Showing posts with label interview. Show all posts
Showing posts with label interview. Show all posts
Wednesday, September 25, 2024
Mohammad Akbarpour, interviewed by Scott Cunningham
Here's an interview of Mohammad Akbarpour, as part of Scott Cunningham's growing series of interviews of interesting economists. (Even the picture of the two of them looks interesting, and it gets better:)
Scott writes:
"Welcome to the Mixtape with
Scott! Sometimes the shortest distance between point A and point B is a
straight line, but other times the shortest distance is a winding path. This
week’s guest, Mohammad
Akbarpour from Stanford University, is perhaps an example of the
latter. Mohammad is a micro theorist at Stanford who specializes in networks,
mechanism and design and two sided matching. Mohammad is an emerging young
theorist at Stanford, student of such luminaries as Matt Jackson and Al Roth,
whose background in engineering, mathematics and computer science has given him
a fresh approach to topics that I associate with Stanford’s theory people as a
whole — policy oriented, applied work, mechanism design, networks and matching.
He got into economics “the long way” — growing up in Iran, majoring in
engineering, and then moving into Stanford’s operations research PhD program.
In this interview, he generously shares a snippet of the arc of his life, and
it’s a remarkable story, and one I really enjoyed hearing. I think you will
too."
Sunday, September 15, 2024
Practical insights from market design, in Japan
I was recently interviewed by Fuhito Kojima as part of a symposium conducted by the University of Tokyo Market Design Center on practical insights from market design. The whole symposium is available on YouTube.
All but one of the presentations are in Japanese (summarized below by Fuhito):
1. Introduction (Fuhito)
3. More explanation of the stable matching problem and its
application to personnel assignment (Shunya Noda)
4. Application of stable matching algorithm in personnel allocation in a firm: My team helped our partner firm, Sysmex, introduce the DA algorithm (in fact, a modified "flexible" deferred acceptance algorithm proposed by Kamada and Kojima 2015 AER) in the assignment of new employees to different divisions of the firm. The firm has been using matching algorithm for 4 years now. Our partner from the firm talks about their experience.
5. Application to daycare assignments: My team is collaborating with a major government contractor for municipal governments IT system, CyberAgent. The project studies daycare-related data provided by municipal governments and helps those government introduce and improve their matching algorithms of daycare seats to children. Our partner from the firm talks about our team's effort, e.g., how we convinced one city change algorithm from Boston-like mechanism to DA, and how we helped fine-tune their priority design to cope with problems in which kids with siblings were not matched as well as single kids.
Saturday, September 14, 2024
Interview about repugnance (and this blog) in Hungary
Here's a link to an interview about repugnance in the Hungary Daily News. The last question and answer was about this blog.
“Repugnance in human transactions became interesting to me” – interview with Alvin Roth
"You have been writing the blog Market Design since 2008, and since then you have written almost every day a post. What motivated you to start this blog and what role does it play in your professional life?
Alvin Roth: I started it for my class. I wanted the students to know that the way to think of ideas for market design is not just to read papers in economics journals but to read the newspaper and follow why markets weren’t working well. Many of my blog posts are short comments on a newspaper article about something in the world. Since I started, it’s also proved to be a useful tool for me to remember things. So, it’s a kind of intellectual diary, as well. I’m currently working on a book on controversial markets and I look at my blog posts for each chapter. Market Design blog is my memory for everything related to market design."
###########Related:
Sunday, July 7, 2024
Sunday, February 25, 2024
Mark Satterthwaite interviewed by Sandeep Baliga (video)
After listening to this interview with the great Mark Satterthwaite, I now understand the independent origins of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem, and the collaborative origins of the Myerson-Satterthwaite theorem.
In the final ten minutes or so of the interview, Mark describes worthwhile future research directions (and methods:), starting just after minute 28:30, particularly about appropriately matching patients to medical specialists.
Earlier interviews by Sandeep Baliga:
Tuesday, August 1, 2023
Thursday, February 8, 2024
Morally contested markets on NPR's Planet Money (including kidneys, revenge and insider trading)
The NPR show Planet Money discusses kidney sales, revenge, and insider trading. The hosts are enthusiastic about at least thinking about all of these.*
They start with a discussion of organ transplants, and in the first 9 minutes of the show you can hear some parts of an interview with me, discussing tradeoffs (and possible titles for a book I'm working on). Then they talk to Siri Isaksson about retaliation, and after that to Chester Spatt about insider trading.
They write:
"There are tons of markets that don't exist because people just don't want to allow a market — for whatever reason, people feel icky about putting a price on something. For example: Surrogacy is a legal industry in parts of the United States, but not in much of the rest of the world. Assisted end-of-life is a legal medical transaction in some states, but is illegal in others.
"When we have those knee-jerk reactions and our gut repels us from considering something apparently icky, economics asks us to look a little more closely.
"Today on the show, we have three recommendations of things that may feel kinda wrong but economics suggests may actually be the better way. First: Could the matching process of organ donation be more efficient if people could buy and sell organs? Then: should women seek revenge more often in the workplace? And finally, what if insider trading is actually useful?"
##########
*In their enthusiasm, they mis-state how few kidney exchanges were done before my colleagues and I got involved. (There weren't many, but more than two...)
As it happens, earlier this week I blogged about another interview, in the NYT, by Peter Coy (in print, not audio) that focused on kidney exchange:
Tuesday, February 6, 2024
Update (5pm): now I see that on the Planet Money site there's a transcript. Here's the part that I participated in:
SYLVIE DOUGLIS, BYLINE: This is PLANET MONEY from NPR.
(SOUNDBITE OF COIN SPINNING)
MARY CHILDS, HOST:
A couple decades ago, Al Roth was working on solving this problem - people who needed kidneys weren't getting matched effectively with people who had kidneys to donate.
AL ROTH: Part of the kind of work I do is called matching theory.
GREG ROSALSKY, HOST:
Al helped create this, like, beautiful, elegant algorithm that would match kidney donors with recipients.
CHILDS: You obviously won a pretty big prize for this work.
ROTH: I did. I recommend it.
CHILDS: OK. Yeah (laughter). You like the prize. It's a good prize.
ROTH: Yeah.
CHILDS: That's good to know.
ROTH: A week long of parties.
CHILDS: The prize he won? - it was the Nobel Prize in economics.
ROSALSKY: As you might know, Al's matching work vastly improved the way people get kidneys and saved literally thousands of lives. Like, in the year 2000, before Al's work, there were only two paired kidney transplants - two. Thanks to Al's algorithm, there are now about a thousand per year.
CHILDS: But, Al says, his Nobel Prize-winning algorithm - it isn't even the best way to get people kidneys. Technically, he says, the best way is to grow kidneys in a lab, so it's not even the second-best way.
I'm just envisioning you doing all this matching work knowing that this is, like, a little goofy. Like...
ROTH: Oh.
CHILDS: ...There's a easier way.
ROTH: I hope it's a lot goofy...
CHILDS: (Laughter).
ROTH: ...The work I'm doing, anyway.
CHILDS: (Laughter).
ROTH: No, no. That's right. So could we figure out a way to have more donors to have fewer deaths? I bet we could.
ROSALSKY: OK, so there is a much easier, more efficient way to get people kidneys. It's the way people get most things - with money. Like, what if we could just buy and sell organs?
ROTH: Oh, we'd have a lot more organs. That's how we get most of our stuff. There's a famous passage quoted from Adam Smith, which I'm going to paraphrase, but it says something like, it's not through the generosity of the butcher and the baker that you get your food. You buy it from them. It's how they - that's how they sustain their families - is by selling you food. And that's how you get food, and that's why there's enough food.
CHILDS: Right. The kidney market already has supply and demand. It just doesn't have prices to balance them because buying and selling kidneys is illegal in basically the entire world. So here we are. We don't have enough kidneys. We desperately need more, and yet, we refuse to pay more than $0 for them.
ROSALSKY: And as Al saw while working on kidneys, people had moral objections to the idea of paying for organs. They had concerns that just didn't really make sense to him as an economist.
ROTH: But when I started to look, it turns out there are lots of markets like that.
CHILDS: Lots of markets where people just don't want to allow a market. They feel icky about putting a price on something. Al has a list - for example, surrogacy - a legal and flourishing industry in much of the U.S., not in much of the rest of the world; assisted end of life - perfectly fine medical transaction in Oregon, illegal where I am in Virginia.
ROSALSKY: Al is actually working on a book about all of this.
ROTH: Its working title is "Repugnant Transactions And Controversial Markets." And the idea is that sometimes economists have perfectly good ideas that other people don't think are perfectly good.
ROSALSKY: Al has sort of made his own little subdiscipline in economics about this.
ROTH: "Ickonomics" (ph), "Yuckonomics" (ph) - you know, I trade in book titles. I'm open to suggestions.
CHILDS: You can email Al with your book title suggestions, though honestly, that's kind of hard to beat. In the meantime, when we have those knee-jerk reactions and our gut repels us from considering the icky thing, economics would like to humbly submit that maybe we should.
(SOUNDBITE OF JORDACHE V. GRANT AND SKINNY WILLIAMS' "OLDER HEADS")
CHILDS: Hello, and welcome to PLANET MONEY. I'm Mary Childs.
ROSALSKY: And I'm Greg Rosalsky. Today on the show, we apply an elegant economic framework to Al's market, the trading of human organs, to whether or not we should exact revenge on our enemies, and to whether or not we should trade on inside information.
(SOUNDBITE OF JORDACHE V. GRANT AND SKINNY WILLIAMS' "OLDER HEADS")
CHILDS: When we face difficult situations that don't have an absolutely clear right answer, economist Al Roth says borrowing tools from economics can be useful.
ROTH: Economists deal in trade-offs, and one of the things about trade-offs is you have to say to yourself, supposing there's something we really don't like, what will happen if we ban it? And if the answer is it won't go away, but it'll go underground or become criminalized or become very irregular, then you might prefer to regulate it rather than ban it.
ROSALSKY: And there are real problems with banning things. For example, remember that time we tried to ban alcohol, like, in the 1920s and 1930s?
ROTH: We discovered that it gave rise to a big criminal economy and didn't completely wipe out alcohol at all. So we legalized it. And the legal market for alcohol, with all its problems, is a lot nicer in many ways, a lot more socially useful than the criminal market - you know, Al Capone and the Saint Valentine's Day massacre and, you know, Eliot Ness.
CHILDS: Alcohol, as you may know, is legal today. Selling kidneys - no, not legal - with kidneys, we are in our Prohibition era.
ROTH: There is a black market for kidneys. And often it's pretty terrible because the almost-universal laws against compensating kidney donors have driven that market underground. And what underground often means is out of the hospitals and into hotel suites and apartments...
CHILDS: Eugh (ph).
ROTH: ...And - yes, so medically very bad, as well as, you know, not just illegal but dealing with criminals - medically very bad, bad for the donors, bad for the recipients.
CHILDS: And that's what we have today. That's the market we have chosen. We have the black market with money and the legal market with no money.
ROSALSKY: So Al has been thinking about solutions to this. Like, what can we do realistically to incentivize more kidney donations? How else could we go about creating a market for kidneys to be, as Al likes to put it, more generous to kidney donors?
CHILDS: And when Al thinks about how to design a market, he prioritizes investigating what exactly it is that we're objecting to so he can build a market that fixes or avoids those problems. And in the case of kidneys...
ROTH: There are metaphysical objections. You know, it's just wrong. But the objections that seem to touch on the world seem to say that you can't do this without exploiting poor people because poor people are so vulnerable that just offering them money takes away their agency.
CHILDS: The first reaction is just a gut reaction, which doesn't help inform Al on design. The second reaction is that money can be coercive, that if people have no money and you offer them money to participate in a study, they might have to do the study, especially if you offer a huge amount, like a life-changing amount of money. It's just too compelling. They wouldn't have a choice.
ROSALSKY: This argument does strike Al as unreasonable.
ROTH: There's lots of jobs that we pay people to do because otherwise no one would do them. And you can earn a decent living being a meatpacker. But that's one of the things that bothers people. They say, why should we allow a market that will be mostly - most of the participants will be in the lower parts of the income range? And of course, that isn't very sympathetic to people who are lower income, right? In other words...
CHILDS: Right.
ROTH: ...We need jobs that people with lower income can get. That's why they have some income - is that there are jobs.
CHILDS: Luckily, there is a really obvious, easy solution to this objection - just solve poverty.
ROTH: There'd be a lot less repugnance to monetary transactions if there was no income inequality.
CHILDS: (Laughter).
ROTH: If you wanted to sell me your kidney, but we all had the same income and the same prospects, it just might not be a big thing.
CHILDS: OK, failing that, Al mentioned another way to create a kidney market, a way to get kidneys only from people who aren't that poor - a tax break.
ROTH: People who are wealthy enough to benefit from tax credits on income tax aren't the poorest of the poor. So it might be that the way to start paying kidney donors is to say, we will give you a tax break on everything after the first $10 million of income in the year that you - you know, and then only hedge fund managers would donate kidneys, and that would be repugnant.
CHILDS: But there's a twisted logic to it because at least they could - like, should something go awry in the surgery or in the...
ROTH: Yeah, they'd be fine. They'd be fine. Yeah.
ROSALSKY: Perfect. Like, now we have a few ideas of how to make this happen without paying people for kidneys. We could resolve income inequality, or we could just, you know, do a tax credit and receive only hedge fund manager kidneys. And - right? - there's something a little goofy about all this because these solutions are trying to account for objections that are just hard to design around 'cause those objections are at least partly stemming from some messy human feeling or intuition that just won't let us exchange things in the normal way.
CHILDS: So do you think there'll ever be a U.S. market for kidneys?
ROTH: Well, I think we're not doing a good job yet and that we ought to find a way to be more generous to donors so that we have more of them.
CHILDS: And what that looks like - you're open to suggestion?
ROTH: I'm open to suggestions.
Labels:
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Tuesday, February 6, 2024
Kidney exchange (and other bits of market design) in the New York Times
Peter Coy, the veteran New York Times economics columnist, writes about kidney exchange, after an interview/conversation sparked by a recent working paper of mine, Market Design and Maintenance. (He's a rare economic journalist who reads economists' papers.)
Here's his column, published yesterday afternoon:
The Economist Who Helped Patients Get New Kidneys, Feb. 5, 2024, 3:00 p.m. ET, By Peter Coy
He's also a rare interviewer: his column includes the names of more of my coauthors than I can recall in any other interview. In order of appearance: Tayfun Sonmez and Utku Unver, Frank Delmonico, Susan Saidman, Mike Rees (implicitly) when he names Mike's nonprofit Alliance for Paired Kidney Donation, and Elliott Peranson. Market design is, after all, a team sport.
Here's his concluding paragraph:
"What is it like to straddle the worlds of academia and practice? I asked. “It takes a lot of patience,” he said. “Market design is outward-facing. I learn from trying to persuade people who aren’t economists. It’s a lot of fun also. Sometimes you have to go beyond your completely reliable scientific knowledge.”
########
Earlier post:
Monday, December 11, 2023
Labels:
chains,
interview,
kidney exchange,
market design,
media,
residents and fellows
Tuesday, December 26, 2023
Market Design in El Mercurio--Chile's oldest newspaper
Last Tuesday, in Chile I was interviewed by Eduardo Olivares, the editor for Economics and Business of El Mercurio, which published the interview yesterday. We talked for an hour about market design generally, about how markets work when they're working well or working badly, and we spoke about school choice (where Chile is a leader) and transplantation (where it is not). The interview is behind a paywall, but below are some extracts (retranslated back into English via Google Translate).
On markets generally:
—Many people ask that “markets be free,” as has recently happened in Argentina. Should they be free?
“That's a complicated question. Markets should be free to function well, but they need conditions that allow them to function well. Having a free market does not necessarily mean a market without rules. A wheel can spin freely because it has a well-greased axle and bearings. A wheel by itself cannot turn very well, and the same goes for the market.”
—Who puts the oil in the wheel gears?
“That's the job of market design. Part of what makes markets work well are good market rules. The government has a role in regulating markets, concerning property rights and things like that. But on another level, entrepreneurs do things. Here in Santiago I [can]... call an Uber using the same app and rules I use in California. Uber is a marketplace for passengers and drivers. The rules can be made by both private organizations and the government.”
On prices:
—Do prices matter?
"A lot. “Prices are important to help allocate scarce resources, but also to make them less scarce.”
...
—When do they not matter?
“Let me start with when they matter a lot: in commodity markets. If you want to buy commodities, price is really the only thing that's happening. But when 'El Mercurio' wants to hire journalists, it doesn't limit itself to offering a salary: it wants it to be a good job, with special reporters. Price is important, but in other markets other things are also important. When you get a new job, the first question your friends ask you is not what the salary is, but who you work for.”
On school choice:
“Most markets are not commodity markets... In some markets we don't like prices to work at all. One of the places where Chile is a leader in market design is school choice: how people are assigned to schools and Chile has done a lot of work on this, although mainly for public schools.”
—What do you know about this system in Chile?
“Not long ago, before there was centralized and widespread school choice in Chile, there were the usual problems with decentralized school choice; That is, parents had to get up early to get in line, and they had a difficult process to register their children.”
—The new system has been criticized. Some claim it caused more people to choose the private system over the public school system. Isn't it similar to what is happening in New York, for example?
“There is something to that. In New York and Boston we also have a system that we call charter schools: free access schools, but organized by private entities, even if they are municipal schools. And they also have different standards. School choice is important, but it does not solve the problems of poverty or income inequality. Now, one of the reasons we have school choice in the United States and perhaps also in Chile is because we think that, otherwise, there is a danger that the poor will be condemned to send their children to poor schools. .
—Has there been any successful case in which parents can honestly rank the order of preference for the school they want their children to go to?
“In Chile, procedures are used that [make it] what game theorists call a dominant strategy to express true preferences. The [remaining] problem is not in creating systems that make it safe to express preferences, but in distributing the information so that people can form preferences sensibly. In the United States, the hardest families to reach are those who don't speak English at home, so it's sometimes difficult to communicate with them. And different families have different feelings about what kind of schools their children should attend.”
“The benefits of school choice come from the fact that some schools may be high quality for some children but not for others, so we would like children to attend the schools that are best quality for them.”
On kidneys:
—You are famous for the proposal that allowed the “kidney exchange.” Years after the first experience, what do you see now in this type of market?
“Kidney exchange is working quite well in the US, but it works especially well for patients who are not too difficult to match. Even in the US, a fairly large country, we have patients who are so difficult to match that we have trouble finding a kidney for them.”
—And in other countries?
“Smaller countries, with 20 million inhabitants, like Chile, would benefit if we could make national borders not so important. When we look at transplants per million inhabitants, Chile is in the middle of the world. But since it is a small country, when the total number of transplants performed is analyzed, Chile has very few. Kidneys are obtained from both deceased and living donors. In Chile, as in much of the world, the majority of transplants come from deceased donors. Kidney exchange would allow more transplants to come from living donors ... “Twenty million is not enough, so it would be very good to see in South America an exchange of kidneys that can cross between countries, which is not so easy to do.”
Equality of exchange and the role of perceptions
“One of the things that worries people when talking about transplants is that [they think it might be] a medical process that exploits the poor. Of course, the thing about kidney exchange is that each pair of people gives one kidney and receives one kidney. It is very egalitarian. I think kidney exchange is a good place to combat this notion that transplantation is like trafficking,” he notes.
—Notions, perceptions are very important. Many people think of “exchange” as the exchange of securities in the stock market.
“That's right, but not every exchange involves money. One of the discussions about money in the world that is taking place in the European Union at the moment is about payment to blood plasma donors. In the EU, only Germany, Austria, the Czech Republic and Hungary pay blood plasma donors. And those are the only EU countries that have as much blood plasma as they need. The others have to import everything, and they do it from the United States. The United States is the Saudi Arabia of blood plasma (…) The World Health Organization says that plasma must be obtained in each country, and from unpaid donors. You have to be self-sufficient... an economist finds that a little funny. Blood is a matter of life and death. “When there is a pandemic, we do not tell countries that they must be self-sufficient [in vaccines].”
—When we talk about these exchanges of blood plasma and kidneys, school choice systems, we are talking about the same idea: coincident or paired markets. But the concept of the market has been so questioned, especially by some political groups, for so long...
"It's true. Now, kidney exchange is special because money doesn't change hands. Money changes hands to get medical care, you have to pay doctors, nurses and hospitals. But we are not talking about buying kidneys from donors, but rather that, at the patient level, each pair receives a kidney and donates a kidney. It is radically egalitarian. Many people who think about markets may not think of it as a market, but I think that's a mistake. Many markets are not just about money… we would worry much less about markets if income and wealth inequality did not exist. “What worries us about markets is that some people are poor and some people are rich, and markets seem like a way to give the rich an advantage.”
“There is no doubt that being rich is better than being poor. The real question is what do we do to alleviate poverty. Making it invisible is not the same as alleviating it. One of the reasons I think many countries don't allow blood and plasma donors to be paid is because they don't like the way that looks. It reminds them that some people would like to get some money and would donate blood for it.”
Apparently, according to the caption, I'm "affable and smiling" (although not in this picture:)
I was in Chile to participate in what turned out to be a wonderful workshop on market design at the University of Chile, organized by Itai Ashlagi, José Correa, and Juan Escobar.
Some related recent posts:
Saturday, December 23, 2023
Market design: some press accounts in Chile
Wednesday, December 20, 2023
Update (Dec. 27): Here's an account of my closing public talk from the U. Chile's Center for Mathematical Modeling, one of the hosts of the market design workshop.
And here's a picture at the close, including some of those mentioned above: At my far left in the picture is José Correa, who in addition to his other roles is Vice Rector for Information Technologies. Next to him is Alejandra Mizala, prorrector (provost) of the university. Next to her (immediately to my left) is Rector of the University of Chile, Rosa Devés, and immediately to my right is market designer and director of the MIPP Millennium Institute, Juan Escobar. Next to him is Héctor RamÃrez, director of the Center for Mathematical Modeling. And next to him (at my far right) is professor Rafael Epstein who (along with Correa, Escobar, and his daughter Natalie Epstein) has been involved with school choice in Chile, among other things.
Labels:
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kidney exchange,
market design,
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Wednesday, October 11, 2023
Saturday, September 23, 2023
Big ideas at Stanford; interviews by Ran Abramitzky
Big Ideas
Stanford’s Nobel Laureates and MacArthur “Genius” Fellows talk with H&S Senior Associate Dean Ran Abramitzky about their award-winning research and their personal and professional paths.
Open to the Stanford community.
Autumn quarter (Thursdays, 3 – 4:20 pm, at CEMEX. The talk
series is open to the Stanford community, and is also offered to undergrads as
a 1-unit course (syllabus attached).
9/28: Market Design with Alvin Roth
10/12:
Causal Inference with Guido Imbens
10/26:
Pediatric Neuro-oncology with Michelle Monje
11/2:
Auctions with Paul Milgrom and Robert Wilson
11/9:
Experimental Physics with Monika Schleier-Smith
11/16:
Bioorthogonal Chemistry with Carolyn Bertozzi
11/30:
Natural Language Processing with Dan Jurafsky
12/7:
Innovation with Heidi Williams
Tuesday, August 1, 2023
Ted Groves interviewed by Sandeep Baliga (video)
Ted Groves reflects on his career and collaborations, including his famous work with John Ledyard
Optimal allocation of public goods: A solution to the" free rider" problem
T Groves, J Ledyard - Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1977 - JSTOR
Thursday, July 13, 2023
Laurie Lee interviews me about kidney exchange, repugnance, and more (podcast)
Laurie Lee interviews me in her podcast Donor Diaries.
Donor Diaries
https://www.buzzsprout.com/1748941/13094958?t=35 (You don’t have to log in; just click on “Listen Now”.)
***********
Here is her written description:
"Exchanging kidneys is a complicated process that involves multiple collaborations between kidney patients, living donors, transplant centers, insurance companies, airlines and more. It’s truly remarkable if you stop to think about the number of people and organizations that need to come together to make 1 paired exchange possible. We only started exchanging kidneys between non-compatible pairs a little over 20 years ago, so it’s a somewhat new process. Have you ever wondered how this was made possible?
"Meet Nobel Laureate Al Roth who is an economist and Stanford University professor. Al designs markets. He’s one of the prominent players who has made kidney exchange possible. In a nutshell, his work has revolutionized kidney exchange around the world by using economic theory to make kidneys more available.
"In October 2012, Al was the co-recipient of the 2012 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences, together with Lloyd S. Shapley, for “ the theory of stable allocations and the practice of market design."
"Al Roth is well known for his application of economics to real world problems. In this podcast episode we touch a wide range of topics ranging from paired exchanges, prostitution, surrogacy, and more. All of these markets are examples of repugnant markets. Kidney Donation can be characterized as a repugnant market, and Al will tell us all about it!
Links:
Labels:
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kidney exchange,
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repugnance
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