AER Papers and Proceedings: 2 sections on market design

In January I blogged about these two sessions at the AEA meeting, and now they are published, except for the paper by Milgrom and Segal, which ran into some kind of embargo before the still to be conducted FCC auction...
[The links below go to a page that requires AEA membership to fully access, but you can see the article abstracts by clicking on "Show Article Details"]

Frontiers of Market Design

Implementation Details for Frequent Batch Auctions: Slowing Down Markets to the Blink of an Eye (#72) Eric Budish, Peter Cramton and John Shim

Full-Text Access | Supplementary Materials

Getting More Organs for Transplantation (#73) Judd B. Kessler and Alvin E. Roth

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Mechanism Design in Large Games: Incentives and Privacy (#74) Michael Kearns, Mallesh M. Pai, Aaron Roth and Jonathan Ullman

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Investment Incentives in Labor Market Matching (#75) John William Hatfield, Fuhito Kojima and Scott Duke Kominers

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Market Design for Auction Markets

The VCG Auction in Theory and Practice (#76) Hal R. Varian and Christopher Harris

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Market Design and the Evolution of the Combinatorial Clock Auction (#77) Lawrence M. Ausubel and Oleg V. Baranov

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The Continuous Combinatorial Auction Architecture (#78) Charles R. Plott, Hsing-Yang Lee and Travis Maron

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