Kidneys and Controversies at Mt. Sinai hospital

 I gave a talk yesterday at Mt. Sinai hospital. They had encouraged me to talk about controversies, which I happily did.  They were a sympathetic audience (although the majority of their last five speakers would not have been:)

 

 

 

Recent kidney transplant papers

 Here are two new papers on kidney exchange that caught my eye, and one on incentivizing deceased donation by prioritizing registered donors on the deceased donor waiting list.

This one concerns organizing international kidney exchanges between countries while making sure that each one gets their fair share. (All exchanges are between 2 pairs.)

Benedek, Márton, Péter Biró, Daniel Paulusma, and Xin Ye. "Computing balanced solutions for large international kidney exchange schemes." Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems 38, no. 1 (2024): 1-41.

Abstract: To overcome incompatibility issues, kidney patients may swap their donors. In international kidney exchange programmes (IKEPs), countries merge their national patient–donor pools. We consider a recently introduced credit system. In each round, countries are given an initial “fair” allocation of the total number of kidney transplants. This allocation is adjusted by a credit function yielding a target allocation. The goal is to find a solution that approaches the target allocation as closely as possible, to ensure long-term stability of the international pool. As solutions, we use maximum matchings that lexicographically minimize the country deviations from the target allocation. We perform, for the first time, a computational study for a large number of countries. For the initial allocations we use two easy-to-compute solution concepts, the benefit value and the contribution value, and four classical but hard-to-compute concepts, the Shapley value, nucleolus, Banzhaf value and tau value. By using state-of-the-art software we show that the latter four concepts are now within reach for IKEPs of up to fifteen countries. Our experiments show that using lexicographically minimal maximum matchings instead of ones that only minimize the largest deviation from the target allocation (as previously done) may make an IKEP up to 54% more balanced.

"We consider IKEPs in the setting of European KEPs which are scheduled in rounds, typically once in every three months.

...

"We first note that the search for an optimal exchange scheme can be done in polynomial time for 2-way exchanges (matchings) but becomes NP-hard as soon as 3-way exchanges are permitted."

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Here's a paper that reports simulations on Using deceased donor kidneys to start living donor kidney exchange chains

Verma, Utkarsh, Nayaran Rangaraj, Viswanath Billa, and Deepa Usulumarty. "Long term simulation analysis of deceased donor initiated chains in kidney exchange programs." Health Systems (2023): 1-12.

ABSTRACT: Kidney exchange programs (KEPs) aim to find compatible kidneys for recipients with incompatible donors. Patients without a living donor depend upon deceased donor (DD) donations to get a kidney transplant. In India, a DD donates kidneys directly to a DD wait-list. The idea of initiating an exchange chain starting from a DD kidney is proposed in a few articles (and executed in Italy in 2018), but no mathematical formulation has been given for this merger. We have introduced an integer programming formulation that creates DD-initiated chains, considering both paired exchange registry and DD allocations simultaneously and addressing the overlap issue between the exchange registry and DD wait-list as recipients can register for both registries independently. A long-term simulation study is done to analyse the gain of these DD-initiated chains over time. It suggests that even with small numbers of DDs, these chains can significantly increase potential transplants.

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And here's the paper on incentivizing registration to be a deceased donor.

Li, Mengling, and Yohanes E. Riyanto. "Incentivizing Organ Donation Under Different Priority Rules: The Role of Information." Management Science (2024).

Abstract: This paper examines the incentive to register for deceased organ donation under alternative organ allocation priority rules, which may prioritize registered donors and/or patients with higher valuations for organ transplantation. Specifically, the donor priority rule grants higher priority on the organ waiting list to those who have previously registered as donors. The dual-incentive priority rules allocate organs based on donor status, followed by individual valuations within the same donor status, or vice versa. Both theoretical and experimental results suggest that the efficacy of the donor priority rule and the dual-incentive priority rules critically depends on the information environment. When organ transplantation valuations are unobservable prior to making donation decisions, the hybrid dual-incentive rules generate higher donation rates. In contrast, if valuations are observable, the dual-incentive priority rules create unbalanced incentives between high- and low-value agents, potentially undermining the efficacy of the hybrid dual-incentive rules in increasing overall donation rates.

Stanford Impact Labs announces support for kidney exchange in Brazil, India, and the U.S.

 Stanford Impact Labs has announced an investment designed to help the Alliance for Paired Kidney Donation (APKD) increase access to kidney exchange in Brazil, India, and the U.S.  Here are three related web pages...

1. Stanford Impact Labs Invests in Global Collaboration to Increase Access to Kidney Transplants.  $1.5 million over three years will support solutions-focused project led by Stanford’s Dr. Alvin Roth and the Alliance for Paired Kidney Donation (APKD)  by Kate Green Tripp

"Stanford Impact Labs (SIL) is delighted to announce a $1.5 million Stage 3: Amplify Impact investment to support Extending Kidney Exchange, a solutions-focused project established to increase access to lifesaving kidney transplants.

"The team, led by Stanford’s Dr. Alvin (Al) Roth, who shared the 2012 Nobel Prize in Economics for his work on market design, and the Alliance for Paired Kidney Donation (APKD) is working in close partnership with organ transplant specialists and medical centers in Brazil, India, and the U.S., including Santa Casa de Misericórdia de Juiz de Fora, the Institute of Kidney Diseases and Research Center and Dr. H L Trivedi Institute of Transplantation Sciences (IKDRC-ITS), and Walter Reed National Military Medical Center.

"Over the course of the next three years, the team aims to increase the number of transplant opportunities available to patients who need them by creating and growing kidney exchange programs in Brazil and India, where millions of people suffer from kidney disease yet exchange is minimal; and explore the effects of initiating donor chains with a deceased donor kidney (DDIC) in the U.S., an approach which could unlock hundreds more transplants each year.

..."

2. How Does Applied Economics Maximize Kidney Transplants? A project aimed at expanding kidney exchange and saving lives puts Nobel Prize-winning matching theory into practice.  by Jenn Brown   (including a video...)

"APKD uses open source software developed by Itai Ashlagi, Professor of Management Science and Engineering at Stanford University, to facilitate the matching process for its NEAD chains, and they currently average 5 non-simultaneous transplants per chain.

3. Extending Kidney Exchange

"In Brazil, our team has launched a kidney exchange program within Santa Casa de Misericórdia de Juiz de Fora and Hospital Clínicas FMUSP in São Paulo and aims to expand to facilitating exchanges between these centers and others with the ultimate goal of kidney exchange transitioning from a research project to an officially approved practice in Brazil.

"In India, our team has deployed kidney matching software and resources for growth to the Institute of Kidney Diseases and Research Center and Dr. HL Trivedi Institute of Transplantation Sciences (IKDRC-ITS) to support kidney exchange programs. We aim to develop an evidence base for potential updates to organ transplantation laws that expand criteria for who can give and receive lifesaving kidneys.

"In the U.S., we are working with Walter Reed National Military Medical Center to test the use of deceased donor-initiated chains (DDIC) so as to generate hundreds of additional life-saving transplants each year that are not currently supported by today's practice of utilizing a deceased donor kidney to save the life of a single person on a transplant waitlist. "

 

Directed deceased donation of organs for transplant. (Legal in U.S. but not yet in Europe.)

 It is legal in the U.S. for a deceased donor organ for transplant to be directed to a particular recipient, if the recipient is compatible (and otherwise the organs are allocated as in the usual way for nondirected deceased donation.)  Because compatibility is tricky, directed deceased donation (DDD) is rare (but deceased donor kidneys can potentially be used to start a deceased donor initiated chain of kidney exchange).

But in most of Europe, it turns out, DDD isn't legal. (!) Here's a paper by the European Society of Transplantation's European Platform on Ethical, Legal and Psychosocial Aspects of Organ Transplantation. It cautiously argues that maybe this ban is "one thought too many," and that the ban should be lifted so that carefully regulated DDD would be allowed to increase organ donation in Europe and save more lives.

"When is directed deceased donation justified? Practical, ethical, and legal issues," by David Shaw1,2 , Dale Gardiner3, Rutger Ploeg4, Anne Floden5,6, Jessie Cooper7, Alicia Pérez-Blanco8, Tineke Wind9, Lydia Dijkhuizen10, Nichon Jansen10 and Bernadette Haase-Kromwijk10; on behalf of the ESOT ELPAT Working Group on Deceased Donation, Journal of the Intensive Care Society, 2024.

Abstract: This paper explores whether directed deceased organ donation should be permitted, and if so under which conditions. While organ donation and allocation systems must be fair and transparent, might it be “one thought too many” to prevent directed donation within families? We proceed by providing a description of the medical and legal context, followed by identification of the main ethical issues involved in directed donation, and then explore these through a series of hypothetical cases similar to those encountered in practice. Ultimately, we set certain conditions under which directed deceased donation may be ethically acceptable. We restrict our discussion to the allocation of organs to recipients already on the waiting list.

"The persistent shortage of organs available for transplantation demands fair and objective allocation of the scarce available organs, based on preset transparent and regulated criteria. In most European countries, organs from deceased donors are allocated to patients on the organ waiting list by national Competent Authorities.3 The current worldwide norm is that organs donated after death are considered as an unconditional gift to the patients on the transplant waiting list according to the allocation system. This implies that donors (prior to their death), or their family members (after it), cannot determine to whom the available organs will be assigned, nor exclude any potential recipients.

...

"In a few countries, like the United States, United Kingdom, Japan, and recently Australia, directed deceased donation is possible in restricted cases, since national legislation does not prohibit it. In living donation however, directed donation is permitted in many countries, even when there is no genetic or emotional relationship between the donor and the intended recipient. This inconsistency between the living donation- and deceased donation system has been noted.4

"This paper explores whether directed deceased donation should be allowed, and if so under which conditions.

...

"The main argument against DDD is that this violates the  basic principle of an altruistic, unconditional gift to society; allowing DDD may turn out to be a “slippery slope” in the direction of conditional donation and discrimination against particular patient groups. Conditional donation could also reduce public support for the transplantation system, since it could reduce transparency and fairness of the system.

...

"What, then, are the conditions for ethical DDD at the present time?

1. DDD under strict conditions should not be prohibited by legislation or policy.

2. There must be evidence that the donor wanted or would have been willing to direct the organ to a particular family member or close friend.

3. The donor/family should generally not be able to  insist on only donating the organ intended for DDD; where other organs are transplantable there should be a willingness to donate other organs (at least one) to patients on the waiting list to preserve the societal altruistic aspect of donation and diminish the overall effect on the waiting list.

4. DDD should proceed only if there is no patient on the waiting list in extremely urgent need of an organ transplantation to avoid imminent death.

5. DDD should proceed only if there is a reasonable chance of successful transplantation.

6. The intended recipient should be on the waiting list or be under assessment for being included.

"If these conditions are met, the medical team should do their best to facilitate the wishes of the deceased patient and his/her family by enabling DDD to take place. Letting deceased donors direct their organs to loved ones under carefully controlled conditions could further enhance trust in organ donation and transplantation systems, and hence willingness to become a donor."

Kidney exchange in The Times of India

 The Times of India covers my talk at the Indian Society of Transplantation meeting:

Alvin Roth for legal boost to kidney exchange pool in India by Chaitanya Deshpande, Oct 15, 2022c

 The site makes it hard to extract text, but here's a photo of some comments, which make me hope that some action may be taken:

Update: 

The Dr H.L. Trivedi Oration at the Indian Society of Transplantation (ISOT) Meeting 2022

Here's the meeting announcement:

ISOT 2022 NAGPUR

32^nd Annual Conference of The Indian Society of Organ Transplantation
2^nd Mid-term Meeting of Liver Transplantation Society of India
15^th Annual International Conference of NATCO
Dates : 12^th - 16^th October 2022 | Venue : Hotel Le Meridien, Nagpur

My talk, the Dr H.L. Trivedi Oration   is scheduled for 11:00am on Friday the 14th in Nagpur, which means I'll be giving it by zoom tonight, Thursday evening at 10:30 pm Pacific Time.

The presentation, which  will be about "Increasing the availability of transplants in India" is in honor of the late Dr. Hargovind Laxmishanker "H. L." Trivedi (August 1932 – October 2019), who I had the privilege of meeting,

Here's his obituary : 

Kute, Vivek, Himanshu Patel, Pankaj Shah, Pranjal Modi, and Vineet Mishra. "Professor Dr. HL Trivedi pioneering nephrologist and patriot who cared for his country (31-08-1932 TO 2-10-2019)." Indian Journal of Nephrology 29, no. 6 (2019): 379.

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Here's my concluding slide:

• India has enormous talent and accomplishment in living-donor transplantation
• To more nearly reach it’s potential, India needs to invest in recovering deceased donor organs.
• In the near term, it can build on it’s accomplishments in kidney transplantation, by 
• establishing national (not just regional) kidney exchange
• Continuing to explore international exchange for the hardest to match pairs
• Reducing restrictions on who can be an exchange donor
• Allowing non-directed donors and chains
• Allowing some chains to begin with a deceased-donor kidney
• Reducing financial barriers by increased investment in public hospitals and government health insurance, for organ donors as well as recipients

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Update: 

Prospects for improving kidney exchange in France

A recent article in Néphrologie & Thérapeutique simulates how kidney exchange in France could possibly be made substantially more effective, following liberalizations in the law. (The article is in French, but also has an English abstract.) A promising feature is that the article is a collaboration between physicians and market design economists.

Perspectives pour une évolution du programme de don croisé de reins en France

Perspectives for future development of the kidney paired donation programme in France by Julien Combe, Victor Hiller, Olivier Tercieux,  Benoît Audry, Jules Baudet, Géraldine   Malaquin, François Kerbaul, Corinne Antoine, Marie-Alice Macher, Christian Jacquelinet, Olivier Bastien, and Myriam Pastural

Abstract: "Almost one third of kidney donation candidates are incompatible (HLA and/or ABO) with their directed recipient. Kidney paired donation allows potential donors to be exchanged and gives access to a compatible kidney transplant. The Bioethics Law of 2011 authorised kidney paired donation in France with reciprocity between 2 incompatible “donor-recipient” pairs. A limited number of transplants have been performed due to a too restricted authorization compared to other European practices. This study presents the perspectives of the new Bioethics Law, enacted in 2021, which increases the authorised practices for kidney paired donation in France. The two simulated evolutions are the increase of the number of pairs involved in a kidney paired donation to 6 (against 2 currently) and the use of a deceased donor as a substitution to one of living donor. Different scenarios are simulated using data from the Agence de la Biomedecine; incompatible pairs registered in the kidney paired donation programme in France between December 2013 and February 2018 (78 incompatible pairs), incompatible transplants performed during the same period (476 incompatible pairs) and characteristics of deceased donors as well as proposals made over this period. Increasing the number of pairs has a limited effect on the number of transplants, which increases from 18 (23% of recipients) in the current system to 25 (32% of recipients) when 6 pairs can be involved. The use of a deceased donor significantly increases the number of transplants to 41 (52% of recipients). This study makes it possible to evaluate the increase in possibilities of kidney transplants by kidney paired donation following the new bioethics law. A working group and an information campaign for professionals and patients will be necessary for its implementation."

While the paper focuses on the situation in France, it's opening lines could have been written anywhere:

"La France, comme l’ensemble des pays du monde, souffre d’une pénurie de greffons rénaux de sorte que le nombre de malades en attente d’une greffe de rein ne cesse de croître." [France, like all countries in the world, suffers from a shortage of kidney transplants so that the number of patients waiting for a kidney transplant continues to grow."

Here's hoping that the authors will succeed in their plans to use deceased-donor initiated chains to save more lives in France.

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Earlier related posts:

Sunday, April 3, 2022

Kidney Paired Donation Chains Initiated by Deceased Donors

Monday, November 22, 2021

A naturally occurring deceased-donor-initiated kidney exchange chain, by Maghen and Veale

Sunday, August 23, 2020

More on Deceased donors as non‐directed donors in kidney exchange chains

Tuesday, August 7, 2018

Deceased donor chains: Market design language is entering transplantation

Monday, April 11, 2016

Using deceased donor kidneys to start living donor kidney exchange chains

 

Kidney Paired Donation Chains Initiated by Deceased Donors

 Starting kidney exchange chains with a deceased donor is a good idea whose time is coming.  

Wen Wang, Alan B. Leichtman, Michael A. Rees, Peter X.-K. Song, Valarie B. Ashby, Tempie Shearon, John D. Kalbfleisch,  Kidney Paired Donation Chains Initiated by Deceased Donors, Kidney International Reports, 2022, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ekir.2022.03.023.

(https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2468024922012438)

"Abstract:

• Introduction: Rather than generating one transplant by directly donating to a candidate on the waitlist, deceased donors (DD) could achieve additional transplants by donating to a candidate in a kidney paired donation (KPD) pool, thereby, initiating a chain that ends with a living donor (LD) donating to a candidate on the waitlist. We model outcomes arising from various strategies that allow DDs to initiate KPD chains. 

• Methods: We base simulations on actual 2016-2017 US DD and waitlist data and use simulated KPD pools to model DD initiated KPD chains. We also consider methods to assess and overcome the primary criticism of this approach, namely the potential to disadvantage Blood Type O waitlisted candidates. 

• Results: Compared to shorter DD initiated KPD chains, longer chains increase the number of KPD transplants by up to 5% and reduce the number of DDs allocated to the KPD pool by 25%. These strategies increase the overall number of Blood Type O transplants and make LDs available to candidates on the waitlist. Restricting allocation of Blood Type O DDs to require ending KPD chains with LD Blood Type O donations to the waitlist markedly reduces the number of KPD transplants achieved. 

• Conclusion: Allocating fewer than 3% of DD to initiate KPD chains could increase the number of kidney transplants by up to 290 annually. Such use of DDs allows additional transplantation of highly sensitized and Blood Type O KPD candidates. Collectively, patients of each blood type, including Blood Type O, would benefit from the proposed strategies."

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Earlier:

Monday, November 22, 2021

A naturally occurring deceased-donor-initiated kidney exchange chain, by Maghen and Veale

Sunday, August 23, 2020

More on Deceased donors as non‐directed donors in kidney exchange chains

Tuesday, August 7, 2018

Deceased donor chains: Market design language is entering transplantation

Monday, April 11, 2016

Using deceased donor kidneys to start living donor kidney exchange chains

A naturally occurring deceased-donor-initiated kidney exchange chain, by Maghen and Veale

 Here's an interesting case report, from the innovative UCLA transplant center, about a kidney exchange chain actually, if not officially, initiated by a deceased donor.

With “reverse engineering” were some living donor kidney chains in actuality triggered by deceased donors?  by Ariella Maghen and Jeffrey Veale, Clinical Transplantation, First published: 21 September 2021 https://doi.org/10.1111/ctr.14491

"Mr. M is a 58-year-old polycystic kidney disease patient waiting for a kidney transplant in the United States (US). Although his wife Mrs. M offered to donate her kidney to him, they were not a compatible match. While waiting to be “exchanged or swapped” with another donor/recipient pair facilitated by the National Kidney Registry (NKR), Mr. M received a rare offer for a “perfectly-matched” (zero-mismatch) deceased donor (DD) kidney. Only 5% of candidates receive a perfectly matched kidney from a DD; Mr. M accepted the offer and underwent transplantation in February 2020. Currently, his allograft is functioning beautifully, and he states never feeling better. 

"One may think Mrs. M feels relief now and that she is “off-the-hook” to donate. But au contraire as she has completed the extensive donor evaluation and remains in the mindset to donate. Mrs. M's gratitude towards the DD family's gift to her husband motivated her to “pay-their-generosity-forward” and now donate her kidney.

"Mrs. M's donation performed on October 21, 2020, brings greater awareness to the concept of a DD triggered kidney chain, a relatively novel phenomenon in the United States.

...

"This case elucidates how transplant chains, believed to be initiated by non-directed living donors, when reverse-engineered may in actuality have been triggered by DDs who were at the pole position. Although this may be one of the first reported cases, it is possible that other transplant centers have been encouraging the allocation of donors in this fashion. There are likely more living donors who may still want to donate their kidney even after their intended recipient received a DD transplant via “zero-mismatch” or “high-PRA” offers."

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Italy seems to be among the first places to formally follow up on the idea of deceased donor chains. See:

Transplant InternationalVolume 33, Issue 10 p. 1177-1184, Kidney exchange strategies: new aspects and applications with a focus on deceased donor-initiated chains, by Lucrezia Furian,Antonio Nicolò,Caterina Di Bella,Massimo Cardillo,Emanuele Cozzi,Paolo Rigotti  First published: 09 August 2020  https://doi.org/10.1111/tri.13712

Summary: Kidney paired donation (KPD) is a valuable way to overcome immunological incompatibility in the context of living donation, and several strategies have been implemented to boost its development. In this article, we reviewed the current state of the art in this field, with a particular focus on advanced KPD strategies, including the most recent idea of initiating living donor (LD) transplantation chains with a deceased donor (DD) kidney, first applied successfully in 2018. Since then, Italy has been running a national programme in which a chain-initiating kidney is selected from a DD pool and allocated to a recipient with an incompatible LD, and the LD’s kidney is transplanted into a patient on the waiting list (WL). At this stage, since the ethical and logistic issues have been managed appropriately, KPD starting with a DD has proved to be a feasible strategy. It enables transplants in recipients of incompatible pairs without the need for desensitizing and also benefits patients on the WL who are allocated chain-ending kidneys from LDs (prioritizing sensitized patients and those on the WL for longer).

...

"Melcher et al. [10] suggested merging DD programmes with KPD programmes in 2016, an idea explored more recently in a concept paper issued by the Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network (OPTN) [11]. 

...

10 M. L. Melcher, J. P. Roberts, A. B. Leichtman, A. E. Roth, M. A. Rees Utilization of deceased donor kidneys to initiate living donor chains. Am J Transplant 2016; 16: 1367.

11Rock Haynes C, Leishman R. Allowing deceased donor-initiated kidney paired donation (KPD) chains. OPTN/UNOS Kidney Transplantation Committee. Concept Paper; July 31–October 2, 2017.

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Earlier:

Tuesday, August 7, 2018

Deceased donor chains: Market design language is entering transplantation

Monday, April 11, 2016

Using deceased donor kidneys to start living donor kidney exchange chains

More on Deceased donors as non‐directed donors in kidney exchange chains

I anticipate that we  will be reading more in the future about kidney exchange chains started by a deceased donor kidney.  In the meantime, here are two recent papers:

From the American Journal of Transplantation:

Deceased donors as non‐directed donors in kidney paired donation

W. Wang 

 

M.A. Rees 

 

A.B. Leichtman 

 

P. X‐K. Song 

 

M. Bray 

 

V.B. Ashby 

 

T. Shearon 

 

A Whiteman 

 

J.D. Kalbfleisch

First published: 16 August 2020

 

https://doi.org/10.1111/ajt.16268

This article has been accepted for publication and undergone full peer review but has not been through the copyediting, typesetting, pagination and proofreading process, which may lead to differences between this version and the Version of Record. Please cite this article as doi:10.1111/ajt.16268

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Abstract

As proof of concept, we simulate a revised kidney allocation system that includes deceased donor (DD) kidneys as chain‐initiating kidneys (DD‐CIK) in a kidney paired donation pool (KPDP), and estimate potential increases in number of transplants. We consider chains of length 2 in which the DD‐CIK gives to a candidate in the KPDP, and that candidate’s incompatible donor donates to the deceased donor (DD) waitlist. In simulations, we vary initial pool size, arrival rates of candidate/donor pairs and (living) non‐directed donors (NDDs), and delay time from entry to the KPDP until a candidate is eligible to receive a DD‐CIK. Using data on candidate/donor pairs and NDDs from the Alliance for Paired Kidney Donation, and the actual DDs from the Scientific Registry of Transplant Recipients (SRTR) data, simulations extend over two years. With an initial pool of 400, respective candidate and NDD arrival rates of two per day and 3 per month, and delay times for access to DD‐CIK of 6 months or less, including DD‐CIKs increases the number of transplants by at least 447 over two years, and greatly reduces waiting times of KPDP candidates. Potential effects on waitlist candidates are discussed as are policy and ethical issues.

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And from Transplant International: 

Kidney exchange strategies: New aspects and applications with a focus on deceased‐donor‐initiated chains

Lucrezia Furian  Antonio Nicolò  Caterina Di Bella  Massimo Cardillo  Emanuele Cozzi  Paolo Rigotti

First published: 09 August 2020 https://doi.org/10.1111/tri.13712

This article has been accepted for publication and undergone full peer review but has not been through the copyediting, typesetting, pagination and proofreading process, which may lead to differences between this version and the Version of Record. Please cite this article as doi:10.1111/tri.13712

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Abstract: "Kidney paired donation (KPD) is a valuable way to overcome immunological incompatibility in the context of living donation, and several strategies have been implemented to boost its development. In this article, we reviewed the current state of the art in this field, with a particular focus on advanced KPD strategies, including the most recent idea of initiating living donor (LD) transplantation chains with a deceased‐donor (DD) kidney, first applied successfully in 2018. Since then, Italy has been running a national program in which a chain‐initiating kidney is selected from a DD pool and allocated to a recipient with an incompatible LD, and the LD’s kidney is transplanted into a patient on the waiting list (WL).

"At this stage, since the ethical and logistic issues have been managed appropriately, KPD starting with a DD has proved to be a feasible strategy. It enables transplants in recipients of incompatible pairs without the need for desensitizing and also benefits patients on the WL who are allocated chain‐ending kidneys from LDs (prioritizing sensitized patients and those on the WL for longer)."

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Previous posts:

Monday, October 14, 2019  A kidney exchange chain initiated by a deceased donor, in Italy

Tuesday, September 5, 2017 UNOS proposal: Allowing Deceased Donor-Initiated Kidney Paired Donation (KPD) Chains

Monday, April 11, 2016 Using deceased donor kidneys to start living donor kidney exchange chains

 

Utilization of Deceased Donor Kidneys to Initiate Living Donor Chains

1. M. L. Melcher¹, 
 
2. J. P. Roberts^2,*, 
 
3. A. B. Leichtman³, 
 
4. A. E. Roth⁴ and
 
5. M. A. Rees

 

Deceased donor chains: Market design language is entering transplantation

Here's some more argument in favor of starting kidney chains with deceased donors, from the journal
Clinical Transplantation Volume 32, Issue 7:

Lessons from Uber and Airbnb: Why we should link the deceased and living donor pools

by Avi Baskin  Ariella Maghen  Tom Mone  Jeffrey Veale

"Deceased donor organs are currently underutilized and undervalued, particularly in kidney chains, similar to how parked cars and vacant homes were before Uber and Airbnb. The ride‐sharing company Uber has been hailed for allowing people to drive their cars to generate more benefit from this underutilized resource. Similarly, Airbnb enables people to rent out their unused property, increasing the potential of an otherwise missed opportunity. Together, Uber and Airbnb represent a new era, amplifying the benefit of cars and property that would be otherwise underused.

"Likewise, the world of transplantation should take note as software programs and mathematical algorithms could also be applied to maximize the benefits of available kidneys for transplant."
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The authors are all transplant professionals, not an economist among them. We've come a long way from the days when it was hard to convince the transplant community that kidney transplantation, and kidney exchange in particular, could be usefully thought about in connection with markets, marketplaces, and market design.

Using deceased donor kidneys to start living donor kidney exchange chains

In American kidney exchange, living non-directed kidney donors initiate chains that produce an average of five transplants.Deceased donor kidneys are also non-directed, but produce one transplant each.  Here's the abstract for a forthcoming paper in the American Journal of Transplantation (AJT), suggesting that it would be helpful to use some deceased donor kidneys to initiate nondirected donor chains:

Abstract: We propose that some deceased donor (DD) kidneys be allocated to initiate nonsimultaneous extended altruistic donor chains of living donor (LD) kidney transplants to address, in part, the huge disparity between patients on the DD kidney waitlist and available donors. The use of DD kidneys for this purpose would benefit waitlisted candidates in that most patients enrolled in kidney paired donation (KPD) systems are also waitlisted for a DD kidney transplant, and receiving a kidney through the mechanism of KPD will decrease pressure on the DD pool. In addition, a LD kidney usually provides survival potential equal or superior to that of DD kidneys. If KPD chains that are initiated by a DD can end in a donation of an LD kidney to a candidate on the DD waitlist, the quality of the kidney allocated to a waitlisted patient is likely to be improved. We hypothesize that a pilot program would show a positive impact on patients of all ethnicities and blood types.

Here's the link to the journal page

Utilization of Deceased Donor Kidneys to Initiate Living Donor Chains

1. M. L. Melcher¹, 
2. J. P. Roberts^2,*, 
3. A. B. Leichtman³, 
4. A. E. Roth⁴ and
5. M. A. Rees^5,6

Article first published online: 9 MAR 2016

DOI: 10.1111/ajt.13740

© Copyright 2016 The American Society of Transplantation and the American Society of Transplant Surgeons

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American Journal of Transplantation

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