EC17: the ACM conference on Economics and Computation

EC is now a long-running computer science conference (underway right now at MIT). I think the initials initially stood for Electronic Commerce, but developments in both Econ and CS have let to the initial-conserving new name, Economics and Computation.

The program is a striking demonstration of the growing intersection between Ec and CS...among the papers that catch my eye are some on fairness, pricing, matching markets, and market design generally.

Here's the program with links to abstracts:

SESSION: Plenary session

Fair Algorithms for Machine Learning

• Michael Kearns

SESSION: 1a: Static Revenue Maximization 1

Dominant-Strategy versus Bayesian Multi-item Auctions: Maximum Revenue Determination and Comparison

• Andrew Chi-Chih Yao

Deferred-Acceptance Auctions for Multiple Levels of Service

• Vasilis Gkatzelis
 
• Evangelos Markakis
 
• Tim Roughgarden

The Optimal Mechanism for Selling to a Budget Constrained Buyer: The General Case

• Nikhil R. Devanur
 
• S. Matthew Weinberg

Optimal Multi-Unit Mechanisms with Private Demands

• Nikhil R. Devanur
 
• Nima Haghpanah
 
• Christos-Alexandros Psomas

SESSION: 1b: Peer Predictions

The Double Clinching Auction for Wagering

• Rupert Freeman
 
• David M. Pennock
 
• Jennifer Wortman Vaughan

Forecast Aggregation

• Itai Arieli
 
• Yakov Babichenko
 
• Rann Smorodinsky

Machine-Learning Aided Peer Prediction

• Yang Liu
 
• Yiling Chen

Peer Prediction with Heterogeneous Users

• Arpit Agarwal
 
• Debmalya Mandal
 
• David C. Parkes
 
• Nisarg Shah

SESSION: 2a: Matching 1

The Stochastic Matching Problem: Beating Half with a Non-Adaptive Algorithm

• Sepehr Assadi
 
• Sanjeev Khanna
 
• Yang Li

Facilitating the Search for Partners on Matching Platforms: Restricting Agent Actions

• Yash Kanoria
 
• Daniela Saban

Matching while Learning

• Ramesh Johari
 
• Vijay Kamble
 
• Yash Kanoria

Redesigning the Israeli Psychology Master's Match

• Avinatan Hassidim
 
• Assaf Romm
 
• Ran I. Shorrer

SESSION: 2b: Predictions and Queries

A "Quantal Regret" Method for Structural Econometrics in Repeated Games

• Noam Nisan
 
• Gali Noti

The Theory is Predictive, but is it Complete?: An Application to Human Perception of Randomness

• Jon Kleinberg
 
• Annie Liang
 
• Sendhil Mullainathan

Comparison-based Choices

• Jon Kleinberg
 
• Sendhil Mullainathan
 
• Johan Ugander

Combinatorial Auctions Do Need Modest Interaction

• Sepehr Assadi

SESSION: 3a: Dynamic Revenue Maximization 1

The Scope of Sequential Screening with Ex Post Participation Constraints

• Dirk Bergemann
 
• Francisco Castro
 
• Gabriel Weintraub

Dynamic Mechanisms with Martingale Utilities

• Santiago Balseiro
 
• Vahab Mirrokni
 
• Renato Paes Leme

Repeated Sales with Multiple Strategic Buyers

• Nicole Immorlica
 
• Brendan Lucier
 
• Emmanouil Pountourakis
 
• Samuel Taggart

Posted Price Mechanisms for a Random Stream of Customers

• José Correa
 
• Patricio Foncea
 
• Ruben Hoeksma
 
• Tim Oosterwijk
 
• Tjark Vredeveld

SESSION: 3b: Economic Equilibrium

Accounting for Strategic Response in an Agent-Based Model of Financial Regulation

• Frank Cheng
 
• Michael P. Wellman

Empirical Mechanism Design for Optimizing Clearing Interval in Frequent Call Markets

• Erik Brinkman
 
• Michael P. Wellman

Potential Function Minimizers of Combinatorial Congestion Games: Efficiency and Computation

• Pieter Kleer
 
• Guido Schäfer

Surge Pricing Solves the Wild Goose Chase

• Juan Camilo Castillo
 
• Dan Knoepfle
 
• Glen Weyl

SESSION: 4a: Matching 2

Stable Secretaries

• Yakov Babichenko
 
• Yuval Emek
 
• Michal Feldman
 
• Boaz Patt-Shamir
 
• Ron Peretz
 
• Rann Smorodinsky

Computing Equilibrium in Matching Markets

• Saeed Alaei
 
• Pooya Jalaly Khalilabadi
 
• Eva Tardos

Communication Requirements and Informative Signaling in Matching Markets

• Itai Ashlagi
 
• Mark Braverman
 
• Yash Kanoria
 
• Peng Shi

Complementary Inputs and the Existence of Stable Outcomes in Large Trading Networks

• Ravi Jagadeesan

SESSION: 4b: Voting

Making Right Decisions Based on Wrong Opinions

• Gerdus Benade
 
• Anson Kahng
 
• Ariel D. Procaccia

Voting in the Limelight

• Ronen Gradwohl

Metric Distortion of Social Choice Rules: Lower Bounds and Fairness Properties

• Ashish Goel
 
• Anilesh K. Krishnaswamy
 
• Kamesh Munagala

Of the People: Voting Is More Effective with Representative Candidates

• Yu Cheng
 
• Shaddin Dughmi
 
• David Kempe

SESSION: 5a: Static Revenue Maximization 2

A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for a Buyer with Complements: Abstract

• Alon Eden
 
• Michal Feldman
 
• Ophir Friedler
 
• Inbal Talgam-Cohen
 
• S. Matthew Weinberg

Price Doubling and Item Halving: Robust Revenue Guarantees for Item Pricing

• Elliot Anshelevich
 
• Shreyas Sekar

The Competition Complexity of Auctions: A Bulow-Klemperer Result for Multi-Dimensional Bidders

• Alon Eden
 
• Michal Feldman
 
• Ophir Friedler
 
• Inbal Talgam-Cohen
 
• S. Matthew Weinberg

Assortment Optimisation under a General Discrete Choice Model: A Tight Analysis of Revenue-Ordered Assortments

• Gerardo Berbeglia
 
• Gwenaël Joret

SESSION: 5b: Information Games

Optimal Signaling Mechanisms in Unobservable Queues with Strategic Customers

• David Lingenbrink
 
• Krishnamurthy Iyer

Information Sharing and Privacy in Networks

• Ronen Gradwohl

Algorithmic Persuasion with No Externalities

• Shaddin Dughmi
 
• Haifeng Xu

Fairness Incentives for Myopic Agents

• Sampath Kannan
 
• Michael Kearns
 
• Jamie Morgenstern
 
• Mallesh Pai
 
• Aaron Roth
 
• Rakesh Vohra
 
• Zhiwei Steven Wu

SESSION: Best Paper and Best Dissertation presentations

Combinatorial Cost Sharing

• Shahar Dobzinski
 
• Shahar Ovadia

SESSION: 6a: Scheduling

Makespan Minimization via Posted Prices

• Michal Feldman
 
• Amos Fiat
 
• Alan Roytman

Truth and Regret in Online Scheduling

• Shuchi Chawla
 
• Nikhil Devanur
 
• Janardhan Kulkarni
 
• Rad Niazadeh

Cost-Sharing Methods for Scheduling Games under Uncertainty

• Giorgos Christodoulou
 
• Vasilis Gkatzelis
 
• Alkmini Sgouritsa

SESSION: 6b: Fair Division 1

Convex Program Duality, Fisher Markets, and Nash Social Welfare

• Richard Cole
 
• Nikhil Devanur
 
• Vasilis Gkatzelis
 
• Kamal Jain
 
• Tung Mai
 
• Vijay V. Vazirani
 
• Sadra Yazdanbod

Controlled Dynamic Fair Division

• Eric Friedman
 
• Christos-Alexandros Psomas
 
• Shai Vardi

A Lower Bound for Equitable Cake Cutting

• Ariel D. Procaccia
 
• Junxing Wang

SESSION: 7a: Dynamic Revenue Maximization 2

Online Auctions and Multi-scale Online Learning

• Sebastien Bubeck
 
• Nikhil R. Devanur
 
• Zhiyi Huang
 
• Rad Niazadeh

Joint Pricing and Inventory Management with Strategic Customers

• Yiwei Chen
 
• Cong Shi

Pricing and Optimization in Shared Vehicle Systems: An Approximation Framework

• Siddhartha Banerjee
 
• Daniel Freund
 
• Thodoris Lykouris

Multidimensional Dynamic Pricing for Welfare Maximization

• Aaron Roth
 
• Aleksandrs Slivkins
 
• Jonathan Ullman
 
• Zhiwei Steven Wu

SESSION: 7b: Experiments

The Tragedy of your Upstairs Neighbors: Is the Negative Externality of Airbnb Internalized?

• Apostolos Filippas
 
• John Joseph Horton

Interacting User Generated Content Technologies: How Q&As Affect Ratings & Reviews

• Shrabastee Banerjee
 
• Chrysanthos Dellarocas
 
• Georgios Zervas

Learning in the Repeated Secretary Problem

• Daniel G. Goldstein
 
• R. Preston McAfee
 
• Siddharth Suri
 
• James R. Wright

Diffusion in Networks and the Unexpected Virtue of Burstiness

• Mohammad Akbarpour
 
• Matthew Jackson

SESSION: 8a: Mechanism Design -- General

Truthful Allocation Mechanisms Without Payments: Characterization and Implications on Fairness

• Georgios Amanatidis
 
• Georgios Birmpas
 
• George Christodoulou
 
• Evangelos Markakis

From Monetary to Non-Monetary Mechanism Design via Artificial Currencies

• Artur Gorokh
 
• Siddhartha Banerjee
 
• Krishnamurthy Iyer

Gibbard-Satterthwaite Success Stories and Obvious Strategyproofness

• Sophie Bade
 
• Yannai A. Gonczarowski

SESSION: 8b: Decision Making and Learning

Planning with Multiple Biases

• Jon Kleinberg
 
• Sigal Oren
 
• Manish Raghavan

Multidimensional Binary Search for Contextual Decision-Making

• Ilan Lobel
 
• Renato Paes Leme
 
• Adrian Vladu

Bifurcation Mechanism Design - from Optimal Flat Taxes to Improved Cancer Treatments

• Ger Yang
 
• Georgios Piliouras
 
• David Basanta

SESSION: 9a: Auctions -- Equilibrium

Approximating Gains from Trade in Two-sided Markets via Simple Mechanisms

• Johannes Brustle
 
• Yang Cai
 
• Fa Wu
 
• Mingfei Zhao

Approximately Efficient Two-Sided Combinatorial Auctions

• Riccardo Colini-Baldeschi
 
• Paul W. Goldberg
 
• Bart de Keijzer
 
• Stefano Leonardi
 
• Tim Roughgarden
 
• Stefano Turchetta

Learning in Repeated Auctions with Budgets: Regret Minimization and Equilibrium

• Santiago R. Balseiro
 
• Yonatan Gur

SESSION: 9b: Fair Division 2

Nash Social Welfare Approximation for Strategic Agents

• Simina Branzei
 
• Vasilis Gkatzelis
 
• Ruta Mehta

Fair Public Decision Making

• Vincent Conitzer
 
• Rupert Freeman
 
• Nisarg Shah

Approximation Algorithms for Maximin Fair Division

• Siddharth Barman
 
• Sanath Kumar Krishna Murthy

SESSION: Plenary session

Graphons: A Nonparametric Method to Model, Estimate, and Design Algorithms for Massive Networks

• Christian Borgs
 
• Jennifer Chayes

SESSION: 10a: Matching 3

Stability, Strategy-Proofness, and Cumulative Offer Mechanisms

• John William Hatfield
 
• Scott Duke Kominers
 
• Alexander Westkamp

Stable Matching with Proportionality Constraints

• Thanh Nguyen
 
• Rakesh Vohra

Making it Safe to Use Centralized Markets: Epsilon - Dominant Individual Rationality and Applications to Market Design

• Benjamin N. Roth
 
• Ran Shorrer

How (Not) to Allocate Affordable Housing

• Nick Arnosti
 
• Peng Shi

SESSION: 10b: Strategic Games

Simple Approximate Equilibria in Games with Many Players

• Itai Arieli
 
• Yakov Babichenko

Theoretical and Practical Advances on Smoothing for Extensive-Form Games

• Christian Kroer
 
• Kevin Waugh
 
• Fatma Kilinc-Karzan
 
• Tuomas Sandholm

A Network Game of Dynamic Traffic

• Zhigang Cao
 
• Bo Chen
 
• Xujin Chen
 
• Changjun Wang

A Polynomial Time Algorithm for Spatio-Temporal Security Games

• Soheil Behnezhad
 
• Mahsa Derakhshan
 
• MohammadTaghi Hajiaghayi
 
• Aleksandrs Slivkins