RGGI, Inc. reports on their first auction.
The WSJ environmental blog report, Capping Carbon: Northeast Utilities Pay to Pollute, But Does That Matter?, says that
"Six of the ten states in the scheme offered 12.5 million permits for power companies to pollute. Bidders actually wanted more than 50 million permits, a sign of serious interest among utilities in getting their hands on the permits. (And it was largely utilities that were bidding; organizers said power companies, rather than environmental groups or third-party traders, bought “most” of the allowances.)
But demand wasn’t strong enough to actually make the emissions permits expensive: The auction price of $3.07 a ton was a little bit above the minimum bid price of $1.86 a ton, and just below the $4-something figures bandied about ahead of the auction. In comparison, greenhouse-gas emissions permits in the European scheme are trading at about $37. "
A firm hired by RGGI to monitor the auction reports no problems. The report includes the following:
"Based on our monitoring of participant conduct in the auction, we find no
material evidence of collusion or manipulation by bidders. The vast majority of bids were submitted in line with competitive expectations."
Tuesday, September 30, 2008
Monday, September 29, 2008
College football bowls
How Economics May Lead to Better Football Games, an interview based on the paper
Frechette, Guillaume, Alvin E. Roth, and M. Utku Unver, "Unraveling Yields Inefficient Matchings: Evidence from Post-Season College Football Bowls," Rand Journal of Economics, 38, 4, Winter 2007, 967-982, with an online appendix).
Frechette, Guillaume, Alvin E. Roth, and M. Utku Unver, "Unraveling Yields Inefficient Matchings: Evidence from Post-Season College Football Bowls," Rand Journal of Economics, 38, 4, Winter 2007, 967-982, with an online appendix).
Unraveling of college admissions--deadline creep
It's not just early action and early decision anymore; regular college admissions can also unravel. The Chronicle of Higher Education reports (Admissions Group Moves to Stop 'Deadline Creep') that
"The National Association for College Admission Counseling has a message for member institutions: Do not rush applicants into accepting offers.
On Saturday, during its annual meeting here, the association revised its professional guidelines to clarify that colleges may not solicit commitments from first-year applicants before May 1—the long-recognized notification deadline. In approving the new language, the association also affirmed that admissions offers must clearly state whether deposits submitted before May 1 are refundable.
Concerns about “deadline creep” prompted the revisions, said Ken Fox, departing chairman of Nacac’s Admissions Practices Committee. In recent years, some colleges have informed admitted students that they must accept or decline financial-aid offers before May 1, a violation of Nacac’s Statement of Principles of Good Practice. High-school counselors have also complained that some institutions pressure students by urging them to send housing deposits in March or April."
Furthermore
"On Saturday, Nacac also approved a change in its guidelines that will prohibit colleges from asking "regular-decision" applicants to rank their preferred colleges in order. Previously, the association stated only that colleges should not “require” such information, and some institutions continue to include the question on application materials, with the word “optional” beside it."
"The National Association for College Admission Counseling has a message for member institutions: Do not rush applicants into accepting offers.
On Saturday, during its annual meeting here, the association revised its professional guidelines to clarify that colleges may not solicit commitments from first-year applicants before May 1—the long-recognized notification deadline. In approving the new language, the association also affirmed that admissions offers must clearly state whether deposits submitted before May 1 are refundable.
Concerns about “deadline creep” prompted the revisions, said Ken Fox, departing chairman of Nacac’s Admissions Practices Committee. In recent years, some colleges have informed admitted students that they must accept or decline financial-aid offers before May 1, a violation of Nacac’s Statement of Principles of Good Practice. High-school counselors have also complained that some institutions pressure students by urging them to send housing deposits in March or April."
Furthermore
"On Saturday, Nacac also approved a change in its guidelines that will prohibit colleges from asking "regular-decision" applicants to rank their preferred colleges in order. Previously, the association stated only that colleges should not “require” such information, and some institutions continue to include the question on application materials, with the word “optional” beside it."
Sunday, September 28, 2008
Repugnant transactions in France
Legendary French bistro Lipp accepts Coke— at arm's length (in their new Mexican branch:)
"There are about a hundred wines on the list, along with a wide range of beers and water — but the only fizzy drink in this most Gallic of French restaurants is Schweppes tonic, which was authorised, after anguished debate, to enable Lipp's British customers to enjoy gin à l'anglaise.
“We allowed that in the name of entente cordiale, but we have never sold a bottle of Coca-Cola,” Mr Guittard told The Times.The only customers who asked for it were children and foreign visitors such as Bill Clinton, who dined at Lipp in 2006.
The former US President wanted to wash down his cassoulet with a Coca-Cola “but we didn't give in and so he had bordeaux instead”, said Mr Guittard. "
"There are about a hundred wines on the list, along with a wide range of beers and water — but the only fizzy drink in this most Gallic of French restaurants is Schweppes tonic, which was authorised, after anguished debate, to enable Lipp's British customers to enjoy gin à l'anglaise.
“We allowed that in the name of entente cordiale, but we have never sold a bottle of Coca-Cola,” Mr Guittard told The Times.The only customers who asked for it were children and foreign visitors such as Bill Clinton, who dined at Lipp in 2006.
The former US President wanted to wash down his cassoulet with a Coca-Cola “but we didn't give in and so he had bordeaux instead”, said Mr Guittard. "
Market for scientists
The market for biochemists is changing: pharma and biotech beckon, the path to academic tenure is strewn with obstacles:
"A decade after 26 members of the entering class of 1991 earned their Ph.D.s from Yale's elite molecular biophysics and biochemistry program, only one holds a tenured faculty position. But is an exodus from academia a bad thing?"
from And Then There Was One, Science 19 September 2008: 1622-1628.
"A decade after 26 members of the entering class of 1991 earned their Ph.D.s from Yale's elite molecular biophysics and biochemistry program, only one holds a tenured faculty position. But is an exodus from academia a bad thing?"
from And Then There Was One, Science 19 September 2008: 1622-1628.
Repugnant transactions in Australia and England: GM crops
In many parts of the world, barriers have been raised to the sale of Genetically Modified (GM) crops.
In Australia, they were legislated against, and now that legislation looks likely to be repealed.
Science 19 September 2008:Vol. 321. no. 5896, p. 1629 reports:
"Four years ago, the governing Labor Party in Western Australia (WA), the country's breadbasket, banned growing GM crops in the state. But after elections last week, the Liberal and National parties formed a coalition that will oust Labor--and the Liberals have promised to rescind the GM moratorium."
In England, where GM crops aren't forbidden, Prince Charles has headed the opposition:
"The mass development of genetically modified crops risks causing the world's worst environmental disaster, The Prince of Wales has warned...
"The Prince, in an exclusive interview with the Daily Telegraph, also expressed the fear that food would run out because of the damage being wreaked on the earth's soil by scientists' research.
He accused firms of conducting a "gigantic experiment I think with nature and the whole of humanity which has gone seriously wrong".
"Why else are we facing all these challenges, climate change and everything?".
Relying on "gigantic corporations" for food, he said, would result in "absolute disaster".
In Australia, they were legislated against, and now that legislation looks likely to be repealed.
Science 19 September 2008:Vol. 321. no. 5896, p. 1629 reports:
"Four years ago, the governing Labor Party in Western Australia (WA), the country's breadbasket, banned growing GM crops in the state. But after elections last week, the Liberal and National parties formed a coalition that will oust Labor--and the Liberals have promised to rescind the GM moratorium."
In England, where GM crops aren't forbidden, Prince Charles has headed the opposition:
"The mass development of genetically modified crops risks causing the world's worst environmental disaster, The Prince of Wales has warned...
"The Prince, in an exclusive interview with the Daily Telegraph, also expressed the fear that food would run out because of the damage being wreaked on the earth's soil by scientists' research.
He accused firms of conducting a "gigantic experiment I think with nature and the whole of humanity which has gone seriously wrong".
"Why else are we facing all these challenges, climate change and everything?".
Relying on "gigantic corporations" for food, he said, would result in "absolute disaster".
Market for certificates of deposit
Do I Hear 4%? On This Site, Banks Bid for Your Cash
The NY Times article talks about Money Aisle, a site on which banks bid for your deposit.
In passing, the article also talks about competition for bank advertisements; at Moneyaisle, banks only pay for customers who open accounts, rather than a pay per click model.
The NY Times article talks about Money Aisle, a site on which banks bid for your deposit.
In passing, the article also talks about competition for bank advertisements; at Moneyaisle, banks only pay for customers who open accounts, rather than a pay per click model.
Saturday, September 27, 2008
Repugnant transactions in Saudi Arabia
I call a transaction 'repugnant' if some people want to engage in it, but others don't want them to. In Saudi Arabia these often involve religious views.
The NY Times report that the Turkish soap opera Noor is very popular among Saudi women, but not among clerics: Arab TV Tests Societies’ Limits With Depictions of Sex and Equality .
"That divided response was apparent this month when Sheik Luhaidan, the Saudi cleric, made his comment about killing the owners of satellite TV stations that broadcast indecent material.
His comments were quickly rebroadcast, and an uproar ensued. Critics across the ideological spectrum, including some hard-line Saudis, berated him as having crossed the line. Some of the television networks Sheik Luhaidan appeared to be referring to are owned, after all, by members of the Saudi royal family.
Sheik Luhaidan, who is chief justice of Saudi Arabia’s highest legal authority, the Supreme Judicial Council, is said to have been surprised by all the controversy.
A few days later, apparently under pressure from senior figures in the Saudi government, he appeared on state television to explain. He said he had not meant to encourage or condone the murder of station owners. Assuming other penalties do not deter them, he said, the owners should first be brought to trial and sentenced to death — and then they could be executed."
For some other, related examples, see
Saudi Arabia bans sale of dogs, cats in capital, and
Saudi Arabia bans all things red ahead of Valentine's Day.
However, as elsewhere, what transactions are repugnant can change over time, in both directions, and things formerly repugnant can become less so:
Saudi Women Can Now Stay in Hotels Alone
The NY Times report that the Turkish soap opera Noor is very popular among Saudi women, but not among clerics: Arab TV Tests Societies’ Limits With Depictions of Sex and Equality .
"That divided response was apparent this month when Sheik Luhaidan, the Saudi cleric, made his comment about killing the owners of satellite TV stations that broadcast indecent material.
His comments were quickly rebroadcast, and an uproar ensued. Critics across the ideological spectrum, including some hard-line Saudis, berated him as having crossed the line. Some of the television networks Sheik Luhaidan appeared to be referring to are owned, after all, by members of the Saudi royal family.
Sheik Luhaidan, who is chief justice of Saudi Arabia’s highest legal authority, the Supreme Judicial Council, is said to have been surprised by all the controversy.
A few days later, apparently under pressure from senior figures in the Saudi government, he appeared on state television to explain. He said he had not meant to encourage or condone the murder of station owners. Assuming other penalties do not deter them, he said, the owners should first be brought to trial and sentenced to death — and then they could be executed."
For some other, related examples, see
Saudi Arabia bans sale of dogs, cats in capital, and
Saudi Arabia bans all things red ahead of Valentine's Day.
However, as elsewhere, what transactions are repugnant can change over time, in both directions, and things formerly repugnant can become less so:
Saudi Women Can Now Stay in Hotels Alone
Friday, September 26, 2008
Incentives for kidneys
AAKP Supports Bill to Clarify Law Regarding Incentives for Organ Donations
The American Association of Kidney Patients writes to the Senate, saying
“As the waiting list for organs grows ever longer, it is time to allow government controlled trials of financial incentives to help increase the number of organ donors. A financial incentive is not necessarily a cash payment: for example, a donor could receive something as simple as lifelong health insurance, or families could receive funeral benefits for the deceased donors.”
The New York Sun has an article on the bill to be introduced by Senator Arlen Spector (the Organ Donation Clarification Act of 2008). The article says of the bill "It faces little opposition, and could pass when Congress returns in November or next year. "
Aside from the fact that the Senate is a bit busy right now, based on my observations of repugnance and how it sometimes constrains markets, I'm guessing that the assessment of little opposition will not prove to be correct.
The American Association of Kidney Patients writes to the Senate, saying
“As the waiting list for organs grows ever longer, it is time to allow government controlled trials of financial incentives to help increase the number of organ donors. A financial incentive is not necessarily a cash payment: for example, a donor could receive something as simple as lifelong health insurance, or families could receive funeral benefits for the deceased donors.”
The New York Sun has an article on the bill to be introduced by Senator Arlen Spector (the Organ Donation Clarification Act of 2008). The article says of the bill "It faces little opposition, and could pass when Congress returns in November or next year. "
Aside from the fact that the Senate is a bit busy right now, based on my observations of repugnance and how it sometimes constrains markets, I'm guessing that the assessment of little opposition will not prove to be correct.
Houses cost more in the summer. Here’s why
Tim Harford, reporting on the work of Rachel Ngai and Silvana Tenreyro of the London School of Economics, suggests it has to do with the thickness of the market.
He says "If Ngai and Tenreyro are right, then the housing market dynamic is something like this: buyers slightly prefer to buy houses in the summer, so house prices are slightly higher in the summer, so sellers prefer to put their houses on the market in the summer, and with more houses on the market, the market is thicker. That means that buyers are more likely to find the exact house they want, and so are willing to pay more; with prices higher, more sellers are attracted into the summer market, and fewer will contemplate selling in the winter. And so on. The self-reinforcing process can produce a large gap between summer and winter prices."
He says "If Ngai and Tenreyro are right, then the housing market dynamic is something like this: buyers slightly prefer to buy houses in the summer, so house prices are slightly higher in the summer, so sellers prefer to put their houses on the market in the summer, and with more houses on the market, the market is thicker. That means that buyers are more likely to find the exact house they want, and so are willing to pay more; with prices higher, more sellers are attracted into the summer market, and fewer will contemplate selling in the winter. And so on. The self-reinforcing process can produce a large gap between summer and winter prices."
Virginity testing: Repugnant under S. African law...
Zulus Eagerly Defy Ban on Virginity Test
S. Africa's Progressive Constitution Collides With Tribal Customs
"Yes!" the girls, ages 14 to 18, said in unison, when asked if they liked virginity testing. They, like their elders, were adamant about the ban.
S. Africa's Progressive Constitution Collides With Tribal Customs
"Yes!" the girls, ages 14 to 18, said in unison, when asked if they liked virginity testing. They, like their elders, were adamant about the ban.
Auction design for bailout by treasury
Peter Cramton and Larry Ausubul weigh in, in "Auction Design Critical for Rescue Plan" in The Economists' Voice
"An auction that determines a
real price for a given security needs to require
multiple holders of the security to compete
with one another. This can be achieved if the
Treasury purchases only some, not all, of any
given security."
"Thus, a better approach would be for the
Treasury to instead conduct a separate auction
for each security and limit itself to buying
perhaps 50% of the aggregate face value. Again,
the auction starts at a high price and works its
way down. If the security clears at 30 cents on
the dollar, this means that the holders value
it at 30 cents on the dollar. (If the value were
only 15 cents, then most holders would supply
100% of their securities to be purchased at 30
cents, and the price would be pushed lower.)
The auction then works as intended. The price
is reasonably close to value. The “winners” are
the bidders who value the asset the least and
value liquidity the most.
This auction has an important additional
benefit. The “losers” are not left high and dry.
By determining the market clearing price, the
auction increases liquidity for the remaining
50% of face value, as well as for related securities.
The auction has effectively aggregated market
information about the security’s value. This
price information is the essential ingredient
needed to restore the secondary market for
mortgage backed securities."
"An auction that determines a
real price for a given security needs to require
multiple holders of the security to compete
with one another. This can be achieved if the
Treasury purchases only some, not all, of any
given security."
"Thus, a better approach would be for the
Treasury to instead conduct a separate auction
for each security and limit itself to buying
perhaps 50% of the aggregate face value. Again,
the auction starts at a high price and works its
way down. If the security clears at 30 cents on
the dollar, this means that the holders value
it at 30 cents on the dollar. (If the value were
only 15 cents, then most holders would supply
100% of their securities to be purchased at 30
cents, and the price would be pushed lower.)
The auction then works as intended. The price
is reasonably close to value. The “winners” are
the bidders who value the asset the least and
value liquidity the most.
This auction has an important additional
benefit. The “losers” are not left high and dry.
By determining the market clearing price, the
auction increases liquidity for the remaining
50% of face value, as well as for related securities.
The auction has effectively aggregated market
information about the security’s value. This
price information is the essential ingredient
needed to restore the secondary market for
mortgage backed securities."
Thursday, September 25, 2008
Market for online music
The Digital Media Association announces a new agreement on how to pay royalties for music that is heard but not saved.
Repugnance and the financial bailout
There are lots of important market design issues being debated on-the-fly regarding the bailout of financial institutions. I am not surprised to see that repugnance seems to be playing a role. In President Bush's speech last night, for example:
“The American people are angry about executive compensation, and rightly so,” he said. “No one understands pay for failure.”
“The American people are angry about executive compensation, and rightly so,” he said. “No one understands pay for failure.”
Market for display ads
In view of the big market that has developed for ads linked to internet search, there is a lot of interest in improving the market for display ads ("banner ads"). See Yahoo Overhauls System for Selling Display Ads
Wednesday, September 24, 2008
Market for litigation--litigation pools
I had an interesting email exchange today with John Mackall of the law firm Seed Mackall LLP in Santa Barbara, and he encouraged me to post it on this blog.
On Wed, 24 Sep 2008, John Mackall wrote:
> Dear Prof. Roth:
>
> I read about your kidney market contributions in the most recent
> Harvard Magazine, and since then I have reviewed your blog.
>
> For several years I have speculated about several new ways to approach
> litigation, which must certainly be the biggest and least organized
> "market" in the country.
>
> I have wondered about how game theory might be applied to the
> resolution of thousands of lawsuits at a time, for example. The idea
> would be to select from game theory one or two methods of dispute
> resolution, and then see if it would be possible to identify a set of
> perhaps 1,000 lawsuits that would be particularly amenable to
> resolution in that manner. For example, three party car accidents in
> which four or five large automobile insurance carriers share the majority of the liability. These could be resolved much more efficiently in large groups-100 or
> 1,000-rather than case by case. Cake cutting algorithms or other game
> theory tools would be much easier to use in bulk.
>
> I have also wondered about lawsuits among Fortune 1000 companies.
> There might be cases in which Company A is suing Company B for $10
> million, and Company B is suing Company C for the same amount, and
> Company C is suing Company A for the same amount. Simple chains like
> that might be identified, in which the chain might be resolved much
> more easily than any one link (lawsuit) in the chain. More complex,
> non-obvious chains might also be identified. There are many
> sophisticated analytical systems in math, and in finance there are
> many tools, that could be applied to identify and resolve various
> large groups of seemingly unrelated lawsuits, particularly if there is
> some cohesion to the larger group.
>
> My goal is to put together an academic group that would draw on
> business, law and certain hard sciences-math (such as number theory
> and game theory) and statistics especially-to see if there is some way
> to settle thousands of cases at once in ways that have not yet been
> conceived. The first step would be to identify theoretical
> approaches, and the next step would be to consider whether there are
> "sets" of lawsuits that meet the theoretical requirements.
>
> This idea falls somewhere between grand and grandiose. I am not sure
> where, exactly. If you have any interest, let me know.
>
> Sincerely,
>
> John R. Mackall
> Harvard '71, Stanford Law School '73
From: Alvin E. Roth
Sent: Wednesday, September 24, 2008 11:18 AM
To: John Mackall
Cc: aroth@hbs.edu
Subject: Re: Designing Markets--Litigation
Hi: the idea sounds interesting, but as a natural skeptic (as market designers must be) let me raise two top of the head concerns.
In an insurance pool, while the insurance companies have many cases, the victims have only one, and might not be in a position to accept a compromise that was good on average if it didn't work for them.
The pool of corporate lawsuits sounds much more likely not to have that problem. But (like patent pools), if there's going to be a pool of lawsuits, maybe I should file some extra lawsuits, i.e. there could be bad incentives that would change the pool of lawsuits, even if you had a good way of litigating an existing pool of lawsuits.
So...I think it's an interesting idea, and I'm happy to hear how it develops, but those are my concerns on first blush.
cheers,
al
Date: Wed, 24 Sep 2008 14:19:48 -0700
From: John Mackall
To: Alvin E. Roth Subject:
RE: Designing Markets--Litigation
Al:
Thanks for your prompt response.
Both points have occurred to me. One I can solve. In the insurance cases, I specify a set of multiple defendant cases for a reason: the defendants would resolve the liability among themselves, and leave the plaintiff out of the equation. The resolution would not be of the plaintiff's lawsuit itself, but of the secondary question as to how the damages are to be allocated. They can then present a united defense.
Your second point raises the possibility of gaming the system by filing lawsuits to score points in the game. Yes, this possibility exists, and I think it would be likely in some degree. I don't think it would swamp the overall benefits however.
I would be delighted if you would simply mull this over. Perhaps in the future you might have a student or two that would be interested, and if so, I would be delighted to help in any way.
Sincerely,
John Mackall
On Wed, 24 Sep 2008, John Mackall wrote:
> Dear Prof. Roth:
>
> I read about your kidney market contributions in the most recent
> Harvard Magazine, and since then I have reviewed your blog.
>
> For several years I have speculated about several new ways to approach
> litigation, which must certainly be the biggest and least organized
> "market" in the country.
>
> I have wondered about how game theory might be applied to the
> resolution of thousands of lawsuits at a time, for example. The idea
> would be to select from game theory one or two methods of dispute
> resolution, and then see if it would be possible to identify a set of
> perhaps 1,000 lawsuits that would be particularly amenable to
> resolution in that manner. For example, three party car accidents in
> which four or five large automobile insurance carriers share the majority of the liability. These could be resolved much more efficiently in large groups-100 or
> 1,000-rather than case by case. Cake cutting algorithms or other game
> theory tools would be much easier to use in bulk.
>
> I have also wondered about lawsuits among Fortune 1000 companies.
> There might be cases in which Company A is suing Company B for $10
> million, and Company B is suing Company C for the same amount, and
> Company C is suing Company A for the same amount. Simple chains like
> that might be identified, in which the chain might be resolved much
> more easily than any one link (lawsuit) in the chain. More complex,
> non-obvious chains might also be identified. There are many
> sophisticated analytical systems in math, and in finance there are
> many tools, that could be applied to identify and resolve various
> large groups of seemingly unrelated lawsuits, particularly if there is
> some cohesion to the larger group.
>
> My goal is to put together an academic group that would draw on
> business, law and certain hard sciences-math (such as number theory
> and game theory) and statistics especially-to see if there is some way
> to settle thousands of cases at once in ways that have not yet been
> conceived. The first step would be to identify theoretical
> approaches, and the next step would be to consider whether there are
> "sets" of lawsuits that meet the theoretical requirements.
>
> This idea falls somewhere between grand and grandiose. I am not sure
> where, exactly. If you have any interest, let me know.
>
> Sincerely,
>
> John R. Mackall
> Harvard '71, Stanford Law School '73
From: Alvin E. Roth
Sent: Wednesday, September 24, 2008 11:18 AM
To: John Mackall
Cc: aroth@hbs.edu
Subject: Re: Designing Markets--Litigation
Hi: the idea sounds interesting, but as a natural skeptic (as market designers must be) let me raise two top of the head concerns.
In an insurance pool, while the insurance companies have many cases, the victims have only one, and might not be in a position to accept a compromise that was good on average if it didn't work for them.
The pool of corporate lawsuits sounds much more likely not to have that problem. But (like patent pools), if there's going to be a pool of lawsuits, maybe I should file some extra lawsuits, i.e. there could be bad incentives that would change the pool of lawsuits, even if you had a good way of litigating an existing pool of lawsuits.
So...I think it's an interesting idea, and I'm happy to hear how it develops, but those are my concerns on first blush.
cheers,
al
Date: Wed, 24 Sep 2008 14:19:48 -0700
From: John Mackall
To: Alvin E. Roth Subject:
RE: Designing Markets--Litigation
Al:
Thanks for your prompt response.
Both points have occurred to me. One I can solve. In the insurance cases, I specify a set of multiple defendant cases for a reason: the defendants would resolve the liability among themselves, and leave the plaintiff out of the equation. The resolution would not be of the plaintiff's lawsuit itself, but of the secondary question as to how the damages are to be allocated. They can then present a united defense.
Your second point raises the possibility of gaming the system by filing lawsuits to score points in the game. Yes, this possibility exists, and I think it would be likely in some degree. I don't think it would swamp the overall benefits however.
I would be delighted if you would simply mull this over. Perhaps in the future you might have a student or two that would be interested, and if so, I would be delighted to help in any way.
Sincerely,
John Mackall
Purchase for Progress
Gates Foundation to Fund Experimental Food Aid Program
"UNITED NATIONS, Sept. 24 -- The world's largest philanthropy on Wednesday announced an initiative to transform the way the U.N. World Food Program purchases food by helping poor, small-scale farmers in undernourished countries of Africa and Latin America sell their surplus crops at competitive prices.
The Purchase for Progress program is designed to help combat hunger and poverty in the developing world by giving farmers, many of them women with little or no access to commercial markets, opportunities to reach reliable buyers, including the World Food Program. In a five-year pilot period, the $76 million program hopes to increase the incomes of 350,000 such farmers in 21 countries, including 15 in sub-Saharan Africa."
"UNITED NATIONS, Sept. 24 -- The world's largest philanthropy on Wednesday announced an initiative to transform the way the U.N. World Food Program purchases food by helping poor, small-scale farmers in undernourished countries of Africa and Latin America sell their surplus crops at competitive prices.
The Purchase for Progress program is designed to help combat hunger and poverty in the developing world by giving farmers, many of them women with little or no access to commercial markets, opportunities to reach reliable buyers, including the World Food Program. In a five-year pilot period, the $76 million program hopes to increase the incomes of 350,000 such farmers in 21 countries, including 15 in sub-Saharan Africa."
Pollution permits: RGGI auction
The Regional Greenhouse Gas Inititative prepares to hold its first auction tomorrow: Emissions auction aims to be US model
Power plants in 10 states will bid on the right to pollute
"The first auction is really just a small release of allowances to the market for price discovery purposes," he said. "I think a lot of people will just be kind of testing the waters."
Here is the RGGI; auction results will be posted here. The auction will be a uniform price, sealed bid auction. A full set of documents is here.
Experiments played a role in the design process, see
Auction Design for Selling CO2 Emission Allowances Under the
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative
Final Report
October 26, 2007
Investigators:
Charles Holt, William Shobe
University of Virginia
Dallas Burtraw, Karen Palmer
Resources for the Future
Jacob Goeree
California Institute of Technology
Power plants in 10 states will bid on the right to pollute
"The first auction is really just a small release of allowances to the market for price discovery purposes," he said. "I think a lot of people will just be kind of testing the waters."
Here is the RGGI; auction results will be posted here. The auction will be a uniform price, sealed bid auction. A full set of documents is here.
Experiments played a role in the design process, see
Auction Design for Selling CO2 Emission Allowances Under the
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative
Final Report
October 26, 2007
Investigators:
Charles Holt, William Shobe
University of Virginia
Dallas Burtraw, Karen Palmer
Resources for the Future
Jacob Goeree
California Institute of Technology
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