The peer review process, for all its flaws, normally eliminates the need to write the kind of wide-ranging reply that I have forthcoming in the Journal of Labor Economics. Here's the abstract and introduction: the link to the full paper is below.
Abstract: In this reply I describe the unraveling of transaction dates in several markets, including the labor market for new lawyers hired by large law firms. This and other markets illustrate that unraveling can occur in markets with competitive prices, that it can result in substantial inefficiencies, and that marketplace institutions play a role in restoring efficiency. All of these contradict the conclusions of Priest (2010).
And here are the opening paragraphs of the paper:
"Priest’s (2010) paper, “Timing ‘Disturbances’ in Labor Market Contracting: Roth’s Findings and the Effects of Labor Market Monopsony” seeks to rebut what he describes as “The work of Alvin E. Roth and colleagues writing in what might be described as the Roth tradition” about “a curious set of phenomena in some labor and product markets.”
"Briefly, the “tradition” Priest addresses has studied the timing of transactions, and observed that some markets go through episodes in which they unravel in time, with transactions becoming earlier and more diffuse in time from year to year, and with offers often coming to have very short durations (“exploding” offers). This has often led to changes in marketplace institutions, including rules and regulations to introduce a uniform time for market transactions, and restore thickness. Frequently this involves facilitating a marketplace at a later as well as a more uniform time. (For overviews, see Roth and Xing 1994, and Niederle and Roth 2009.)"
Roth, Alvin E, "Marketplace institutions related to the timing of transactions, and reply to Priest (2010)" Journal of Labor Economics, forthcoming (maybe April 2012).
Specialist: Industrial Economics, Organizational and Market Design
UCL - Université Catholique de Louvain
Leuven, Belgium
The successful candidate will carry out research in the field of Industrial economics, organizational and market design. He will be expected to develop high quality theoretical and/or applied research in industrial organization, incentive theory, organizational or market design, the economics of information and technology and game theory with applications. The research topics we are interested in include but are not limited to economics of networks, internet, communication medias, innovation and patents, two-sided markets, matching, the theory of the firm, not-for-profit organizations, and auctions.The successful candidate will have teaching assignments in general economics and in the above-mentioned field within the various degree programmes organised by the Faculty. He will have to supervise master theses and PhD dissertations.
Tasks: The applicant will
- be responsible for teaching courses at all the study levels (i.e. undergraduate, graduate and postgraduate), as well as in programmes of continuing education;
- supervise the final diploma work (i.e. master thesis) of undergraduate students, as well as PhD theses;
- be involved in (and/or supervise, promote) research programmes;
- contribute to the international visibility of the University through teaching and research excellence;
- contribute to activities of the University with a societal impact in the fields of the economy, socio-cultural changes or cooperation with developing countries.
- a PhD degree in economics, or equivalent qualifications;
- a significant scientific record proven by international publications;
- either studied abroad for an extensive period or had substantial experience outside UCL;
- experience in and aptitude for teaching at university level;
- the capacity to work within a team of teachers and to integrate research findings in their courses;
- creativity and must be open to pedagogic innovation and interdisciplinarity;
- the capacities required to undertake academic research at a high level and to advise, or lead, a research team ;
- a good knowledge of both spoken and written French. If this is not the case, the applicant should be willing to learn French within 2 years. Fluency in English and other languages is an additional advantage;
- the capacity to teach in French and in a second language.
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