Showing posts with label auctions. Show all posts
Showing posts with label auctions. Show all posts

Friday, January 12, 2018

Bichler on market design: textbook from Cambridge U. Press


Martin Bichler has a new textbook on market design, focused on auctions and linear programming:

Market Design A Linear Programming Approach to Auctions and Matching

  • Date Published: December 2017 

Wednesday, July 26, 2017

Spectrum auctions explained (by Scott Kominers in Bloomberg)

Explaining economics is something economists should do more of (especially in light of some of the silly things written about economics in the popular press by people who misunderstand what they are writing about).  Here's a good example of good explanation, written clearly, by an expert:

To Improve Wireless Networks, Auction the Airwaves:
People are watching TV on devices, so mobile companies need more spectrum and broadcasters need less. Here's how to get there.
By Scott Duke Kominers

Monday, July 10, 2017

Economics and computer science of a radio spectrum reallocation in the PNAS

A PNAS article on the recent incentive auction, by its design team.

Economics and computer science of a radio spectrum reallocation
Kevin Leyton-Brown, Paul Milgrom, and Ilya Segal
 Early Edition >  doi: 10.1073/pnas.1701997114

Abstract
The recent “incentive auction” of the US Federal Communications Commission was the first auction to reallocate radio frequencies between two different kinds of uses: from broadcast television to wireless Internet access. The design challenge was not just to choose market rules to govern a fixed set of potential trades but also, to determine the broadcasters’ property rights, the goods to be exchanged, the quantities to be traded, the computational procedures, and even some of the performance objectives. An essential and unusual challenge was to make the auction simple enough for human participants while still ensuring that the computations would be tractable and capable of delivering nearly efficient outcomes.

Conflict of interest statement: P.M. led the team of consultants on behalf of Auctionomics, which was responsible for advising the Federal Communications Commission on the design of the incentive auction. K.L.-B. and I.S. were the two other members of the Auctionomics consulting team.


Sunday, April 30, 2017

Paul Milgrom on the history of spectrum auctions


How obscure science led to spectrum auctions that connected the world
BY PAUL MILGROM,  04/30/17 07:00 AM EDT

"The incentive auction I helped design is an innovation building on decades of economic theory research on auctions dating back to the Nobel-prize winning work of William Vickrey and to work by my own research advisor, Robert Wilson, in the 1960s with funding from the Atomic Energy Commission. What interest did this Cold War era agency have in theoretical auctions? Well, nothing, but they were highly interested in advancing the field of game theory – a then obscure branch of mathematics used in economics that aims to understand how individuals strategize and act in competitive situations.


Over more than 30 years, Wilson, I, and others continued to advance this seemingly esoteric field, until the FCC issued its first proposed rulemaking on developing a spectrum auction that referenced our work. Together with Preston McAfee, who had independently been developing similar ideas, we worked with the FCC to design the first spectrum auction in 1994. The simultaneous multiple round auction we invented has since been used for dozens of spectrum auctions here and around the world. Collectively, these have been called the greatest auction in history, delivering more than $60 billion for the federal government since the early 1990s and enabling the robust wireless communications we enjoy today.

In 2014, the three of us received a Golden Goose Award for our work in this obscure field of social science and its unexpected application to spectrum auctions. None of us envisioned such an auction when we began our study, we were driven by a curiosity in human behavior and markets, not data flying around the country. But the auctions we designed have nonetheless helped change the way we all communicate, consume media, and do our work.

The auction that closed last month was the first of its kind, both because it was two-sided, engaging both TV broadcasters as sellers and mobile operators as buyers, bidding in a single auction, and because the choices of which TV broadcast rights to buy and how to reassign continuing broadcasters needed to respect more than a million constraints to avoid interference among uses. Designing such a complex process brought together a new generation of researchers in both economic and computer science.

When the dust had settled, we were able to repurpose channels 38-51 from broadcast TV uses to free 70 megahertz of spectrum for the growing mobile broadband sector (plus 14 megahertz for wireless microphones). This will enable continuing innovation in broadband and bring better coverage to rural communities. The auction also raised nearly $20 billion in revenue, with more than $7 billion to federal coffers to be used for debt reduction.

Our work on auction design is just one example of how research that may sound obscure or even silly has often benefited society. The Golden Goose Award was founded five years ago to celebrate stories like ours, and it has recognized colleagues of mine like Al Roth whose studies of how to make perfect marriage matches now informs medical residency assignments and kidney exchanges, among many other researchers. In each case, a small investment of federal money returned huge benefits to our nation. And all led to outcomes the researchers never would have predicted when they started."

Sunday, April 23, 2017

The FCC Spectrum Incentive Auction: conference at Duke

Here's a chance to hear about one of the most exciting auctions of modern times...

The FCC Spectrum Incentive Auction: Lessons for the Future

Friday, May 12, 2017, 8:30 a.m. - 1:30 p.m.
Duke University's "Duke in DC" offices
1201 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Suite 500 | Washington, DC 20004
The FCC is concluding the most complex auction in history, the culmination of a decade-long planning process for moving spectrum from broadcast to mobile broadband uses. On the morning of May 12, The Center for Innovation Policy at Duke Law will hold a half-day conference that will identify lessons from this auction for spectrum policy, government disposition of assets (whether of spectrum or other resources), and the future of innovation policy generally. The conference will be at Duke in DC, 1201 Pennsylvania Ave., NW, Suite 500, Washington, DC. The program is free and open to the public; due to limited space, registration is required (see the link below).
Speakers include: Lawrence Ausubel, Univ. of Maryland, Power Auctions; Jonathan Chaplin, New Street Research; Paul de Sa, Quadra Partners; Gary Epstein, FCC; Karla Hoffman, George Mason Univ.; Allan Ingraham, Economists Inc.; Edward Lazarus, Tribune Media; Michael Ostrovsky, Stanford Graduate School of Business; Preston Padden, Boulder Thinking; Charla Rath, VerizonDorothy Robyn, former Commissioner at GSA; Gregory Rosston, Stanford Univ.; David Salant, Auction Technologies; Steve Sharkey, T-Mobile; and Ilya Segal, Stanford Univ.
PRELIMINARY AGENDA
8:30 AMIntroduction
8:35 AMAuction Design
9:45 AMAuction Implementation
11:15 AMAuction Participation and
Future Directions
12:30 PMAdjourn

Thursday, October 27, 2016

Re-auction of Kenneth Wilson's, 1982 Nobel medal for Physics

The Nobel Prize medal awarded to physicist Kenneth G. Wilson in 1982 is up for auction, again. (Apparently its hard to pick an appropriate reservation price...)

Here's the current auction page:
Nobel Prize Awarded to Physicist Kenneth G. Wilson in 1982 -- One of the Kingpins of Quantum Physics, OCTOBER 2016 AUCTION ENDS THURSDAY, OCTOBER 27TH, 5PM PACIFIC
Minimum Bid:$95,000


Here's the previous auction (from the same auction house), which apparently didn't draw any bids:
MAY 2016 AUCTION ENDS THURSDAY, MAY 26TH, 5PM PACIFIC
Minimum Bid:$450,000
Final prices include buyers premium.:$0
Number Bids:0

****************
Update: this auction apparently didn't draw any bids either:
Current Bidding
Minimum Bid:$220,000
Final prices include buyers premium.:$0
Number Bids:0

Auction closed on Thursday, October 27, 2016.



Tuesday, October 11, 2016

John F. Nash, Jr.'s 1994 Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences medal and memorabilia: Auction at Sotheby's

 Here's the auction page:
John F. Nash, Jr.'s 1994 Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences 
17 OCTOBER 2016 | 2:00 PM EDT | NEW YORK,
Estimate  2,500,000 — 4,000,000  USD.

There are some essays and paragraphs from colleagues and relatives at the auction link.
Here's a 3 minute video from Sotheby's, advertising the auction...



***************
Update:
I'm guessing that this results page means that the auction closed without a sale (perhaps because the reserve price was not reached...):
http://www.sothebys.com/en/auctions/results.results.sale.pdf/2016/john-f-nash-jrs-1994-nobel-memorial-n09586.pdf

JOHN F. NASH, JR.'S 1994 NOBEL PRIZE IN ECONOMIC SCIENCES October 17, 2016 Sale Number N09586 Sale Total (Including Buyer's Premium) 0 USD

Saturday, September 3, 2016

Sotheby's to Offer John F. Nash, Jr.'s 1994 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences

Sotheby's to Offer John F. Nash, Jr.'s 1994 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences

"For John F. Nash, the accolade of the Nobel Prize was a transformative event, particularly in the context of his struggles with mental illness. During an interview at a 2004 meeting of Nobel Laureates in Economic Sciences, Nash acknowledged that the Nobel Prize “had a tremendous impact on my life, more than on the life of most Prize winners because I was in an unusual situation. I was unemployed at the time...And so I was in a position to be very much influenced by the recognition of my earlier work...I had become widely known, but in a sense it wasn’t officially recognized. I was quoted very frequently in the literature of economics and mathematics, but it’s quite different to get official recognition”.

With its gold medal in its original red morocco case, accompanying calligraphic diploma with an original watercolor drawing by Bengt Landin, the original box and attaché case for the diploma, and official letters from the Nobel Foundation and the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, John F. Nash, Jr.'s 1994 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences is one of the most complete documentations of the Nobel Prize to ever be offered for auction (estimate $2.5/4 million)."

Friday, April 29, 2016

Zurich celebrates Tuomas Sandholm: Symposium on Electronic Market Design

A symposium and more in honor of Tuomas Sandholm:


Location

The symposium will take place at the Department of Education of the University of Zurich (building KAB), at Kantonsschulstrasse 3, 8001 Zurich in room G-01 (interactive map).
A map is available below.

Talks

TimeSpeakerTitle
14:00 - 15:00Prof. Tuomas Sandholm
Carnegie Mellon University, USA
Keynote: Journey and new results in combinatorial auctions, automated mechanism design for revenue maximization, and kidney exchanges
15:00 - 15:45Prof. Martin Bichler
TU Munich, Germany
All models are wrong, but some are useful: About spectrum auction design and challenges in market design
15:45 - 16:15Coffee Break
16:15 - 17:00Prof. Sven Seuken
University of Zurich, Switzerland
Designing better combinatorial auctions: Algorithms, incentives, and bidding languages
17:00 - 17:45Prof. Axel Ockenfels
University of Cologne, Germany
Engineering trust on eBay

Thursday, April 28, 2016

Stanford celebrates Paul Milgrom and the Incentive Auction "Dream Team"

New on the SIEPR webpage, by Krysten Crawford: To secure a mobile future, Stanford expert creates an auction like no other (the url is more informative than the headline: http://siepr.stanford.edu/highlights/secure-mobile-future-stanford-expert-paul-milgrom-creates-auction).

"More than two decades ago, Stanford economist Paul Milgrom played a key role in the design of the first wireless spectrum auction. Since then, the framework he helped create has been used in more than 80 auctions in the United States, generated billions of dollars in government licensing fees — and been replicated around the world.

"So it made sense for the Federal Communications Commission to tap Milgrom in 2011 when the agency needed a new way to free up more broadband for mobile devices. It took him and a small band of fellow economists and computer scientists 18 months to design the auction, which finally opened last month after years of regulatory procedures, software development and presentations to potential bidders.

"When the auction ends later this year, the country’s wireless landscape will never look the same.
...
"For help, Milgrom pulled together an interdisciplinary “dream team” of top experts in economics and computer science: Jonathan Levin, also a SIEPR senior fellow and faculty member in economics; Ilya Segal, a professor of economics at Stanford; and Kevin Leyton-Brown, a computer scientist at the University of British Columbia who earned his PhD from Stanford."

Tuesday, April 5, 2016

FCC incentive auction


USA Today covers the earliest stage of the FCC's incentive auction: FCC's complex incentive auction could net more than $30 billion

"The most sophisticated and complex spectrum auction ever conducted by the Federal Communications Commission is officially underway.

"When the entire process comes to an end more than three years from now, big wireless carriers that provide most of our smartphone access should have more bandwidth to delivery services to mobile-hungry consumers.

"TV broadcasters by Tuesday night must have made official their intentions to accept the FCC's opening price for the rights to the spectrum they currently use for digital TV broadcasts. Once the agency knows how much spectrum can be made available in this "reverse auction," then, in a few months, the FCC will open up the bidding in the "forward auction" in which companies such as AT&T and Verizon can bid on the reallocated spectrum in each of 400-plus localities."

Sunday, January 31, 2016

The FCC's upcoming 2016 Incentive Auction: SIEPR policy brief by Greg Rosston and Addrzej Skrzpacz


Moving from Broadcast Television to Mobile Broadband: The FCC’s 2016 Incentive Auction


Gregory Rosston, Andrzej Skrzypacz

Wednesday, May 27, 2015

Leon Lederman's 1988 Nobel Physics medal up for auction--closing May 28

Another Nobel medal up for auction--this could be the start of a trend...
Nobel Prize Awarded to Physicist Leon Lederman in 1988 -- Won for His Groundbreaking Discovery of a New Atomic Particle -- One of Only 10 Nobel Prizes Ever to Be Auctioned

The 1988 Nobel Prize in Physics, awarded to particle physicist Leon Lederman for his discovery of the muon neutrino, a particle 200 times the size of an electron. Lederman, along with colleagues Melvin Schwartz and Jack Steinberger, found the muon neutrino in 1962 while using a high energy particle accelerator. They discovered that in some cases a muon (rather than an electron) was produced, illuminating the existence of a new atomic particle. Lederman was also instrumental in the discovery of the bottom quark in 1977, and was the champion of the Superconducting Super Collider. His popular 1993 book ''The God Particle: If the Universe is The Answer, What is The Question'' was released to critical acclaim. This Nobel Prize is made of 18kt gold, plated in 24k gold, as were all Nobel Prize medals awarded after 1980. Medal features the relief portrait of Alfred Nobel to front, with his name and the years of his birth and death. Verso features a relief of the Goddess Isis, whose veil is held up by a woman who represents the genius of science. Encircling the medal are the words ''Inventas vitam juvat excoluisse per artes'', translating to ''And they who bettered life on earth by their newly found mastery''. Lederman's name and 1988 in Roman numerals are engraved on a plaque below the relief of the two women, with ''Reg. Acad. Scient. Suec.'' also written, an abbreviation for The Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences. Etched upon the medal is the name of Erik Lindberg, designer of the Nobel medal. Housed in the original red leather case with Leon Lederman's name gilt stamped. Medal weighs 173 grams or just over 6 oz. and measures 2.5'' in diameter, consistent with the original Nobel Prize awarded in 1988. Case measures 5.5'' x 5.5'' x 1''. Presented in near fine condition, and with an LOA from Leon Lederman.
Nobel Prize Awarded to Physicist Leon Lederman in 1988 -- Won for His Groundbreaking Discovery of a New Atomic Particle -- One of Only 10 Nobel Prizes Ever to Be AuctionedNobel Prize Awarded to Physicist Leon Lederman in 1988 -- Won for His Groundbreaking Discovery of a New Atomic Particle -- One of Only 10 Nobel Prizes Ever to Be AuctionedNobel Prize Awarded to Physicist Leon Lederman in 1988 -- Won for His Groundbreaking Discovery of a New Atomic Particle -- One of Only 10 Nobel Prizes Ever to Be AuctionedNobel Prize Awarded to Physicist Leon Lederman in 1988 -- Won for His Groundbreaking Discovery of a New Atomic Particle -- One of Only 10 Nobel Prizes Ever to Be Auctioned
Nobel Prize Awarded to Physicist Leon Lederman in 1988 -- Won for His Groundbreaking Discovery of a New Atomic Particle -- One of Only 10 Nobel Prizes Ever to Be AuctionedNobel Prize Awarded to Physicist Leon Lederman in 1988 -- Won for His Groundbreaking Discovery of a New Atomic Particle -- One of Only 10 Nobel Prizes Ever to Be Auctioned
Click above for larger image.
BIDDING
Current Bidding
Minimum Bid:$325,000
Current Bid:$0
Number Bids:0
1 Day(s) 9h : 46m : 33s Until Bid By Time
Please register or login if you want to bid.
**********
Update: with 22 and a half hours to go, a bid:
Current Bidding
Minimum Bid:$325,000
Current Bid:$325,000
Number Bids:1

Saturday, March 7, 2015

Sniping on eBay, revisited



Is Sniping A Problem For Online Auction Markets?

Matthew BackusTom Blake, Dimitriy V. Masterov, Steven Tadelis

NBER Working Paper No. 20942
Issued in February 2015
NBER Program(s):   IO 
A common complaint about online auctions for consumer goods is the presence of "snipers," who place bids in the final seconds of sequential ascending auctions with predetermined ending times. The literature conjectures that snipers are best-responding to the existence of "incremental" bidders that bid up to their valuation only as they are outbid. Snipers aim to catch these incremental bidders at a price below their reserve, with no time to respond. As a consequence, these incremental bidders may experience regret when they are outbid at the last moment at a price below their reservation value. We measure the effect of this experience on a new buyer's propensity to participate in future auctions. We show the effect to be causal using a carefully selected subset of auctions from eBay.com and instrumental variables estimation strategy. Bidders respond to sniping quite strongly and are between 4 and 18 percent less likely to return to the platform.

Thursday, February 26, 2015

Kuznets' Nobel Prize medal auction

The auction of the medal that Simon Kuznets received with his Nobel Prize in Economics in 1971 ended this evening.

The auction had a minimum bid of $150,000, and a soft close, i.e. the closing time was extended for 30 minutes (I think) beyond the last bid. All the bids were made on the last day, and the auction was extended for several bids before reaching the final price of $385,848.

Sunday, February 1, 2015

Penn State honors Bob Marshall

Dr. Robert C. Marshall Named Distinguished Professor

"Robert C. Marshall, Department of Economics recently was named Distinguished Professor by Penn State. Distinguished professors have demonstrated significant leadership in raising the standards of the University with respect to teaching, research or creative activity, and service; and contributed significantly to the education of students who subsequently have achieved recognition of excellence in their fields.
Dr. Marshall is Head of the Department of Economics and Co-Director of the Center for the Study of Auctions, Procurements, and Competition Policy at Penn State. He is a recognized leader in the areas of industrial organization, collusion, applied game theory, auctions, and procurements. His 2011 Michigan Law Review paper, “Plus Factors in Agreements in Antitrust Law” won the Jerry S. Cohen Memorial Fund Writing Award for best antitrust scholarship of 2011.
His book co-authored with Leslie M. Marx is titled The Economics of Collusion: Cartels and Bidding Rings (MIT Press, 2012). He has served on two panels for the National Research Council and he is on the editorial board of the Journal of Antitrust Enforcement."

Wednesday, October 29, 2014

Traditional auction houses move online

Competition, like similarity, isn't as symmetric as we think. Where once eBay competed with established auctioneers like Christies and Sotheby's, now they are playing catchup in the market that eBay pioneered.

Carol Vogel in the NY Times has the story: Gone, in an Instant Auction

"Right now it’s possible to click on Christies.com and bid on a Warhol drawing, a Helmut Newton photograph and an ostrich Hermès Birkin bag. Often there is a selection of rare wines to be purchased there, too.
And last year, the auction house introduced a buy-it-now feature echoing eBay that offers a head-spinning variety of watches that can be snapped up instantly. “The main objective here is the acquisition of new clients,” said Steven P. Murphy, Christie’s chief executive. “We’re building our online business the old-fashioned way, brick by brick.”
So far the auction house says it has invested $50 million in hiring experts and building its own infrastructure. It dipped its toes in online-only auctions in 2011 with a sale of Elizabeth Taylor’s clothes and jewelry. That effort ramped up considerably last year when Christie’s held 51 online-only sales. Officials there said that number was increasing by 50 percent this year.
Both Christie’s and its rival Sotheby’s introduced online bidding during their live auctions about four years ago. Their success, coupled with the realization that a new population of online shoppers is waiting to be tapped around the world, is what is driving their focus on online-only sales.
While Christie’s is promoting its homegrown e-commerce business, Sotheby’s is taking a different route. In July it announced a partnership with eBay. In the next few months Sotheby’s plans to broadcast most of its live auctions on a new area of eBay’s website. And over time Sotheby’s and eBay will add more options for shoppers, including online-only sales. Sotheby’s hopes to lure eBay’s nearly 150 million customers into being as comfortable buying a 19th-century dining room table or Damien Hirst print as they are a new suitcase or a pair of sneakers.
“Both auction houses are racing to catch up with luxury retailing that has been a huge success online,” said Josh Baer, an art adviser who publishes the Baerfaxt, an industry newsletter, and who was hired by eBay last year to help shape its art programs. “It is now clear to everyone in the art business that it is no longer if online sales of art can happen, but who executes them best.”

Monday, October 27, 2014

Microeconomics and computer science at Cornell: auctions and privacy

Gates Hall isn't a bad name for a building in which to schedule a seminar in which economics and computers are the subject...

Joint Microeconomics and Computer Science Workshop, Aaron Roth

Mon, 10/27/2014 - 4:00pm

Aaron Roth

University of Pennsylvania

310 Gates Hall

Downloads

Event Categories: Microeconomic Theory
Private and (Asymptotically) Truthful Combinatorial Auctions


Aaron Roth
Monday, October 27, 2014
4:00pm 310 Gates Hall
Abstract:
Consider the following problem: a large public electricity provider (say, in California) faces a situation where demand for electricity might, without intervention, rise above the utility's ability to generate power. Rather than resorting to rolling brown-outs, however, a forward-thinking ballot initiative has given the utility the ability to shut off the air-conditioners of individual buildings remotely. Using this ability, the utility hopes, they might be able to coordinate shut-offs so that nobody is ever uncomfortable (say, guaranteeing that every apartment's air conditioner runs during some 10 minute interval of every hour in which the apartment is occupied), but so that peak electricity usage never rises above peak power production.
While this combinatorial optimization approach to the problem might be preferable to rolling brown outs, it introduces a privacy concern: the utility will now be making decisions as a function of when customers report they are at home, which can be highly sensitive information. Is there a way to solve this problem so that no coalition of customers j != i can learn about the schedule of customer i? Moreover, can we pair such a solution with a schedule of electricity rates so that no player has more than a vanishing incentive to misreport their demands?

We show that the answer is "yes" to this problem, and to a broad class of welfare maximization problems that can be posed as convex programs. We give a method to compute near optimal solutions to such problems under the formal constraint of ``differential privacy'', while giving Walrasian-equilibrium like item/resource pricings which result in truth-telling as an asymptotically dominant strategy, as the size of the economy grows large (in a mild way). 

Friday, October 3, 2014

Combinatorial clock auctions

My colleagues Jon Levin and Andy Skrzypacz have an NBER paper on combinatorial clock auctions of the kind proposed by Ausubel, Cramton and Milgrom (2006), which are becoming widely used outside of the U.S. to auction spectrum. They point to it's multiplicity of equilibria, in some of which bidders can act to raise their competitors' payments without changing their own, as a source of potential problems, some of which may have been observed in practice,

Are Dynamic Vickrey Auctions Practical?: Properties of the Combinatorial Clock Auction

Jonathan LevinAndrzej Skrzypacz

NBER Working Paper No. 20487
Issued in September 2014
NBER Program(s):   IO 
The combinatorial clock auction is becoming increasingly popular for large-scale spectrum awards and other uses, replacing more traditional ascending or clock auctions. We describe some surprising properties of the auction, including a wide range of ex post equilibria with demand expansion, demand reduction and predation. These outcomes arise because of the way the auction separates allocation and pricing, so that bidders are asked to make decisions that cannot possibly affect their own auction outcome. Our results obtain in a standard homogenous good setting where bidders have well-behaved linear demand curves, and suggest some practical difficulties with dynamic implementations of the Vickrey auction.