This year we've organized an expanded set of posters at the AEA meetings in Chicago, and mine is on The Ongoing Design of Kidney Exchange: Recent and Prospective Developments. Below is a picture of the poster taken by Craig Huey (but it is probably easier to read at the link above:).
Kidney exchange has become an increasingly standard and important part of kidney transplantation in the U.S.. But in some ways how it has developed is very different than my experience in other areas of market design. One way to see the difference is that in some other markets on which I've worked, like labor markets for doctors and other healthcare professionals, and school choice, the initial designs that were proposed, adapted, adopted and implemented are still in use today, using variants of the deferred acceptance algorithm in more or less the original form in which they were implemented in each labor market and school district. Not so for kidney exchange, which has to constantly adapt to the ways that transplant centers themselves adapt to kidney exchange, and to each other and the several multi-hospital kidney exchange networks.
Here are the papers of mine that I chose to reflect this evolution on the poster, in chronological order. (Of course there's lots of related work in which I'm not a coauthor, but posters have their limits.) Another difference from some of my previous market design experience is that a lot of the discussion of practical design issues goes on in medical journals...
Kidney exchange has become an increasingly standard and important part of kidney transplantation in the U.S.. But in some ways how it has developed is very different than my experience in other areas of market design. One way to see the difference is that in some other markets on which I've worked, like labor markets for doctors and other healthcare professionals, and school choice, the initial designs that were proposed, adapted, adopted and implemented are still in use today, using variants of the deferred acceptance algorithm in more or less the original form in which they were implemented in each labor market and school district. Not so for kidney exchange, which has to constantly adapt to the ways that transplant centers themselves adapt to kidney exchange, and to each other and the several multi-hospital kidney exchange networks.
Here are the papers of mine that I chose to reflect this evolution on the poster, in chronological order. (Of course there's lots of related work in which I'm not a coauthor, but posters have their limits.) Another difference from some of my previous market design experience is that a lot of the discussion of practical design issues goes on in medical journals...
1.Roth, Alvin E., Tayfun Sönmez and
M. Utku Ünver,
"Kidney Exchange," Quarterly Journal of Economics,
119, 2, May, 2004, 457-488.
2.Roth, Alvin E., Tayfun Sönmez, M.
Utku Ünver,
Francis L. Delmonico, and Susan L. Saidman, “Utilizing List Exchange and
Undirected Good Samaritan Donation through “Chain” Paired Kidney Donations,” American
Journal of Transplantation, 6, 11, November 2006, 2694-2705.
3.Rees, Michael A., Jonathan E. Kopke,
Ronald P. Pelletier, Dorry L. Segev,
Matthew E. Rutter, Alfredo J. Fabrega, Jeffrey Rogers, Oleh G. Pankewycz,
Janet Hiller, Alvin E. Roth, Tuomas Sandholm, Utku Ünver, and
Robert A. Montgomery, “A Non-Simultaneous Extended Altruistic Donor Chain,” New
England Journal of Medicine, 360;11, March 12, 2009, 1096-1101.
4.Ashlagi,
Itai, Duncan S. Gilchrist, Alvin E. Roth, and Michael A. Rees, “Nonsimultaneous
Chains and Dominos in Kidney Paired Donation – Revisited,” American
Journal of Transplantation, 11, 5, May 2011, 984-994
5.
Ashlagi, Itai, Duncan S. Gilchrist, Alvin E. Roth, and Michael A. Rees, “NEAD
Chains in Transplantation,” American Journal of Transplantation,
December 2011;
11: 2780–2781.
6. Rees,
Michael A., Mark A. Schnitzler, Edward
Zavala, James A. Cutler, Alvin E. Roth,
F. Dennis Irwin, Stephen W. Crawford,and Alan
B. Leichtman, “Call to Develop a
Standard Acquisition Charge Model for Kidney Paired Donation,” American
Journal of Transplantation, 2012, 12, 6 (June), 1392-1397.
(published online 9 April 2012
7.Ashlagi,
Itai, and Alvin E. Roth, "Free Riding and Participation in Large Scale,
Multi-hospital Kidney Exchange,” Theoretical Economics 9
(2014), 817–863.
8.Anderson,
Ross, Itai Ashlagi, David Gamarnik and Alvin E. Roth, “Finding long chains in
kidney exchange using the traveling salesmen problem,” Proceedings
of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America (PNAS),
January 20, 2015 | vol. 112 | no. 3 | 663–668
9.
Fumo, D.E., V. Kapoor, L.J. Reece, S.M. Stepkowski,J.E.
Kopke, S.E. Rees, C. Smith, A.E. Roth, A.B. Leichtman, M.A. Rees, “Improving
matching strategies in kidney paired donation: the 7-year evolution of a web
based virtual matching system,” American Journal of Transplantation,
October 2015, 15(10), 2646-2654
10.Melcher, Marc L., John P. Roberts, Alan
B. Leichtman, Alvin E. Roth, and Michael A. Rees, “Utilization of Deceased
Donor Kidneys to Initiate Living Donor Chains,” American Journal of Transplantation, 16,
5, May 2016, 1367–1370.
11.Michael
A. Rees, Ty B. Dunn, Christian S. Kuhr, Christopher L. Marsh, Jeffrey Rogers,
Susan E. Rees, Alejandra Cicero, Laurie J. Reece, Alvin E. Roth, Obi Ekwenna,
David E. Fumo, Kimberly D. Krawiec, Jonathan E. Kopke, Samay
Jain, Miguel Tan and Siegfredo R. Paloyo,
“Kidney Exchange to Overcome Financial Barriers to Kidney Transplantation,” American
Journal of Transplantation, forthcoming
12.Nikzad,
Afshin, Mohammad Akbarpour, Michael Rees, and Alvin E. Roth, “Financing
Transplant Costs of the Poor: A Dynamic Model of Global Kidney Exchange,” 2016
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