The first issue of the Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design is now online here: http://www.mechanism-design.org/arch/v001-1/jMID-vol1(1)-01.pdf
Showing posts with label mechanism design. Show all posts
Showing posts with label mechanism design. Show all posts
Saturday, January 28, 2017
Saturday, December 13, 2014
Herve Moulin at The Adam Smith Business School of the University of Glasgow
The University of Glasgow highlights the work of Herve Moulin:
Economists as Social Engineers: Professor Hervé Moulin, Donald J Robertson Chair in Economics at the University of Glasgow, explains mechanism design.
Hervé Moulin graduated in 1971 from the Ecole Normale Superieure in Paris, and received his Ph.D. in mathematics from the Universite de Paris in 1975. Before joining the University of Glasgow as a Professor (Donald J Robertson Chair) of Economics, he has taught at the Ecole Nationale de Ia Statistique et Administration Economique in Paris, University of Paris at Dauphine, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Duke University, and Rice University. His research has been supported in part by seven grants from the National Science Foundation (USA). He has written five books and over 100 peer-reviewed articles.
Economists as Social Engineers: Professor Hervé Moulin, Donald J Robertson Chair in Economics at the University of Glasgow, explains mechanism design.
Hervé Moulin graduated in 1971 from the Ecole Normale Superieure in Paris, and received his Ph.D. in mathematics from the Universite de Paris in 1975. Before joining the University of Glasgow as a Professor (Donald J Robertson Chair) of Economics, he has taught at the Ecole Nationale de Ia Statistique et Administration Economique in Paris, University of Paris at Dauphine, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Duke University, and Rice University. His research has been supported in part by seven grants from the National Science Foundation (USA). He has written five books and over 100 peer-reviewed articles.
Monday, August 11, 2014
Stanley Reiter 1925-2014
Ricky Vohra brings the news: Stanley Reiter (1925-2014)
He was a pioneer of mechanism design, and an academic institution builder, at Northwestern, and at Purdue before that.
He was a pioneer of mechanism design, and an academic institution builder, at Northwestern, and at Purdue before that.
Thursday, September 26, 2013
Study mechanism design online with Jason Hartline
Jason Hartline writes:
Please share the following announcement:
*** Online
Self-study on Mechanism Design and Approximation ***
To enroll: go to
course page on Piazza and enroll as a student.
Synopsis. This course is a self-study course based on the
manuscript "Mechanism Design and Approximation" which is based on a
graduate course that has been developed at Northwestern over the past five
years. Over the fall quarter we will work through roughly one chapter per week.
The week will start with students reading and discussing the material of the
chapter and it will conclude with students working together to solve and write
up solutions to the chapter exercises.
The textbook is in final draft and your comments and suggestions will
help improve the book for future students.
Excerpt from Chapter 1: Our world is an interconnected
collection of economic and computational systems. Within such a system,
individuals optimize their actions to achieve their own, perhaps selfish,
goals; and the system combines these actions with its basic laws to produce an
outcome. Some of these systems perform well, e.g., the national residency
matching program which assigns medical students to residency programs in
hospitals, e.g., auctions for online advertising on Internet search engines;
and some of these systems perform poorly, e.g., financial markets during the
2008 meltdown, e.g., gridlocked transportation networks. The success and
failure of these systems depends on the basic laws governing the system.
Financial regulation can prevent disastrous market meltdowns, congestion
protocols can prevent gridlock in transportation networks, and market and
auction design can lead to mechanisms for allocating and exchanging goods or
services that yield higher profits or increased value to society.
This text focuses on a combined computational and
economic theory for the study and design of mechanisms. A central theme will be
the tradeoff between optimality and other desirable properties such as
simplicity, robustness, computational tractability, and practicality. This
tradeoff will be quantified by a theory of approximation which measures the
loss of performance of a simple, robust, and practical approximation mechanism
in comparison to the complicated and delicate optimal mechanism. The theory
provided does not necessarily suggest mechanisms that should be deployed in
practice, instead, it pinpoints salient features of good mechanisms that should
be a starting point for the practitioner.
Tuesday, September 6, 2011
Mechanism design conference: Copenhagen, Sept. 6-9.
WORKSHOP: NEW TRENDS IN MECHANISM DESIGN, Sept 6-9, 2011.
"A main focus of the workshop will be contributions from computer science to the field of mechanism design."
Keynote Speakers:
"A main focus of the workshop will be contributions from computer science to the field of mechanism design."
Keynote Speakers:
- Rick Antle, Yale School of Management, Yale University
- Peter Cramton, University of Maryland
- Uriel Feige, the Weizmann Institute
- Jason Hartline, Northwestern University
- Nicole Immorlica, Northwestern University
- Hervé Moulin, Rice University
- Tim Roughgarden, Stanford University
Wednesday, December 30, 2009
Dan McFadden salutes Hurwicz and Laffont
Daniel McFadden, The human side of mechanism design: a tribute to Leo Hurwicz and Jean-Jacque Laffont,
Rev. Econ. Design (2009) 13:77–100
(I can't help noticing something about the mechanism of economics publishing: this paper was Received: 26 June 2007 / Accepted: 30 January 2009.)
HT: David Warsh
Rev. Econ. Design (2009) 13:77–100
(I can't help noticing something about the mechanism of economics publishing: this paper was Received: 26 June 2007 / Accepted: 30 January 2009.)
HT: David Warsh
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)