in the 1990s that dissolved. The OTA reinstated the match in 2007, which was initially administered through the OTA. In 2008, the OTA formalized the match process through SF Match."

Another important aspect is the time away from work and the financial burden of interviewing. As mentioned, residents have an average of ten interviews. This number seems to be consistent between the subspecialties and to be representative of the number of interviews for the fellowship match process. The subspecialty societies have different approaches to the process. The OTA previously offered interviewing at its annual meeting in the fall. However, many programs still require on-site interviews. Currently, the OTA annual meetings offer information sessions from the programs. In this way, the applicants can meet and can interact with faculty and can decide if the program would be suitable for them. The meeting affords the applicants the ability to talk to the fellowship program faculty and current and past fellows before spending several hundred dollars on an interview. Sports fellowships attempt to offer regional interviews so that the applicant can attend several interviews in a short time period, saving time and the added expense of additional flights.POSNA permits interviews at the International Pediatric Orthopaedic Symposium. The society encourages applicants to attend formal interviews at the fellowship location, but it is not a requirement.The Board of Specialty Societies Match Committee has offered interview space to each subspecialty society during the AAOS Annual Meeting. One perceived limitation of regional or national meeting interviews is the inability of the applicant to see the program site firsthand.The cost of the interviewing process associated with the match process has been raised as a concern by applicants from almost every subspecialty society. The costs cited by applicants in the post-match survey response from the applicants ranged from $600 for the interview process to more than $5000.".."A previous reason cited for the failure of the previous matches was the lack of process regulation. To ensure the integrity of a match process, guidelines need to exist. The biggest concerns lie in the area of communication between applicants and programs after the interview. The precedent for the current strict rules could possibly be traced back to the failure of the previous matches in the 1990s and early 2000s. There was no universal match process at that time. The ASES rules state: “No communication between the applicant and program director/staff after the interview.” Likewise, the spine and sports subspecialties have similar strict rules of no communication. The sanctions that each society has in place are available on their web sites. The subspecialty society for the respective match imposes any sanction necessary. Most sanctions to the program involve restriction from participation in the match for a specific time period to fellowship faculty not being allowed to serve on subspecialty boards of directors and/or committees or to the program being banned from making podium presentations or receiving research grants. There have been no major sanctions reported by any subspecialty society.In conclusion, with the advent of a fellowship match and the increased number of applicants, the fellowship application process is not so different from the residency application process. 

Some history of the Common App

The Chronicle of Higher Ed has a long, informative article on the Common App and the recent troubles with its computer systems, from which I excerpt below:

The Uncommon Rise of the Common App

Although the Common Application is now a vast, bustling highway, it was once just a shortcut. Its founding purpose: to make applying to college easier.

Back before the computer, applicants and counselors had to write or type answers to the same questions on every college's application. Each year the nation's hands cramped up. Then, in 1975, Colgate University, Vassar College, and a handful of other private institutions with similar admissions requirements created a common form that students could photocopy and mail in.

This modest stand against redundancy was infused with a high-minded mission: increasing access by going beyond grades and test scores to conduct robust evaluations of each applicant. "It was a time for reaffirming what was important in admissions," says Mary F. Hill, a former dean of admissions at Colgate who served on the Common Application's board of directors from 1996 to 2005.

...

By the mid-1990s, more than 150 colleges—all private, all relatively selective—were using the Common Application, run by a network of volunteers. In 1996 the National Association of Secondary School Principals dedicated a staff member to handle logistics and the increasing volume of paperwork. The application then was a booklet of perforated forms with maroon type; the masthead listed participating colleges in small print. Each year, as more names were added, the letters shrank.

The Common App first went online in 1998. To keep up with growth, the board hired a staff and incorporated as a nonprofit organization. It also agreed to admit public universities, the first six of which joined in 2001.

...

At least until this fall, ease of use has made the Common App a success by any measure. According to its tax return for 2011, the organization, based in Arlington, Va., generated $13-million in revenue. Of the group's 517 members, 178 offer no other way to apply. The fee structure rewards exclusivity. Nonexclusive members pay $4.75 per application; exclusive members pay $4. Colleges that further "streamline" their policies—by having no more than two early-admission plans, for instance—pay only $3.75. All nine admissions officials on the organization's board represent exclusive users.

The Common Application now has nine employees, but it expects to grow to 65. Next summer, as part of a long-term acquisition plan, the organization will hire about 30 employees who now work for a company called Hobsons, which designed and developed the new online system. (Hobsons also owns Naviance, which high schools use to send documents to colleges, and the website College Confidential.)

In the admissions profession, the Common App is ubiquitous. This year it was the lone platinum sponsor of the National Association for College Admission Counseling's annual conference, for which it paid $50,000. (The Chronicle was also a sponsor of the event.) Recently the Common App gave the association $80,000 to send 80 college counselors to a professional-development workshop. Each year it mails a poster to every high school in the nation, listing its ever longer roster of colleges.

With visibility comes cachet. Joining the Common Application in 1990 was an important move for Ursinus College, says Richard G. DiFeliciantonio, vice president for enrollment. "There was status associated with that membership," he says. "It confirmed our position in the marketplace."

Now he believes the benefits have less to do with prestige than with scale. The wider a college's recruitment net, the more applicants of every kind it can attract. He credits the Common App with helping Ursinus double its enrollment of both nonwhite students and those eligible for federal Pell Grants.

Mr. DiFeliciantonio also sees trade-offs. With more applications, "yield"—the percentage of accepted students who enroll—declines and becomes harder to predict. (A law of recruitment: More applicants doesn't necessarily mean more serious applicants.) And member colleges must relinquish some authority over the questions they can and cannot ask. "We were willing to put up with a loss of control," he says, "to get with the herd."

...

The Common Application is not without competitors. College­NET, an Oregon-based technology company, builds customized application-processing systems for some 500 colleges worldwide. After creating an account through, say, Washington State University, a student can automatically transfer basic information to another member college that has signed on to that service.

...

Joshua J. Reiter, who helped build the Common Application's first online system, went on to start the Universal College Application in 2007. The for-profit company is a small rival, for sure: Membership peaked at about 80 colleges a few years ago, then dwindled to 32, in part because those that also belonged to the Common App decided it was simpler to manage just one system. But since problems with the Common Application arose, Princeton University and seven other colleges have joined or rejoined the Universal College Application, which admissions deans say charges $1,000 annually, plus $4.50 per application.

...

Timeline: The Common Application, 1975-2013

1975: The Common Application begins a pilot program with 15 member institutions, primarily selective liberal-arts colleges.

1980: Passes 100 members.

1994: Harvard U. becomes the first Ivy League member; Dartmouth College follows the next year.

1998: First online application system launches.

2000: The Common Application incorporates as a nonprofit; passes 200 members.

2001: The Universities of Delaware, Vermont, and Maine are among the first public institutions to join.

2004: Binghamton University becomes the first State University of New York campus to join; by 2011, 18 other SUNY campuses will have joined.

2007: Passes 300 members.

2010: First international institutions join; passes 400 members; number of unique applicants exceeds 500,000.

2013: Paper application is retired; passes 500 member institutions; fourth generation of the online application faces technical difficulties and criticism.

News story on sorority matching, quoting two Roths

Here's a news story from the Daily Pennsylvanian, that is notable for quoting two Roths, without any suggestion that they are related (Roth is a common name...:)

Sorority, medical residency recruitment similar: Applicants are matched with organizations through an algorithm for both

The back story, I gather, is that the student reporter first contacted Penn computer science professor Aaron Roth to comment on the use of an algorithm in matching applicants to sororities, and he mentioned to her that there was an economics paper on sorority matching.

Dress exchange

Joshua Gans points out to me that now there's a dress exchange called 99dresses.comhttp://www.99dresses.com/ (which seems less complicated than kidney exchange).

FREE FASHION

and never wear the same thing twice!

Get Started It's FREE. Learn more about how it works.

1 UPLOAD

Upload your quality unwanted clothes, shoes and accessories into the Infinite Closet.

2 SELL

Sell your fashion to other girls for a virtual currency called buttons.

3 SPEND

Spend your buttons on anything you want in the Infinite Closet.  

School Choice in New Orleans with top trading cycles

Something exciting is happening in New Orleans Recovery School District: a novel school choice algorithm is being tried out for the first time. And it's being rolled out with some pretty good communications to the community. Here's a story by Andrew Vanacore in The Times-Picayune yesterday: Centralized enrollment in Recovery School District gets first tryout

The newspaper story even comes with a graphic meant to convey an important piece of the top trading cycle algorithm:

"Somewhere inside the jumble of narrow beige corridors on Poland Avenue in the Upper 9th Ward, in the state-run Recovery School District's headquarters, someone will hit a button on a computer in the next few weeks, and presto: Almost all of the roughly 28,000 students in New Orleans who applied for a seat this fall at one of the district's 67 schools will be assigned a place. With that final keystroke, the school system will move for the first time from a frustrating, ad-hoc enrollment process handled at individual campuses to one centralized at district offices.


"Every child will get a spot. But because schools don't have an infinite number of seats and some schools will doubtless prove more popular than others, not every family will get their top pick. More than likely, some small percentage won't get any of the eight choices they ranked when they filled out their application earlier this year.

"So it's worth considering: Who will decide the fates of these 28,000 students? In a district unique for giving children the right to pick the school they attend, instead of the right to attend the school down the street, who decides what's fair?

"The short answer is nobody, or at least nobody with a pulse. As the technical experts working with the Recovery District explained to a group of community groups and reporters last week, a computer algorithm will go to work trying to match every student with a school that's as high on their list as possible. Students with siblings at a particular school will get a first shot at open seats at that school, followed by those living nearby. But much will hinge on a randomly assigned lottery number.

"This, officials say, will give the greatest possible number of students as close to their top choice as possible in a way that's fair and transparent.

"For parents, there are some key ideas to keep in mind. The experts who developed the algorithm -- folks from Duke, Harvard and MIT -- say there is no way to game the system. If what you really want is a seat at KIPP Renaissance High School, you should not rank Sci Academy first, thinking that you're more likely to get your second choice. Ranking KIPP as your top choice gives you your best shot at getting in. 

"There's also no way to lose a seat that your child already has. If a second-grader at School A applies for a transfer to School B and doesn't win a spot, he will automatically remain where he is.

"For now, there's no way of telling which percentage of families will get their top choice, but a small number will almost certainly get none of the eight schools they ranked on their application. That's simply because they were unlucky in the assigning of lottery numbers, picked eight very popular schools or both.

"Until all of our schools are equally amazing, not every family is going to get everything they want," said Neil Dorosin, founder of the Institute for Innovation in Public School Choice, which helped develop the new process."

...

"Another important caveat: The 17 schools that are still overseen by the Orleans Parish School Board will not be included. "That's the missing link, " said Debra Vaughan, a researcher at the Cowen Institute. It means students who want to reach for a spot at one of the city's prestigious magnet schools still have to navigate two separate enrollment systems. The Recovery District and the School Board have been in talks but haven't reached an agreement on how to merge the systems."

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Previous posts on New Orleans schools (most recent first):

New Orleans launches its new school choice process

School choice design in New Orleans Recovery School District

Centralized enrolment in New Orleans public schools

School choice in New Orleans

The Common App and college admissions

An article on updated software to be used for college admissions by the Common Application process reflects how the process of applying to colleges, once entirely decentralized, has changed: Common App 4.0

"The Common App, the all-purpose form accepted by 456 colleges and universities, is getting a digital makeover, down to the most fundamental swatches of code, with the end result intended to be a smoother, faster, more intuitive application. (The application itself will still be a rigorous exercise, complete with 250- to 500-word essays.)
"The new electronic form, now on the drawing board, is scheduled to make its debut in 2013.
...
"In the application season beginning to wind down this month, an estimated 750,000 students will have submitted three million online applications. That represents an increase of about 25 percent in only the last year. Meanwhile, teachers, counselors and school administrators are expected to submit 10 million transcripts, recommendations and other school forms through the Common Application’s electronic pipeline this year.

"For that matter, it has only been in the last decade that most students began to apply to college by pushing the “send” button instead of walking their applications to the post office. The Common App itself — which made it possible, for the first time, for a student to type up one form and photocopy it for multiple submissions — is only 36 years old.
...
"The number of applications filed through the Common Application portal by the end of this decade could exceed 10 million — and the number of schools accepting it could grow to 1,000 or more. That workload is well beyond what the latest Common Application is built to withstand."

HT: Neil Dorosin

Progress in the national kidney exchange pilot program

There is recent modest but welcome progress in the effort to organize a Federally sponsored kidney exchange on the national level in the United States.

Ruthanne Hanto, who moved from NEPKE to UNOS this summer writes:
"15 transplants from sept 2011-dec 2011

Compared to 2 transplants oct 2010 - aug 2011

Progress

Happy New year!"

Here's the most recent UNOS press release dated Dec. 6:

"From September to mid-November, 10 transplants took place through the OPTN's national kidney paired donation (KPD) pilot program. Five more transplants are scheduled to occur by the end of 2011.

A six-way, non-directed donor chain was identified in August. Four of the transplants occurred between September and mid-November. The remaining two transplants are scheduled to take place by early December.
A non-directed donor chain resulted in three transplants in September, and a separate three-way exchange also was completed in September. An additional three-way exchange is scheduled to occur in December.
A free informational brochure has been developed to provide basic information to potential donors and recipients about the national program. Order printed copies of the brochure now >
Currently there are 86 transplant centers participating in the pilot program. For additional information about the program, or to seek information about participating, please consult the KPD page on the OPTN Web site or contact Ruthanne Hanto, RN, MPH, Program Manager, at kidneypaireddonation@unos.org.  "

Further followup on school choice in San Francisco

My Thursday post, Followup on school choice in San Francisco, has generated some followup on its own, in the form of an audio interview yesterday of School Board member Rachel Norton by Stan Goldberg who follows the SF school system under the name Senior Dad.  He summarizes the interview as "Straight answers from Commissioner Norton “because people have a right to know”."

The issue is whether the algorithm adopted by the board last year was in fact implemented correctly by the district staff. It's an important question because the correctly implemented algorithm would be strategy proof, and if parents had confidence in this it would vastly simplify the school choice system from parents' point of view.

Here is my very incomplete and possibly imperfect transcript to give the flavor of the last 5 minutes of the interview (starting just after minute 39) in which Stan Goldberg (SG) raises this issue, and Rachel Norton (RN) replies. It's worth listening to.

SG “The school district was supposed to release the algorithm they were assigning students on, and so far they have not released that algorithm.”

RN “you’ve been reading Al Roth’s blog” ...“I’ve advocated for that, and will continue to advocate for that. I don’t think the staff right now wants to do that. [laughter] But short of 5 votes, 4 votes, they don’t have to.

…

SG ‘why should the public trust the school district?  “I’ve had the deputy Superintendent say ‘you guys shouldn’t trust us, we haven’t been reliable’. He said that; I believed him.”

RN “I don’t know what to tell you Sam, I think we should release the algorithm, and I’ve said that to staff, I’ve said that to the Superintendent”…short of 3 other board members joining with me and demanding that it be released the superintendent can do what he thinks is best,  unless he’s ordered by the board to do something else…”

SG “not releasing the algorithm makes everybody think something funny is going on…”

RN” well, not everyone…”

Followup on school choice in San Francisco

My previous post on how school choice is faring in San Francisco was called  School choice in San Francisco: a promise of transparency.  That promise still hasn't been fulfilled.

The idea was that, after the adoption by the school board of a New school choice system in San Francisco, SFUSD decided to implement the new, strategy-proof  "assignment with transfers" choice system itself (San Francisco school choice goes in-house).

School Board member Rachel Norton wrote in a November 9, 2010 blog post that
"Staff did pledge to make the documentation of the algorithm requirements and process flows public by February; I will continue to push to make the assignment algorithm itself open source."

While SFUSD has prepared a number of documents since then, none of them seem to contain a description of the SF school choice algorithm as actually implemented by the staff. All I can find are descriptions of the priorities used for tie-breaking if more children than can be accommodated by a school would otherwise have been assigned there, but no description of the process by which they would have been assigned before tie breaking has to be invoked.

The latest document of that sort, via Rachel Norton's June 1 blog post, is here: Board of Education Policy.
On page 7, under the heading "Method of Allocating Seats," the document states "The SFUSD will replace the diversity index lottery system with an assignment with transfers algorithm that uses school requests from families and the preferences outlined in this student assignment policy."
However the document doesn't describe the assignment with transfers algorithm at all, just the tie breaking priorities.

So...I'm still in the dark about whether SFUSD has actually implemented the choice system the Board adopted, and I bet SF parents and board members are too.
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Read more »

School choice in San Francisco: a promise of transparency

San Francisco school board member Rachel Norton blogs about the most recent school board meeting this week, concerning the new SF school choice algorithm, which they are now implementing in house (see this earlier post, and a followup interview).

The latest news sounds good regarding plans for transparency. Norton writes:

"Staff did pledge to make the documentation of the algorithm requirements and process flows public by February; I will continue to push to make the assignment algorithm itself open source."

Couples match

The University of Alabama at Birmingham magazine (June 2010) writes about the couples match: Match Making--Software Helps Medical Couples Stay Together

(Here's a paper with a more technical description of how the couples match works...

Roth, A. E. and Elliott Peranson, "The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic Design," American Economic Review, 89, 4, September, 1999, 748-780.,

and here's a paper that's about why it works as well as it does...

Kojima, Fuhito, Parag A. Pathak, and Alvin E. Roth, " Matching with Couples: Stability and Incentives in Large Markets," working paper, April 8 2010.)

Kidney exchange at Northwestern

Tomorrow (Wednesday) afternoon I'll be giving the Nancy L. Schwartz Memorial Lecture at Northwestern, and I'll talk a lot about kidney exchange.

So it's a good time to mention a big exchange chain that was completed last month entirely at Northwestern Memorial Hospital, which has one of the biggest living donor transplant programs in the country: Sixteen Patients, Eight Kidney Transplants, Three Days... One Life Changing Event .

This was an innovative non-simultaneous altruistic donor chain, conducted over three days (with 3 transplants done the first day, 3 the second, and 2 the third.)

Here's a page containing (scroll down) a May 19 video interview with the non-directed donor, and two of the transplant docs, John Friedewald and Joseph Leventhal.

Some of my earlier posts on the revolution caused by non-simultaneous chains are below:

Advances in kidney exchange, in the New England Journal of Medicine

Kidney Exchange in People Magazine

Non-simultaneous kidney exchange chains

More non-simultaneous kidney chains

Progress towards a sensibly organized national kidney exchange.

(John Friedewald, the Northwestern transplant nephrologist interviewed about the story at the top of this post, is the chair of the UNOS Kidney Paired Donation Work Group charged with organizing a pilot national program...)